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THE GOLDEN AGE OF GREECE.

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THE GOLDEN AGE

A Study of Warfare in Relation to Survival and Progress

BY WILFRID D. HAMBLY

DURING recent years there has been so much popularising of science that phrases such as "Struggle for Existence," and "Survival of the Fittest" have become current coinage for an exchange of ideas relating to civilization and progress. Nature has been generally accepted as "Red in tooth and claw," while the whole world in times ancient and modern, has been represented as a battle ground for human, plant and animal life. No doubt this is largely true, for the record of the rocks reveals many a romantic episode in the unfolding of various forms of life over unmeasured millions of years. Feeble were the beginnings in the form of microscopic plants and plant-like animals. Then followed a series of changes in which fishes, amphibians, reptiles, birds, mammals, and lastly Man appeared. Every tropical forest is today a battle-ground. The sand dunes around America's great lakes are a striking object lesson which illustrates the ceaseless fight between several forms of vegetation, each of which is competing for the primary necessities of sunlight, warmth, and moisture.

That Man had to play his part in this Armageddon there is no doubt; nor were his competitive efforts limited to inter-racial combat. Through slow cycles of time climatic changes brought the ice cap further from the Poles. In the northern hemisphere the presence of boulder clay, striations on the rocks, and the scattering of masses of stone called erratics, tell the tale of Nature's enmity toward Man. In intervening epochs between the glaciations he established himself, only to be ousted again when a more rigorous climate overtook him. Much has been said of the "Fall of Man," but Henry Drummond was nearer the mark when he wrote of the

"Ascent of Man." A fair-minded perusal of human history and pre-history emphasises the heroism of mankind in a struggle against adversities of nature. The Eskimo illustrate Man's ability to make a good cultural response to harsh environmental conditions. The Arunta of Central Australia have met their difficulties of existence with an ingenuity which is remarkable. Now, in the most recent phases of combat, the engineer has to solve problems of irrigation, and the construction of flexible steel dwellings which will withstand the tremors of earthquake and the blast of the tornado. Conquest of the plant and animal world is well advanced by application of the experimental results of Mendel. Great advances have been made in surgery and parasitology; though the conclusion that a prolongation of life is progress, may be fallacious.

Taking for granted that life has been, and always will be of the nature of a fight, what may be said of the competitive relationships of human beings among themselves in the past, present, and future? Was Man ever the simple harmonious child of nature, the "Noble Savage" of Rousseau, who in one phrase of his writings glorified the primitive past? Perhaps the consensus of opinion would be that man is by nature pugnacious. Furthermore it might be agreed that the incentives to combat in elementary society have been, and still are, matters of sex and food supply. These factors must have operated in early times. The primitive pugnacious streak, so much exploited in novels and moving pictures, appears to provide great delectation for readers and audience. We hear likewise of the woman who responds only to cave-man methods; for tunately she remains to most of us a figment of the imagination. Perhaps an examination of some of the most retarded peoples of today will throw new light on this question of a primitive pugnacity. At the same time there may be some assistance from reviewing the great civilizations. What has been gained and lost, for themselves and posterity, by the warlike and the passive?

In 1914-18 there stepped out, more or less spontaneously and cheerfully, millions of men and women who obeyed the herd instinct. It is well that this is the case, for with war at the door there is little else to do. A sudden attack on one's person leaves only the alternative of ignominous surrender or a fight. At such a crisis speculation on the reform of the penal code, the more skillful handling of juvenile delinquents, and removal of corruption from

the police force are of little avail. A quick choice has to be made. But, with regard to international situations, is humanity to wait complacently for the next inevitable cycle of greed, unskilled diplomacy, and nationalism, to complete itself? as it surely will. On the whole, the present generation, somewhat inarticulately and without determined cry, says "we hope that this abomination of war will not occur again." In sonorous voices and muttered responses, the prayer for freedom from war ascends in thousands of churches. Unless, however, the outlook is changed by definitely and radically altered Education, the next generation will come up smiling to take its gruel. In spite of his lapses, Man can claim some amount of intelligence and pure reason. It is the scientific spirit, applied to social problems on a broad scale, that will set up a new standard of conduct and responsibility.

There ars some writers who invite us to look beyond the sordid cruelty and waste of war so that we may see a horizon of new ideals, cultures, and capacities. The strain on the eyesight would indeed be great in order to discern clearly the benefits conferred by the struggle of 1914-18. There is the possibility that the condition of some of the belligerent countries might have been worse had they refused to participate. The opinions of many writers on warfare are curious in their disparity. War has been regarded as an ordeal by God for the welding and purification of nations. Hostilities have been described as an indisputable adjunct of culture, and a necessary expression of strength and vitality. Waitz, an anthropologist, says that war through waste hinders progress, but on the credit side it arouses nations from psychological indolence, and gives cohesion. L. F. Ward finds that for primitive races peace means social stagnation. Karl Pearson defended the selective value of warfare, opining that, apart from war, selection would take place through famine and disease. This idea seems to lose sight of the fact that the class A men go to the field while the class C men stay at home. Of the class A men exposed to casualty, those of the best constitution are most likely to be killed because their physique enables them to remain in the danger zone for the longest periods. The weaker of the fighting men gradually become invalided from the front, owing to the development of one disability and another under conditions of stress. Men of the most daring and initiative volunteer for the most dangerous enterprises, and

the casualty list in this section is high. War selects the best manhood for slaughter. Kant saw war as an obstacle to progress and spent much philosophical thought on the means of abolishing conflict. Comte regarded theology and militarism as two main obstacles to progress and reason. This diversity of opinion arises from two main sources. The philosophical and historical method is selective and synthetic, borrowing here and there, sometimes consciously, sometimes unwittingly. Then follows interpretation according to prevailing politics, or on the contrary, there may be a complete negation of the generally accepted evaluation of warfare. In the latter case the pioneer lays himself open to the opprobrium of the mob. The word 'progress' is capable of many interpretations, not infrequently the term is used as if synonymous with complexity, speed, and physical power. In addition to these causes of disparity in views on warfare, there have to be added those which arise from Christian teaching, and at the other extreme those which result from deliberate scheming of financiers.

The historical and comparative ethnological methods of survey have their weaknesses, but these tools, like any others depend on the skill and caution with which they are used. There is nothing inherently unsound in such methodology; the danger of arriving at conflicting or unwarranted conclusions arises from the possibility of having a major premis which has resulted either from a too narrow observation, or a range of observation which has been too heterogenous, having no regard for time of occurrence, and no cognizance of physical and social setting .

A consideration of an ethnological map shows that there are certain peripheral peoples, ostracised, and living on the margin of subsistence. They represent so many races, and sub-races, Mongoloid, Australoid, and Negro, that a theory of racial inferiority will hardly serve to account for their position in the scale of civilization. If civilization is rightly said to be that which is over and above what is necessary for existence, in a biological sense, these marginal people are low in the scale, for life is at the best precarious. There are no margins through saving the proceeds of agriculture. This science is either impossible owing to adverse geographical situations, or for a complexity of reasons it has not been developed, although conditions are not prohibitive. To call such people unprogressive is, in a sense, question begging, because progress may be

regarded as the attainment of peace with extreme simplicity. So argues Gandhi, who woud oust western civilization and place the spinning wheel in every Indian home.

The chief of these peripheral peoples are the Eskimo, Tierra del Fuegians, Pygmy groups of Africa and the Malay Peninsula, Bushmen, Veddas, Todas, Andamanese, Punans of Borneo, Australian aborigines, and the now extinct Tasmanians. All these groups are static or decadent in numbers, all have come to occupy unfavourable situations, and none have any contribution to leave to posterity at large. What are the causes of isolation and stagnation?

Aborigines of Australia are still to be found unaffected by European contacts. This is especially so in the center, the north west, and a region to the south of the gulf of Carpentaria. Habits of life connected with hunting and collecting are simple, neither is there any knowledge of agriculture. Vessels of bark and bags of fibre are made, but pottery is unknown. Stone is well flaked into the form of spearheads having fine serrations round the edge. Though the material culture is so elementary the social organization is complex, especially in relation to totemism, exogamy, and magical ceremonies.

The weapons are stone-tipped spears, simple wooden clubs, boomerangs, shields of wood, and spear throwers. There are also stone axe heads fitted into cloven sticks. Warfare is not a serious affair, conflict is of the nature of a stealthy blood-feud and sly retribution. After much time has been spent in painting the fighters with stripes of red, white, and black, and after women have shouted themselves hoarse, and men have danced to the point of exhaustion, the contending parties meet. A few on each side may be injured, then all the old men retire to some secluded spot where peace terms are discussed. Warfare is infrequent, without elaborate organization, and not of a devastating nature. Social functions are largely directed to securing food. In fact the struggle against drought, and the constant effort to follow game demand all available energy. With the exception of the region adjacent to New Guinea there is no culture contact or hostility from outside. So far as is known the only intrusive enemy has been the White man.

That the Tasmanians were allowed to become extinct without any well directed attempt to study them, will always be a slur on

British administration. There was no organized suppression beyond the gathering of the natives and their transfer to an island in Bass Strait. In 1876 there died the last survivor of this early stone age people, who could have taught us what we desire to know of the life of prehistoric man. The culture of the Tasmanians was even more simple than that of the Australian aborigines. Agriculture and the arts of pottery making were unknown. Stone implements were more simple than those of Australia. The only weapon was a wooden spear sharpened to a point by burning and scraping. Of clothing, with the exception of an opossum skin rug, the Tasmanian had no knowledge. His home was a break-wind shelter of bark, open to the weather except on the windward side. The only forms of personal ornament were scarification and daubing with red ochre. The climate of Tasmania is cold in the highlands, but may be generally described as warm temperate. There was no organized warfare, though there was occasional rivalry between roaming bands. Toward the Europeans the Tasmanian was, after provocation, sly and treacherous. There do not appear to have been any laws, chiefs, or systems of government. The only musical instrument was an opossum skin rug stretched across the knees and beaten with a stick. Fire was made by friction, and to save trouble glowing embers were carried in clay receptacles. The quest for food occupied most of the day. While women and children were collecting shell fish and berries, the men were in pursuit of the wallaby and opossum. Every form of animal life was edible, frogs, lizards and snails were a welcome diet. There were dances resembling those of Australia in a general way, but elaborate ceremonies of a magical kind were absent. The Tasmanians were an isolated people without culture contacts or the necessity of preparing a defensive program. They made a poor response to a good environment.

The continent of Africa shows at least two examples of an ostracised people. The Ituri forest pygmies and other scattered groups of racial affinity have a simple culture based on hunting and collecting. They occupy dense forest glades, and so far as they are known, there is no evidence of any culture except that of a very elementary kind. The Bushmen of the Kalahari desert are thought by some anthropologists to be closely allied in a racial sense to the Pygmy groups. The differences are said to have arisen through

disparity of environment. The Bushmen were driven from areas of north east Africa by Hamites, Hottentots, and Bantu. Finally Dutch and British settlers forced these primitive hunters into the least desirable parts of the Kalahari. The Bushmen are skilled raiders of cattle, and in a sly and treacherous way can take care of themselves with their poisoned arrows. They were when first in contact with Europeans a stone age people unable to stand against their enemies, all of whom made use of iron.

Negritos of the Malay Peninsula, and Andamanese, have been regarded as isolated fragments of an anciently dispersed negroid race, whose other representatives are the African groups mentioned, also the pygmy tribes of New Guinea. Physically and culturally the Semang of the Malay Peninsula show variation according to the extent of contact with Malays. Typically these Negritos are a shy retiring people who are difficult to find. They are skillful hunters of the jungle who spend their time making traps and weapons. The latter are poisoned with an extract from the Upas tree. Men assist the women in jungle forays in quest of edible roots and berries. Bark-cloth is made from fibre, while the Perak Semang have learned to beat a piece of iron into shape. The Yandis of southern India are a people of backward culture living the simplest of lives. Of the Todas of southern India Rivers said (1906) "It can not be said that the Todas use any weapons though they retain in ceremonies, weapons such as the bow and arrow." The Andamanese have no combat as a stand-up fight, but they indulge in surprise attacks and petty feuds. If they meet with any resistance or lose a man, all retire. Attacks last only a few minutes. Peace negotiations are conducted by women. Females are generallly responsible for keeping the feuds alive. Veddas of Ceylon have been influenced by racial contact and intermarriage with Sinhalese, but the small tribes of the forest are in a state of sylvian simplicity. These Veddas, armed with bows and arrows, live by pursuit of small game, collecting honey, and digging up wild vegetable produce. One observer says that in habits they are little removed from the animals on which they subsist, being timid, unapproachable, and off like the wind at the slightest intimation of danger. Communities are made up of one to five families. These share rights of hunting and food gathering over a prescribed area. A family consists of parents, unmarried child-

ren and married daughters with their husbands. The conditions are of the primitive matrilocal type. Every Vedda helps his community and shares his goods so readily that it is difficult to determine who has a claim on any other member of the group. On further observation a scheme of sharing in order of precedence is observable. Medicine men have a special training before they are allowed to make offerings to the Yaku, or spirits. Many groups have no houses other than cave shelters. The Punans are jungle tribes in the interior of Borneo. Here indeed is the simple life. There are no houses, no crops, and no margins over and above what is caught and collected day by day. Physically and mentally the Punans are well endowed. They are no puny cowards, but on the contrary are rather feared for the stealth and certainty of their revenge. They are not aggressive. They are retiring, hospitable, friendly and brave. Commodities obtained by collecting and hunting with the blow pipe are regarded as group assets, and sharing with the group is the order of the day. The Yahgan and Ona are two simple decadent tribes in Tierra del Fuego, near the inhospitable shores of Cape Horn. The Yahgan have no organized warfare in which any combatant of one group will kill any combatant of the other force. There is, however a system of blood revenge. The Ona will fight over women, hunting rights, and to reduce the strength of a possible opponent. In seventy five years it is estimated that the Ona have been reduced from a strength of 3,600 to 70, while the numbers of the Yahgan have fallen from 3,000 to 50. The Fugieans have for long been isolated from the main streams of cultural development. They are a typical marginal group, wanting in houses, tools, clothing, domestic animals, and agriculture. The climate is harsh, but observers agree that the conditions are not so adverse as to justify the low cultural status. Here is an example of a poor response to environment.

In spite of Stefansson's description of a "Friendly Arctic," there can be little doubt that the Eskimo of the Northwest, Baffin Land, and Greenland have had a stern fight with environmental conditions. The fight has been a winning one, for ethnologists agree that the cultural response has been excellent, more colloquially, the Eskimo have made the best of a bad job. Carefully they preserve a margin of animal food, wrung from land and sea with great toil and danger. Agriculture is impossible. Timber is obtain-

able only from drift wood. There has been in some localities a development of high artistic skill in the engraving of ivory, and great ingenuity in the manufacture of weapons of the chase. Dogs are used for transport. Houses are ingeniously made. In all ways the Eskimo has utilized every factor which could contribute to his preservation and comfort. The Eskimo have had the sternest of all fights, namely that against harsh environmental conditions. They have their blood feuds, but warfare has been nothing more than a seires of skirmishes with hostile Indian tribes. It is generally assumed that the Eskimo came into North America at Bering Strait, whence they spread eastward. There is a theory that they represent men of the late European stone age who followed the reindeer northward as the ice cap retreated, but precise reasons for the migrations and settlements are unknown.

At the present day the Ainu of northern Japan offer an example of a people who have peace but alas no prosperty. Theirs is the peace of decadence resulting from complete subjection to a conquering race. Japanese legends say that in early days the Ainu were their fiercest opponents. There is some evidence too that the Ainu carried on inter-tribal warfares on a considerable scale. They have been bowed in the dust both in fact and metaphor. The Ainu are an ethnological puzzle. They have wavy hair and features which are not Mongolian. Apparently they represent the terminus of a very ancient migration which settled in Japan with comfort until the arrival of the Japanese.

The factors which arrest attention in these groups are: 1. Isolation. 2. Harsh environmental conditions in several instances. 3. Either inability or failure to indulge in agriculture. This means that there is no margin on which to build up the arts, luxuries, and defence. Just the biological needs of the present claim full time and energy. 4. With the exception of the Todas, who have herds of buffalo, these margnal peoples have no domestic animals which can serve as food. The inference appears to be, that hunters and collectors who have not been swept into the vortex of civilization, are doomed to extinction without leaving anything to posterity. Apparently retirement, absence of culture contacts, failure to build up margins of supply, and lack of weapons in addition to a want of combative organization, spell extinction without addition to the knowledge of the human race.

Warlike Indians of the plains of North America were able to put up a stout resistance to foreign intrusion over a period of three centuries. The Maories of New Zealand were endowed with intelligence and the fighting spirit, so made an heroic attempt to drive the British intruders from their shores. Despite what some geographers have said with regard to the unsuitability of the tropics for culture building, Africa has produced several empires and great military organizations. Among these were Benin, a warlike kingdom, and at the same time foremost in the arts of ivory carving and bronze casting. This kingdom was not reduced until 1897. Other organizations, depending on margins of agricultural produce and cattle, were able to resist inroads of Portuguese, British, Dutch, and Germans. In West Africa the most notable kingdoms were Dahomey, and the Songhai Empire. The fighting Herero resisted the Germans by force of arms for a decade. The Zulu were not reduced until 1875, while the Masai, whose fighting machine was a remarkable organization, gave an excellent account of themselves. Defeat was inevitable, but margins gave arts and a tolerably efficient defence, except against peoples of overwhelmingly superior culture.

In striking contrast to the peoples mentioned are those which built up great empires, partly through agriculture and trade which gave margins, and an increased population. A more important factor in their progress was the utilization of these margins of supply and population for conducting both offensive and defensive warfare. In the New World the Peruvian, Columbian, Mexican, and Mayan, civilizations grew from the surrounding mediocre levels of culture. At any rate such is the opinion of those most competent to judge. Elliot-Smith has however a theory of the introduction of culture from the Old World. Fundamentally there was a building up of a surplus through agriculture, and though the details of growth are not known, it may be said that these people maintained themselves by hostilities until the Spaniards arrived. Then the empires of the New World fell before treachery, internal dissention, gunpowder, and steel. The history of Egypt is that of a struggle against Assyria, Persia, Greece and Rome. Phoenicians paid heavy tribute rather than engaging in war with Philistines and others. But the end of Phoenicia was absorption by Rome. Carthage held out valiantly, chiefly for the possession of Sicily, but

was eventually annihilated by the Roman empire. Arabian civilization advanced into Africa and India by the sword, used under the impetus of a pugnacious religious creed. The causes of the rise and fall of the Khmer civilization of Cambodia are, in the absence of extensive archaeological work, unknown. The Moghul Empire rose and was maintained through forces of arms. Greece fell before Rome, and in its turn Rome bowed before the Vandals. In Europe during the past three centuries there has been every kind of combination in an effort to preserve the 'Balance of Power,' neither is the ingenuity of politicians in that directon yet exhausted. America gained her independence by war,—there was no other way. There has been a never-ending procession of peoples rising and maintaining themselves by the sword, which ultimately destroyed them. These nations are without doubt the ones which have contributed to laws, literature, art; in general terms they have made bequests to posterity. This is as might be expected. In primitive society war is bound up with formation of age groups, councils, and rules regulating absorption of new cultures. Sometimes only the women of the defeated enemy are preserved, these bring with them new ideas relating to religion, magic, weaving, pottery, or some other aspects of culture. Warfare has had a profound effect in stimulating growth of language and culture.

It is such views as these that have led to the glorification of war by men who were supposedly taking a rationalistic point of view. The masses do not go to war because they have some logical theory that war is an indispensable adjunct of progress. Men enlist on a large scale, and rightly so, when they have a choice between fighting and extinction, or at the best, extreme humiliation. To suppose, that because complex civilization and cultural progress are usually associated with war, the two phenonema are inseparable effect and cause, is fallacious. If the two factors of war, and preservation with progress, are not necessarily connected as cause and effect, by what means can the false testimony of historical philosophy be negatived?

Fortunately the pliability of public opinion can be demonstrated in a variety of ways. Within the subject of warfare itself there have been evidences of humanizing influences. It is a tragedy of course that scientific research has been misapplied to refining methods of slaughter, but this does not alter the fact that there

have been modifications of procedure in the direction of treatment of prisoners and the country conquered. From the custom of eating the heart of the prisoner after he had been tortured to death, opinion has advanced to an indignant denial of the underfeeding or overworking of prisoners. Outside warfare there have been still more emphatic changes of social sanction. Little more than a century ago in England, it was thought a right and proper thing for children of six or eight years of age to work in factories for hours which were quite undetermined. Poaching a salmon was sufficient cause for life-long transportation. At certain times and places the man who refused to uphold his opinion by a duel would have been ostracised as a coward. Now-a-days the successful duellist would be indicted for murder. Sports such as dog-fighting, cock-fighting, and bear baiting were in their time quite normal recreations. Brutal floggings in the army, navy, prisons, and lunatic asylums were once regarded as inevitable accompaniments of discipline. Sometimes the reform has been a peaceful and very gradual penetration of a higher standard of thought, through improvement of general education and the efforts of self-constituted leaders of reform. In the instance of Divine Rights of Kings in England, and the abolition of slavery in the United States, the reform came through civil war. Sometimes self-constituted leaders are howled down by the mob. A few years later the reforms previously decried are accepted as an integral part of the social system. Custom and social habit, it is true, are often backed by law. But apart from legal sanction there can be a growth of consolidated opinion founded on reason and the scientific spirit.

The chief agencies in forming attitudes are the press, religion, education, and family life. The press too frequently has inflammatory letters relating to imperial expansion and racial animosities. The church is usually to be found on the side of current politics and policies. When a crisis is at hand the church has little choice of opinion. Usually, and notably in the Great War, the denominations of each belligerent country endeavored to show that their particular people were on the side of God, fighting for liberty, freedom, and self determination. Education in primary schools always includes historical teaching. This is largely an emphasis of the conquests of the sword. Far too little is made of the conquests of the inquiring spirit in literature, the arts, science, and exploration.

The mighty heroes are those of the battle field. Whole newspaper syndicates are controlled by the personal politics and financial interests of a few men who not infrequently misuse their power in the direction of creating suspicion and ill-will.

At the conclusion of wars, brought to an end by exhaustion of the combatants, peace is discussed around a table. The terms give no real satisfaction to anyone, and the years of quietude enforced on an effete economic organization echo the rumblings of the past conflict and presage new outbreaks. All the pressing problems of economic conflict, so-called racial antagonism, and pressure of the population on the means of subsistence, are capable of rational solution. What is represented as inevitable racial antagonism, is largely a matter of defective education, social setting, the language barrier, and lack of travel. The ratio between population and food is rationally concerned with problems of birth control, engineering with regard to transport and irrigation, also attention to intensive agriculture.

Intelligent masses in whom reason and impartial inquiry were dominant could not be forced to war. They would demand the same international standards as those prevailing for the settlement of internal disputes. When the hounds of war are straining at the leash argument becomes futile; the lesser of the two evils is to fight.

There is evidence that the Golden Age type of simple hunters, who are unable to hold their position by fore of arms, are compelled to occupy the least desirable situations. There they linger until annihilated by a stronger culture. Without doubt warlike civilizations have preserved themselves for long periods. In doing so they have been able to contribute to architecture, law, music and the arts generally, navigation, and every other factor over and above what is necessary for mere existence.

This general truth has given rise to the belief, that because warfare and development have been so constantly associated, their union is one of inseparable cause and effect. The next stage in the evolution of societal relationships is a recognition of the fact that war has depended on mob mind injudiciously led. Man is highly educable, pliable, and responsive to moulding forces. There is hardly any part of the world today where the attitude toward children, slaves, employees, prisoners, and the sick, which was accepted a century ago, would be able to survive. In this responsiveness of

Man lies the hope that emotionalism will give place to rationalism. An attitude of impartial inquiry can solve racial and economic problems which war serves only to augment. If the educational agencies of schools, the press, religion, and the family, are rightly used, there will be set up a more rational background of thought. This will permeate the public of every country so that large scale warfare will be regarded, not merely in a sentimental way as cruel and wasteful. General opinion will refuse to employ a method which is incapable of giving any thing approaching a permanent settlement to problems which are capable of solution by rational procedure. The time for instilling intelligent inquiry and pacific methods is in the more or less tranquil intervals between conflicts.

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THE PHILOSOPHIC STUDY OF RELIGION*

BY FREDERICK C. GRANT

ONE wonders, sometimes, at the magic power which resides in names—as in that of the wonderful and mysterious great-great-grandmother in George MacDonald's *Princess and Curdie.* Names are not things—though in so saying we have no wish to raise an ancient question once more!—but they nevertheless have the power to shut off, arbitrarily, the further consideration of things, or of other things than those in hand; and to open up new ranges of perception, to release new meanings, to rise to heights whence wider horizons, fresh backgrounds, new significances appear. Words have a 'power of the keys,' 'to shut, and none shall open; to open, and none shall close.'

Two such magic names are Philosophy and Religion, words whose spell reaches across long ages of time and touches, directly or indirectly, most human hearts. And when these words are combined, as in some double and compounded formula of the hidden art; when we speak of 'the Philosophy of Religion,' what meaning have the words in their new relation? Might one reverse the process of compounding, and speak of the 'Religion of Philosophy,' and get a meaning out of it—as one might reverse or transform a mathematical equation? Indeed, I feel sure a meaning would result: one thinks of holy men of old, of consecrated intellectual geniuses like Plato and Spinoza, and many another, whose philosophy was a religion as well, and for whom the life of reason and the life of religion were set in no contradiction but were fruits of the selfsame vital tree—the abandonment of the soul, the loss of self, in the pursuit of the supremely Real.

But 'Philosophy of Religion'—this is our theme; what meaning has it, what meanings does it open up, and what does it exclude?

* A lecture delivered in Wieboldt Hall, Northwestern University, November 15, 1928.

What is its object and purpose? What are its prospects and promises of success? Is it more than a hint of what passes human knowing, like the essence of essences, like the inside view of an atom, like the 'sound' of a color or the 'color' of a sound? Or is it, on the contrary, a solid, substantial, and entirely unfanciful segment in the rounded whole of empirical, factual knowledge?

Now it has happened that 'Philosophy of Religion' has been so understood—great is the power of names and of their associations and family relationships—so that some thinkers and students have supposed religion could be reduced to formulae, and 'Philosophy of Religion' be set on the shelf beside 'Philosophy of Mechanics' or 'Philosophy of Magnetism.' Indeed, the parallel suggests at once the era when Philosophy of Religion was thus understood. Men also wrote of 'Philosophy of History,' and reached similar results: History became a great machine, with successive thrusts and counter-thrusts of great driving rods, with successive expansions and contractions pushing or produced by the mighty pistons of the active human consciousness. And 'philosophy,' in this particular cycle of meanings, became only the synonym of explanation, formulation, analytical description, or even of mathematical exposition. I do not wish to underrate all this: it was one step in the process by which Philosophy of Religion has arrived at its present state; and there is meaning still, a permanent meaning, in the term which finally supplanted it in this phase of investigation, namely, the 'Science' of Religion. But the danger was real that in such an understanding of the Philosophy of Religion, i. e., as scientific explanation, research itself should lose sight of 'the many-splendored thing' of which it was in quest. Just as Biology had to advance beyond Anatomy, and study the living, not the dead, organism; so Philosophy of Religion has had to move forward from the analysis, classification, and formulation of dead or dying religions to the study of the living religious impulse, with its varied and sometimes unpredictable manifestations, with its curious fashions, its strong undercurrents of feeling, its inexplicable and indeed ineffable elements, its mysticism and its heroism, its 'war in the members,' its instinctive urge to abolish certain instincts, its strange ancient ways and its flaming novelties, its roots in folk-way and primitive custom, its ethereal rationality and its logic-defying 'reasons' for the things religious men and women do. In a word,

the history of religion has had to be supplemented by the Psychology of Religion for a thoroughly sound basis to be provided the modern Philosophy of Religion.

Finally, still another interpretation has been offered: Philosophy of Religion is the investigation of the light religion has to cast upon the major problem and question of all modern scientific and philosophic research, viz., man's place in the universe, and the meaning and purpose—if any—of his fitful parade across the briefly lighted stage of human society upon this small, aged, and lonely planet. That is, instead of explaining religion, either in terms of some mechanistic formula—a notion derived from the beginnings of the present machine age, when the idea of machinery first strongly seized upon the imaginations of men—or else in terms of science taken in the later and broader sense of modern biology and psychology; instead of explaining religion, men seek to explain the universe, and themselves in relation to it, and they call upon religion for whatever valid interpretations it has to make of the riddle of existence. One might almost say that the history of the Philosophy of Religion in the 19th century and later has run through these three stages, taken broadly—in the succession of Kant, Hegel, Schleiermacher, Pfleiderer, James, and some among our contemporaries.

But the question recurs, Is this what Philosophy of Religion means? Does any one of the suggested series of limitations really exhaust its meaning or significance? I must confess that, as for myself, though the emphasis in each seems strongly needed—especially the last two—and though strongly preferring the last of all, if a choice must be made, no one of them is exhaustive or completely satisfactory. What I propose is the choice of an objective that shall embrace all three—and still leave room for more. What I mean to say is this: 'Philosophy of Religion' is not the definition of a certain mass of subject-matter, or the anticipatory description of a set of all-embracing, all-explaining formulae; Philosophy of Religion means a method of approach, of study, of asking questions, or reaching out toward reality; in brief, 'Philosophy' of Religion means the philosophic study of Religion.

And what has such a method of approach in view, what are its prospects, what does it promise? As Professor Bridgman has said of the science of Physics,[1] it is one thing to ask questions—

[1] *The Logic of Modern Physics,* pp. 28 ff.

anyone can do that, from the babe in arms to the hoary questioner, 'ever learning, and never able to come to the knowledge of the truth'[2]—but it is quite another thing to ask the right questions, either questions that admit of an answer, or that are relevant, and lead to some answer, even if not the one intended or anticipated.

Now the philosophic study of religion, as I understand it, is no resignation of the philosophic quest in general, no shedding of the pallium, but is still the ardent pursuit of truth, wherever and howsoever arrived at; it is still 'thinking in terms of the whole;' it is still the unflagging quest for that view of reality that corresponds, really corresponds, with human experience in all its length and breadth, its height and depth, in richest knowledge and ablest skill, in strictest logic and in sublimest achievement of ethical character; philosophy is still philosophy—the love of the true, the beautiful, and the good. Nor, in this definition, does religion cease to be that factor in human experience which comes nearest achieving this realization of the whole—certainly for the broad mass of men and for many of the noblest—religion, which binds men into unity, which sweeps aside the mists and bids men see larger backgrounds than are envisaged in their daily toil, which steadily urges upon men that old divine discontent with things seen and temporal and bids them search for things unseen and eternal. It is no formula we want, no mere explanation of certain historical phenomena; it is reality. We wish not merely to understand but to live.

A great, pervasive, overwhelming tide of realism is sweeping the world in our generation. Shams and artifices are mere dykes of sand before this rising tide; 'time makes' even 'ancient good uncouth,' and only what really is, can endure. Whether or not ancient formulae hold, whether any formulae at all will hold, we demand to find out the best and worst that life holds, and from the bottom of our hearts we crave contact with reality. Though it slay us, we must seek it. Though Pandora's box spread endless ills, though the sphinx himself warn us against asking the fatal question, we cannot refrain, for we are made like that. Of certain things, one 'just *must* know,' and that is all there is to it. For my part, I find this spirit of our age exceedingly exhilarating. It may be carried to excess—in things that do not really matter in such a quest; as in asking the wrong questions, meaningless, stupid, or even idiotic ques-

[2] II Tim. iii. 7.

tions or questions that lead nowhere, whether answered or not; or questions that have already been asked and answered ten-thousand times and more. But the essential question-asking, reality-pursuing quality in the modern mind is, at least to some of us, a mark of what may really be holy zeal, and may lead eventually to one of the profoundest and most universal religious movements the world has ever seen—all the profounder and the more widespread now that civilization is tending toward a unity the whole world around. This is itself at least a latent phenomenon of religion, and one of the latest. I could illustrate it in a dozen ways, if there were time: in the current movement toward Church-unity, one of the most obvious examples; in saner missionary efforts; in universal education; in the motives leading men in the direction of social welfare and justice, of international peace, world hygiene and sanitation, world-wide medicine and surgery, religious and political tolerance—all these illustrate the burning thirst for reality that has taken possession of men's souls. Why should we retain social shibboleths and antiquated political formulae that only dig trenches for men to die in like vermin; why uphold ancient ecclesiastical prejudices which only lead to spiritual sterility and futility, to ridiculous competition, and effectually paralyze the religious sense of men?

Reality we want, as never before, and no fine-spun systems of dreamers sitting comfortably in their studies, far from the crush and turmoil of life! That note I hear all the time, and on all hands, and in philosophy no less than in common life; and that note, I believe, is no discordant one, but the signal of an oncoming change in the motif, the arrival of what is to be the major movement in this vast symphony of the inner life of man. It is itself very close to religion, perhaps the very harbinger and prophet preparing the way for the coming of a new era in spiritual development.

Now if it be true, as many persons hold, that philosophy is not a purely timeless pursuit, and that the spirit of each age is reflected in the philosophy which it produces, we shall not be greatly surprised if the ethos of our age is reflected in its philosophy of religion. That is, the method of the philosophic study of religion will be—so far as it is possible under the circumstances—the method of the pursuit of knowledge in general and of reflection upon phenomena generally which is in vogue in other departments

of human interest. The method, in a word will be scientific, so far as that method applies in a philosophic study—of religion or anything else. And the spirit will be this spirit of inquiry after reality, of pursuit of truth wheresoever and howsoever to be found.

For the Christian Church, or churches, this will mean an entire reshaping of our old-fashioned apologetics; indeed, it may easily turn out that a thorough-going philosophy of religion will take the place of the old apologetics—and this without loss, but rather with gain, to the ends which true religion has at stake. "Ye shall know the truth; and the truth shall make you free."[3] Religion has nothing to fear from the new method, the new freedom, so long as it is freedom in the service of truth. And for those who stand outside the immediate circle of the Church's membership, this new approach surely means clearing away the obstructions which have for too long impeded progress. There are those, alas, who can scarcely think of religion dissociated from some particular type of ecclesiasticism—the formalism of one, the fanaticism of another, or the chill and arid intellectual dogmatism of some third type. The philosophic or thought-out exposition of religion, or its dialectical defense, has too often included a defense of things really indefensible, or partial, or even partisan. 'Mint, anise, and cummin' have been tithed, while 'the weightier matters of the Law' were left out of view.[4] So that Religion and Ecclesiasticism have come to be identified—whereas, no genuinely religious man or woman, however highly valuing the outward expressions of the Visible Church, would for a moment admit the justice of such an identification.

Now it so happens that this brings us face to face with the first problem of the philosophic study of religion, and indeed of any philosophy of religion, viz., What is religion? What is the extent, and what are the limitations, of this particular field of philosophical inquiry? We might halt at this point for the rest of the evening, discussing various definitions of religion, and finding value, no doubt, in every one of them. But I doubt if, in the end, everyone present would be satisfied with the chosen definition; and so I venture to face that danger at once, rather than later, and offer—if not a definition—at least a general statement: Religion is the awareness of God, and the consequences thereof. Those

[3] John viii. 32.
[4] Matt. xxiii. 23.

consequences may be enormous, and far-reaching: in laws, standards, customs (as seen in the history of religions), in private and public worship, in priesthoods and sacrifices, in rituals and in sacred writings, in ascetical abnegation and inspired rhapsody and mystic transport—all depending upon the social outlook and the 'psychology' of the individuals involved. Hence religion has many and diverse vestures and embodiments. The revelation comes 'in many parts and after divers manners.' But the heart of it is one, and really continuous—even when viewed as a purely human historical phenomenon. At heart, it is the awareness of God; and for religion—i. e. for religious men and women—this means, in one form or another, revelation: God chooses that man shall become aware of Him; the Universal touches the particular; the Infinite Spirit breaks through the bonds of finitude; the Absolute embraces the individual. Put it in whatever language you prefer, philosophical, poetical, or prosaic, religion is apparently unable to do without the conception—if religious men think at all—of the Divine coming in contact with the human. So that 'awareness of God' may be only the inebriate dance of frenzied nature-worshippers; or it may rise to the heights of the Prologue of St. John and the Catholic faith in the Incarnation, or to mystic ecstasy; yet all along, in the simple language of religion, God is 'making Himself known to men.'

But of what value is this experience, someone will ask. Cannot we do without it in this modern age of independence of ancient forms of thinking and inherited patterns of feeling and behavior? I must answer this by another question: What would life be worth if the values which religion has enshrined in the past, and still enshrines, were blotted out? What would life be worth if the ethical values were obliterated? And where, as a matter of history, have ethical values obtained dominance in human society, and maintained this dominance, save in alliance with some form of the awareness of God? It is useless to point to religions that have no God; for in such religions the mass of their followers have, as a matter of fact, worshipped a God, or gods; while, for the elect, some universal principle or law has taken the place of God and functions in His stead, as the object of 'awareness' or the principle from which flow the 'consequences' which make up the concrete manifestations of the 'religion.' Nor is it wholly relevant to point to the discordance and antagonism between one ethical system and

another, or even between the ethical principles of one religion and another. The systems clash—but that is often because they are systems; in less systematic form, in less articulate, individual expression, they more readily flow into one another, accommodate themselves to one another, and unite in safeguarding those basic values which give worth to human life. Nor, finally, is it conclusive to point to the lowly origin of our sense of ethical values, or to distinguish this sharply from the religious sense. Granted that the ethical values originated in even sub-human social orders, in the ethics of the herd, the pack, the lowly colony or group of animals pitting its strength against a difficult or dangerous environment, and unconsciously but inevitably demanding patience, honor, self-sacrifice, from its members—or what in human behavior goes by these names: granted all this, it is still significant that with the emergence of religion the group-consciousness found therein its most powerful ally and support. If ethical origins may be traced back to sub-human biological stages, so also, one would almost venture to guess, may religious origins: that is, the motives that religion cherishes, in chief the consciousness of the 'Superhuman,' the 'Awe-ful,' the 'Wholly Other'—to use Professor Rudolf Otto's terminology—these motives and this consciousness are so deeply laid in human nature that one would not be surprised if they sprang from a biological origin. Which is by no means to say that that is the end of them. Does a sub-human origin of speech, in the rude sounds of the lower animals, disqualify the orator or the singer? Does it keep presidential candidates from making speeches, or millions of citizens from listening to them, by radio or otherwise? And it is surely significant that on their upward march, religion and ethics have become more and more closely allied: the sense of ought, and along with it the sense of someone, something, outside, above, objective to and set over against the human consciousness. The identification of the voice of duty with the voice of God underlies the history of the higher religions.

But if we thus grant the value of religion, a still further question arises as to its validity. The experience may be valuable—we hold that it is—but is it true? Or if partly true and partly untrue, how are we to distinguish the true from the false? It is here that philosophy of religion must lean most strongly upon its philosophic training and inheritance. What is the criterion of truth in any department of knowledge or of thought? At once we shall be

told by some that it is demonstrable correspondence with fact; by others that it is logical consistency, that it must 'hang together,' and demonstrably meet the requirements of thought. (These two answers, by the way, almost completely divide the world of philosophy, past and present—if taken in a broad sense.) But it may be asking too much to require religious experience to demonstrate its correspondence with external fact. It may do so, up to a certain point; but it may not be able to exhaust the whole range of potential fact. Do we ask of aesthetic judgments that they shall correspond with facts? Yes, we do; taken in the large sense, and recognizing certain qualities in 'facts' not given in immediate sense-perception or in scientific analysis. A dozen strokes of the violin-bow may mean only so much energy at work, so many vibrations produced, so much sound; or they may mean, in their real essence, something nearer akin to the flight of a swallow or the charge of a brigade or the death of a child. If the essential quality of human life is, perchance, spiritual and not material, then the 'facts' to which religious experience may be required to correspond will be of a higher and vaster order than those of physical sensation. No one here, I suppose, will contradict this statement. If not, then we proceed to the next consideration, namely, that the 'facts' to which religious experience must correspond may be themselves indemonstrable and yet real. I am quite free to grant that the arguments for the existence of God may one and all succeed no futher than in setting up 'the noblest hypothesis' to explain human life, the ordered universe, the moral sense, or the all but endless recessive series of causation. With Professor Webb I agree that the theistic arguments are reasons men have given for a faith, springing out of experience, which they could not help but hold.[5] But the same is true of other existences. How prove your own existence, as a conscious, self-directing, super-physical being? *Cogito, ergo sum* may be a logical inference for the man himself; for all others it is an act of faith—or 'the noblest hypothesis,' under the circumstances. For there are not wanting those who would reduce human cogitation, and with it the existence of a free, self-directing, individual personality, to the behavior of atoms in an inherited pattern which has been moulded by the long, slow process of biological adaptation and evolution. I do not think such scepticism is necessary, or even warranted; in philosophy, as in

[5] *Problems in the Relations of God and Man*, pp. 154 ff.

human thought and life generally, there are some things one must take for granted; for apart from such assumptions the whole process refuses to work, to go, to make even the initial start. And the idea of God—or rather, the real, objective existence of God—is the initial assumption presupposed in most religious experience. I feel that we are often in danger of too much abstractness in studying religion. We treat it as an idea; we deal with religion as if it were dissociable from experience; we propose such questions as, 'Can religion function without God?" and forget that religion is nothing if it is not experience, that the intellectual element is secondary and derivative, and that we cannot know religion unless we get really inside the experience which gives it meaning and makes it religious. There is no reason, so far as I can gather, why a philosopher of religion or a student of philosophy should not say his prayers, attend and share in public worship, examine his conscience and live a religious life in simple earnestness and humble piety. Only so can the language of religion acquire its full meaning, and the student find out for himself what religious men are talking about when they use words that really have a sense and connotation hidden from the casual hearer or superficial investigator. It is in experience—not hectic, over-wrought emotionalism, but normal, daily, pedestrian religious experience—that the student will begin to grasp the finer shades of meaning in the language of saints and seers, inspired prophets and religious philosophers.

Something of the same dissatisfaction attends the second proposed criterion of validity, viz., the test of 'rational coherence,' 'demonstrable correspondence with the requirements of thought.' For your judgment of rational coherence may not be mine, or any one's else. Your social background and that of a Hindu or a Bantu or a Turk may be quite distinctly different; and the 'requirements of thought' may correspondingly vary. One may require a hierarchy of emanations interposing between the Absolute and the individual, the Infinite and the finite; another may require a God seen in every action and event; another a transcendent God who, nevertheless, stands in closest contact with the visible world of phenomena, working His purpose out through events, ordinary or extraordinary, 'natural' or miraculous. A solution might be to cast up 'the world's best thought' on the subject, and then validate this with the imprimatur of authority. But this will not do, imposing as such an authority might be made, and valuable as it

would be for some purposes. For philosophy must be free and entitled to testify, like St. Athanasius, if necessary, *contra mundum*. The basis I propose is one broader still: not rational coherence, merely, but *truth to life*. For there are situations in human life where rationality has little to offer; where we can think and ponder without rest and be no nearer a solution; where not thought, primarily, but action is required—action guided by thought, perhaps, but by thought more heavily loaded than usual with emotion; by thought, but thought too deep for reasons or for words. In such hours the habits of a lifetime come to the fore and the man's real self, deeper than his intellectual nature, stands out clear in the open. For there is a self—a mind, perhaps, at any rate an activity of some sort—deeper than consciousness and deeper than rationality. It may be only the crude biological vital center of the individual life; or it may be the channel uniting him with the universal life; or perhaps it is that divine seed or spark implanted by the creative hand of God (and men have called it one or another of all three); whatever it is, the real self, or an important part of it, lodges there. And religion means man's attunement with his whole environment in the very center of his being, at one with the universe, at peace with God, in a coherence deeper than thought and with a rationality deeper than logic. Herein lies the real validation of religious experience. It satisfies requirements larger and more mandatory than those of rational thought; and it satisfies rational thought, as a rule (certainly for the normal religious individual), because it satisfies requirements which thought itself must satisfy. In a word, the world is much bigger than we think it is, with these intellects of ours, born to guide us through certain ranges of phenomena just as eyes were born to use light, and feet for locomotion, and hands for manipulating small, loose objects. And in this bigger world, religion, or the religious consciousness, and with it the moral sense, represents an adaptation just as real and just as valid as the physical senses or the biological instincts or the rational intellect. It is possible to be adjusted to God, and adapted to the spiritual qualities or factors in the universe, quite as much as it is possible to be adapted to a space-time environment and to the competition for survival or for ready access to a stable food-supply.

But how are we to explain the varieties and contrarities of religious experience, on such a theory? The answer is the old one of the mystics: the light is not various, but one; variety is the work

of the prism through which it passes. In essence, all religion is one, and truth or falsehood in religion is a matter of gradations, not of absolute contradictions. The pious Buddhist, the saintly Mohammedan, the godly Christian and the pious Jew are not, in truth, worshipping different Gods—that *cannot* be, for God is one. They approach by different routes; their progress is measured not so much by relation to each other—that would be a difficult problem in calculus—as by relation to the common center and goal of all their striving. They are all *en route* to God, 'who is their home.'

If I may be allowed to summarize this argument in a few words it will be as follows:

First, the Philosophy of Religion, like other branches of Philosophy, must go back once more and set out afresh from first-hand experience, leaving aside, at least at the outset, the metaphysical or other intellectual constructions of the past, and facing religious experience itself in its widest reaches and meanings. This, as I believe, cannot be accomplished unless the philosopher of religion has himself a rich and various inner religious life, is himself aware of God, and is willing to carry out the consequences of such awareness in his own life and in the life of his own particular corner of the world.

Second, the affirmations of religious men in all ages and climes must be taken fully into account, from the crudest and humblest to the loftiest and most complex. No science is developed in isolation, in these days; nor is any full-orbed philosophy likely to grow out of purely private speculation. The 'realistic' and the 'social' notes in modern thinking are more than accidental features; they are vital and inescapable factors in all modern thought, philosophic or any other, which can claim wide satisfaction or offer permanent solution of our problems.

Third, this very quality of tolerance, catholicity, comprehensiveness, must be acquired as soon as possible by our teachers and students alike. The philosopher of religion who should leave out of reckoning the non-Christian types of religious experience would prove himself incompetent from the outset for his task. But the same ought to be true of anyone who proposed to leave out of consideration the Protestant or the Catholic types of Christian experience, the orthodox and dogmatic or the evangelical or the mystic. There are values here—rich veins for exploration and exposition—underlying every one of these terms. Every one of them represents

some pathway to reality, more or less direct. And the older forms of piety, e. g. Calvinism or Puritanism, ought to be studied with all the historical sympathy and understanding we can muster. Perhaps I ought to choose Catholicism for my example. For it has often happened that philosophers of religion have neglected Catholicism —either on account of the inheritance of strong Protestant prejudices or because of the difficulty, unfamiliarity, or inaccessibility of the subject. This does not mean that our philosopher of religion should adopt an attitude for which all 'forms' of religion are indifferent, and 'one as good as another.' That is to pre-judge the situation, and effectually to close the mind against the discovery of fresh values, and to anticipate a conclusion, *ex hypothesi,* which renders all further research futile and meaningless.

Fourth, he must emulate the example of one of our most eminent metaphysicians and 'accept' the data of religious experience 'in simple piety.' There is time for criticism, plenty of time; but first let us get the facts clearly before us, or what are assumed to be the facts, or are claimed as such by those who assert them. The witness must be given 'the benefit of the doubt,' when doubt exists, and must be presumed to be telling the truth unless obviously he is lying, or has a clear motive for fabricating his testimony, or contradicts himself. To me it is an impressive fact that all men everywhere or almost everywhere, agree in the broad fundamental asseverations of the religious consciousness—in the reality of the unseen, in the existence of a Power or Wisdom outside of and superior to man, in the 'categorical imperative' of righteousness and self-sacrifice to higher ends understood as obedience to His will, or harmony with the universe, or submission to 'the reason of things' generally. Mystics, for example, in India and in America, in ancient Greece and mediaeval Germany and modern Chicago, tell us something about the inner life and the possibilities of union with the Supreme. I cannot find that their testimony was agreed upon beforehand: and instead of conflicting it seems to be mutually confirmatory to a large degree. Catholics pray, and so do Quakers; and despite their conflicting theologies and discrepant patterns of experience, they do find peace and strength and joy and illumination. There is reality in it, and I cannot help but conclude that prayer is at least one mode of access to the highest Wisdom and supreme Love in the universe. It does not seem possible that they can all be wrong, and the truth be either that there is no God or that He is inaccessible and

unknowable. The presumption is that they speak the truth, and that 'God is, and is the rewarder of them that diligently seek Him.'[6] I do not mean that the truth of religion stands or falls with unanimity or universality of testimony; there are ranges of truth in every sphere of human interest that cannot be so established. But the existence of such evidence certainly creates an impression favorable to its truth, and deserving to be reckoned with by the philosopher of religion as among his most primary data.

I sometimes wish we could really go back and start over again with some of our problems, setting out as Plato and Aristotle set out in a territory not too well known, mapped out in advance, and covered with sign-posts and other memorials of great names in the past or of theories fallen into decay. Such a wish is of course preposterous—there was a *tradition* even in Plato's day, and even in Homer's, and probably there has been, in science, philosophy, and religion ever since men began to observe, to think, and to pray. At the very least, however, our philosopher can study the theories of the past sufficiently to think through some of them, and emerge on the other side. Whereupon he himself is confronted with the primary situation, as it faced earlier students and thinkers, with the question, What is the ultimate truth of all this? Such study of the past is bracing, not unnerving, and the student is a student of philosophy, or of religion, and not merely of its history.

But supposing we *could* attack the problems afresh and at first-hand, as the founders of the tradition themselves attacked them, would not one of our first observations be the following?—Here is a mass of various but not wholly discordant testimony, a mass of testimony springing out of inner experience, experience that we ourselves may share in some degree. The all but unanimous witness is that this experience is not fallacious, and that God, the spiritual world, the inner core of life and the meaning of human destiny may really be apprehended and truly, not falsely, known—though not, perhaps, exhaustively. Then we should proceed to what Plato and his successors called Theology,[7] the rational knowledge of God or the gods, and the consistent elaboration of whatever hypothesis or 'myth' best accounted for the facts and 'saved the appearances,' as the Stoics said. So much of our time is taken up with the examination and criticism of theories that men grow bewildered and wonder

[6] Heb. xi. 6.

[7] Rep. 379A.

if anything exists to correspond with the subjects or relations under debate. That was the western world's criticism of Scholasticism—but it is a danger by no means limited to one period or school of thought. And though my hope may be a forlorn one, I still believe there is something to be said at least for such an emphasis in the philosophic study of religion. Puzzled as we are often times by the many minor and secondary questions, let us not lose sight of the primary and ultimate ones. There have in fact been philosophers who resembled the man in *Robinson Crusoe's Further Adventures,* who sawed off a limb to dislodge a bear but was himself on the outer end of the limb.

My *fifth* observation is that religion is to be studied, by the philosophic student, in its actual practice, not only in books, in liturgies and sermons, in sacred scriptures, in the records of the past. And the very heart of it comes nearest being unveiled in the act of worship. Here the Numinous is actually felt by most religious men; and without worship, religions tend to decline. When the warm, pulsing, vibrant life-stream of religious worship fails, the religion is doomed—unless, as often happens, that doom is averted by a religious revival. As William James put it a generation ago, religion functions through 'prayer, guidance, and all that sort of thing immediately and privately felt,' rather than through 'high and noble general views of our destiny and the world's meaning.' Moreover, somewhat in contrast to James' later treatment, this sort of immediate apprehension of the divine is to be studied and known in its normal rather than its abnormal phases. The saints, the converts, the twice-born have something to tell us; but so have the pious everyday folk who love justice and mercy and walk humbly with their God. And it is not impossbile that their testimony, less dramatic but wider in extent, may prove of even greater importance in the construction of an outlook upon reality in the light of religious experience. If this is so, it has a good deal of significance for the present-day student, when towering genius in religion seems to be growing rare, and at least the first half of Browning's prayer to be fulfilled:

'Make no more giants, God,
But elevate the race.'[8]

'Pedestrian' religion, if it be centred in God and really in contact

[8] Paracelsus.

with the supernatural, is good enough for our purposes; indeed, it has some qualities that recommend a preferential consideration—for example, it does not so readily disappear in the alembic of the abnormal psychologist.

Finally, let me offer a parting affirmation of my belief that this new method has all the future before it. The range of possible experience in the external, space-time universe is by no means yet exhausted: far from it! Some of us have still to take our first aeroplane ride! Nor are the mysteries of nature by any means exhaustively explored and catalogued by our scientific investigators. Nor has philosophy yet written its final chapter—we study its past in large measure in order to prepare for its future developments, as the diver goes back and runs toward the springboard for his plunge. Nor have we made much more than a beginning in the philosophic study of religion. Here lie rich veins for the patient miner, vast ranges of data for the ardent collector of facts, for the classifier and tabulator of phenomena. But above all, religion itself, true spiritual religion, is still in its infancy, as an adaptation of life—and of thought, following life, but guiding it as it follows—as an adaptation of human life to a wider sphere of reality than ordinarily enters our ken. As a Christian, I believe profoundly that 'the best is yet to be' and that untold riches of light, of guidance, of knowledge and illumination, of nobler ethical achievement, of further spiritual discovery, lie on before us in the uncharted future. And as a Christian I may say that, for me, it is Christ Himself who leads in that direction.

CHARACTER TRAINING IN SCHOOL AND COLLEGE

BY J. V. NASH

EVER since the close of the World War the problem of character training in our schools and colleges has been one of increasing concern. At the Minneapolis Convention of the National Education Association, in the summer of 1928, it was a leading topic of discussion among the educators gathered from all parts of the country. "Emphasis must be placed," declared one speaker, "on honesty rather than on accuracy. Academic subject matter may be the means to an end, but never the end itself." Press dispatches from Chautauqua, N. Y., July 22, reported Ernest C. Hartwell, superintendent of schools at Buffalo, as urging, in an address before the Chautauqua Summer Schools, the vital necessity of an educational system "which would stress the development of character and high ideals rather than merely retail facts."

Professor A. A. Stagg, the veteran Director of Physical Education at the University of Chicago, in a recent talk pointed out the seriousness of this problem. Speaking of the destructive effects on home life caused by the war, he said:

"There seems to be a little less loyalty to the home ties on the part of fathers and mothers than there was before the war. The children naturally have suffered. The fact is that many children—thousands of children—now are getting very little home direction. Luxury and pleasure have been exalted, and the fathers and mothers to a certain extent have run away from their duties and responsibilities. The children have become free to an extent that they never were before. They have a freedom which is away beyond any of us ever dreamed we might have. . . . . It is no wonder that the standards have been changed. No one should blame the children. We are to blame—we fathers and mothers—for the situation."[1]

[1] Address on "The Training of Men," Chicago, June 26, 1927.

The problem of character training has been put squarely up to our educational institutions; and if the schools and colleges do not solve it, we shall have growing up a generation sadly lacking in moral responsibility and social usefulness.

Let us take, first, our high schools. How shall we approach the problem of character training in the high school? In the beginning, we must understand what is meant by moral or ethical instruction. John Dewey distinguishes between "moral ideas" and "ideas about morality." Moral ideas he defines as "ideas of any sort whatsoever which take effect in conduct and improve it, make it better than it otherwise would be." Ideas about morality, on the other hand, "may be morally indifferent or immoral or moral. There is nothing in the nature of ideas *about* morality, of information *about* honesty or charity or kindness which automatically transmutes such ideas into good character or good conduct."[2] This distinction he believes is a fundamental one in the discussion of moral education.

Hence, according to Dewey, "The business of the educator is to see to it that the greatest possible number of ideas acquired by children and youth are acquired in such a vital way that they become moving ideas, motive-forces in the guidance of conduct." In other words, the end in view is pragmatic, not mere edification. The moral purpose should be dominant in all instruction, regardless of the subject, "because the ultimate purpose of all education is character forming."[3]

Naturally, the attention of student and teacher must be centered much of the time upon purely intellectual matters, but Dewey is convinced that it is possible to have the methods of learning, of acquiring intellectual power, and of assimilating the material, so organized that they will have a constructive and invigorating effect upon behavior. And in order that real character training may result from instruction, it is necessary that the methods should not be confined to successful absorption on the part of the student. If the larger part of the learning process consists simply in a group of forty children reading the same books and reciting the same lessons, there is no social division of labor, no opportunity for each student to work out something of his own which will call forth his interest and desire to achieve. Through such a technique the social spirit

[2] John Dewey, *Moral Principles in Education*, p. 1.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 2.

is not cultivated, and the cultivation of the social spirit should be the basis of character training. The youth has an innate desire to create, to do things, and to serve. This instinct must be given an opportunity for expression; otherwise it will decay and in its place selfish individualistic motives will be given free play. As Dewey expresses it: "Separation between instruction and character continues in our schools (in spite of the efforts of individual teachers) as a result of the divorce between learning and doing."[4]

It is therefore important that the various subjects in the curriculum should be presented, as far as possible, from a social angle. For instance, in history there should not be a mere mechanical learning of names and dates in the past. "The ethical value of history teaching," Dewey maintains, "will be measured by the extent to which past events are made the means of understanding the present—affording insight into what makes up the structure and working of society to-day."[5] In the same way, in the study of mathematics the science of numbers should not be taught as an end in itself; the student should get a consciousness of the use and purpose of number in our social organization. So we may go through all the subjects in the curriculum. "Ultimate moral motives and forces are nothing more or less than social intelligence—the power of observing and comprehending social situations—and social power —trained capacities of control—at work in the service of social interest and aims. There is no fact which throws light upon the constitution of society, there is no power whose training adds to social resourcefulness, that is not moral."[6]

It seems to be quite generally conceded that the direct teaching of ethics, and still more, of religion in any form, would be not only useless but harmful in high schools, although it is agreed that in colleges and universities there should be courses in ethics. Professor Palmer points out why such instruction should be avoided. He shows the danger in making a boy or a girl morally self-conscious. His remarks are so much to the point as to be worth quoting at some length. He says:

"That self questioning spirit springs up which impels its tortured possessor to be continually fingering his motives in unwhole-

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 27.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 36.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 43.

some pre-occupation with himself. Instead of entering heartily into outward interests, the watchful little moralist is 'questioning about himself whether he has been as good as he should have been, and whether a better man would not have acted otherwise.' No part of us is more susceptible of morbidness than the moral sense; none demoralizes more thoroughly when morbid. The trouble, too, affects chiefly those of finer fibre. The majority of healthy children . . . . . harden themselves against theoretic talk, and it passes over them like the wind. Here and there a sensitive soul absorbs the poison and sets itself seriously to work instilling duty as the mainspring of its life. We all know the unwholesome result: the person from whom spontaneity is gone, who criticizes everything he does, who has lost his sense of proportion, who teases himself endlessly and teases his friends—so far as they remain his friends—about the right and wrong of each petty act. It is a disease, a moral disease, and takes the place in the spiritual life of that which doctors are fond of calling 'nervous prostration' in the physical. . . . The wise teacher will extirpate the first sproutings of the weed; for a weed more difficult to extirpate when grown there is not. We run a serious risk of implanting it in our children when we undertake class instruction in ethics."[7]

In the psychological aspects of character training, it should be remembered that, as Dewey says, "all conduct springs ultimately and radically out of native instinct and impulses."[8] Therefore, the teacher should understand these instincts and impulses in order to know what to appeal to and build upon. Although individuals differ, each has a primary equipment of impulse—an urge to do. This is a fundamental factor in character training, because character implies the ability to participate constructively in the actual conflicts of life. "The problem of education on this side," Dewey believes, "is that of discovering what this native fund of power is, and then of utilizing it in such a way (affording conditions which both stmulate and control) as to organize it into definite conserved modes of action—habits."[9]

Other factors which must be considered are, on the intellectual side, judgment or good sense—the capacity to judge of values; and

[7] Geo. H. Palmer, *Ethical and Moral Instruction in Schools,* pp. 17-18.
[8] Dewey, *op. cit.,* p. 47.
[9] *Ibid.,* p. 50.

on the emotional side, a personal responsiveness, a sensitiveness to conditions, a regard for the ends and interests of other people. The aim of the school should be to afford an opportunity for the development of all these factors in character training.

Professor Coe emphasizes the importance of cultivating the student's variability in a constructive way. "Education, then, is to aim at variability in the student, a cultivated variability. The youth brings to high school and college the precious treasurers of youth, a feeling that the world is not finished and done, but in the making, and that he himself is not finished and done, but in the making. He is hospitable to changes in the world and in himself. Right here, in the natural variability of youth, the possibility of a progressive civilization chiefly lies. In the human species, and in it alone, is there provision for voluntary variation, for foresighted progress; for evolution by the economical process of analysis, discrimination, and agreement, as against the wasteful processes of chance and of strife. And youth, itself changing from the relative irresponsibility of childhood to the self-guidance of maturity, is the ever-renewed organ of this part of the creative process. What does education do with this infinitely precious gift of God? What ought education to do with it? Answer for yourself. Do our high schools and colleges tend, on the whole, to keep alive the youth's readiness for variation? Do they cultivate his variability, or leave it impulsive, immature, narrow? Do they, perchance, rob him of his variability and make of him a piece of conventional furniture?"[10]

A novel experiment is being conducted at the University of Wisconsin in the experimental college recently inaugurated under the direction of Professor Meiklejohn, former president of Amherst. Under this plan, as I heard him explain it, two hundred youths are engaged in a species of co-operative study. The students do not register for an assortment of "elective" courses; on the contrary, they take a whole field of human culture, in some historical period, and ascertain how men and women adapted themselves to their environment in that period, applying to present-day problems the lessons they have learned. During the first year of the experiment, said Dr. Meiklejohn, the cultural epoch selected was Ancient Greece; next year it may be the Middle Ages.

This brings us to a vital way in which character development

[10] Geo. A. Coe, *What Ails Our Youth?* p. 46.

may be fostered: through student co-operation; i. e., giving the members of a class practical problems to work out in groups. Various forms of student self-government offer further opportunities for developing responsibility and initiative. There is also a rich field for character training through activites such as membership in orchestras or glee clubs, participation in publishing the school or college paper, managing a school bank, making flower-boxes and apparatus for the laboratory, and so on. These activities inculcate unselfishness, loyalty, co-operation, and the spirit of service. "Nor should it be overlooked," says Neumann, "that services of this kind draw the pupils more closely to their school. It is a matter of familiar observation that people are apt to become more firmly attached to an institution by reason of what they themselves do for it than by virtue of what it does for them. Young people who have helped to build a school playground or prepare a school garden are much more likely to keep the grounds in good shape than are those who come into a place where everything has been made ready for them beforehand. Like adults they cherish that to which they have given themselves."[11]

A striking illustration of the constructive results of this sort of student activity is given by a case wherein the members of a civics class at a certain high school arranged for a series of public meetings with addresses by experts, to arouse interest in community improvement. As a result of these meetings, they helped to secure the establishment of a system of garbage collection, the appointment of a municipal nurse, the laying out of a park, and the provision of a bathing beach with bath-houses for the people of the community. Here was a fine example of training for citizenship through voluntary co-operation in work for social ends.

Recently the country has been shocked by the large number of college students who have committed suicide. During a period of about six months it was said that more than twenty-five such cases had occurred. The epidemic—for such it may almost be called—has not been confined to any one institution, nor to any one section of the country. Cases have been reported from widely scattered States, and the students have been enrolled at all sorts of colleges and universities, from aristocratic endowed institutions in the East

[11] Henry Neumann, *Education for Moral Growth,* p. 207.

to corn-belt State universities in the West, and at large schools and small ones alike. Most of the suicides were young men, but there were several girls in the list. Even the high schools have not been exempt from such tragedies.

Surely there must be something radically wrong when in a day and age such as ours, with unrivaled educational opportunities for youth and all the inventions of modern science which make our lives so much more comfortable than those of our ancestors, young men and women in the full bloom of adolesence should lose interest in life, see no object or advantage in going on living, and even find existence so unbearable that they resort to self-destruction.

All sorts of alleged reasons for these cases of *felo de se* have been advanced in the press, such as disappointment in love, discouragement over failure in studies, reading of occult literature, financial troubles, ill-health, and so on. It would appear that none of these reasons, except perhaps ill-health in some instances, really had much to do with the fundamental causes of the tragedies. Furthermore, since the cases of ill-health reported seem to have been largely mental, we have to go back farther to find the real cause of the trouble.

Careful analysis reveals that the problem is essentially one of lack of adjustment, a sense of bewilderment in the midst of a complex situation, resulting in brooding, worry, and mental aberration.

Nor is the genesis of the maladjustment far to seek. When a youth comes to college he is thrown into a novel environment, where he has to meet many difficult problems of conduct and to fit himself into the scheme of things. But he does not know how to "find" himself; or, as it is sometimes expressed, he is unable to "orient" himself to the new milieu in which he is placed.

In this connection, Professor Coe remarks: "The so-called 'orientation courses' for freshmen are a recognition of certain of these needs, particularly the need for thinking the different college subjects in relation to one another. The results appear to be good, as far as they go. They are signs of a new intellectual seriousness in some of the colleges. Much more, however, is necessary; namely, a critique of modern life, not only at the beginning of the college

course, but throughout it, and related to every part of the instruction."[12]

Take, for instance, the average boy from a small town, or even from an ordinary home in a fairly large city. What has he really learned about life? He has probably had a good bringing-up by his parents. He has gone through the grade school and the high school, where he has acquired a smattering of knowledge. His parents probably had little schooling themselves; they have believed in the efficacy of simple, old-fashioned rules which satisfied them because they did not have to grapple with the problems of this post-war and jazz age.

No doubt the boy was sent to Sunday school, where he was taught the old orthodox religious beliefs, and supposed that the Bible contains the scientific truth about the creation of the world and the origin of man. He read about Adam and Eve, about the Flood and Noah's Ark, about the Tower of Babel, and other Old Testament stories. He was taught, in addition, the creeds of his own particular denomination. But he learned little, if anything, about other churches and their different points of view, and of course nothing at all about the history of religion or modern Biblical criticism.

In science, at high school, his education was probably confined to a smattering of zoölogy, chemistry, and physics. He learned nothing of the revolutionary discoveries in astronomy, biology, and dynamics, from electrons and protoplasm to galaxies of suns a million light-years distant, and from protoplasm to man.

When the boy enters college he takes courses in geology and suddenly learns that the earth was evolved millions of years ago, instead of the six thousand of traditional Biblical chronology. He studies fossils of early forms of life, and he finds that life has been a slow and painful evolution through many aeons of time. He discovers that millions of years ago the highest form of life was the fish, followed by the amphibians, and then the age of reptiles. He sees in the museum the skeletons of great dinosaurs that roamed the earth in those far-off days. Then he learns how the mammals and the birds evolved out of the reptiles, and how all the different families of mammals—the horse, the dog, the elephant, the cat, the monkey—became specialized for different environments and

[12] Coe, *op. cit., p.* 27.

habits of life. He learns, also, how the continents rose and fell, how the ice advanced and retreated, and how the great coal beds were laid down by decaying vegetable matter accumulated during untold thousands of years in the immense semi-tropical swamps. It is a strange and very bewildering new world to which our youth is being introduced.

Then, perhaps he takes courses in biology and anthropology, and discovers that man first appeared on the earth a million instead of only six thousand years ago. He sees reconstructions of Pithecanthropus, of Neanderthal man, the Piltdown man, the Heidelberg man, and various other specimens of early humanity. He learns, to his surprise, that man, instead of having popped up like Jonah's gourd in a night, slowly evolved through hundreds of thousands of years, from a creature that was half animal into *homo sapiens*.

All this naturally proves a severe jolt to his belief in the Bible as a whole. In a brief time he is wondering whether there is "anything in" the religion he was taught in childhood. In nine cases out of ten he quickly becomes a half-baked agnostic or atheist, for he has not the materials with which to work out a constructive religious attitude or philosophy of life to take the place of the discredited inherited faith.

Meanwhile, he begins to learn about sex. He probably reads many modern works dealing with sex problems, and finds therein facts about sex that upset all the old-fashioned ideas he brought with him from home. Indeed, the chances are that his parents taught him nothing about sex and allowed him to grow up in ignorance of this vital subject, until the sex-crisis of adolescence is upon him.

Such a young man usually is sound at heart; he wants to do what is right and honorable, but his old standards have been uprooted, and he cannot without intelligent and sympathetic aid construct new standards which will appeal to his intelligence.

What are we going to do about it? We must find some practical means to fit the student into his new world. Coe offers an excellent suggestion when he says: "What would happen if the whole of the high school and college curriculum were to be organized around such questions as these: What shall I need to do, and therefore to know, as a voter, a taxpayer, a married person, a

parent, a member of a church, a member of the community; especially, what are the unsolved problems of life and society, and what decisions may I be called upon to make? What are my resources for rational and lasting happiness? Why is there so much unhappiness? Why don't we get rid of ancient, recognized evils? What is valid, if anything, in Oriental judgments upon Western civilization? What is the relation of my present practices and habits to my future occupation, and to the well-being of society? Some such forward look toward the vocation of living is the thing that is needed to bring health to our colleges. Some colleges have taken steps in this direction, and the results seem to be promising."[13]

I have already spoken of the "orientation" courses. Probably this, for many colleges and universities, may prove to be the best means of attacking the problem. Such courses will give the student a broad, general survey of the new world in which he is living and show him its significance. He will be encouraged to read thought-provoking books of the day, and to pass intelligent criticism upon them, in the spirit of Bacon's counsel:

> "Read, not to contradict and confute, nor to believe and take for granted, nor to find talk and discourse, but to weigh and consider."

Thus will he be assisted to "orient" himself to his environment, and to hook the new knowledge up with his own experience. And he will learn something about many things of which he had never thought before.

If he takes a number of such courses, he will be led to a new synthesis of knowledge. Although he may have to abandon many of the beliefs which he formerly held, he will find worthy realities to take their place. He will see his relation to his fellows in a constructive way, and will have the material wherewith to build a personal philosophy that will give a meaning and a purpose to life—at least for him. He will have a sense of the significance and value of human effort that will tend to make this a better world, not only for the present generation but for those that are to come after. In short, such a training will develop personality and character for the oncoming duties and responsibilities of life.

I have reserved for the last a discussion of the place of athletics

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 26.

in character training. "The purpose of education to-day, "says Hicks, joining the general chorus of educators, "is in a great measure directed to the making of good citizens. Athletics, when pursued with moderation, to a great degree solves the problem of physical development. It also becomes the laboratory where many of the good and bad traits of character are acquired—therefore its office in the moral training of the student. . . . The athletic field is the great common ground where every man proves his merit or worthlessness. It is the final analysis of character, and he succeeds or fails because of what he really is."[14]

But character cannot be developed by restraint, repression, or prohibition; it requires the atmosphere of freedom for its healthy growth. "The character of the boy," declares Ehler, "is determined most largely by the habits and ideals that are prevalent among those with whom he associates, the environment of his real life. Here is where he goes wrong or works out his own salvation. It is in the activities of this free life of play and through the associations and relationships that are here formed that the fundamental virtues or vices get their grip upon mind and heart."[15]

Since the influence of athletics and sport in general may be markedly for good or ill, the function of the athletic instructor is to give to those in his charge the right kind of leadership. A well-known athletic coach cites many instances in his experience on the athletic field in which, through personal contact with young men, undesirable character traits were eliminated and the right ones developed.

At high school and college age, competitive play is a dominant interest of the youth. Rightly directed athletics, therefore, offer unusual opportunities for character training. "This form of activity," continues Ehler, "presents daily innumerable opportunities for the practice of the precepts and maxims that home and school have taught. If the environment is favorable, the reactions tend to the establishment of right habits of thought and action. If the environment is unfavorable, anti-social, unethical and immoral habits will result. The environment is determined by the character of the

[14] C. S. Hicks, "The Influence of Faculty Supervision on the Moral Effects of Athletics in High Schools and Colleges," *Journal of Proceedings, N. E. A.*, 1912, p. 1147.

[15] Geo. W. Ehler, "Athletics an Essential Moral Factor," in *Journal of Proceedings, N. E. A.*, 1912, p. 1151.

leadership supplied." Given the right leadership, lessons of right and wrong can be driven home at the psychological moment, when they will make the deepest impression. "Athletics provide for an expression of youthful instinct and interest that is vital to the development of character. It is an essential factor in any scheme of moral education."[16]

The great value of athletics is in the development of the physique, on the one hand, and on the other in the building up of such qualities as courage and self-confidence and the teaching of the spirit of fair-play, unselfishness, give and take, team-work, quick thinking, loyalty to the group—*esprit du corps*. The art of "playing the game" is a schooling in social ethics. "What does a member of the football team care for battered shins or earth-scraped hands? His side has won, and his own gains and losses are forgotten. Soon his team goes forth against an outside team, and now the honor of the whole school is in his keeping. What pride is his! As he puts on his uniform, he strips off his isolated personality and stands forth as the trusted champion of an institution."[17]

Physical education, because of its unique value in character building, should be accessible in some form to every student, whether boy or girl. Good health is the necessary foundation for lasting success and happiness in life, and "a sound mind in a healthy body" should be the ideal for all. No less an authority than the late President Eliot, in an address to the incoming students at Harvard, said quite frankly:

"So far as I have seen, there is one indispensable foundation for the satisfactions of life—health. A young man ought to be a clean, wholesome, vigorous animal. That is the foundation for everything else, and I hope you will all be that, if you are nothing more. We have to build everything in the world of domestic joy and professional success, everything of a useful, honorable career, on bodily wholesomeness and vitality."[18]

The mental and spiritual fruits of good health are so obvious as hardly to need elaboration. "Other things being equal, boys and girls will bring to their tasks minds more alert, spirits more cheerful, and wills more energetic if their bodies are sound. Particularly in adolescence many are apt to entertain morbid fears which better

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 1151.

[17] Palmer, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-40.

[18] Charles W. Eliot, *The Durable Satisfactions of Life*, p. 3.

health can do far more to banish than continued exhortations to cheer up and be brave. The same may be said of other nervous disorders. Frequently they require most of all a proper physical regimen."[19]

All of the various factors that I have tried to summarize herein have their place in character training. The problem in every case will be to adjust one to the other so that each will be given its proper emphasis, thereby insuring a well-rounded development for every boy and girl.

[19] Neumann, *op. cit.*, p. 295.

CYNICISM AS A NECESSITY

BY HARRY SOOTIN

THERE are times both in the life-history of man and in the life-history of a civilization when cynicism acquires an excellent reason for existence. And when this stage is reached, its poking force is very much more in order than any beautifully expressed belief in man, or any everlasting faith in his progress. To show that we have reached this point in our economic and social evolution is the purpose of what follows.

Cynicism, as has often been pointed out, is nothing more than a thwarted, inverted idealism. And to seek reasons for this doubting, skeptical slant on life, we have only to refer to that concentrated mirror of our time—the newspaper. Individuals to whom the news perusal habit has not become a brain deadening drug usually find in the fat, advertising-filled journals an unfailing cause of profound depression. The insane proceedings of leagues and committees, the platitudinous statements of eminent public figures, the sordid interest in petty crimes, the stories of graft-infested cities, and the generally stupid utterances of powerful officials,—these certainly are not conducive to any soul-stirring optimism.

Considering the conditions which prevail in large urban centers, where millions of people live on a few square miles of the earth's surface without any stabilizing attachment to the soil or to an art, it will be seen that the attitude of cynicism is the only one that will assert the individual. Surrounded at every hand by influences which never cease to stress his smallness and unimportance, he must, if he wishes to exist as a human being and not as a member of a mob, assume a belligerent attitude—the only one that will enable him to maintain his precious consciousness of self.

Therefore he commences to look about critically; he begins to

resist the omnipresent influence of the skyscrapers and huge buildings which tend to depress his ego. If he lets himself be permeated with the feeling that he is a weak creature living in the shadow of things that are strong, powerful, eternal—then he automatically surrenders his spiritual freedom. It follows of necessity that he will regard whatever he finds established very uncritically. For how can he, a solitary helpless mortal, dare to look askance at what is ever so much stronger than he is?

Thus we have in our complicated transit systems, in our large industrial enterprises, in our towering apartment houses, and in our endless city crowds, forces that tend to destroy the independence of the individual and to make of him nothing more than a spiritless type. If men with the gifts of a Dante or a Goethe were to grow up in this chilly environment, in all probability they would have to protect their personalities with the armor of cyncism in order to avoid being crushed. The chances are that their work would contain the satirical thrusting element to a great degree. For they would at all costs have succumbed to the necessity of escaping this feeling of comparative smallness which the city surroundings are so apt to induce.

It is indeed true that the creators of the city's glories were men like ourselves; that they did their work well; and that they derived the greatest pleasure from their successes. But it is also true that the succeeding generations find the atmosphere of *things done* into which they are born intensely stifling. Ease and comfort are there, to be sure; but as far as the utilization of the creative energies of youth goes, opportunities are sadly lacking. We cannot escape the fact that human beings must fill the thousands of small jobs which the industrial pioneers succeeded in developing; and that human beings must fit into the ponderous institutions which men of great foresight and abilities had brought into existence.

This, in short, is the situation which to an ever increasing extent exists in our great cities today. Anyone who has had the uncomfortable experence of looking for a job will recognize the truth of the psychological effects noted above. The best of the young men, the type who might have been pioneers themselves, given the proper conditions, actively resent the predicament into which their late arrival has forced them. If they should rebelliously attempt to strike out for themselves, it is quite possible that they may succeed

in attaining an independent economic foothold; but in most cases, because of the competition from large organizations, the odds are definitely against them.

In most cases these rebels learn to restrain their feelings, especially after their lack of restraint is quickly followed by a sharp awareness that one must live and eat. So they jump into small jobs, work hard, and optimistically hope that promotion will soon follow to soothe their hamstring ambitions. As for the rest—the great majority of young men, they easily fall into line, happy to secure a safe berth and destined to remain forever oblivious of the fact that their abilities have had no outlet.

It is in the bottled energies of the former more restless class, however, that a society finds a destructive cleansing force. The resentment and the hatred that the suppression engenders soon manifests itself in a desire to pull down, to destroy—and then to build anew. After all, this tendency is a healthy one, for it puts to test the different parts of the inherited economic and social organisms. And if these products of the labor of old men and dead men cannot change to meet conditions, or cannot survive the rigors of a stock-taking, then it is best that they be replaced by those that can.

Man has never looked kindly at the dynamic element in life. Where the human body was concerned he could do nothing but submit to old age and death; but where the achievements of his own brain and skill entered, he strained every nerve and muscle to win permanence. He built for the next generation, he planned for years to come, he created institutions which he hoped would exist forever.

What happened, however, was that the generations which succeeded these inspired builders forgot that what met their eyes was only the work of human beings like themselves. The newcomers looked, were impressed, and then prostrated themselves. They did not perceive that the objects of worship had a far from miraculous origin; and that the great structures were the products of human efforts and human errors. This point of view was impossible, for men were quickly impressed with the strength of the existing creations; they could only feel how utterly preposterous it would be for people like themselves even to think of improving or reconstructing.

But youth does not like this humbling of spirit: the more sensi-

tive and capable the individual, the more resentful he is. For the growing spring-like qualities of a civilization are always stirring in the strong-minded youth, and the consciousness of this makes him distrustful of anything that threatens to rob him of the air and light that he needs so much. He refuses to worship, he refuses to be grateful for the safety that is forced upon him; and when he takes these steps toward affirming his "self," when he takes the offensive as far as his spirit and intelligence is concerned, he falls right into the cynical mind-set. Which brings us to the question of what cynicism means.

Perhaps the best way to understand cynicism is to show how it differs from the sophistication with which it is so often confused. The cynical mind is honest: it is free of the pretence, the affected smartness, and the inane laughter of the sophisticated one. The cynical mind weighs what it sees, without allowing itself to be bluffed by any superficial appearance of solidity, piousness, or rectitude. It laughs and questions and doubts: it tears away the coating of half-truths and lies which make difficult any true evaluation of the character of an institution or an individual. Cynicism has absolutely nothing in common with sophistication, which is a product of social decay and of spiritual senescence. The smile of the sophisticate is little more than an egoistical assertion of a weak self for the purpose of experiencing the pallid thrill of being "different." The smile of the cynic is active, it is belligerent, it requires intellectual stamina. Alongside of it the laughter of sophistication seems like bloodless sneering.

In the last analysis, the essential difference between cynicism and sophistication, or even between cynicism and the meek, receptive attitude of the great mass of people, is that the former is a rejuvenating, humanizing force, while the others are not. If man is to escape the domination of the things which clutter up his horizon, if he is to be anything besides a large piece of short-lived protoplasm, then he must rise above the brick-mortar-and-steel deities that loom up and oppress him with their invisible strength. And to do this he must learn to rely on purifying, invigorating laughter . . . . the laughter that will make him superior to *things* . . . . laughter that will make him free.

With this in mind, let us proceed to examine several widespread distortions present in the popular mind to an amazing degree.

Then we shall try to show how a dash of cynicism would quickly bring the needed clear-mindedness into the situation.

First we have the phenomenon of personification, by which the vast resources of large corporations are identified with the individuals who have become wealthy through their control. It is this, perhaps, more than anything else, that is at the bottom of the vast respect and reverence rendered our millionaires. Since personal contact between the subway riders and the limousine owners is impossible because of social differences, a flowery myth has grown up around the latter. They are regarded as an extraordinary people, gifted with almost superhuman powers and energies. And aided by amiable newspapers, the public reads of every activity of great wealth cliques with wonder and admiration,—whether it be fox-hunting, the purchase of million dollar paintings, or hotel horse-shows.

Now there may be no harm in the accumulation of money through commercial astuteness, or in spending it as the same astute temperament pleases. But there is something wrong when certain men possessing certain faculties which lead to great pecuniary successes, are held up as ideals for the youth, and as authorities on all questions—even educational and religious.

One important point generally overlooked is that merchant princes and small shop-keepers are fundamentally alike both in the trading nature of their occupation, and in the characteristics that their business requires. The difference between the two is chiefly one of degree of evolution, the owner of a news-stand being a potential department store owner. It is strange, therefore, to find ourselves regarding the small struggling store-keeper with commiseration and very often contempt, and at the same time looking up to his wealthier cousin with incredible awe.

Another example of loose thinking, and one more often noticed, is the elastic morality of gambling. Horse-racing, lotteries, roulette wheels, dice, pitching pennies—are all taboo as far as self-respecting and law-abiding citizens are concerned. But when it comes to gambling with the nation's industries by way of Wall Street stocks, or to speculating with apartment houses which contain the homes of hundreds of thousands of human beings, there seems to be little restraint, either from conscience or from public opinion. Or to consider the ever-increasing practice of playing

with the laws of probability, we have the large-scale gambling in the form of insurance against death, against rain, and against almost any undesirable event. Here again we see out-and-out inconsistancies, and again these are due more to surface judgments than to any recognized standard. For instance, would a man who made a fortune by rolling dice, have as secure a social position as one who made an equal amount on the stock market?

Then there is that very definite line we draw between bankers and persons who lend money on a small scale. The pawn-broker, for instance, advances comparatively small sums: he does this on proper security and he charges interest. But to the romantic public he is a figure for ridicule, and novelists and scenario writers have done little to correct this prejudice. What we cannot seem to discern is that the small money-lender is in exactly the same business as his more prosperous banker colleague, who does his work in mahogany and marble surroundings. Perhaps if men grasped this fact, the concept that the successful banker is the embodiment of all that is desirable in human beings would begin to fade.

In connection with this we should not fail to mention the awe that fills us on being introduced to an heir to a vast fortune, or to one who has already inherited great properties. Certainly if anyone is to be given credit for possessing the awesome millions, it is the man who amassed them. Regardless of the social position of his children, they certainly had nothing to do with being born to the family for the purpose of becoming the heirs. Hence any profound respect for the inheritors, or any speechlessness resulting from a meeting with the same people, is absolutely senseless.

Here again the inability to distinguish the points involved, the inability to resist being overpowered by the tremendous power implied in the feeling of wealth, is an indication of servility. And to conquer this feeling, the individual exposed to its strength must not only be aware of its unfoundedness, but he must also find it ridiculous. After a little intelligent consideration he must be able to laugh at it. For with the arrival of real understanding comes the doubt and the smile. Then he has asserted his "self"—he has asserted his right to evaluate. In other words, he has become free.

Passing from men and things to ideas, we find a bondage to the products of the printing press which is comparable to that

rendered to teen-storied buildings and well known names of social standing. It seems that men must always worship: and in the absence of a gripping religious force they fall back on the vicarious thrill derived from the use of mouth-to-mouth expressions like "service," "constructive criticism," and "cooperation." These words, representing ideas that originally were probably praise-worthy and well-founded, have swept across the country and are now being applied to innumerable situations, regardless of whether or not they fit. The strangest interpretations are made; but since these slogans are supported by the very highest authorities, it is impossible for most of us even to suspect that anything could be wrong in their indiscriminate application.

For instance, "constructive criticism" which has become so common a term in every branch of life, was probably invented to discourage petty fault-findings by carping individuals. But in its popularization, the term "destructive critic" has, as often as not, become a weapon against important and highly necessary criticism. It is being used to discourage efforts to change habits, to introduce new ideas, or to effect improvements. The average person finds his morale badly damaged when accused of criticizing things out of pure cussedness. For this reason it is often sufficient to throw the words "destructive criticism" and all that goes with it, into the face of anyone who should disagree with us, in order to put a halt to that person's annoying activities.

If we analyze the thought behind the word "cooperation" it will be quickly seen that the idea is altogether different from the one implied in its current use. It signifies willingness, a voluntary desire to help towards some end. But how do we find it being used by thousands of imitative intelligences?—Just as another way of commanding, an indirect way of getting people to follow a certain line of action without any regard for their preferences.

Of course there is still a large number of cases where it is used properly; but the point is that in countless instances the word has been perverted into a clever way for forcing people to do as they are told,—with a minimum amount of friction. Men are told that they "must cooperate" . . . . What a ludicrous statement! But even more ludicrous is the fact that so few are able to perceive the humor of this inconsistency. The respect for the expression is so great, and the consciousness of its good standing among successful

men so frightening, that any sort of calm consideration of it is impossible.

As for "service," the third of this remarkable trio, it especially, has been worked almost to death in the strenuous efforts made by large organizations to create "good will." Royalty once monopolized the idea of "serving;" then statesmen got hold of it. But today it has become the precious inheritance of great industrial enterprises who hold it up as an ideal, and who try hard to instill the conviction that they are to all intents and purposes philanthropic institutions. Instead of candidly admitting that they existed for the purpose of paying dividends, and then showing that in doing so they were developing the natural resources of the nation and giving employment to thousands of citizens, they unnaturally attempt to cloak the entire business with an attitude of benevolence. The whole procedure smacks of a certain disagreeable falseness that somehow is not noticed in the general gulping down.

What it all sums up to, is that the city-bred man of today is intellectually servile and dispirited. He gives credence to ideas like those described above because he sees them in print, because they seem backed by authority. Not having been trained to sift ideas, and separated as he is from the hard sense and stabilizing strength of the soil, he soon loses his healthy and almost instinctive preference for simple reasoning. Thus in a short time he becomes as foot-loose intellectually, as the city environment forces him to become physically.

As would be expected, we find him falling easy prey to innumerable scientific charlatans. He accepts whole-heartedly, for instance, baseless generalizations concerning racial supremacy; he is absolutely convinced by scientific "experiments" which prove conclusively that the blonde flapper is more intelligent than the brunette or vice versa. He is deeply impressed by complicated equations which show the rate at which Chinese children learn spelling; he has complete faith in studies which prove that alcoholic beverages are poisonous or beneficial—depending on the newspaper.

Should he come across statements contrary to what he has considered to be true, he very meekly changes his mind. For who is he to set his hit-and-miss brain against the bulls-eye intellects of the experts? And how can he be so bold as to doubt, when his

scientific background and abilities are as nothing compared with those of the well trained specialists?

What is so much needed here is the touch of the cynic, the magic touch that would quickly strengthen the city man's intellectual backbone. For expert or no expert, he has the right to ask questions, and to demand clarification as to the general methods which led to the conclusions. Whether or not the ordinary mind is capable of understanding all the details of an experiment or of a scholarly study does not matter. What the non-technical mind can understand, is the pattern of the evidence which led to the final conclusions; for these patterns are usually of a simple logical nature, comprehensible to most, regardles of special training.

Fundamentally, we have here a situation similar to the one gone into earlier in this article. In other words, the edifice representing the accumulated learning of the times has assumed such awe-inspiring proportions that it is inducing a squelching effect of the same nature as that induced by the gigantic physical creations. Psychologically there is very little difference between the two. It is easy therefore, for unscrupulous people to take advantage of the blind reverence for whatever goes under the name of "science," and then proceed to bully the newspaper-fed public into a firm belief in unsupported assertions. When the men who laid the foundations of the sciences did their work, it was not difficult for the laymen to understand what it was all about, and how it affected them. But now, the intricacies of scientific research is so great that men are afraid to ask questions, they have even lost the basic knowledge they once had.

It is perhaps these facts, more than those generally included under the headings "Education" and "Background," that make the prevalence of the stereotyped mind easier to understand. We are all affected by physical and psychological forces that surround us: we are all affected by the symbols of authority, great power, and of permanence with which our environment is filled. Nourished and raised in this unescapable atmosphere of "things done," men cannot help but acquire a certain sameness of thought and feeling.

To sum up the points made above: If youth is to retain its freshness of spirit, its freedom of thought, and its desire to create—it must thrust aside the heavy restraining "Established" which is constantly weighing down and humbling it. If the present stage

of civilization is not the forerunner of a sickly old-age period, then its activities must be quickened with the energetic blood of youth. And to do this rejuvenating, the cynical turn of mind must be developed. The chances are that it will, whether we like it or not. To repeat, it is the doubt, the question, and the smile, which can shield the free spirit, and which puts to rout the subtle enslaving influences. We need laughter to purify man, to clear his eyes, and to bring back to him the strength and the courage that are part of his natural life.

THE HUMOROUS SIDE OF THE SERIOUS

BY ROBERT SPARKS WALKER

AS serious as she appears to be, Nature is sometimes very humorous. From the high flying eagle to the humble doodlebug in the dry sheltered soil, and to the lowly ant that sneaks into the pantry, there is a touch of humor as rare and as rich as the amusing product found in the human family.

And, it is not always the animal life that monopolizes the humorous actions that cause the observer to see the amusing side. For example, an opening flower will sometimes get itself into a very ridiculous situation, and the person who has a trained eye for observing the amusing sight will see in the face of the helpless flower bud an expression that is certain to beget laughter. Almost every week during the months of July and August, I find an unfortunate bud of the wild sweet-potato which has gotten itself into a rather amusing situation.

The flower-bud of a wild sweet-potato vine measures about two inches long, is cream colored, and reminds one of a small cigar. Hungry beetles and voracious caterpillars eat holes in this vine's foliage. The wind sometimes blows one of the perforated leaves over the flower-bud. The wild sweet-potato usually opens its floral bud early in the morning before daylight. When one of its flower-buds gets its head through a hole in a leaf, it cannot open, and there it sits and grunts and groans, securely shackled throughout the day, and while its brother blossoms are spread wide open and are entertaining insect beaux, it seemingly begs for assistance. As soon as the leaf is slipped off, the bud gets a hump on itself and spreads like a person opens a parasol, provided the handicap is removed before midday.

A few years ago, I went to Wildwood, Georgia to assist in

making a motion picture of the Periodical Cicada, or Seventeen-year locust as it emerged from the ground, ascended a tree and slipped off the old skin jacket, which it had been wearing for seventeen long years without laundering or starching. A person who knows anything at all about this insect, knows that it has the habit of emerging from the ground during the night. On the evening that was set for it to come forth at Wildwood, a heavy downpour of rain that afternoon had brought Lookout Creek out of its banks. The torrents went on a wild spree and the overflow had filled the thousands of holes which had previously been dug by the cicadas. The water held them to the ground in their earthen chambers.

By morning the flood had receded. During the forenoon that wooded land was the busiest place I have visited in many years. The locusts were coming forth from the ground by tens of thousands, climbing the trees and splitting their old skins. Slowly but surely each one crawled out, leaving the old husk firmly anchored to the rough bark of the tree. It presented as humorous a spectacle as one might find at some summer resort where the outdoor crowd has been soaked in a heavy downpour of rain. It was amusing as the presentation by expert actors of Shakespeare's Twelfth Night.

In the year 1925 some parts of the South experienced one of the severest drouths ever recorded. I happened to be living in the drouth-stricken area. One Sunday, the middle of June, before the drouth reached its worst state, I visited a farmer living on the Chicamauga Creek, seven miles east of Chattanooga. We were walking through his meadow when I observed tens of thousands of weed pests known as bracted plantain which had gone to seed. There were also other weeds like wild asters, flea-banes, trumpet creeper, and swamp loosestrife, all green. I suggested that if the drouth persisted two weeks longer that he might touch a match to the meadow and destroy the bracted plantain with its hundreds of millions of seeds before they fully matured.

As we walked along, he unconsciously acted on my suggestion, removed a match from his vest pocket, struck it and dropped it into the weeds. The blaze that followed startled us completely. As green as the vegetation seemed to be, it quickly ignited. The flames spread speedily over an acre of ground, and burned rapidly in two directions. Bracted plantain and other weed pests fell as gracefully before the flames as if they were being cut with a mowing machine.

There were tens of thousands of grasshoppers feasting in that field, all ages, all sizes. When the flames disturbed their peace, they leaped into the air and struggled frantically to escape. So numerous were they that the air was almost darkened by their flight ahead of the long fire line. There was a wild stampede for a few feet in front where they took wing and fled. Up they flew by the thousands, some like old grey bearded men grasshoppers, wobbly from age, hobbling with canes! Young men grasshoppers with hats and canes in hands! Boy grasshoppers fleeing bare-footed! Flapper grasshoppers scurrying wildly in advance of the crackling fire!

Onward the population thus moved. The flames steamed and sizzled and crackled, but void of other sounds save the clattering of grasshopper wing cases. The host of tenants moved steadily onward. However, with all the wild excitement, no grasshopper citizen stirred until the blaze had advanced near enough that it could feel the heat.

By standing in direct line of the stampede, I sensed ten thousand grasshopper feet that roughened my cheek and neck as they flew wildly through the air, careless of what they were running up against. I wrinkled the skin on my nose and face a thousand times under the tickling sensation of rough unshod grasshopper feet. Like a traffic officer handling a mob of human pedestrians, I kept my arms in constant motion forcing the wild creatures away from my face. Without a single traffic policeman of their own tribe to manage the large crowd, if there were one boy or girl, or man or woman grasshopper burned, I did not learn about the tragedy. A dozen times or more, I investigated the fire-line, but no grasshopper was stupid enough to let the flames reach his body, and none was so terribly confused that it fled towards the blaze instead of away from it!

What would an equal number of human beings have done under a similar catastrophe, with a raging fire in their midst as large as this one? Of the many experiences that I have had with insect life, this is one of the most amusing that I have witnessed in many years.

In the meanwhile, this farmer's rat-terrier had treed a box turtle in a nearby pea patch. When we reached the house, we saw the dog was carrying the boxed up pedestrian in his mouth. The turtle's hard shell was slobber-soaked. Whatever the dog thought the animal was, I do not profess to know, unless he believed it to

be an animated bone of some sort, for when he reached the house, he carried it into the garden and buried it!

Back to the turtle-field the dog hurried, and succeeded in finding and in bringing in four other box turtles all of which he interred in his turtle-burying ground. It was no punishment for the box turtles, for they had simply been cast into a turtle's heaven! As soon as the dog was off guard, the turtle opened his front window, clawed out of the prison and was soon tramping lightly back home! But when the slow traveler was passing the house, the terrier lifted his ears in surprise, ran out, grabbed the hard-shelled trophy up, carried it back and re-interred it in his turtle-graveyard. This put the dog on guard, and thereafter he tried to keep a keener vigil on his burial grounds. However, despite his watchfulness, his victims were shrewd enough to slip out of the ground and make their escape.

Many animals possess human traits. Even the detested housefly and other flies are somewhat human-like in their manners. In my city, the superintendent of the construction work for a gas company, tells me that in sending men out to seek gas leaks, that he cautions them to be on the lookout for green flies, for these green complectioned aviators disclose the gas leaks by gathering about them in great numbers.

Like the human being who seeks his fill of moonshine liquor, and who sometimes gets poisoned on a swallow of wood alcohol, these green flies seek the gas leaks, and there they sit and absorb the ill smelling stuff until their bodies turn greener and greener, and sooner or later, one by one they topple over dead!

To my peach and persimmon trees there come every evening just at dusk in summertime, thousands of hard-shelled May beetles which alight on the green foliage and devour it. Just as it grows dark I can see them buzzing about in swarms between me and the sky, and when I turn on the flashlight under the branches, the light reveals here and there a beetle sitting astride the leaf-edge taking in food to last it until the following evening. When I touch one of these beetles, it turns loose and makes no attempt to fly, but drops into the grass at my feet, hiding in the herbage. Thus it preserves its life.

I sometimes wonder who first taught those beetles about the habits of the insectivorous birds,—those that are fond of snapping

up just such beetles in daytime! How do these beetles know that birds which are fond of beetles come to the peach and persimmon trees while the sun is shining? How do they know that if they themselves should also go there in daytime to feast that instead of feasting they would be feasted on, and that their race would be threatened with extinction? At any rate, it is a humorous sight to witness these beetles emerging at evening from the grass in which they have been concealed. And then they go boldly to their green dinner tables at a time they are sure that the birds have gone to roost!

It is a hot day in August that I am writing these observations and notes, and as the perspiration flows from my forehead and cheeks, and while my stomach fusses for a cool refreshment of some kind, a fidgety brown wren intensifies my thirst by alighting in front of my open window, and bobbing his stubby tail up and down, screams loudly into my ears in pure English, *"Sherbet! sherbet! sherbet!"*

A False Newspaper Report

It is not an easy matter to feel that it is just as natural for a man to perish as it is for a clump of grass to wither. Love of friends and family, love of pleasure, and a desire to accumulate property, and best of all the craving to achieve something worth while, are some of the things that make a person struggle to live.

It is a fact that we seldom heed the sad event which we call death until it concerns our immediate family. Every being, no matter how deeply he is engrossed in his personal affairs, and those of the world, at intervals, must seriously meditate on this event which is surely coming to him.

But, really, to hear that you are dead, and then to read the fact, not only in the daily newspapers, but to see the glaring tale proclaimed in a special newspaper bulletin, brings one face to face with a subject that he would rather not discuss, and it so arouses his thoughts that he must put to test some act that will prove the report false or true.

When the astounding report of my death came to me, it was during the World War when Germany was sinking every craft of the Allies that she could approach. At five o'clock in the afternoon, I was waiting for a street car one block away from the daily

newspaper office, where special bulletins were being written and displayed almost hourly.

The street car finally came, much belated, and, as usual at that hour not only every seat was occupied, but there was scarcely standing room in the aisle and on the platforms. Just as I squeezed through the crowd into the aisle, I heard a man say, "Yes, he's dead," and then I was startled to hear my name mentioned. "I was acquainted with him," declared another, and I know it is he, since he is the only man by that name who ever lived in this city," and then my name was repeated over and over.

I halted and breathed with some difficulty, as I stood there listening to the conversations and the opinions regarding my character, as is customary when a citizen has passed away. The crowd was so sure of my death that I did not dare dispute the fact at first, and since I was entirely ignorant of the source of their information, the news came as a serious shock to me, though ridiculous. I could not, however, repress a feeling that in all probability the report might be true!

Like a flash, for the moment, I really thought that which I had been listening to probably might be true, but of one thing I was certain: my ability to observe physical bodies was still undestroyed! Tho bring some physical test on which I might rely, I looked over the crowd, peeped out of the window, grasped hold of the leather strap over my head, examined my hands thoroughly, yanked on each of my ears, and I found I still was not robbed of the sense of touch. I took out my watch, and while everything about me seemed natural, yet there was that sensation that I was dreaming. The conversations concerning my demise continued uninterruptedly, and I was quite anxious to learn the details, but dared not make inquiry. When I had traveled a mile, I was confident that I was not literally dead, and I gave a man a weighty slap on his shoulder and said, "Here I am!" He and his companion looked me in the face through excited eyes, and one face paled. The other man was speechless. Finally, one of them said, "A special bulletin posted at the daily newspaper office declares that you lost your life with the sinking of the President Lincoln."

"Ah, that solves the mystery," I told him, "but I believe the report is untrue!" I hurried on through the crowd to the front platform. At intervals, while traveling the rest of the way home,

I had the privilege of listening to further conversations concerning my death by a number of passengers, the most of whom were rank strangers to me. But even after I had convinced myself that there was a mistake somewhere, during the next few minutes, as I listened to the grave discussions of my death, doubts came to my mind that I was really alive and in the flesh!

When I reached home, I was feeling trembly over the reports, and I immediately broke the news to my family. A half hour later, I learned from my neighbors that friends had been calling on them to ascertain if there were any truth in the report. The pastor of the church of which I was a member, had been asked concerning my welfare, and the newpaper reporters had directed their inquiries to my near relatives to avoid agitating grief or uneasiness among the immediate members of my small family.

That evening while en route to the Red Cross headquarters to help in some work, I was driven to the daily newspaper office, and was permitted to behold with my own eyes the large bulletin proclaiming my death! It was an unusual experience, and when I read the display announcement written in heavy script, there I stood shivering in my tracks like some old fool!

That was all there was to it, except for a month afterwards, I was frequently hailed on the streets by friends and acquaintances, who thoughtlessly, though quite naturally, asked many questions, some of which might have been classed as being foolish.

"Was that you who went down with the sinking of the President Lincoln?"

"Didn't you die a few weeks ago?"

"Was that a false report?"

Finding that I was not quite gone from this sphere, a few days later the newspapers reproduced the photograph of a young man who owned my full name, and who lived in a nearby suburb. It was declared that he was the person who lost his life in the sinking of the boat. However, a few weeks later, this young man escaped the briny depths as safely as I, for when the final report was made, the man who bore my full name who really lost his life was a resident of the State of New York, almost a thousand mlies away! This verified report brought me back to normalcy again!

*AL FURQUAN

BY LLOYD MORRIS

"IT is written," said Abid; "be, therefore, not sad, Lord."

We were looking down at a dead elephant from which the ivory had been hewn. Two natives lay near: one, with a broad bladed spear driven through his back between the shoulder blades, was lying face downwards; his head slightly twisted and mouth filled with particles of earth ground up between his teeth, the other lay staring up to the sky, one leg stiffly extended and one knee drawn upwards; the outflung hands clenched round uptorn reeds whose serrated edges had lacerated the fingers as he had plucked in his convulsive act of death. The haft of a knife, with a slight shewing of its double edged blade, projected from his breast a little below and to the left of the breast bone.

The hunters had been hunted and the same hands had robbed them at once of their booty and their life.

The tawny vegetation for a little space was trampled flat. The air shimmered in the heat and silence of the tropic noon; and high, very high directly overhead, a speck poised patient and changelessly in the fierce blue African sky.

"Surely it is ordained that the slayer shall be slain, likewise he that slays; and that all things shall prey on each other."

He gazed athwart the savage sunlight as he spoke; his dark face expressionless, his burnous thrown back, and one delicate hand resting lightly on the haft of the knife in his broad sash; the thin fingers of the other combing down the small beard curling darkly at the point of his chin.

"Does not the creeping weed climb up the stem and strangle

* Al Furquan——— Arabic: derived by Muhammad through the Jews from the Syriac and the Aethopic; where its meaning is Deliverance. In Koranic exegesis it is applied to express Insight, i. e. Deliverance through Insight.

the flower of the forest; is not the voice of my lord the lion heard in the night calling unto Allah for meat; and from afar do the jackal and the vulture journey to the kill . . . these things be known. And the hawk strikes down the dove; and the monkey-people chatter foolishly as they pluck and eat the young corn . . . and women, do they not prey on men. Surely they are as a madness to men. . . . And this thing is true as my lord knowest; for to Lokimi who was as moonlight in the darkness of my heart, I brought death with my hand because of her lover . . . my friend, whom also I slew. And men because they are the greatest of all things they prey on all and on each other . . . this, also, knows my lord; who is my brother, also, since our blood mingled as we slew together, and together lay under the shadow of *Azrael* at the killing in the land beyond this country of low black people. And above men are devils and *afreets* which are a torment unto mankind, decoying them into solitary places there to slay them. And above the devils are there not the gods of the unbelievers: the devil gods of the black people, and the god-spirits of El Weslei and Katoliki and Petero the great cutter of ears all fighting together. . . . Nay, lord, why should we give burial to these dogs? Allah will provide their burial; for it is written, "unto all it is given to be hungry and seek meat." Shall we rob the jackal and the vulture? Moreover it were a great foolishness to toil with the matter of digging when the sun looks down so fiercely. Nevertheless, I will take the knife from the dead one; seeing it is surely a good blade. . . . *Bismillah!*"

In the country of the low black people Abid died long ago; betrayed by a woman to the spears of his enemies. His words remain. They came often to me in the wet, blood bespattered trenches of Flanders and on Eastern Fronts; as I participated in a killing great beyond his dreams, or any his fierce soul ever imagined. They come to me above the voice of the cities as I walk among men in their ways of peace.

Along cold blasted ways within the Arctic circle where the northern lights go wavering over the snow; by fever stricken swamp and tangled jungle within the tropics; storm tossed on icy and desperate seas off the once dreaded Horn; over heat smitten wastes of desert sand where the Simoon lurks behind the mirage—where these roads go down, in offices of duty I passed in earlier years with the heart of high adventure. And when despite eager

youth and its proud physical exultancy, some fateful and tragic happening struck me to sobriety and thoughts on the cruelty of men and things—yet would I bring comfort to myself with the thought that it was only in waste places of earth as yet untamed by civilization that men and things were cruel; and that beyond the wild in the cities and towns wherein man had fenced himself off from raw nature, there was a comity and security wherein something splendid in man labored upwards from the brute.

Now, after the *abbatoir* of Europe with its volume production of organized human butchery; and the *abbatoir* of Peace with its killing by *chicane* and jobbed politics; I look again wistfully back to the trails that I trod in youth, as to a sweet and easy pleasuring. And I take with me and hold fast to the sure knowledge that amid all the tumult of civilization there is a splendid striving after fineness; but knowing also, that whether in the brooding wild, or the capitals of the western world, the saying made to me by Abid in the country of the low black people is a thing of record and of substance; in that the slayer is slain, and likewise he that slays; and that all things prey on each other, since it is given unto all things to be hungry and seek meat—*Bismillah!*

But there is a killing that transcends the mere slaying of the body which rises in the morning and at evening is not.

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JESUS AND HIS FAMILY

BY ROBERT P. RICHARDSON

JESUS ben Joseph was born, most probably, in Nazareth, a Galileian village, whose identity with the place now described by that name is somewhat doubtful. The biblical story of his birth in a manger at Bethlehem has all the marks of a fable invented to make a so-called prophecy come true. None the less the orthodox adhere to this tale, and they give equal credence to the date, December 25, conventionally assigned to the Nativity. Yet it is obviously very suspicious that the celebration of the anniversary of Chirst's birth should coincide with a celebrated pagan feast, that of the *dies natalis solis invicti.* This festival of the winter solstise, consecrated by the pagans to the victory of the sun; to the defeat of darkness by light as evinced by the length of the day beginning to increase, followed on the joyous seven-day "Saturnalia" which was marked by the kindly custom of bestowing gifts upon relatives and friends, in particular of giving dolls to children, and thence can be traced a linear line of descent to our so-called "Christmas gifts" and "Christmas holidays." And an impartial inquirer, bearing in mind that some of the early Christians dated the Nativity at the vernal equinox in March, will be constrained to think that the chance of Christmas day being the true anniversary of the birth of Christ is precisely one in three hundred and sixty five.

We again find a lack of appreciation of patent fact in the clerical chronology which fixed the year of Christ's birth. This, all competent authorities admit, could not possibly have taken place at the beginning of the "Christian era." For according to Holy Scripture Jesus was born in the reign of "Herod the king," and this monarch died in the year 4 B. C. On the other hand, if the date of the birth of Jesus be fixed by that first fiscal census of the

Jewish lands made under the Emperor Augustus by Quirinus (*Luke,* ii, 1-2) then the year must be one coming after the deposition of Archelaus, Herod's son, whose reign covered the period from 4 B. C. to 6 A. D. And as regards Sir William M. Ramsay's recent attempt to reconcile the inconsistencies in the biblical Nativity chronology, Kirsopp Lake well remarks (in his notes to *Eusebius*) that there is "evidence for a former governorship of Quirinius but none for a census under Herod." Evidently the sacred authors had very vague notions of chronology, and probably the passage that comes nearest giving us a clue to the true date of Christ's birth is the statement in *Luke* that in the fifteenth year of the reign of the Emperor Tiberius (i. e. in 29 A. D.) Jesus was "about" thirty years of age.

As regards the ancestry of Jesus we again find a lack of harmony among the sacred authorities. Two quite different genealogies are given, both tracing descent from David to Joseph, the husband of Jesus's mother. *Luke* (iii. 23-38) tells us that Jesus "began to be about thirty years of age, being (as was supposed) the son of Joseph, which was the son of Heli, which was the son of Matthai" this pedigree running up to David and thence to Adam. An unprejudiced reader, realizing there could be no *raison d'etre* for the genealogy unless Jesus really was the son of Joseph, could only infer that the parenthetical "as was supposed" was the interpolation of some redactor and not a part of the original passage. The genealogy given by *Matthew* (i. 1-16) is quite incompatible with the pedigree recorded by Luke but has this much in common with it that both authors are obviously taking pains to show that Jesus was descended from David and are satisfied that their purpose has been fulfilled when the Davidic descent of Joseph has been demonstrated; in other words they hold that Joseph was the physical father of Jesus. The *Gospel of Matthew,* as the Church has handed it down to us, traces the ancestry of Jesus from Abraham down to David and thence to Joseph, making the latter however the son, not of Matthai, but of Jacob, and then describing Joseph merely as "the husband of Mary of whom was born Jesus who is called Christ." Here too any reader free from the trammels of a Christian education would suspect that a clerical redaction had been tampering with the text, and this suspicion was made a certainty in 1892 by the discovery of the Sinaitic-Syriac manuscript of the Gospels in which *Matthew* i, 16 reads "Jacob begat Joseph, Joseph to whom

was betrothed Mary the Virgin, begat Jesus who is called the Christ." Moreover Paul, with his reference to Jesus as born of the seed of David "according to the flesh," indicates that he has no knowledge of any miraculous conception of the Saviour.

The impartial inquirer will thus hold that Jesus was in every physical sense undoubtedly the son of Joseph by Mary, and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary will regard him as the legitimate offspring of a perfectly respectable marriage. The miraculous conception of which the Gospels tell cannot be deemed an admissible alternative even should we admit the possibility of such a thing. Not only does it fail to harmonize with the genealogies but it likewise cannot be reconciled with other parts of the scripture story. For instance, it is impossible to believe that though Joseph and Mary knew the child of the latter was the son of God, they "understood not the saying which he spoke unto them" when, finding him in the Temple among the doctors, in reply to Mary's reproach, "thy father and I sought thee sorrowing," he said. "How is it that ye sought me?" Wist ye not that I must be about my father's business?" Inconsistency between two alleged facts, while justifying the rejection of one of them, does not obligate us to accept either. And we may well reject also this tale of a twelve-year old boy engaging in discussion with the learned doctors of the Law. It was probably suggested by the vainglorious boast of Josephus: "When I was a child and about fourteen years of age, I was commended by all for the love I had for learning, on which account the high-priests and principle men of the city came to me frequently together in order to know my opinion about the accurate understanding of points of the Law." (*Life,* §2).The pious historians naturally felt that their prophet could not possibly, as a boy, have been behind the uninspired and profane Josephus and fabricated a story which they felt expressed what must have been the truth about the cleverness of the youthful Jesus. And to show how far the latter surpassed the former they fixed the age at which Jesus was depicted as exhibiting his wisdom two years below that at which Josephus says he distinguished himself.

Christianity ought, one would think, be greatly relieved at the obliteration of the old orthodox picture of the procreation of Christ. Yet even today denial that Jesus was of divine paternity in a physi-

cal sense is greeted by the more orthodox churchmen with a shriek of horror. To the unprejudiced mind this seems passing strange, for you cannot be deemed to be honoring the Deity by depicting him as ruthlessly stepping between a humble carpenter and his fiancee and becoming the father of the latter's child. If there be such a thing as blasphemy it is assuredly blasphemy of the most atrocious description to attribute to God the amorous exploits of a Casanova which is what the orthodox story really amounts to. And if the blasphemer incurs the perils of hell-fire, then those persons who boast they believe the Bible "from cover to cover" might well be asked how they can possibly hope to escape the damnation of hell.

While they avowedly accept the unsavory miraculous conception story so strangely cherished by the Church, orthodox Christians have, as a matter of fact, a strong subconscious disbelief of the possibility of a miraculous conception, as is evinced by the reception they give to any poor girl who announces that she has conceived a child by a miracle. Without deeming it necessary to make any investigation they invariably treat her with scorn and contempt. One rather interesting case of this kind was reported in the eighteenth century by Dr. Watson, the biographer of Lord George Gordon, who was noted as one of the leaders in the religious bigotry of the day. "One evening" says Dr. Watson "a young lady from Oxford St. waited upon his lordship and requested the favor of a private audience . . . . She assumed a solemn air, and with a hollow tone of voice, said that six months ago she had conceived by the power of the Holy Ghost, without any communication with man, which had rendered her very miserable and unhappy, till the night before when the angel Gabriel had appeared to her, and exhorted her to be of good cheer. He announced that the end of the world was at hand, as might be seen by the fulfilment of the ancient prophecies, and revealed many things hidden in the womb of time, particularly respecting France, Rome and Great Britain. He assured her that the consummation of all things was at hand, and added that the child she was about to bring forth was destined to announce the glad tidings of universal redemption, and commanded her to go quickly to Lord George, and follow his advice; upon which he vanished in an instant. As Lord George seemed to avoid entering into particulars" continues Dr. Watson "I was induced to

reason with her on the impropriety of her conduct. She soon convinced me she was in the way in which women wish to be and I was not a little surprised at the abilities which she displayed in supporting her story. Upon my endeavoring to demonstrate the impossibility of her narrative, she quickly shifted her ground, and observed that the whole history of revelation was equally mysterious, and that to question the possibility of one miracle was to undermine the whole. We saw the force of the argument without being convinced; and this immaculate virgin retired, pitying our want of faith."

The reasoning of the young woman was obviously perfectly sound, and if the Christians who claim they believe in the miraculous conception of Jesus had really in their hearts belief in that to which they give lip service they would listen sympathetically to all such announcements and take an attitude of hope, not one of suspicion. It is not too much to say that the orthodox by their attitude towards Mary, cast a foul aspersion on the chastity of a woman who, in default of evidence to the contrary, we "infidels" hold to have been a virtuous maiden, a faithful wife and a devoted mother. In fact the subconscious orthodox thought and the thought of narrow minded medieval Jews coincide here. The latter, in the Toldoth Sepher Jeshu, elaborated a tale that Jesus was the illegitimate son of a Roman soldier, Pandera, by his light of love, Miriam or Mary. They describe Mary as a hairdresser, that profession evidently then being in as ill repute as manicuring is in these days, and they tell with bated breath that she even committed the further sin of conceiving Jesus at one of those periods at which the "Law" ordered women to keep apart from men.

What, now, was the relation between Jesus and his kinsfolk? The fourth gospel represents the family as, on one occasion at least, mingling with the disciples, for we are told that "after this he went down to Capernaum, he and his mother and his brothers and his disciples." (*John,* ii. 13). And Mary is depicted as confidently turning to her son at the Cana feast in the expectation that he would miraculously furnish more wine for the thirsty wedding guests (*John,* ii, 1-11). We are told however that the brothers of Jesus had no faith in his pretensions; "For neither did his brothers believe in him" (*John,* viii, 6). Jesus is reported to have resented this attitude, for when he reached his home town in the course of

his missionary tour, his mother and brothers came to the house where he was preaching and sent in word to him. The message was delivered in the words: "Behold thy mother and brothers without seek for thee." And we are asked to believe that the Prophet of Nazareth actually repudiated mother as well as brothers, replying dramatically "Who is my mother and my brethren?" and then, "stretched forth his hands towards his disciples, and said "Behold, my mother and my brethren!" (*Matthew*, xii, 46-50) *John* too would have us believe that when at the wedding feast at Cana the wine gave out and Mary said to her son: "They have no more wine!" Jesus boorishly replied to his mother: "Woman, what have I to do with thee?" (II, 1-11). And *Mark* actually asserts that when Jesus healed the sick and cast out unclean spirits his family concluded he must be crazy and sought to put him under restraint: "And when his family heard of it they went out to lay hold of him, for they said he is out of his mind." (iii, 21). A somewhat different translation is given this passage in the King James and in the Revised Version, "his friends" being substituted for "his family" and the euphemism "beside himself" being used for "out of his mind." But certainly any person so beside himself that he has to have others lay hold of him and keep him under restraint is mentally deranged, for the time being at least. And it is admitted by scholars that the only possible rendition of the original Greek of the first phrase in question is "his family" or "the people of his household." John Wyclif showed himself to be more honest than later translators since he frankly rendered it "his kinsmen."

To appreciate the assertions of the canonical writers at their full value we must remember that nineteen hundred years ago the miraculous healing and the "casting out of devils" were regarded as quite the proper thing for a holy man. The thought of ascribing madness to a person who alleged he performed such wonders would be the last thing that would enter the heads of his fellow citizens. If not a holy man the miracle monger might be an impostor or an emissary of the devil, but he would scarcely be deemed a madman. Moreover, as all liberal biblical scholars admit, the breach between Judaism and Christianity only came about gradually, and in the beginning of his career, at least, Jesus could not have aroused the animosity of the Jewish people as a whole but only that of certain interpreters of the Law from whose dicta he

dissented. And hence if we were to conjecture *a priori* what effect the reports of the feats performed by Jesus would have been likely to have had upon his family, we would naturally suppose that his brothers and sisters would boast of their relationship to the new prophet, and that his mother would feel that her fondest hopes had come true. It is as difficult to imagine Mary looking upon her son as a lunatic as it would be to suppose that a pious Methodist woman of today would call her son crazy because he embarked on a successful career as an evangelist.

Orthodox churchmen are, it would appear, quite willing to believe that Jesus was a boor and an undutiful son; at least they prefer this view to the belief that the "inspired" scripture-writers might have been lying about the matter. We infidels, on the contrary, have no particular tenderness for ecclesiastical historians, and would be loath to believe that Jesus was as black as they paint him. And without letting our feelings sway us one way or the other we shall find reasons which might well have impelled the gospel writers to deviate from the truth as regards the relations which subsisted between Jesus and his family.

Let us investigate further into what the four canonical gospels tell us about the family of Jesus. His father, Joseph, was apparently dead when Jesus began his ministry, at least this is the natural explanation of there being no longer any reference to him at or beyond this time. Jesus had four brothers and several sisters, the names of the four sons of Mary being given in *Mark,* vi, 3, and *Matthew,* xiii, 55, where it is reported that when Jesus returned to Nazareth the town's folk said: "Is not this the carpenter, the son of Mary, and brother of James and Joses and Judas and Simon? And are not his sisters here with us? The Greek wording here would indicate that there were at least three sisters, but Epiphanius tells us there were only two, named Mary and Salome. Catholics, it should be noted, deny that these brothers and sisters were children of Mary whose perpetual virginity is insisted on by the Church, but all Protestant scholars agree that as these brothers and sisters are always mentioned in conjunction with the mother of Jesus it is hardly possible to assume that they were cousins or other kinsmen. Now none of the brothers of Jesus are in any of the lists of the twelve apostles. In the canonical lists of the twelve there is a Simon, but this is he who was renamed Cephas, the ex-disciple

of John the Baptist, who deserted the latter and enlisted under the banner of the man from Galilee. There was also a Jude, who was however the son of a certain James. Moreover there was a James, son of Zebedee and brother of John, and another James, son of Alphaeus, neither of whom could have been "James, the brother of the Lord" mentioned under that title in the writings of Paul. The four canonical gospels then give us to understand that the brothers of Jesus were in no way connected with his ministry. And *Acts* has only this much to say about them: that after the Ascension, in a house on Mount Olivet, the eleven apostles who remained after the defection of Judas, "went up into the upper chamber" and with one accord continued steadfastly in prayer, with the women and Mary the mother of Jesus and his brethren." (i, 13-14).

It is then astounding to learn, on turning to other sources of information, that tradition is unanimous in holding that James, the brother of the Lord, took up the leadership of the Christian flock after the death of Jesus—a succession which, if this brother's previous attitude had been what the canonical gospels would give us to understand, is unparalleled in history and is wholly beyond the bounds of credibility. The heretical *Gospel according to the Hebrews* however puts the past record of James on a different footing. This asserts that James, the brother of the Lord, was one of those present at the Last Supper. Grieving over the prospective death of his brother but hoping for a glorious resurrection, James vowed that after drinking from the cup handed around by Jesus he would not taste food or drink until after the Lord rose from the dead. Consequently James was one of the first to whom the Lord made himself known after the Resurrection. Paul however (I *Cor.* xv, 5-8) puts the order of the appearance of the risen Jesus as first to Cephas, then to "the twelve," next to five hundred brethren, following this to James, then to "all the apostles" and finally to Paul himself. Clement of Alexandria tells us that, after the Ascension, Peter, James and John chose "James the brother of the Lord" to be the head of the disciples of Jesus and that the office of Bishop of Jerusalem was assumed by him. *Acts* gives no inkling of any such election of a head of the Church while telling us at some length (i, 21-26) of the choice of a new apostle, Matthias, to replace Judas. Confirming the story of Clement we have Hegissipus who narrates that after the Ascension the charge of the Christian Church

devolved on James, the brother of the Lord, in concert with the apostles. The title of "James the Just" had been applied to him from the beginning, as he was holy from his very birth. According to Josephus (or perhaps to a Christian interpolator of his *Antiquities*) "the brother of Jesus who is called Christ whose name was James" was condemned to be executed by the Sanhedrin at the instigation of the High Priest, Annas, a Sadducee. And James was duly stoned to death, though this had as sequel the removal of Annas from the office of High Priest. Hegissipus however relates that James was stoned by a mob, and finally had his brains dashed out with a club, animosity having been aroused by his advocacy of the doctrine of a future life (denied by the Sadducees but upheld by the Pharisees) and brought to a climax by a public profession of faith in Jesus as the Messiah. After the martyrdom of James it is asserted by tradition, as transmitted by Eusebius, that "those of the apostles and the disciples of our Lord that were yet surviving came together from all parts with those that were related to our Lord according to the flesh" and "all unanimously declared Simeon, the son of Clopas . . . . as worthy of the episcopal seat." And this Simeon, "they say . . . . was the cousin german of our Saviour, for Hegissipus asserts that Clopas was the brother of Joseph." In the reign of Domitian (A. D. 82 to 96) the followers of Christ in Judea still had at their head (according to Hegissipus) members of the "family of the Lord, namely two "grandchildren of Judas, called the brother of our Lord according to the flesh." At first arrested by Domitian these two men were subsequently released, and "Thus delivered they ruled the churches, both as witnesses and relatives of the Lord. When peace was established they continued living even to the time of Trajan."

Acts on several occasions, mentions a "James," evidently a person of some importance, but without further designation. After Herod Agrippa had "killed James, the brother of John with the sword" he imprisoned Peter who was released from his confinement by an "angel" (which some commentators would identify with the "death angel" that brought Herod Agrippa's life to a close). Peter proceeded to the house of the mother of John Mark and after relating the story of his deliverance said: "Tell these things unto James and to the brethren" and departed (*Acts,* xii, 17). James is again mentioned, as someone of authority, in *Acts* xv and xxi, in

connection with the controversy as to whether Gentile converts need be circumcised and compelled to keep the Jewish Law, and from Paul's account of the same dispute we can identify this James with James the brother of the Lord. It is well known that *Galatians* gives a view of this transaction quite different from that of *Acts,* and the brilliant work of Ferdinand Christian Baur definitely established that James must have been the acknowledged head of the Judaizing faction in the Christian Church and a zealous advocate of the strict observance of the Jewish Law who only reluctantly agreed not to insist on imposing circumcision and the Law on the Gentile converts of Paul. And not only *Acts* (as Baur contended) but to a certain extent the four canonical gospels as well were "tendency" writings, partisan documents written from a Pauline point of view which endeavored not to set forth the truth but to obscure it whenever so doing would benefit the Pauline party. This fact is perfectly obvious, and those recent opponents of the Tuebingen School who deny that *Acts* is a tendency tale, and base this on the paradoxical assertion that none of Paul's Epistles are authentic, cut a very poor figure indeed in their attempts to refute the arguments of Baur.

We know that the rift between Judaizing and Pauline Christians gradually widened, and that finally the latter became dominant in the "orthodox" Christian Church, the former becoming outcast heretics known as Ebionites. These Ebionites did not become extinct until after the fifth century. The animosity between the orthodox and the heretics was, as usual, very great, and since the heretics took James, the brother of the Lord, as their patron, the orthodox would naturally do all in their power to belittle the importance of this progenitor of heresy. And in this way may be explained the omission of all reference to any part played by James in the ministry of his brother. It was not deemed desirable to attack James directly; he was slighted by being ignored in the gospel histories and only slurred by implication as in the story that the family of Jesus thought that the latter was out of his mind. How far the orthodox would go in their tales may be seen from the passage in the fourth gospel in which we are told that Jesus on the cross, seeing his mother and "the disciple he loved" standing by, said "unto his mother, Woman behold thy son" and then "to the disciple, Behold thy mother! And from that hour the disciple took

her into his own home." (*John,* xix, 26-27). It is not credible that Jesus should commit his mother to the care of a mere disciple when she had another son who occupied so prominent a position in the Christian flock as to be selected as Christ's successor, and not merely must we reject this story (as of course all liberal biblical scholars do) but we are constrained to regard it as a malicious fabrication aimed at James.

The attitude of the early Catholic Church—the Church of Paul as distinguished from the Ebionite Church of James—towards Mary is indicated by a passage in *Luke,* (xi, 27-28) where we are told that "a certain woman out of the multitude lifted up her voice" and said to Jesus: "Blessed is the womb that bare thee and the breasts which thou didst suck." This eulogy of one's mother would have been gratifying to a loving son, but *Luke* gives us to understand that it met with a rebuke from Jesus who replied: "Rather blessed are they that hear the word of God and keep it." The contrast between this attitude of the early Church and the Mariolatry of modern Catholics is startling. Whether Mary accepted her son Jesus as a prophet or whether she repudiated his claims and really regarded him as out of his mind cannot be positively decided. But assuredly all of his family cannot have held aloof. James, the brother of the Lord, could never have taken over the reins so easily had he not previously had a prominent part in the work. And we may regard it as a certainty that if Mary the mother of the Lord belonged to the Christian flock she was of the Church of James, not of the Church of Paul, and was by no means in the good graces of the Catholics of the early days.

The gospel passage in which it is related that the family of Jesus believed him to be insane and endeavored to put him under restraint is taken by Paul W. Schmiedel (undoubtedly one of the ablest and most brilliant of biblical scholars) as one of the nine "foundation pillars for a truly scientific life of Jesus." These pillars he describes as "such data as from the nature of their contents, on that account, cannot possibly be regarded as inventions." Much as we respect this acute thinker we cannot regard the passage in question in such a light. It may represent the truth or it may not, but there were ample reasons for orthodox prevarication here. For all that is really known to the contrary Jesus may have been on the best of terms with all his family, loving and loved by his

mother and looked up to and revered by his younger brothers and sisters. The attitude towards his mother which the canonical gospels attribute to Jesus would, if founded on truth, be an ineffable blot on his memory. Christians are quite content to accept what they ought (one would think) regard as a vile libel. An infidel on the contrary will refuse to believe that Jesus was an undutiful son merely on the authority of heretic-hating historians.

WHY WILLIAM JAMES "STOOD BY" GOD

BY HI SIMONS

MATTHEW ARNOLD had the temerity to deny, in the lecture on Emerson which he addressed to his first audience in Boston, that his subject deserved place among "the legitimate poets" or the great men of letters or the philosophers. Yet in one of his letters home he remarked that his hearers, among them Miss Emerson, were satisfied that he rested the preacher's claim to the gratitude of many generations on the simple grounds that, like Marcus Aurelius, Emerson was "the friend and aider of those who would live by the spirit." Insofar as his lectures on "The Varieties of Religious Experience" represent him, William James merits the same classification.

It would be uncharitable not to acknowledge his charity toward "the intellectual cripples and the moral hunchbacks," as Professor Santayana has referred to James' "cases." His discourses are preëminently a study in "the relativity of different types of religions to different types of need." He responded with quick sympathy to any "spontaneous need of character."—

> Here is the real core of the religious problem: Help! help! No prophet can claim to bring a final message unless he says things that will have a sound of reality in the ears of victims such as these. But the deliverance must come in as strong a form as the complaint, if it is to take effect; and that seems a reason why the coarser religions, revivalistic, orgiastic, with blood and miracles and supernatural operations, may possibly never be displaced. Some constitutions need them too much.

James' recognition that "The gods we stand by are the gods we need and can use;" his vigorous denial of objective truth as a criterion by which the validity of religion is to be judged, and his substitution for this of religion's efficacy in relieving, or fulfilling, "a pro-

found interior need of many persons," led to this conclusion:

> Taking creeds and faith-state together, as forming 'religions,' and treating these as purely subjective phenomena, without regard to the question of their 'truth,' we are obliged, on account of their extraordinary influence upon action and endurance, to class them amongst the most important biological functions of mankind. . . . 'The truth of the matter can be put,' says Leuba, 'in this way: *God is not known, he is not understood; he is used*—sometimes as meat-purveyor, sometimes as moral support, sometimes as friend, sometimes as an object of love. If he proves himself useful, the religious consciousness asks for no more than that. Does God really exist? How does he exist? What is he? are so many irrelevant questions. Not God, but life, more life, a larger, richer, more satisfying life, is, in the last analysis, the end of religion. The love of life, at any and every level of development, is the religious impulse.'
>
> At this purely subjective rating, therefore, Religion must be considered vindicated in a certain way from the attacks of her critics. It would seem that she cannot be a mere anachronism and survival, but must exert a permanent function, whether she be with or without intellectual content, and whether, if she have any, it be true or false.

This is the positive outcome of James' examination of the phenomena of religious experience. It has proved important. Following his recapitulation of earlier and contemporary investigations, and his emphatic statement of his own findings, later students, with the more powerful and precise instrument provided them by a larger body of psychological data, have defined religion as a function of the nervous constitution whereby an individual compensates himself for deficiencies in himself or in his relation to his environment. To have adumbrated this conclusion justifies James in his non-traditional method of handling the subject, even to his gullible tenderness for the most mopsy of his specimens.

II

Plainly, a corollary of his idea of religion is that a person who feels no deficiency in himself or his circumstances, or at least none that he cannot rectify by the exercise of other functions, will not need or have a religion. This proposition is scarcely less important than the one from which it proceeds. For the only evidence of the existence of a function is its operation. If some human beings do not manifest the phenomena of religion, this function cannot be regarded as a constant element in human character. In this case one of two things is true: either experience can be lived satisfactorily

without dependence on such a function, or the shortcomings of life can be made up to the individual who suffers them by some other kind of activity that is like religion in some respects but yet different in others.

This question, whether religion is *the* means of revising the errors of circumstance, as the pathetic fallacy suggests that they be regarded, or whether it is merely *a possible* way out of difficulties, is of more than academic interest. Considered solely by James' own standard, its degree of usefulness as a guide in conduct, the answer is important. For religion needs no justification to the person whose sole sustenance is its fruit. The one most concerned in its establishment or disestablishment as a primary, autonomous function is the man or woman whose every tradition exhorts to its profession but whose intellect prompts to dismiss or ignore it. To such the problem is real enough.—Life attracts with a multitude of goods that may be had for the getting. I must choose the finest, the surest of them to try for. Even after this elimination, the effort will fill an arduous lifetime. I must strip for it—must throw off every impediment. Is the faith of my mothers such a superfluity? Or is the universal experience of mankind such that I had better keep this thing—if not actively practice its use, at least retain it in deference to a possible emergency?

James offered little explicit counsel on such a dilemma. In his first lecture on conversion he said:

> Some persons . . . never are, and possibly never under any circumstances could be, converted. Religious ideas cannot become the centre of their spiritual energy. . . . Such inaptitude for religious faith may in some cases be intellectual in its origin. . . . In other persons the trouble is profounder. There are men anaesthetic on the religious side, deficient in that category of sensibility.

Is the intellect inept in religious faith deficient, or is the capacity for faith a saving supplement to an intellect otherwise incapable of relieving its own embarrassments? James only answered by inference. According to the empiricism that formed the platform upon which his whole discussion was conducted, insusceptibility to faith would be a defect in a character that radically needed saving and could be saved by nothing but faith. Granted. But two questions remain unsettled: Will anything but faith save such a character? and, are all characters such as need saving or, eventually,

will stand in that condition? It will be apparent presently that James did not beg these questions; for a reason, he neglected them. It has remained for later pragmatists to discover that art, which he treated only by a reference to its service as ritual ornament to religion, and the philosophies that desiderate unity, spirituality, eternity, immortality of the soul and freedom of will, are functions that may perform the same office ascribed to religion. These thinkers also have been brilliantly clear in the contention that defects of experience arising from an interior confusion of the personality may be overcome by the cultivation of the function of intelligence, and that maladjustments of individuals to their environments may be removed by concerted social action. In this is a positive answer to the corollary James ignored.

III

But why did he ignore it? The fact is that James did not consider the case of the man who does not need religion because he did not believe that such a one existed. In the quarter-century since these lectures were delivered and published, James has got a great reputation for what he called "healthy-mindedness," for a specially balanced and unobjectionable optimism—for what more simple optimists vaguely denote as "wholesomeness." The virtue has been imputed to him because of his charity and because his private belief coincided to a remarkable degree with the common faith that predominated in his time. "He seems to have felt sure," Santayana observes, "that certain thoughts and hopes—those familiar to a liberal Protestantism—were every man's true friends in life." This is true: in view of the universal propensity to regard agreement with one's self or one's sect as righteous and genial, it is clear why James was accepted as "wholesome" and optimistic. But the truth is that he was profoundly pessimistic. There are marks of this fact throughout the book; this extract is representative:

> To suggest personal will and effort to one all sicklied o'er with the sense of irremediable impotence is to suggest the most impossible of things. What he craves is to be consoled in his very powerlessness, to feel that the spirit of the universe recognizes and secures him, all decaying and failing as he is. Well, we are all such helpless failures in the last resort. The sanest and best of us are of one clay with lunatics and prison inmates, and death finally runs the robustest of us down. And whenever we feel this, such a sense of the vanity and provisionality of

> our voluntary career comes over us that all our morality appears but as a plaster hiding a sore it can never cure, and all our well-doing as the hollowest substitute for that well-*being* that our lives ought to be grounded in, but, alas! are not.

If this credo is insufficient to categorize its author among his "sick souls," there is plenty of additional evidence that he belongs among them. Optimism has undashed confidence in the individual's ability to correct discrepancies between wish and natural circumstance. This mood was alien to James at bottom.—

> If one has ever taken the fact of the prevalence of tragic death in this world's history fairly into his mind,—freezing, drowning, entombment alive, wild beasts, worse men, and hideous diseases,—he can with difficulty, it seems to me, continue his own career of worldly prosperity without suspecting that he may all the while not be really inside the game, that he may lack the great initiation.

This being his view, James could hardly be counted on, were he living now, to support the program Professor Dewey proposed in *Reconstruction in Philosophy*. A man who must confess this as his final conviction is likely to overlook the possibility of the existence of others, no less averse than himself to articles of "healthy-minded" faith that are callow though merchantable, who are conscious of no need for compensatory religion. And, by his rule that "the deliverance must come in as strong a form as the complaint, if it is to take effect," one must look for a profound manifestation of religious feeling in one who could say, "Our civilization is founded on the shambles, and every individual existence goes out in a lonely spasm of helpless agony."

IV

Not in any marked idiosyncrasy of James' personal "over-belief" —for, as Santayana has recognized, it was far from unique—but in the extraordinary lengths he went to, to firm-found and fortify it, is to be found evidence of this profundity. His need of a faith impelled him to a final absolute that is a little shocking in contrast with the sustained empiricism of his previous discourse.

"Disregarding the over-beliefs, and confining ourself to what is common and generic," he said, in recapitulation of his conclusions, "we have in *the fact that the conscious person is continuous with a wider self through which saving experiences come,* a positive con-

tent of religious experience which, it seems to me, *is literally and objectively true as far as it goes.*"

This reassurance must have been consoling to those who had been warned in the preceding lecture that "we . . . must bid a definite goodby to dogmatic theology" and that "In all sincerity our faith must do without that warrant." The consolation cost its minister a dialectical and a psychological error.

". . . is there," he asked, "under all the discrepancies of the creeds, a common nucleus to which they bear their testimony unanimously?"

This he answered affirmatively.—

> . . . there is a certain uniform deliverance in which religions all appear to meet. It consists of . . . (1) a sense that there is *something wrong about us* as we naturally stand. . . . (2) a sense that *we are saved from the wrongness* by making proper connection with the higher powers.

Then he amplified.——

> The individual, so far as he suffers from his wrongness, . . . is to that extent consciously beyond it, and in at least possible touch with something higher, if anything higher exist. Along with the wrong part there is thus a better part of him, even though it may be but a most helpless germ. . . . when . . . the stage of solution or salvation arrives, the man identifies his real being with the germinal higher part of himself. . . . *He becomes conscious that this higher part is conterminous and continuous with a MORE of the same quality, which is operative in the universe outside of him, and which he can keep in working touch with, and in a fashion get on board of and save himself when all his lower being has gone to pieces in the wreck.*

Then presently he inquired:

> Is such a 'more' merely our own notion, or does it really exist? If so, in what shape does it exist? Does it act, as well as exist? And in what form should we conceive of that 'union' with it of which religious geniuses are so convinced?

To be acceptable so fully as to form a center for all an individual's psychic energies, a religious belief must be so formulated as to avoid conflict with any active current of that force. So it is natural that James found a way to make his answer accord with the technology that was his habitual instrument of operation: "we shall do well," he said, "to seek first of all a way of describing the 'more,' which psychologists may also recognize as real. The sub-

conscious self is nowadays a well-accredited psychological entity; and I believe that in it we have exactly the mediating term required."

James was no man to shirk the duty of illustrating how his term would apply. He continued:

> Let me then propose, as an hypothesis, that whatever it may be on its *farther* side, the 'more' with which in religious experience we feel ourselves connected is on its *hither* side the subconscious continuation of our conscious life. Starting thus with a recognized psychological fact as our basis, we seem to preserve a contact with 'science' which the ordinary theologian lacks. At the same time the theologian's contention that the religious man is moved by an external power is vindicated, for it is one of the peculiarities of invasions from the subconscious region to take on objective appearances, and to suggest to the Subject an external control. In the religious life the control is felt as 'higher'; but since on our hypothesis it is primarily the higher faculties of our own hidden mind which are controlling, the sense of union with the power beyond us is a sense of something, not merely apparently, but literally. true.

It is to be noticed that here the existence of a higher-than-the-individual power and the mutual relation of it and the individual are candid postulates, while in the concluding statement that was quoted previously they are hypostatized as "literally and objectively true." Moreover, the ordinary theologian does not contend that an external power is "suggested" to men nor that union with it is "sensed"; he holds that such a power *is* and that its manifestations are of its essence and so independent of human sense. But the most important thing to be remarked is that James' hypothesis is tautological. For the "subconscious self," whether or not it be "higher" than the conscious, ordinary self, is, still, self. It might appear that James was attempting to distinguish between the two selves by asserting that the "subconscious," or "higher," is, unlike the other, in immediate working relation with a more diffuse and more powerful extension of itself. But the existence of this cosmic extension of powers superior to those of ordinary humanity is just what wants proving. It is not proved by the hypothecation of an agency between it and the individual through which the two appear to communicate.

This difficulty is more than logical. The supposed entity is eliminated by a plain re-statement of the psychological impasse which James believed himself to have resolved.—One is in difficulty, and cannot escape from its consequences by one's own powers; so one invokes an external helper:—the call is responded to, not by anything actually external, but by another part, a usually (ap-

parently) inoperative part, of one's self. This may or it may not meet one's need; those in whom it is likely to do so are, as James himself demonstrated, persons in whom the intellectual function is less developed than are the emotional and imaginative propensities. To the intellectual temperament, mere multiplication of metaphysical terms is a singularly repugnant kind of hoodwinking. Whether or not the process proves efficacious in the cases of various persons, it certainly does not establish as fact "that the conscious person is continuous with a wider self through which saving experiences come."

V

Especially, when the glibly accredited but here insufficiently described entity is examined. What did James mean by "the subconscious self"? There can be no doubt that he was talking about what his successors in psychology know as "the unconscious." In his first lecture on conversion, while discussing sudden irruptive manifestations of the phenomenon, he explained his preference for the term since then discarded.—

> We shall erelong hear still more remarkable illustrations of subconsciously maturing processes eventuating in results of which we suddenly grow conscious. Sir William Hamilton and Professor Laycock of Edinburgh were among the first to call attention to this class of effects; but Dr. Carpenter first, unless I am mistaken, introduced the term 'unconscious cerebration,' which has since then been a popular phrase of explanation. The facts are now known to us far more extensively than he could know them, and the adjective 'unconscious,' being for many of them almost certainly a misnomer, is better replaced by the vaguer term 'subconscious' or 'subliminal.'

Concluding his treatment of conversion, he identified his conception explicitly.—

> The ordinary psychology, admitting fully the difficulty of tracing the marginal outline (of consciousness), has nevertheless taken for granted, first, that all the consciousness the person now has, be the same focal or marginal, inattentive or attentive, is there in the 'field' of the moment, all dim and impossible to assign as the latter's outline may be; and, second, that what is absolutely extra-marginal is absolutely non-existent, and cannot be a fact of consciousness at all. . . .
>
> I cannot but think that the most important step forward that has occurred in psychology since I have been a student of that science is the discovery, first made in 1886, that, in certain subjects at least, there is not only the consciousness of the ordinary field, with its usual centre and margin, but an addition thereto in the shape of a set of memories,

> thoughts, and feelings which are extra-marginal and outside of the primary consciousness altogether, but yet must be classed as conscious facts of some sort, able to reveal their presence by unmistakable signs. . .
>
> In the wonderful explorations by Binet, Janet, Breuer, Freud, Mason, Prince and others, of the subliminal consciousness of patients with hysteria, we have revealed to us whole systems of underground life, in the shape of memories of a painful sort which lead a parasitic existence, buried outside of the primary fields of consciousness, and making irruptions thereinto with hallucinations, pains, convulsions, paralyses of feeling and of motion, and the whole procession of symptoms of hysteric disease of body and of mind. Alter or abolish by suggestion these subconscious memories, and the patient immediately gets well. . . . They throw, as I said, a wholly new light upon our natural constitution.
>
> And it seems to me that they make a farther step inevitable. Interpreting the unknown after the analogy of the known, it seems to me that hereafter, wherever we meet with a phenomenon of automatism, be it motor impulses, or obsessive idea, or unaccountable caprice, or delusion, or hallucination, we are bound first of all to make search whether it be not an explosion, into the fields of ordinary consciousness, of ideas elaborated outside of those fields in subliminal regions of the mind. . . .

What does the substitution of the proper term, the unconscious, with the fairly ascertained quantum of facts it defines, do to the proposition that "the fact that the conscious person is continuous with a wider self through which saving experiences come . . . is literally and objectively true?" It clarifies beyond any possible confusion the relationship between the ordinary self and the "higher" or "wider" or somehow "better" self. It deodorizes James' still vaguer synonym for these latter terms—"higher powers"—of the cosmic and extra-human aroma which was faintly present in it, even as he used it. And it reduces the "higher" or "better" self to the status which he determined in his first lecture.—

> When we think certain states of mind superior to others, is it ever because of what we know concerning their organic antecedents? No! it is always . . . either because we take an immediate delight in them; or else it is because we believe them to bring us good consequential fruits for life.

That James should have fallen into this confusion indicates the intensity with which he sought to vindicate his personal faith, and consequently the urgency upon him of his need for its vindication. Beyond this, it illuminates the temper of the man—charitable toward others because of his wish for charity toward himself, impatient of dialectic because, as others have pointed out, he was unskilled in its

use. Also, despite the great heap of data that forms the bulk of these half-a-thousand pages, one is disappointed with his handling of them. He used cases like a lawyer, to prove his points; not as one expects a scientist to do, setting out the facts, allocating them in their general classifications and then analyzing them to their minutiae to discover their significance. Referring to the sense of the reality of the unseen, he says, "for the psychologists the tracing of the organic seat of such a feeling would form a pretty problem." Well, he was a psychologist: why did he not attempt, at least, to solve it? He quotes pages of Tolstoy's record of his perplexities, with the banal conclusion that the subject suffered from a melancholy induced by general and objective circumstances: one reflects upon the finesse with which Dr. Freud would have analyzed the delicacies of cause and effect involved in the case. In more than a few instances James seems to neglect the plain duty of the psychologist for the more attractive and sympathetic office of befriending "those who would live by the spirit." So in the particular part of his thesis under discussion: "If the grace of God miraculously operates," he said, "it probably operates through the subliminal door, then. But just *how* anything operates in this region is still unexplained. . . ." Why did he not explain it, rather than step outside his special field to mediate between dogmatic metaphysics and distressed humanity? The answer is implicit in his character; it does not absolve him of the error of hasty generalization.

However, his concluding absolute does not invalidate his whole conception of religion; its discovery only restores the subject to the empiricism in which it was conceived originally. In many persons, a *sense* of salvaton from inward wrong *is* produced by the mechanism of the unconscious, and the same agency does *"suggest* to the Subject an external control." In such persons one part of the self—if the operation must be conceived this way—does assist another evidently inefficacious part of the self, and therefore seems to be an agency outside of and ineffably superior to the self as ordinarily known. Psychoanalysis, in short, does not abolish religion as a beneficent, and a direly needed, experience in many lives—those, say, of "the intellectual cripples and the moral hunchbacks." But for others there is nothing in the empiricism of William James that makes the cultivation of any of the varieties of religious experience either desirable or inevitable.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL SPECULATIONS OF GIORDANO BRUNO

BY BIRGER HEADSTROM

OF all the writers of the transition period between medieval and modern philosophy, probably no one represents its general characteristics better than Giordano Bruno, for in his numerous works, poetical, scientific, philosophical, are reflected all the distinctive features of that period, the revolt against authority, the demolition of the artificial division that existed between things sacred and secular, human and divine, the exultation of intellectual freedom and the consequent intellectual unsettlement and unrest, the revival of ancient philosophy, as well as the predilection for the occult sciences and arts and the despairing tendency to blend the dreams and vagaries of the imagination with the results of rational investigation.

Although there is no systematic unity to his multifarious writings, expressive of an intellectual enthusiasm and of a mind seeking after truth yet undisciplined and erratic, full of speculations, theories, conjectures, propounded on the impulse of the moment or under the varying influence of the circumstances of the atmosphere in which he moved, his mind seems to have been dominated by one central idea, that of the divinity of nature and man, an idea which he constantly sought to explain and defend by means partly of Aristotelian categories and partly of Neo-Platonic emanation theories, for above all else he was profoundly sympathetic with the revolt against the medieval notion of a transcendant God, and a sphere of divine things absolutely separated from nature and the secular life of mankind. During the scholastic period, the course of religious thought had not only tended to greater obscure the Christian idea of the unity of the divine and human but the ecclesiastical conception of God as well had gradually become that

of a Being above the world, to whom thought can be related only as the passive recipient of mysterious dogmas authoritatively revealed, and not of a Being who reveals Himself in and to the human spirit. Such a false exaltation of the idea of God could lead to nothing but the degradation of nature, and the individual and social life of man. Obviously, then, for minds in which the divine was identified with the supernatural, the observation of nature lost all religious interest, for to them divine presence was not revealed in the course of nature but rather in interferences with its laws. For the same reason, religious life became one of abstraction from the world, and the secular life of man, its domestic, social, political relations, gradually came to be recognized as outside the sphere of spiritual things.

The reaction to this false separation of the natural and spiritual, the human and the divine, not only reawakened interest in nature, as indicated by the scientific revival of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but gave rise as well to the pantheistic tendency in philosophy, so distinctively characteristic of Bruno's speculative writings for Bruno was decidedly opposed to the conception of a supramundane God, and a world in whose life and thought no divine element could be discerned. Instead, he seemed to intuitively discern in the phenomena of the external world in which science had begun to perceive an intelligible order and law, and in the inner world of mind, to whose boundless wealth of thought the consciousness of the time was becoming awakened, the immediate expression of a divine presence and life and not the mere production of a distant omnipotence. "The true philosopher," he says, "differs from the theologian in this, that the former seeks the infinite Being, not outside the world, but within it. We must begin, in other words, by recognizing the universal agent in creation, before attempting to rise to that elevated region in which theology finds the archetype of created beings."[1]

The means Bruno employed to give a philosophic justification to the idea of an immanent relation of God to the world consisted partly of a recurrence to Neo-Platonic figures and analogies, partly in a manipulation of the Aristotelian categories of matter and form, and of potentiality and actuality, the former point of view serving as the basis for his studied exposition of the notion of a "soul of the world," by which the universe is considered as an infinite, living

[1] *De la causa,* Wagner's edit., i. p. 175.

organism, not created by any outward cause, but having within itself the principle of all its existences and activities, in other words, being that beyond which nothing exists and in which all things live, move, and have their being; and which principle he furthermore compared to the principle of life in the root or seed, "which sends forth from itself shoots, branches, twigs, etc., which disposes and fashions the delicate tissue of leaves, flowers, fruit, and again, by the same interior energy, recalls the sap to the root." To natural things, it is, in one sense, external for it cannot be regarded as itself a part of the thing it creates, and, in another, internal for it does not act on matter or outside of matter, but wholly from within, in the very heart of matter. And again it is represented as an "inner artist" of infinite productiveness, differing from a human artist in that the latter works on matter which is already living or instinct with form, whereas no such presupposition is involved in the case of the former. To him, although we may recoil from viewing the universe as a living thing, we can no more conceive any form which is not already, directly or indirectly, the expression of a soul, than we can conceive a thing which has absolutely no form. And though it would be absurd to regard the productions of human art as living forms, yet my table, such, though not animate consists not only of matter taken from nature but is composed as well of materials already living. Consequently there is nothing, however, minute or worthless; that does not contain life or soul.[2]

Whereas the human artist works on materials taken from nature, and which as part of nature already have a life and being of their own, the divine, or inner artist, has no pre-existing materials on which to operate; His art is therefore creative, of the materials as well as of the infinitely diversified forms into which they have been fashioned. In Him creative and formative energy are the same; and if lower forms should be changed by Him into higher forms of existence they are not taken from a province foreign to Him but are already innate with His own life, while the latter are merely a new expression of its inexhaustible energy. This thought finds further utterance, in a slightly varied form however, in Bruno's view that the ideas of efficient and final cause are inseparable in the divine artist in contrast with the human, for in nature, he contended, the efficient cause cannot be separated from the final as every reasonable act presupposes an end or design, that design being "nothing else

2 *De la causa,* i. p. 241.

than the form of the thing to be produced. From which it follows that an intelligence capable of producing all, and of raising them by a marvellous art from potentiality into actuality, should contain in itself the forms and essences of all things."[3] As it is intelligence, or the soul of the world, that creates natural things, it is not possible for the formal to be distinct from the efficient cause for they must unite in the inner principle of things.

In his conception of the world as a living organism, Bruno carried this latter thought still further. Whereas the conception lies outside the materials on which he works in the case of the human artist, it is the contrary with the design at work in the creation of an organized structure, for then the ideal principle, or formative power, accompanies the matter and constitutes its essence, such a principle being considered as having been present from the beginning, inspiring the first minutest atom with the power of the eventual perfect whole. The inner principle, the life within, is first cause as well as last; and when applied to the universe deduces a universe containing within itself the principle of its own being, a vast organism, as it were, in which the least and most insignificant of finite existences presupposes and manifests the end to be realized, and in which the first principle is at once the beginning and end of all. Unfortunately, Bruno failed to realize all that is contained in this conception, yet when we trace the course of his procedure from his fundamental thought to an explanation of God, and His relation to the world, it is easy to see how, under the limiting influence of the scholastic categories, the inherent wealth of his own idea escaped him.

In an effort to determine the nature of the first principle of all things, Bruno employed the Aristotelian distinction of "form" and "matter" saying in part: "Democritus and the Epicureans hold that there is no real existence which is not corporeal; they regard matter as the sole substance of things, and assert that it is itself the divine nature. These, with the Stoics and others, hold also that forms are simply the accidental dispositions of matter. . . . A closer examination, however, forces us to recognize in nature two kinds of substances, form and matter. If, therefore, there is an active principle which is the constitutive principle of all, there is also a subject or passive principle corresponding to it, a something that is capable of

[3] *De la causa,* i. p. 237.

being acted on as well as a something that is capable of acting. Human art cannot operate except on the surface of things already formed by nature; . . . but nature operates, so to speak, from the center of its subject-matter, which is altogether unformed. Therefore the subject-matter of the arts is manifold, but the subject-matter of nature is one, seeing that all diversity proceeds from form."[4] What Bruno sought to prove by this passage and similiar others is that the conceptions of matter and form are correlative, in other words, that neither is apprehensible in abstraction from the other, and that we are compelled by the necessities of thought to conceive of a primal substance which is neither matter nor form alone but rather a unity of the two. And again we arrive at the same result in considering the distinction of substances corporeal and incorporeal. "It is necessary that of all things that subsist there should be one principle of subsistence. . . . But all distinguishable things presuppose something indistinguishable. That indistinguishable something is a common reason to which the difference and distinctive form are added." Furthermore "it is necessary that there be one thing which corresponds to the common reason of both subjects, . . . a first essence which contains in itself the principle of its being. If body, as is generally agreed, presupposes a matter which is not body, and which therefore naturally precedes that which we designate as properly corporeal, we cannot admit any absolute incompatibility between matter and the substances which we name immaterial. . . . If we discern something formal and divine in corporeal substances, on the same principle we must say that there is something material in divine substances. As Plotinus says, if the intelligible world contains an infinite variety of existences, there must be in them, along with their characteristics differences, something which they all have in common, and that common element takes the place of matter as the distinctive element takes that of form. . . . This common basis of things material and immaterial, in so far as it includes a multiplicity of forms, is multiple and anyformed, but in itself it is absolutely simple and indivisible; and because it is all, it cannot be itself any one particular being."[5] Such considerations are, however, not suggestive of the idea of an extramundane God but rather "of the soul of the world as the

[4] *De la causa,* p. 251.

[5] *De la causa,* i. pp. 269, 270, 272.

actuality of all, the potentiality of all, and everything is one."[6] "There is one form or soul, one matter or body, which is the fulfillment of all and the perfection of all, which cannot be limited or determined, and is therefore unchangeable."[7]

Though Bruno's aim was to attain to a first principle which should be the living source and explanation of all finite existences, material and spiritual, the result of his reasoning was far different to that which he supposed himself to have reached, for the false method by which he proceeded led him to a unity which excludes, rather than comprehends, all determinations—an empty abstraction, and not a being which embraces in its concrete unity the whole inexhaustible wealth of the finite world. Upon finding that the ideas of matter and form, as well as of corporeal and spiritual, cannot be separately retained, he failed to rise to a higher unity which transcends yet comprehends both; instead he sought to find his higher unity in that which matter and form, mind and body, have in common when their differences are eliminated. He erred in thinking, like so many others, that he could explain the differences and contrarieties of existence by simply eliminating or ignoring them. And therefore his first or highest principle (which he identified with God), in which he thought he had reached the origin and end of all things, became nothing more than the abstraction of "Being."

If Bruno's idea of God were thus depleted of all reality, his idea of the finite world fared no better for the same reason. In seeking a first principle, or "soul of the world," in which all finite existences should find their being and reality, he could arrive only to a solution which necessarily implied at once the nihility of all finite beings apart from God, and their reality in God, for his fundamental notion of an organic unity made it necessary for him to explain the universe as an organism in which the parts are simply dead, meaningless fragments in separation from the life or vital principle of the whole, as well as showing that through their relation to that principle they cease to be such unreal abstractions. "In its externality," he says, "nature is nothing more than a shadow, an empty image of the first principle in which potentiality and actuality are one. . . . Thou art not nearer to the infinite by being man rather than insect, by being star rather than sun. And what I say of these I understand of all

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 275.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 280.

things whose subsistence is particular. Now, if all these particular things are not different in the infinite, they are not really different. Therefore the universe is still one, and immovable. It comprehends all and admits of no difference of being, nor of any change with itself or in itself. It is all that can be, and in it is no difference of potentiality and actuality.[8] . . . Individuals which continually change do not take a new existence, but only a new manner of being. It is in this sense that Solomon has said, 'There is nothing new under the sun, but that which is was before.' As all things are in the universe and the universe is in all things, as we are in it and it is in us, so all concur to one perfect unity, which is sole, stable and ever remaining. It is one and eternal. Every form of existence, every other thing is vanity, every thing outside of that one is nothing."[9] While his method enabled him to prove the unreality of all finite existences apart from the first principle, what he could not prove was that even in their relation to this "soul of the world" any reality was left to them, for viewed as that which is reached by abstraction from the limits of finite existences, the first principle annuls rather than explains them. Their finitude is their distinction from God; and though the withdrawal of their finitude makes them one with God equally as well makes them lost in God.

In summation, Bruno sought not only to justify for thought the idea of the absolute unity of all things but to explain the universe from itself, and in the idea of God endeavored to find the immanent cause or principle of the world. In him, the first principle is the union of potentiality and actuality; and whether considered as a principle realizing itself in the actual (God), or as all actuality in relation to its principle (Nature), it is the same only differently contemplated. And finally, he failed to reach the result to which he aimed—a concrete unity, simply because he employed a method that can yield only an abstract one.

[8] *De la causa,* i. p. 281.
[9] *De la causa,* i. p. 283.

THE EARLY LIFE OF EDWIN MILLER WHEELOCK

BY CHARLES KASSEL

THROUGH the issues of the present magazine for February and March, 1922, March, August and September, 1923, March and July, 1924, April and September, 1925, March and November, 1926, April, 1927, and January, 1928, we traced the story of the author of *Proteus* from the days of the Unitarian pastorate at Dover, New Hampshire, through the anti-slavery agitation and the Civil War, but his youth and young manhood we passed over, preferring to withhold the earlier installments until the extraordinary character of his later life should earn for those less striking chapters an interest which otherwise they could not have possessed.

The Civil War was now at an end and a new and less dramatic epoch was dawning filled with tasks of reconstruction in the Southern states, with which also our minister was to enjoy no unimportant connection. The point seems a fitting one for a retrospect over the formative years in the life we have followed, and here therefore, we turn back the pages of this biography and take up the passages thus far omitted.

Rarely indeed do we fail to find in the childhood and youth and early manhood of a remarkable individual the roots of his afterlife. In human experience, as in the realm of inanimate nature, there is seed-time and harvest, but what is sown is sown through silent years and the season of flower and fruitage awaits often the stimulus of some stern and tragic call.

The springs of heroic action in the case of the subject of our narrative—as in the case of many, doubtless, to whom the liberating challenge never comes—lay partly sealed, but living and vibrant none the less, within the deeps of his being. The slavery crisis and the Civil War, with their powerful appeal to generous and idealistic natures, wrought with him, as with other and more distinguished figures in that great struggle, the magic change from scholar to crusader.

It is a mocking commentary upon the vanity of renown that fame with its blare and blather so often enfolds the mediocre, lending an illusive dignity to their actions and utterances and ill-formed views, while the individual of larger genius languishes unknown—unknown, at times, even to himself. An awakening and advancing humanity, perhaps, pursuing the spiral round to racial excellence, may learn, in the slow lapse of ages, the true test of greatness. Meanwhile, the thoughtful student, thumbing the endless pages of biography, must continue to moralize upon the strange caprice of fate which lifts into a garish light some inconsequential name while a lordly nature, bedraggled in the net of circumstance and carrying unopened within it a well-spring of boundless good for human kind, wages a bitter and fruitless battle for recognition, and even, at times, for existence.

Edwin Miller Wheelock was born in the City of New York in 1829. He was probably of Welsh descent. The father was a chandler in New York City, whose diary and account books—no uninteresting relics of those days—were among the possessions of Mr. Charles B. Wheelock of Boston, recently deceased, son of the subject of our sketch. They were people, evidently, in moderately good circumstances. After the birth of their four boys and four girls the parents moved from the City of New York and took up their residence at Rosedale, near Ithaca in the same state, where they continued to live until their death and where the children grew to maturity. Of the daughters two became in succession the wives of Prof. Stebbins of Cornell University, one died unmarried and of the fourth no record is in the hands of the present writer. The sons had interesting careers. One went out to Santa Fe, New Mexico, in its early days, another had a checkered life as a financier, and the third wandered over the world, landing finally in one of the South American Republics where he suffered egregious ill-treatment for which, later, through our own government, he recovered an indemnity.

The remaining brother, Edwin—evidently the most promising of the four—was destined to a different life from all the others. He was intended by his parents, it would seem, for the profession of the law since we find him at Harvard studying for that profession and graduating, indeed, from the department of law; but we infer that during his Harvard days he came into contact with Unitarianism, his parents having belonged to a more orthodox church, perhaps the Methodist, and this touch with the more liberal faith awakened the

latent bent in his nature toward the ministry. He pursued the course in theology at the Divinity School of this University and we learn from the records of the American Unitarian Association at Boston that he graduated from the Divinity School in the class of 1856.

Of the questioning nature of the young graduate from his earliest years, where religious problems were concerned, we find an interesting proof in a chance reminiscence of his childhood days culled from one of the later discourses. He had been present, he tells us, at a revival of the familiar type and the burden of the revivalist's exhortation had been the tragic death of a young sinner who had attended a dance in preference to a religious service.

It is apparent that the imagination of the child was powerfully wrought upon by the tragedy, seemingly providential. The thought, as he tells us, haunted his soul and in the darkness and stillness of the night the childish mind was terror-stricken by the vengefulness of the Almighty, who, for so light an offense, could inflict so dreadful a punishment.

When morning dawned he made a confidant of his mother. How did the preacher know, he asked, that the awful death was a penalty for the young man's levity and that the tortures of hell were awaiting him? The mother, herself evidently creedbound and undisturbed by such questions, tried to hush the child's doubts. The evangelist knew, she assured him, and to question was wicked. The boy, we may fancy, withdrew into himself with his thoughts, sufficiently fearful of the consequences of doubt but still skeptical none the less.

Of his life at Harvard, his associations there and the traits of character which may have marked him to his fellow students, we are without distinct memorials, just as there is denied to us the details of his life during early boyhood and young manhood. As regards his character we glean something, indeed, from the testimony of those who knew him, delivered at his ordination as a minister at Dover, New Hampshire, and this gives us an insight of no mean value; but aside from this we are without material, and the next mile-stone of his life, which our data permits us to register, is his installation as minister of the First Unitarian Church at Dover, New Hampshire, on the 7th day of January, 1857.

Dover was then, perhaps, a town of some four or five thousands, though it had been founded as early as 1623. One might venture

the guess that the Unitarian movement at Dover had enjoyed a fitful and spasmodic life at intervals during the century and now, for some years, had been languishing or was quite dead. In the Newberry Library at Chicago we find the *Collections of Dover, New Hampshire, Historical Society,* of which Vol. 1 shows the marriage-records of the First Unitarian Church from 1829 to 1850, and this gives us a basis for the belief that during these twenty-one years the Unitarian faith had claimed an organized representation in that community. It is evident, however, that for some years the movement had been without a head and without an organized body, for in the address of Rev. Andrew P. Peabody at the ordination service of the young minister, which we find in the Boston Library and which is catalogued there, we see a reference to the event as the beginning of an entirely new ministry in the community. The field was evidently one of rather uncertain promise. Even now, as we are informed from the headquarters of the American Unitarian Association at Boston, the place is without a Unitarian ministry or movement, and the records of the Association are without the names of any of the young minister's parishioners from whom details of his labors there might be gained.

Whether the soil, however, which he had been sent to till was lean or rich in promise meant little, doubtless, in the eyes of the youthful clergyman. It was the fact of the field being given him alone that must have seemed of supreme importance. The occasion of the ordination itself appears to have been no inauspicious one and the fact of the publication of the sermons and addresses by Crosby, Nichols & Company of Boston, who had been since 1846 the agents of the Unitarian Association and the publishers of the *Christian Examiner* and other Unitarian periodicals, is token of the importance of the ordination in the eyes of those who conducted it. The ordination address was delivered by Rev. Andrew P. Peabody, the charge by Rev. Convers Francis and the right-hand of fellowship was extended by Rev. F. Frothingham.

It may be well to pause for a glance at the place which these gentlemen filled in the public life of their time. It was no inconspicuous group who stood thus with the subject of our story upon the threshold of his ministerial life and ushered him formally into the career which for more than forty years was to claim his loyal and earnest devotion.

Andrew P. Peabody was at that time the editor and proprietor

of the North American Review—the leading organ of enlightened opinion in America—and at the same time fulfilled the duties of pastor of the South Parish Unitarian Church at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. A few years later he became Preacher to Harvard University and retained that position for twenty-one years, becoming the author during the interval of important works upon Christianity and moral philosophy as well as of a volume of Harvard reminiscences published in 1881.

Convers Francis was Professor in Harvard Divinity School, which place he had held since 1842 and continued to occupy until his death in 1863. He had been a minister at Watertown, and he had assisted at the ordination of Theodore Parker and preached the sermon upon that occasion. At Cambridge, during his incumbency of the *Parkman Professorship* after the resignation of Henry Ware, Jr., he taught *Ecclesiastical History, Natural Theology, Ethics, The Composition of Sermons and Instruction in the Duties of a Pastor.* In his work on *Boston Unitarianism,* Octavius Brooks Frothingham gives this characterization of Francis—a characterization it is well to keep in mind in view of the undoubted influence of the personality of Francis upon the young men who studied under him:

> "I have elsewhere described him as one of those rare men whom too few appreciate; a liberal scholar in the best sense of the phrase. He was at heart a transcendentalist and reformer but he could not break the ties that bound him to his sect and he did not feel the necessity of doing so, his theory of influence recommending to him the wisdom of preserving existing relations. He said once that he who defied public opinion, like the man who spits in the wind, spits in his own face. He was an enormous reader of books. He was criticized as being too all-sided and not sufficiently commital."

The charge of Dr. Francis contained this notable tribute to the young minister and this prophecy of the future:

> "I cannot deny myself the pleasure of saying that my acquaintance with you during your theological education has surrounded your entrance into the ministry with the fairest and brightest hopes in my mind.*** As long as you live be it your main endeavor to stand in the line of those by whom the moral glory is received and transmitted from age to age—that brotherhood of the faithful which commenced with those who first heard the Great Teacher."

Throughout the whole address, with its fine feeling, a distinct personal note resounds, evidencing the high place young Wheelock held in the affection and esteem of the speaker. The *Right Hand of*

Fellowship by the Rev. A. F. Frothingham was no less an inspiring word, admonishing of the trials which should come in the endeavor to live true to the ideals of a pastor's life. Both these utterances must have touched deep chords in the heart of the youthful and inexperienced but earnest and enthusiastic initiate and as we follow the course of his life it is easy to see that the loftiest sentiments in these addresses found a splendid, if modest and unobtrusive, expression in his career.

The address of Dr. Peabody, it may not be amiss to add, was, despite that distinguished man's liberality of view, peculiarly orthodox in tone, discountenancing the tendency to discard authority in religion and to suffer the preacher to rely upon his own spiritual intuitions—something quite at war with all the thought of the young minister in his later life; but the presence of the Editor of the *North American Review* was an excellent omen and spoke eloquently of the high consideration the young man had enjoyed at the hands of his instructors for talent and scholarship.

Among the manuscript sermons left by Mr. Wheelock after his death is the original of the ordination discourse delivered by him at this time. This sermon lacks the literary beauty which, some two years later, began to mark his discourses, and there is not the breadth of thought noticeable in the manuscripts of several years after; but there are noteworthy passages nonetheless and one in particular we shall quote at length for its proof of the intellectual characteristic to which the whole course of his life was to bear conspicuous testimony:

> "He who enters upon the high office of the Christian ministry," we read, "must be *called* to it, or sincerely believe himself so to be."******** He must see, or believe that he sees, the hand of Providence leading, guiding and preparing him to be a servant in his Holy Temple. He must be sure that he did not set out to attain this end for any selfish motive of his own, but that while simply and humbly following the line of duty he had been led step by step until he found himself *here*."

Developing this thought he adds:

> "We believe that every one is formed by the Creator for some distinct and special place in the great society of human beings and is prepared for some peculiar use in that society, and we also believe that if men would not oppose the divine order by their own blind and evil desires each man would be led into his own proper place and to his own peculiar use, and we conclude that if any one is ready to give himself up to the leading of Providence and is willing to enter upon any course which seems that of duty he will be led or called into his proper office."

The mystical feeling of an over-brooding Providence thus evidenced so early in our young pastor's life was plainly a fundamental thing in his thought, and the course of his life, as we shall follow it in these pages, will amply demonstrate that he lacked neither the faith nor the courage to live out to the uttermost the belief which breathes from these passages. Already, doubtless, he had made a study of Swedenborg and of such of the writings of the poet and mystic Thomas Lake Harris as had been published, but it is not difficult to believe that the faith in a guiding Providence expressed in this sermon was organic in his mental makeup and that it would have found utterance in his words and expression in his deeds had Swedenborg and Harris remained strangers to him throughout life.

The remarkable man last named the young minister had doubtless met before this time. In 1855 Mr. Harris started upon a lecture-tour explanatory of the doctrines with which his name is associated and all evidences point to the conclusion that Mr. Wheelock came into touch with him even before that time and while the latter was pastor of a New York church. A powerful and impressive speaker, possessed of a glowing eloquence rich in the graces of rhetoric, and endowed with a rare personal magnetism, it is easy to understand that the young subject of these pages should have been attracted to him, his nature being charged doubtless with a native mysticism that was propitious to the influence of a personality such as that of Thomas Lake Harris.

This meeting, whatever its date, could not but have led young Wheelock into an intimate study of Swedenborgianism and of Harris' own poems and prose writings. *The Lyric of the Morning Land* had been published in 1858, the *Wisdom of the Angels* in 1856, the *Epic of the Starry Heavens* in 1854. Mr. Harris had been drawn into the spiritualistic movement about 1850, and these early poems were the fruit of his participation in that movement. It was the second year of the pastorate at Dover that Harris' *Arcana of Christianity Genesis* appeared, but the earlier writings and the personal association with Harris told deeply from the beginning upon the thought of the eager and impressionable young preacher and we are not surprised when we find the early sermons at Dover discovering the fact in tone and phrase. It was altogether fitting that this the greatest influence of his life, and one which was to lend color and tendency to his every thought and action, should

have made its impress thus early upon him, nor is it a trifling testimony to the power of the personality behind these writings that half a century's span should have left Mr. Wheelock as devoted and loyal a friend and disciple as he had been in the glow and enthusiasm of young manhood.

In the ordination sermon the young minister speaks not only with respect but with affection of those forms and ceremonies which even in the Unitarian Church were still common. Thus, in addition to the parochial duties of visiting his people, rejoicing with them in prosperity and consoling them in suffering and adversity, it is his, we are informed, to administer the ordinances of the church.

> "He is to take the smiling infant in his arms and while it looks up in innocent wonder in his face gently to mark it with the Christian sign—that sign which will have power to bring angelic guardians more closely around it."

So again:

> "He is to distribute the consecrated bread and wine, those symbols of that spiritual food which is to nourish our souls unto life eternal."

Time was to be when the growing thought of the hero of these pages was to reject the rite of baptism with the communion service and all ceremonies else as vain and empty forms hiding the beauty of religion in its native purity and weighing down the religious feeling in the heart; but that time was not yet.

Emerson, nearly thirty years before, while settled as Colleague at the Second Church in Boston, had preached a sermon on the Lord's Supper which was reprobated by the larger part of his congregation and which resulted in his resigning his charge. In this sermon the great trancendentalist's aversion even to the moderate forms of the Unitarian church was more than intimated and his unwillingness plainly expressed to accept the customary view of the communion service. He would, he had explained, continue the service only with the understanding that it was without the slightest sacramental meaning and at best a mere commemoration and upon the condition that he himself should not be asked to partake of the bread and wine; but this was too great a heresy for his people to approve and he left the ministry, resolved perhaps to seek a pulpit more congenial to his thought but only to find in another year or two that he had become doubtful of public prayer as being, too, perhaps, a mere form deadening to the spirit. So it was that in 1838—the

year of the famous address before the senior class in Divinity College at Harvard in which his rejection of the Incarnation was voiced to the amazement and horror even of the Unitarian world—Emerson turned his back upon the pulpit forever and adopted the lecture platform and the printed page as his avenues to the ear and heart of the public.

The memory of all this must have been present to our young minister—for at Cambridge he had many times sat in the presence of the amiable heretic and drunk in his wisdom and poetic diction—but he had not yet found his intellectual growth or else the influence of Swedenborg and Thomas Lake Harris were a check as yet upon his skepticism. Let one read the sermons delivered at Austin in 1893 and later, noting the scorn of all formalism in religion and the rejection of all that smacks of ecclesiasticism, and a wide divergence will be manifest between the young man, facing for the first time the breaking up of old traditions, and the old man, ripened by nearly a half century of study and reflection.

Nor is it a just matter of marvel that our youthful pastor, entering thus upon his first ministry, should have clung lovingly still to the old forms and beliefs which, as his mind expanded, he was wholly to reject. It is a tribute, indeed, to his native strength of mind and power of thought that he grew so rapidly, and no less marked a tribute to his character that as rapidly as he grew and as the larger thought took hold of his being just that rapidly he declared his new belief, thinking nothing of what consequences might ensue but thinking merely of his duty to declare the truth as he saw it.

The state of Unitarianism itself at that early date was not one propitious to liberality, as liberality would now be understood. It was only among the younger and more ardent that the influence of Emerson and Parker was telling markedly and the younger and more ardent were not the directing heads of the church nor the dominant factors in molding the destinies of the Unitarian movement.

Beginning with 1835, we are told by George Willis Cooke in his *Unitarianism in America,* the more liberal Unitarians were increasingly active.

> "Hodge's Club held its meetings. 'The Dial' was published, 'Brook Farm' lived its brief day of a reformed humanity, Parker began his preaching in Boston and the more radical young Unitarian preachers were bravely seeking for a religion natural to man and authenticated by

> the inner witness of the truth. The agitation thus started went on with growing insistence of statement and earnestness of feeling. The new doctrine gained the interest of the young in increasing number. In pulpit and on the platform, in newspapers and magazines, this new teaching was uttered for the world's hearing. The breeze thus created seems to have grown into a gale but the *Christian Register* and the *Christian Examiner* gave almost no indication that it had blown their way.***** All at once, however, in 1853 it came into the greatest prominence as the result of action taken by the *Unitarian Association* and thenceforth for a quarter of a century it was never absent as a disturbing element in the intellectual and religious life of the Unitarian body. The early Unitarians were believers in the supernatural and in the miracles of the New Testament. They accepted without question ideas on the subject that had been entertained by all Protestants from the days of Luther and Calvin. When, therefore, Parker and the Transcendentalists began to do away the miraculous foundations of Christianity many Unitarians were quite unprepared to accept their theories."

Mr. Cooke tells us of the resolutions of the American Unitarian Association in 1853, in which the body declared its belief in the divine origin of Christianity and the divine authority of the gospels as founded on a special and miraculous interposition of God, and he explains that the activities of the Association were interfered with because the conservative churches objected to the presence of radicals in the Association and the radicals to the presence of conservatives.

> "This controversy was emphasized by that arising from the reform movements of the day, especially the agitation against slavery. Almost without exception the radicals belonged to the anti-slavery party, while the conservative churches were generally opposed to this agitation. As a result anti-slavery efforts became a serious cause of discord in the Unitarian churches and helped to cripple the resourses of the Association and when, as the climax, Civil War came on the Association was brought to a condition of almost desperate poverty."

This disgression and these quotations will afford a fair light in which to read the passages of the ordination sermon. Young as yet in his chosen vocation, and with this tumult everywhere about him, the freedom of his first sermon from the liberality of opinion which marked his later discourses can be understood. It was not ripeness of view, it was the tremendous capacity for growth, which was the promising equipment of the new preacher.

Truth to say, however, it was not in its tone that the ordination sermon is chiefly important. Its significance lies in a direction altogether different. It is in the ringing statement of the minister's

attitude toward public questions that what is at once an original and a courageous note is struck.

> "Whenever a moral principle is involved in a public question, whether of trade, or politics or legislation or social life, the Christian minister as a champion of public morals is bound to speak and act—to speak and act kindly, carefully, dispassionately, indeed, but with all the manly freedom of one who is responsible only to his own conscience and to his God."

This, in very sooth, was the keynote of his life. In these words we read a trumpet call to his own soul to which, ever and again, in his long and useful and by no means uneventful life, a fiery response was heard, giving assurance that his words on this occasion were a solemn pledge of fidelity to the highest ideal of intellectual rectitude and courage. The time was but a few months distant when he should give token to his congregation that he meant just what he said, and a few years later, in the great crisis which tried men's souls, his voice was to sound high and true when others should speak with trembling accents; but, as yet, perhaps, the young man foresaw little occasion for any signal exercise of that independence of thought and speech which he bespoke for himself.

The occasion came when, in the election held in March, 1858, respectable citizens of Dover, following a practice common enough in the politics of that day, sought with money and drink support for their candidates. It is plain that these things passing before his very eyes—for the first time perhaps in his life—set the soul of the young pastor aflame. In his pulpit the Sunday following, March 13th, his congregation heard from him, in words direct and at times even stinging, what was at once a rebuke and a call to a nobler ideal.

> "I shall abstain from all political or secular discussion. I have nothing to do with that here. This place is for the enunciation of God's eternal Truth and for the application of its maxims to every phase of human work. Alas for the nation whose prophets prophesy falsely or flatteringly or equivocally; who shrink from declaring in all its fullness their holy message or tone it down for the sake of peace or whatever else. The law of God may have faded out of American politics but it has not yet faded out of the sky nor out of the earth and if we delay in reading it it may yet be written up and down our land in letters of fire."

Then, growing more pointed and specific, our flaming monitor directs an accusing finger at those who have "dispensed through the town the double infamy of drunkenness and bribes," and says:

"Men of property and standing, and even with religious pretensions, have declared that there is no higher law of morality—not even a lower law of decency—in politics; that there is no room at the polls for the gospel of Jesus but only for the shameless gospel of expediency. Temperance men who might with one determined word have closed every drinkery in this city on the day of election, and have banished liquor from sight and ordinary reach, consented to render rum as free as water to all comers. You know that there were men in this town whom God had endowed with but slight power of resisting temptation; men who were usually found sober and who do not seek temptation if it is kept out of their path but upon whose untrained appetite the presence and sight of liquor acts as does upon the tiger the sight of blood. You thought it a light thing to tempt these your weaker brethren though God out of Heaven has rolled these awful words 'Cursed be he who puteth the cup to his neighbor's lips.' Your liquor bills, for last week are not all settled yet. Jehovah, who does not admit the plea of expediency, and who notes every stumbling block put in the way of the weaker of his children, *has a bill against some of us that no bank account can balance.*"

A good start this, right surely, for a young preacher—a safe harbinger of loyal devotion in future to the highest behests of duty. They were not mistaken words, those beautiful ones of Francis and Frothingham—this youthful minister has sleeping within him the celestial fires and shall speak when occasion serves like a very prophet of old! There is a clarion sharpness in these words which speaks of an unusual soul, a soul cast in heroic mold, and which shall show its strength and greatness in every crisis. No fear is here, no timid thought of compromise, no misgivings; the evil and the evil-doer are before him and with prophetic swiftness he presses his trumpet to his lips and peals a long-resounding blast, announcing the evil and recalling the evil-doer to the path of right. There is a grandeur in these words that was to find a solemn commentary a few years later when the supreme crisis of his life should confront him and through every epoch of his career they were to echo and re-echo!

Of the early period of his pastorate at Dover a number of published sermons exist as memorials which may be dealt with at this point by way of conclusion to the present chapter. The earliest, perhaps, was one upon the subject of *Inspiration* published evidently in the year of his ordination by Crosby, Nichols & Company of Boston. No copy of this pamphlet has come to the notice of the present writer but the original manuscript of the sermon shows by

a pencil notation that it was published in a sixteen page pamphlet by that firm and that five hundred copies of it were made. Of the next published discourse, however—the next, at least, so far as we have been able to discover—a copy exists in the Boston Public Library and is among the books and pamphelts bequeathed to that library by Theodore Parker and received by the institution on October 31, 1861. The pamphlet had been printed by George Wadleigh, printer at Dover, in 1858, and evidently found its way soon after into the library of Mr. Parker. The style of this sermon is somewhat involved. It lacks the clearness and crispness which characterize his later sermons. The discourse, however—in reality a sermon upon immortality, though entitled *The Human Soul*—is finely reasoned and suggests by its tender touches the beautiful sermon *The Life Hereafter,* written some forty years later and begun beside the dead body of his wife, though lacking the latter's pure, chaste, Saxon English. Another copy of this discourse is to be found among the celebrated Waterman Collection of pamphlets in the Congressional Library at Washington. In this collection also appears a sermon entitled *Divine Sonship of Man,* printed by G. Wadleigh, Dover, New Hampshire, in 1858, and bound together with sermons and addresses by Emerson, Theodore Parker and Ezra Ripley. In this discourse, by its tone and cast of phrase, we get for the first time suggestions and forehints of the thinker and preacher as he was to be when ripened by the years and we detect those characteristics of style and thought which were in time to become a part of the very man. Doctrinally, however, the discourse lacks the spirit of the later sermons—there is an unmistakable lack of ripe conviction upon the question of the Incarnation and one might even suspect that the young clergyman was not wholly free from that disposition for ascribing a Divine origin to the Bible which in his maturer years he cast off wholly.

THE MYSTERIOUS MEANING OF LIFE

BY HENRY HARBERS

THERE is no one, except he be one who cannot think at all, who does not at times wonder what life means, why it ends in death, what comes after, and why it is all a mystery.

Yet while man has thought and wondered about these things for thousands of years, the strange fact is that what really seems to be the most important truth about life, the very facts of life that will lead to the clearest answer to the questions of life's meaning and destiny, are truths that have ever been overlooked, unrecognized and ignored.

These truths or facts of life have been neglected and their meaning allowed to pass unrecognized, no doubt because life is held to be essentially a mystery, the solution of which is not to be found in life and the world, but beyond this life and the world.

As it is the average man who would like to know what life means, why it is so uncertain and unequal, what comes after death, and why it is all so mysterious, if he does not feel that it is all an insoluble mystery and useless to attempt to give a real solution, looks for his solution either in the profundities of theology and metaphysics, or else the obscurities of occultism. Never does anyone seem to think of looking to the actual facts of life for the solution of any questions of the meaning of life.

Yet the riddle of life may not be so insoluble after all, for there are things that plainly indicate what life is, what it means, what its destiny is, and why everythng must be shrouded in mystery and uncertainty.

The things or facts that indicate the meaning of life and explain the conditions of our existence, are the fact that life is gamelike in character, and the further fact that life is dramatic also in its character. Life and the world is at once both a drama and a game. Everything in and about the world contributes to make life and the world's story a drama and a game.

The non-recognition of these facts is shown in that the world's drama and the game of life are recognized only as incidental matters and not as the essential features. They are not seen as being the very things that the world exists for, and that life here is meant to be.

Life's game and the world's drama are seen to be matters of primary importance, only when we assume that the world and life in it are in real truth a drama and a game, being played for the interests of some higher world.

How this world and life can be purposely a drama and a game playing to a higher world will be seen by what follows:

After a man has lived this life and gone to Heaven to live eternally, a life of perfect ease and happiness, how will this world and its affairs look to him? Will it not all look like some sort of huge game, a game of life as we should say? And suppose after many million years have passed and the world has ceased to exist as a world of man, everybody being now in Heaven, it happens that someone suggests that the world's story or history be retold in play. The suggestion is adopted and a stage is built as big as the world. On it each person plays the part he took in the real life of the world, and the play, owing to the fact that time in Heaven is eternal and a few million years no objection, takes just as long as the real world did for the same thing when it was real life. Would not this be a drama?

Now note the fact that while this world would look to a person in Heaven exactly like some sort of huge game, in fact be in actual truth a real game, a repetition of the world's history or story of action would not look like a game, but like a drama and would be in real truth a drama. Yet all the difference there would be between the world of real life and a dramatic repetition of the world's story will and can only be that real life is like a game, and a repetition is like a drama, in that a game's course of action is free and determined by the players, while the drama's course of action is fixed, being predetermined upon. That the world and life should be a game, or like a game, and yet be like a drama, being a real drama if repeated, is because the world and life is a drama that is played like a game, or a game, the playing of which is the telling of a drama.

The world and life, in being a game and drama in one, shows a

uniqueness that is absent in any game or drama that we possess in this world.

It is in this possession at once of dramatic and gamelike characteristics, that the real meaning of life and the purpose of the world must be sought for.

The secret appears to be simply this. Your life, in all that you do in showing your ambitions, your characteristics, your passions, with all the results that follow in the different situations in life, that you find yourself in, situations that are comic, tragic, and romantic, and which if portrayed upon the stage would be called dramatic, is really and truly dramatic.

Life is in real truth the playing of a drama, your world is the stage, and your audience is not only the people in this world, but the people of a higher or super world, who are really placed in the position of an audience in relation to the drama of life, and who undoubtedly created the world to be a drama. This superworld is the world that man dimly recognizes the existence of when he speaks about Heaven.

But this is not all. Your life in all the things in which you take chances, in all the things in which you must contend and struggle, in all the things in which you must plan, and in all the things in which you must strive to attain some sort of skill or success, all things that make life gamelike and are analogous to the elements which make the sort of action we call the playing of a game, means that life is a true game.

Life is really the playing of a drama and a game at once, and in one and the same play of action. It is a special form of game, for the playing of which the world was designed and created, to meet the requirements of a higher world.

It is because life in this world combines the dramatic and gamelike in a unit play of action, that it must exist under condition that it be mystery to itself, for it can be shown that it is one of the necessary conditions of a dramatic game, or gamelike drama, that the players know nothing that will break up the course of dramatic action, or interfere with its gamelike character, except that knowledge be gained as part of the dramatic game itself and in the course of its action.

This world of ours is contained in and is part of a higher world, order of reality or order of existence, and our life here is really an episode in our higher eternal life, but being a dramatic game our

world must be isolated, not only from the higher world, but from other dramatic games of its kind, (that is, other planetary worlds,) and we must know nothing save what we learn as we play the game of life.

You came from the higher or superworld, a world of such dimensions and with so many people as to be infinite, a world enjoying such perfection in science, skill and power as to be omnipotent and absolutely perfect, a world of immortal people, a world in comparison with which this world of ours, which is to it really a game and drama, and all the worlds in the universe, are related about as the theatres of New York are related to the whole United States.

When you entered the world at birth, you lost all memory of your life in Heaven, in order that you should not bring into this world any knowledge, any memory that would affect you as a player in an action which is at once both dramatic and gamelike. Think it over, and you will realize that if you knew to a certainty that you lived before your birth, remember what you did, how you did things in a world of perfection, this world could never continue as a drama and game in one.

Possibly you still doubt that this life and world is a dramatic and gamelike incident or event in the life and order of a higher world of being or existence. Explain then why man is born under such conditions of diversity and unequality; why is his life ruled so much by chance? Why is he subject to the vicissitudes of life? Why does injustice exist? Why the mystery surrounding life and why does man possess free will, something which means nothing in a pure drama, but is all important in the playing of any kind of a game? If life and the world be a drama and a game in one, the meaning of all these things becomes plain, and they have no clear meaning in any other interpretation of the meaning of life.

Why does the world exist as a drama and game? Why do we have dramas and games? They are things that make life interesting. But the whole explanation of the meaning of life cannot be told in a few words; a book is needed to tell all.

THE WORD OF GOD IN NATURE

BY GUILFORD WILCOX

"In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by Him; and without Him was not anything made that was made. In Him was Life; and the Life was the Light of men. And the Light shineth in darkness; and the darkness comprehendeth it not." St. John, Chapter I. 1-5.

"In the midst of the sun is the Light, in the midst of the Light is the Truth, in the midst of the Truth is the imperishable Being." *Vedas.*

"After Him the Shining One, all shines, from his light is lighted this whole world." *ibid.*

A man and a flower—a dahlia, let us say—are brought into proximity. Light of the definite wave-length corresponding to the color of the dahlia is reflected from it and is vibrated through space. The reflected light vibrations are received in the eye of the man where they undergo transformation and pass on to the mind. The mind, a receiving and sending station for many varieties of vibration, integrates the impression of the flower that it receives from the eye and immediately gives it a certain classification or category that is dependent upon past experience with like impressions. That is, the mind co-relates this present impression with past impressions of a like order, just as a filing clerk files a letter relating to a special type of business transaction with previous papers of similar purport. In thus filing the impression away in the mind some particular filing case or cell, some individual "aisle of memory" is re-opened. The mind of the man passes from the consideration of this particular dahlia to that of other dahlias that bloomed long ago in his mother's garden and from the thought of dahlias and gardens it passes to thought of his mother. He recalls that he has not communicated with her for a long time, and, in order to make amends, resolves to send her a telegram. Seated at his desk an idea or ideas of definite significance appeal to him as worthy of conveyance. His mind is "made up." A command goes out from the mind, a command that

is vibrated through the nerves of the body to the muscles of the hand. The command to write. The hand, trained to co-ordinate with mind, obeys. The ideas of the mind are clothed in certain conventional, man-designed, symbols. These take the form of black marks of a peculiar configuration that contrast with the white of the paper. The ideas are thus reduced to a form in which they are intelligible, through the medium of Light, to other minds. The message can now be read by the operator to whom it is submitted. This individual transmutes the symbology of the more or less stable written characters into an instantaneous symbology of dots and dashes that are formed by alternately opening and closing an electric circuit. These dots and dashes are received at another point as individual clicks of sound that are significant to the trained ear of the receiving operator who transmutes them back again into written characters.

For the purpose of carrying the illustration further, let us now assume that the message has to be relayed to another city by radio. In this event the characters of the written message are pronounced by voice into the microphone of a transmitter. The sound waves are thus impressed upon the electromagnetic carrier wave that accompanies the current in the transmitting apparatus. These waves, carrying the sound impression—which in turn carry the ideas of the message—are oscillated at the spark gap into the ether. At a distant receiving set, tuned to receive waves of just this wavelength, the impressed sound waves are delivered back to a material system and their message of articulated human words is conveyed to the intended recipient.

The foregoing hypothetical incident has to do in its entirety with an operation of the Word in nature—i. e., the conveyance of words, thoughts, ideas or intelligence. From the time of their original conception by the sender to their reception by the addressee the words or ideas of the message took various forms. There was the originating stimulus—the memory rotating light vibrations received from the dahlia—that preceded the formation of the ideas in the mind. There was an interval when the formless idea existed only in some vague fashion in the mind of the sender. There was a stage during which the ideas were being flashed through the nerves of the arm and hand and being given concrete expression in the conventional symbols of the familiar tongue. There was an instant when cognizance was taken of the words by another mind. There was an

instant when the words existed in the form of electric pulses traveling along a wire. There was another stage in which they again existed in symbolic characters and came under the purview of other human minds. There was an instant when they existed in the form of sound waves, or as alternate rarefactions and compressions of the material atmosphere. There was an instant when they existed as an impression upon an electromagnetic carrier wave that was expanding to infinity through the ether. There was an instant when with the carrier wave the words were re-integrated from the ether to another material system and when the radio waves were changed back to sound waves. Finally, there was the stage when the words came to the awareness of the person to whom they were directed.

The incident illustrates how closely such things as light, sound, electricity, magnetism, matter, mind and thought are inter-related. It also indicates how the mind is resonated and stimulated to thinking by the vibrations of light that reach it from an object and how mind, in its turn, has power to initiate vibrations that, through auxiliary agencies, may be changed into many forms.

Thousands of years before anything was scientifically known of the emission and absorption of electromagnetic radiation the word, LIGHT, was employed in the expression of both natural and spiritual ideas. The word itself and all kindred words that have come down to us—such as "luminous," "illuminate," lucid," "elucidate," "enlighten," "enlightenment," "bright," "brighten," etc.,—are used in ordinary speech and writing more frequently to express ideas relating to mental excellence and wisdom than they are used in connection with ideas relating to natural light. In reality, no one can write or utter many sentences upon any subject without introducing words or terms that have a direct or a veiled reference to Light. Even the physicist, describing his investigations of natural light, is sometimes caught speaking of the measures he is taking to "throw light on the subject," or conveying the impression—in no sense untrue—that light may be thrown upon itself.

In ancient philosophic and religious literatures Light is used synonymously with "Truth," "Righteousness," "Wisdom," "the Word," etc. In the Vedic hymns Light is referred to as "Sacrifice" and this idea is allied with the occidental concept of the sacrifice of the "Light of the World."

The ancient and the modern civilization sought Truth along very different paths but it is more and more evident that all paths with

which Light is involved lead at last to the same goal. The more complete our knowledge of vibratory science becomes the clearer does it appear that Light, even as revealed in nature, is just what the ancients deemed it to be—i. e. the Word, Truth, Wisdom, and Sacrifice.

That Light,[1] or vibration, is both the Word and the means by which the Word is conveyed can be observed in the incident outlined above. Vibration is thus revealed by modern science and technology as the fundamental basis of all human language and symbology and the only means by which intelligence may be conveyed from mind to mind.

That Light in its relations with matter is Truth itself is becoming more and more realized by physicists. Light never steals or takes anything unto itself. Whatever wave-length or quantity of energy is imparted to it by a material resonating system is always—whenever and wherever it meets another material system—handed back to matter again in the same measure and definite magnitude of energy.

That Light is Wisdom itself follows from the fact that it combines the idea and the expression of the idea. Being the sole intermediary between separate particles and entities Light alone can be the essence of Wisdom.

Light is Sacrifice. Consider a modern radio transmitting apparatus in which the alternating current waves are oscillating at the spark gap into the ether. In such a system the current that was ascending in one direction is brought to a limit, declines in the opposite direction, is reversed in polarity at the spark gap and sacrificed to the ether. That is, a portion of the electromagnetic energy that accompanies every moving electron or electric current is given up or dies to matter in the spark gap.

Consider also the tiny atomic resonating systems that emit visible light. Electrons revolving in the outer orbits of a heated or excited atom fall inward towards the inert proton. As they descend to inner energy levels something which actuated them in the outer orbits is lost. In this system, too, there is no doubt a reversal of polarity in which electromagnetic energy is given up to the ether. Light is Sacrifice.

[1] The word, Light, as used herein is employed in the comprehensive sense that includes all vibration. The whole gradient of electromagnetic vibration is implied together with sound and other probable forms of vibration.

Milleniums ago Job pondered over the "dwelling-place of Light." Today, though we have learned much about light in a physical way, there are none who know the dwelling-place of Light; neither are there any who know where Light begins and ends or if it has beginning and ending. But we do know that Light is a relative thing that steps down through an unknown number of octaves from infinitely short to indefinitely long waves. The shortest known vibrations at the present time are those of Millikan's lately discovered "cosmic rays" which have a beginning wave length of .00038 Angstroem units and a frequency of 78919 vibrations per second. They are believed to arise from the minute disturbance imparted to the ether when the primordial hydrogen protons combine to form heavier elements. From this rarefied beginning—if it is the real beginning of vibration—Light progressively steps down through about 35 symmetrical octaves to a point where the far intra-red region of natural vibrations merges into the region of electrical vibration artificially generated by men. From this point, λ=420u, to the wave-length of the industrial 60 cycle alternating current, λ=5200 kilometers, is about 33 octaves more. This may by no means be taken as marking the long-wave limit of vibration. As the wave-length and frequency of vibration is governed by the physical dimensions and periods of the resonating systems involved there is no conceivable long wave limit short of the dimensions of the greatest suns and stellar systems.

The light octave, it may be recalled, is identical in structure with the musical octave—i. e. the frequency of vibration is halved or doubled with the beginning of each successive octave in progressing respectively toward the long wave and short wave regions of the radiation gradient. Etherial radiation thus forms a progressive "Jacob's Ladder" upon which creative power descends and ascends between the Primal Source and the divergent categories of Being. Light is the vibratory and supervisory power of Deity over differentiated essence and the unifying relation between all diverging substances and entities. The different octaves are representative of gradations of differential essence in connection with which life and intelligence in different forms and degrees is possible.

Light, it will be inferred, alters in quality and significance as it varies through the long gradient of octaves. Its wave-length and frequency are a sort of mirror-image of the size and orbital periods of the resonating systems that give rise to the vibration and these, as has been implied, vary from the dimensions of the minute hydro-

gen proton to those of stars and universes. Wave-length is the ultimate and natural yardstick of dimension and space as frequency is the fundamental measure of Time. They are the pulse and period of the vibrating cosmos itself, which varying through the long vibration gradient, bring in, in due season, the periods and conditions of matter through which the diverse categories evolve. Light emitted by an individual resonating system is monochromatic in character and such vibration "falls in" in its natural order in the great procession of light.

The analogy between light and sound is often remarked. Indeed there is much more than analogy existing between these two types of vibration; there exists a direct reciprocal and reversible relationship between them. Sound is readily convertible into electromagnetic vibration and this into sound, as we have noted before. The tones of music and the spectral series of light are akin and the character of both are due primarily to the quality, symmetry and dimensions of the emitting resonators. The resonators that emit light are the well ordered cosmically constructed atoms and material compounds while musical resonators are the artfully devised instruments of men. Musical resonators may also be deemed aggregates of atomic systems brought into certain juxtapositions and conditions of strain whereby they vibrate and harmonic sound, of musical tones, is produced.

Electromagnetic vibration and sound are thus observed to arise from the disturbance of matter or essence. There is, however, a marked distinction between the two types of vibration. Light vibrates through the medium of the ether. Sound, on the other hand, is "of the earth, earthly" and vibrates only through material mediums at a velocity that is only a tiny fraction of the velocity of Light.

It would seem that these two forms of vibration, the electromagnetic and sound, which appear to vibrate on two sides of matter, form two dimensions of an all embracing system of cosmic vibration which might be given the name of Light in an all inclusive sense. If two sides of Light are respresented in electromagnetic vibration and sound vibration there must be yet another dimension of Light so that it has the three dimensions that make of it the reciprocal of matter.

What, then, is this third dimension of Light? There is no other name that we can give it but that of Life. Does not Life also consist of an immense Jacob's Ladder of vibration that varies in

character according to the resonating systems—i. e. the genera, species and individuals—from which it emanates?

The electromagnetic vibration gradient and the life gradient are similar in their manner of unfoldment. Both must first exist in a high frequency or unevolved form before they may exist in low frequency or evolved forms. The high frequencies of tiny resonating systems and the short life periods of the lower forms of life are analogous.

Life would appear to also have this in common with electromagnetic vibration that it is a thing of two planes, the material and the etherial or spiritual. Just as natural light—the soul of matter—seemingly dies to matter as the light ray slips away into the ether, so the life of the creature appears to die as the bodily functions discontinue. But as we know, and have physically proved, that the energy that dies at once place and time in matter as intra-atomic energy is born through the medium of Light in like measure and quality in a kindred resonating system—however distant in time and space—can we not assume the same for life, another type of Light? When life slips away from the failing body it must, if it obeys the same laws as natural light, pass an interval—either small or great—in the etherial medium (heaven?). However, if a kindred resonating system is made accessible to it—i. e. a male and female of kindred characteristics—it may be born again in another living form.

We observed how readily the electromagnetic waves "carry" the sound waves. May not the shorter wave-length rays of natural light carry life waves as well? Is this not the secret of how living types are reflected by Light from planet to planet? Is it not probable that all the potentialities of sound, life and mind are stepped down to us from the Primal Source of Light through a vibration gradient of unknown length?

I must leave this fascinating subject at this point to take it up again perhaps in other papers. The study of Light in all of its natural and psychic aspects should, I believe, be among the very earliest to be introduced to the adolescent intellect. Just now the scientific evidence concerning Light is incomplete and exists in fragmentary form scattered through the technical literature of a dozen sciences. These loose ends should be brought together and co-ordinated for it is Light itself that forms the one continuous thread through all nature and knowledge of nature. All human

knowledge could well be re-arranged according to their natural sequences and relations in the Light gradient.

The laws of light propagation and reception when they shall have been deciphered and co-ordinated in their entirety will be found to form the basic expression of all that is at present true in mathematics, music and religion, and to form a science of nature that can only be equalled by arithmetic for exactitude. Once perfected, this synthetized All-science would serve equally well as the foundation study for all scientific, aesthetic and priestly careers and in the realm of human affairs Light would, for the first time, become the true intermediary between divergent minds just as it ever is the intermediary between divergent particles of essence. However their paths might diverge in later years men grounded as boys in this cosmic science could never overlook the Thread that runs through all and the separatistic opinions and dissensions that mark our contemporary era would no longer arise.

GETTING AT THE BOTTOM OF OUR CORRUPTION

BY BOLLING SOMERVILLE

FOR those of us who sincerely feel that corruption is growing in politics and in general, here would seem a simple enough summary of the thing:—A world growing in corruption is a world in which the more corruptible people are growing in power. It is a world in which the people who would have things otherwise are losing the necessary power. Those who would cannot, and those who can will not, bring about a better state of things. Realization of this marks the proper beginning of any thought and effort towards improvement.

How can one speak of improvement after saying that those who would bring about a better state of things cannot do so? It is because a better state can often be hoped of the somewhat distant future than of the immediate future. By allowing themselves a greater length of time for the task, and husbanding their resources, the less corruptible among us can effect good changes almost without limit. It is the patient focusing of effort and power alone which brings about good things. It is the focusing of effort and power which is to say it is purpose, which binds together all time, all days and generations, thereby giving meaning and value to all. What a relief to think that good things which are absent and impossible at present yet exist in the possibilities lying before us!

Of course this belief in vast possibilities lying before us makes many of us wax weak in present effort. Over-confidence comes before a slipping and a backward slide. (There is indeed no progress for us except that progress which we *make* with our own efforts.) Now this devitalizing over-confidence on the one hand, and on the other hand the present widespread pessimism as to the possibility

of spiritually rejuvenating civilization, hang very much like millstones about our neck. Both weigh us down far more than we are wont to admit. Both act as aids to the forces of decadence.

Both are great enemies of ours. Between the extremes of popular optimism and high-brow pessimism lies of course the golden mean of action, of amelioration, of effort which is focused and which makes good things to come. The necessity and way of focusing is indeed too little realized by the people who would have the world grow ever less corrupt. It is too little realized by the dutiful, that is by those who endeavor to act with regard to the interest of the human whole. Instead of acting as a well united, focused body, the dutiful everywhere stand noticeably scattered. They lack common impulse to come to the aid of one another and to make their weight felt at the points where their weight is needed above all other things. They stand helpless in the face of the greatest and most widespread age of corruption which has ever found the human race. Their voice is of all things like that of the lamb crying in the wilderness. It shows no power. It inspires no fear. It is the voice of deep distress.

During war we have all witnessed how dutifulness and idealism can be made to flow into the channels which serve the interests of a special class of rulers or manufacturers or even laborers as against the interests of the whole state. During war the enslavement of idealism, its wounding and partial destruction, is verily writ red. The aftermath of disillusion, disgust and decadence fully verifies the thing. Now the diversion of idealism which is very evident during war also goes on during peace, as things now are in this unfinished world of ours. Notice how often advertisements which are not of the "statement of fact" variety appeal to the higher, deeper, and more generalized wants and fears. Undoubtedly "it pays to advertise." It pays the advertiser to capture all he can of our interest in ourselves and as well in our families and communities, whether or not it pays the community itself. Even in the drives for charity, there is little regard for things other than "getting results." "Five dollars will save a life" is a fine slogan for opening up the pocketbooks of men; and it seems a pity that it will save a life for a very short while only. It also seems a pity to ask whether such exaggeration will not eventually dull the charitable spirit! And so on the whole all interests squeeze and suck at

the strength of our sympathies and loves, and leave us somewhat weaker at the end of every year. We become weaker, and, by way of self-protective compensation, harder and more thoughtful of ourselves. The age sinks deeper into egoism.

It is truly difficult to realize the dutiful everywhere are deplorably lacking in unity as a group. It is difficult to believe it even when our eyes and ears tell us it is surely so. For we are wont to think of dutifulness as a rather self-sufficient affair. Many of us resent the idea that "an honest man has a poor show." We resent it, but we give little critical consideration to it. The fact is that an extremely dishonest man has about as poor a show on the whole as the opposite extreme in the way of an honest man. It is the lukewarm to whom all blessings seem to flow, at present. In honesty, the "point of diminishing returns" is soon reached; from this point on, the more scrupulous you are, the greater is your handicap, your chances of bankruptcy or other loss. As competition grows, the general plane of practice in every field is set by the least scrupulous man who succeeds in that field. If they would survive in that field, the others must sooner or later move towards the plane of the least scrupulous. Men say with a certain truth that they are "forced to do it," and they seldom feel pangs of conscience, but the fact we need to remember, is that they actually do it—that it is the tendency wherever there is competition.

Every phase of life is of course more or less filled with competition. and that brings us to the appalling possibility, which as we study it, seems more and more a certainty, that on the whole scruples are declining. On the whole, survival in power and possessions goes more and more to the strongest in "immediate values," such as cunning and self-interest. Consideration for others, consideration for the human whole, acts always as an immediate handicap. No wonder decadence has stolen upon the world!

In a true sense, any active interest in society is an "investment" of self-interest. For the time being, we suffer a certain loss, but in time (with society properly organized for such an extremely important thing) full return with interest is to be expected. What we have a right to complain of then, is not that we suffer an immediate loss in interesting ourselves in society, but that society is still childishly unaware that it is under real obligation to meet, as far as possible, its payments. What we have a right to complain of is the

fact that there is being developed no "machinery" for rewarding the higher human excellences, such as the higher degrees of honesty and courage. On the lower levels of human activity, the monetary system sustains reciprocity among men fairly well. Men give and take of much stuff and services through the medium of "currency." On the higher levels of human activity, however, there is really nothing to sustain reciprocity among men. Therefore reciprocity here is not being sustained. On these levels those who give of their stuff and services receive in turn little and seldom. It has become more and more a one-sided affair. Have not all of us heard of the increasing disproportion within the last hundred years between the monetary returns for mere commercial service as compared with that for more humane services such as those of the teacher and research worker? Truly, the problem of curing the world of its decadence is the problem of sustaining reciprocity on the higher levels of human life. It is the problem of showing dutiful men everywhere their duty to sustain one another—to support,—or as we often say, "back" one another—more whole-heartedly. In politics, in business, and in everything else, eternally confronting us is the problem of taking up for the dutiful man, the man with a conscience, the man who considers his fellows as a whole.

For many ages the idea has prevailed that the universe on the whole acts to support the good man and to bring the evil to destruction. This idea, like that of "automatic progress," is certainly very pleasant to those of us who held to it, and certainly very deadening to our efforts. If only we can believe that nature, or even human nature, works on the whole for the well-being of the dutiful, we can avoid so much effort in his behalf! But it is not so. There is neither automatic progress not automatic reward for the good man. Sadly we learn that the support of the good man is to a certain extent a real struggle against human nature, a real struggle against this world of the majority, the flesh and the devil. It is the real struggle of human life. According as we become aware of the thing, and conduct ourselves properly with it all in mind, can we hope that amelioration will set in, that the good and dutiful among men will gain in power and means for improving the world. The dutiful need become aware of the great need for their cooperation in behalf of their own special interests as a group. A peculiar and all-important group they are, indeed. And it is only in being

true to their own "group-self" that they can hope to be true to humankind. The special interest of the dutiful as a group gathers into itself all other interests, and therein fully simplifies the problem of accelerating social and moral progress. It gives a bulls-eye, a point of unity, to our at present conflicting ideals and efforts to improve mankind's well-being.

THE DIGNITY OF MATTER

BY WILLIAM ALPHONSO MURRILL

IN the olden days, anything *material* was spurned like the dirt beneath one's feet, and only force and spirit were esteemed worthy of attention. Matter was then considered inert, formless, and degrading; but the brilliant discoveries of modern science have lifted it up from its low position and placed it upon a pedestal. Matter as formerly conceived has vanished and energy has taken its place.

Consider the atom, which in days gone by could neither be divided nor analyzed. Every atom is now known to be a little system in itself, with definite elements definitely arranged, and most of them moving at terrific speed. In an atom of hydrogen, for example, there are two tiny particles; a nucleus, or proton, at the center and an electron moving around it at the rate of 1300 miles per second. Although the nucleus is 2000 times smaller than the electron, the mysterious attraction between the two holds the latter in its orbit as the earth is held by the sun. If the electrons were three inches in diameter, the diameter of its orbit would be 7200 feet, which is another way of saying that by far the greater part of the atom is space.

There are ninety-two elements, all built up from hydrogen, which is the simplest. In the hotter stars, extreme temperatures prevent combination, so they are all pure hydrogen; but upon cooling the hydrogen atoms gradually unite to form the other elements in succession. Four hydrogen atoms, for example, unite to form a helium atom, which has four protons packed together in its nucleus and two electrons revolving about it in distinct, fixed orbits. Next comes the element lithium, with three electrons; beryllium, with four; boron, with five; carbon, with six; nitrogen, with seven; oxygen, with eight; and so on up to uranium, with ninety-two electrons

moving with a speed of 125,000 miles per second about a single nucleus composed of protons.

Not quite all of the ninety-two elements have been discovered—numbers 85 and 87 are still missing—but chemists know where to look for them and something of their properties, just as astronomers have located and described unknown heavenly bodies in the past. After the discovery of argon and terrestrial helium, toward the close of the last century, Ramsay obtained neon, xenon, and krypton from liquid air; celium was discovered by Urbain a few years ago; and two additional elements were reported by Noddack in 1925. The following year was a notable one for America because of the discovery of illinium at the University of Illinois after five years of patient research. The new element was named for the university and the state.

By analyzing the light of the various stars with the spectroscope, it is possible to determine the presence of carbon, calcium, and other elements as they are formed. The yellow light of our sun is said to be due to the presence of sodium. The various elements differ greatly in their properties. Helium gas, for example, is much more valuable for balloons than hydrogen because it is inert, like nitrogen, and cannot be set on fire with explosive bullets. Argon is another inert element, with its bonds of attraction satisfactorily balanced among themselves; while potassium, with one more electron, is exceedingly active. One inert element in a compound may readily wreck it: this is the basis of explosives.

The attraction of matter for matter is a remarkable thing. In the heavens, we call it gravitation; between two surfaces, adhesion; among the molecules of a solid, cohesion; and in the atom, the electrical attraction between positive and negative particles. What a power there must be in the tiny hydrogen proton to hold an electron two thousand times its size rotating a considerable distance away at the rate of thirteen hundred miles a second! Atoms combine into molecules because of their mutual attractions, and some of these combinations are so complicated as to be almost beyond human comprehension.

When we pass beyond the sphere of chemical reaction, there are other forces that determine the state of matter, whether solid, liquid, or gaseous. Suppose these three conditions of matter were

impossible, or even one was lacking, what would become of the earth—and the universe? If air could only exist as a liquid; if water could only be solid; if a nebula must always remain an attenated gas!

The sun is not only the mother of the earth but, like a true mother, is continually giving of itself to supply the light and heat—without which life on the earth's surface would be impossible. Four million tons of the sun's substance is being poured out into space every second in the form of electromagnetic waves; and the same thing is true of countless myriads of other stars; some of which, at least, will entirely disappear in this way. What becomes of all this energy? Perhaps these waves are changing back to atoms somewhere to form new nebulous masses for the production of new star systems. These waves of energy proceed from the nuclei of atoms in the interior of the stars, where the temperature may reach thirty million degrees on the Centigrade scale!

Another way in which new nebulous masses may be produced is by collision among the stars. When such an event occurs, the pressure at the center of two colliding stars as they strike and flatten is a billion tons to the square inch, or, enough to vaporize a star as large as our sun one hundred thousand times over. If the heavenly bodies can thus disappear and reappear in cycles of countless ages—eon upon eon—, then matter must be regarded as practically eternal.

The immense size of the universe, also, challenges our greatest admiration and taxes our comprehension to the utmost. Our largest telescope penetrates space to a distance of 840 million million million miles without reaching a boundary. Our own stellar system, with its ten billion suns, is 300 thousand light-years in diameter; and there are two million other known systems similar to ours with their countless hosts of suns. So far as it is possible to estimate, the known universe is twenty million light-years in diameter; a light-year being the distance light travels in a year, speeding at the rate of 186,000 miles a second!

It is not my intention to exalt matter unduly, nor to claim that the chasm between non-living matter and living matter may be lightly bridged. However wonderful the stars; however beautiful the snowflake and the crystal; the tiniest living creature, whether

plant or animal, is far more remarkable. It is composed of matter, to be sure, but possesses individuality and irritability as well; has birth, the power to grow and reproduce its kind, and death; is able to vary in form both throughout life and in its heredity; and to give rise to new types of life through segregation and selection.

But we have seen how remarkably well organized are the elements of matter in the atom, the molecule, the mass, the star, and the universe; and it seems to me that this very beauty of form and organization eminently fits the material elements to be closely associated with and to take orders from the immaterial forces resident in living beings. Of all things existing in Nature, nothing is unworthy—except, perhaps, the man who does not appreciate and live up to his opportunities.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Van Meter Ames *Aesthetics of the Novel.* Chicago, The University of Chicago Press. $2.50.

Frederick D. Lute, *Christianity in Science.* New York, The Abingdon Press, $3.00.

Michael Pupin, *The New Reformation.* New York, Charles Scribners Sons. $2.50.

E. A. Burtt, *Principles and Problems of Right Living.* New York, Harper & Bros. $3.00.

Joseph Ratner, *The Philosophy of John Dewey.* New York, Henry Holt & Co. $4.00.

Edgar S. Brightman, *A Philosophy of Ideals.* New York, Henry Holt & Co. $2.00.

Edward G. Spaulding, *What Am I?* New York, Charles Scribners Sons. $2.00.

Bishop C. Fiske, *The Confessions of a Puzzled Parson.* New York, Charles Scribners Sons. $2.00.

J. O. Hertzler, *Social Progress.* New York, The Century Co.

Charles Gore, *Christ and Society.* New York, Charles Scribners Sons. $2.00.

Henry Kendall Booth, *The Background of the Bible.* New York, Charles Scribners Sons. $2.00.

Robert Sparks Walker, *My Father's Farm.* Boston, The Four Seas Co. $2.00.

Henry Van Dyke, *Even Unto Bethlehem.* New York, Charles Scribners Sons. $1.50.

Robert Norwood, *The Steep Ascent.* New York, Charles Scribners Sons. $1.50.

Margaret Naumberg, *The Child and the World.* New York, Harcourt Brace & Co. $3.50.

Dr. Martin Grabmann, *Thomas Aquinas.* New York, Longmans, Green & Co. $2.50.

G. A. Coe, *Motives of Men.* New York, Charles Scribners Sons. $2.25.

Richard McKeon. *The Philosophy of Spinoza.* New York, Longmans, Green & Co. $5.00.

Walter R. Bowie, *The Master: A Life of Jesus Christ.* New York, Charles Scribners Sons. $2.50.

John Baillie, *Interpretation of Religion.* New York, Charles Scribners Sons. $4.00.

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Devoted to the Science of Religion, the Religion of Science, and the Extension of the Religious Parliament Idea.

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Volume XLIII (No. 3) MARCH, 1929 Number 874

ETHAN ALLEN AND HIS *MAGNUM OPUS*

BY CLARENCE GOHDES

> Reason now reigns, and by her aid we hope
> Truth may revive and sickening Error droop:
> She the sole judge, the Rule, the gracious Light
> Kind Heaven has sent to guide our minds aright.
>
> But what too deep in mystery is thrown,
> The wisest preachers chuse to let alone,
> How Adam's fault affects all human kind;
> How three is one and one is three combined;
> How certain prescience checks not future will;
> And why almighty Goodness suffers ill;
> Such points as these lie far too deep for man,
> Were never well explained nor ever can.
>
> George Smalridge, *Art of Preaching*.[1]

WHAT has commonly been denominated American Puritanism, like all other movements in thought, bred the giant that was to destroy itself. In that whimsical performance, *The Christian Philosopher*, which is best characterized, perhaps, by the profound observation, "The bladder is an admirable vessel," Cotton Mather delivers himself of this incipient heresy:

> Reason, what is it but a faculty formed by God in the mind of man, enabling him to discern certain maxims of truth which God himself has established, and to make true inferences from them! In all the dictates of reason there is the voice of God. . . . Reason extends to points of morality with as much evidence as to those of mathematics.[2]

[1] This imitation of Horace's *Ars Poetica*, by the Englishman George Smalridge (1663-1719) was very popular in certain circles in America, being reprinted in Philadelphia, in 1739 and 1741; in Boston, 1747; in New York, 1751; and again at Philadelphia, in 1762. (Cf. Evans, *Am. Bibliography*).

[2] London, 1721, 283.

His admiration for Newton, Boyle, Hooke, and their like, no doubt, prompted his surrender of the Utter-depravity notions that had marked the Calvinism regnant in earlier New England. The secret of the much-remarked "heresy" of Cotton Mather, of course, lies in the transitional nature of the age in which he lived—an age which was confronted by the necessity of adjusting inherited religious beliefs to the exigencies of a new "science." The general tenor of the period in question is reflected in numerous sermons like Experience Mayhew's *Discourse Shewing that God Dealeth with Men as with Reasonable Creatures,*[3] and Benjamin Colman's *God Deals with Us as Rational Creatures.*[4] The party of progress in eighteenth-century thought merely developed the capacity of the later Puritans to establish categories and subtle theological distinctions, into an exaltation of the faculty by which such categories and distinctions were fashioned; namely, Reason.

Another favorite catchword of the period, and of every other, for that matter, was Nature. For the devout among the intelligent people of the century, particularly in America, the problem of most consequence was that of "Natural Religion." As one would expect, there existed upon this subject a wide divergence of views—from the vehement insistence upon revelation as the sole authority for principles of conduct, through the "pale negations" of early Unitarianism, to the emphatic declarations of the deists. The most general attitude of enlightened conservatives is, perhaps, expressed by the following words of Jonathan Edwards:

> Indeed there is what is called natural religion or divinity. There are many truths concerning God, and our duty to him, which are evident by the light of nature. But Christian divinity, properly so called, is not evident by the light of nature; it depends on revelation. . . .[5]

A perusal of the lectures delivered at Harvard on the Dudley foundation during the latter half of the eighteenth century will indicate how varied were the opinions rife among the eminent Americans chosen to speak. In addition to sermons on popery, church organization, and the like, one finds such titles as *The Coincidence of Natural with Revealed Religion,*[6] and *Natural Religion*

[3] Boston, 1720.

[4] Boston, 1723.

[5] "Importance of the Knowledge of Divine Truth," preached in 1739, *Works,* Worcester, 1899, VIII, 7.

[6] Preached in 1775, by Pres. Samuel Langdon, Boston, 1776.

Aided by Revelation and Perfected in Christianity.[7] In the latter these words appear:

> To affirm . . . that the reason of man cannot come to the knowledge of God and his duty to him by any contemplations and deductions of his own is to say a great deal too much ....[8]

But Gad Hitchcock, their author, was notoriously liberal. More representative, unquestionably, were the sentiments of Andrew Eliot, who granted that the "high priori" road was too intricate for ordinary men, but insisted that the exercise of reason was not designed to be the only guide for human activity.[9] Peter Clarke, in 1763, maintained that the religion of Christ, "as to its practical part, is founded in the reason and nature of man, and so may in some sense be said to be natural."[10] Four years earlier, Ebenezer Gay recommended a judicious combination of both natural and revealed religion, and informed his audience that in the Bible could be found "the religion of nature in its greatest purity."[11] Such was the attitude of the leaders of religious thought at the most liberal institution in New England. No doubt, some of them were more discreet than honest.

The emancipation of New England ideas from the rigid self-sufficiency of "Neo-Puritanism" was, of course, largely effected by the reading of such theologians as Samuel Clarke and Tillotson.[12] But the influence of John Locke is in a good many cases more striking. If, as Leslie Stephen says, Locke "became the intellectual ruler of the century"[13] in England, in America he became a veritable Allah, with Newton as his prophet.

William Livingston, afterward Governor of New Jersey, allowing his muse to amble through *Philosophic Solitude,* had no hesitation in passing from Milton, Dryden, and "gentle Watts," to

> Sagacious Locke, by providence design'd

[7] Preached in 1799, by Gad Hitchcock, Boston, 1779.

[8] *Ibid.,* 15.

[9] *A Discourse on Natural Religion,* Boston, 1771, 7 and 32.

[10] *Man's Dignity and Duty as a Reasonable Creature and His Insufficiency as a Fallen Creature,* Boston, 1763, 46.

[11] *Natural Religion as Distinguished from Revealed,* Boston, 1759, 20 and 31.

[12] Cf. S. G. Hefelblower, *Relation of John Locke to English Deism,* 1918, 183. As early as 1698 Tillotson was read in Boston, if one can judge from the receipt of 10 vols. of his works by King's Chapel, from William the Third, *Proc. Mass. Hist. Soc.,* XVIII, 429.

[13] *Hist. of Eng. Thought in the 18th C.,* London, 1902, I, 35.

T'exalt, instruct, and rectify the mind;

or to

Immortal Newton, whose illustrious name
Will shine on records of eternal fame.[14]

When the boys at Harvard wanted to express their appreciation for the activities of Stephen Scales, who forsook the teaching of philosophy to practice law, they had Paul Revere make a silver cup upon which were pictured two books, Price's *Morals,* and Locke's *Essays.*[15] Locke was quoted in sermons,[16] a commonplace book was designed after the method he approved,[17] and he was used as a trusted authority in most of the philosophical effusions written during the period—from the iron-clad arguments of Jonathan Edwards, to the despised immaterialism of Samuel Johnson, Berkeley's chief American disciple.

Although the students at Yale just began to hear of such names as Descartes, Locke, and Newton in 1714, and were duly cautioned against "thinking anything of them,"[18] in 1743 a number of seniors in the college had Locke's *Letter Concerning Toleration* printed at their own expense, as an aid in thwarting the policy of the President and Governors.[19]

Once established, the philosophy of Locke, or, better, what was esteemed to be his philosophy, prevailed for an incredibly long period. In 1816 no one seems to have been aroused when a certain A. Cummings held forth at a Harvard "exhibition" on "The Value of the Metaphysical Researches of Locke."[20] Thirteen years later, in perhaps the first notable manifestation of American transcendentalism, James Marsh, of the University of Vermont, wrote:

> Let it be understood . . . that by the prevailing system of metaphysics, I mean the system of which in modern times Locke is the reputed author.[21]

[14] *Philosophic Solitude, or the Choice of a Rural Life. . . ,* N. Y., 1747, repr. Boston, 1762, 38 and 39.

[15] Benjamin Rand, *Philosophical Instruction at Harvard,* MS., 23.

[16] See, for example, Andrew Eliot, *op. cit.,* 21 and 29ff.

[17] Strange to say, the commonplace book of George Ripley is of that type, MS. in Widener Library.

[18] E. C. Smyth, "The New Philosophy Against Which Students at Yale College Were Warned. . . ," *Proc. Am. Antiq. Soc.,* New Series, XI, 252.

[19] Trumbull, *History of Connecticut,* II, 183.

[20] B. T. Hill, "Life at Harvard a Century Ago. . . ," *Proc. Am Antiq. Soc.,* New Series, XX, 230.

[21] *Preliminary Essay to Coleridge's 'Aids to Reflection,' Coleridge's Works,* ed. Shedd, 1856, I, 86.

However, with all the interest aroused by Locke in the more intellectual circles, comparatively few editions of his works were brought out in America. According to Evans' *American Bibliography,* the essay sponsored by the Yale boys, Boston, 1743, was the first to appear. It was reprinted at Wilmington, in 1764; at Windsor, Vermont, in 1788; and at Stockbridge, in 1790. Up to 1795 the only other works of the Englishman to be reprinted in this country were the *Essay on Civil Government,* Boston, 1773; an abridgement of the *Essay on the Human Understanding,* Boston, 1794; and selections from his letters, appended to an *Extract of a Letter Wrote by the Earl of Essex. . . ,* edited by A. Benezet, Philadelphia, 1775(?). One needs to remember, however, that during the period in question, and long after it, books of a more esoteric appeal were almost always imported.

With all the discussion of natural religion on the part of the better educated clergy, and with all the veneration of Locke, there is, nevertheless, no evidence for believing that free-thought cut much of a figure in America before the palmy days of Jefferson and Tom Paine. The enormous popularity of Watts's pious lucubrations alone would prove the point. True enough, there must have been some grounds for John Walton's *Religion of Jesus Vindicated, occasioned by some deistical writings lately printed at Newport,* Boston, 1736, or George Gillespie's *Treatise Against the Deists or Free-Thinkers,* Philadelphia, 1735. More famous than these, of course, was Charles Leslie's *Short and Easie Method With the Deists,* first reprinted in America at Boston, in 1719; and afterward at Williamsburg and Annapolis, 1733; at New York, 1745; and at Philadelphia, 1783. But this work may have owed some of its popularity to the appended arguments for toleration and the account of the trial of John Checkley, who, in 1724, was fined for having published a "false and scandalous libel."[22]

It will be observed from the preceding account of some phases of the development of thought in America during the eighteenth century, I believe, that up to the period immediately following the Revolution there were rationalistic tendencies, more or less adroitly expressed, in the more cultivated elements of society. Yet the spirit of the fathers was heavy in the land. It was not until even the people of the backwoods were reading Tom Paine that a man

[22] Every American edition afterward, and all of the later English editions I have seen, appeared with the account of Checkley's trial, etc.

with authority could say, "The fashionable bias of the present time will be readily acknowledged to be unfavorable to Christianity."[23]

Accordingly, one is not a little surprised to find among the most significant attempts at slitting the throat of Puritanism by means of rationalistic argument, *Oracles of Reason*,[24] by Ethan Allen, published at Bennington, Vt., probably in 1785. This work, usually considered to be the first printed attack on the Christian religion brought out in America, has been called by Woodbridge Riley "a good example of the popular recoil from Puritanism,"[25] and as such, is of no ordinary significance to an appreciation of the character of the age. The preface, dated July 2, 1782, provides this information:

> An apology appears to me to be impertinent in writers who venture their works to public inspection for this obvious reason, that if they need it, they should have been stifled in the birth and not permitted a public existence. . . . I have as good a natural right to expose myself to public censure . . . as any of the species . . . and I ask no favor at the hands of philosophers, divines or critics. . . .
>
> In my youth I was much disposed to contemplation, and at my commencement in manhood I committed to manuscript such sentiments or arguments as appeared most consonant to reason. . . . I was deficient in education. . . . I have struck the outlines of a consistent system, which I recommend to abler writers to perfect.
>
> The Bible and a dictionary have been the only books which I have made use of since I have been correcting my manuscripts and making the following composition, though in those manuscripts I had copied sundry passages from certain authors. . . .
>
> I have invariably endeavored to make reason my guide.
>
> In the circle of my acquaintance (which has not been small) I have generally been denominated a deist, the reality

[23] Timothy Dwight, *Nature and Danger of Infidel Philosophy. . . ,* New Haven, 1798, 63.

[24] The full title is "Reason the only Oracle of Man, or a Compenduous System of Natural Religion. Alternately adorned with Confutations of a variety of Doctrines incompatible to it; deduced from the most exalted ideas which we are able to form of the Divine and Human Characters and from the Universe in General," Bennington, printed by Haswell and Russell, MDCCLXXXIV.

[25] *American Philosophy, The Early Schools,* N. Y., 1907, 47.

> of which I never disputed, being conscious I am no Christian, except mere infant baptism make me one; and, as to being a deist, I know not, strictly speaking, whether I am one or not, for I have never read their writings.[26]

For the material treated in *Oracles of Reason* the reader is referred to Riley's *American Thought.* Suffice it to say here that there is in it a fairly complete system of natural religion, with a discussion of such matters as the nature of God, creation, free will, etc., based wherever possible upon cold logic, and, wherever that fails, upon "conscious intuition." Moreover, there is included an attack upon some of the fundamental doctrines of Christianity, such as the inspiration of the scriptures, the possibility of miracles, the atonement, etc. The Virgin Birth is esteemed to be unworthy of "serious confutation."[26a] Two examples will illustrate, I believe, the general character of the work. The first will indicate the method of Allen's application of "reason." On the doctrine of man's depravity he writes:

> Without the exercise of reason we could not understand what reason is, which would be necessary for us previously to understand in order to distinguish what it is not. . . . But for us to have the knowledge of what reason is, and the ability to distinguish it from that which is depraved, or is irrational, is incompatible with the doctrine of the depravity of our reason. . . .[27]

More vigorous is the following, perhaps:

> When we consider what a diabolical, powerful, malicious, spiteful, designing, cunning, and ensnaring rascal the Devil, Satan, the Dragon, or the Old Serpent is represented to be, we cannot reconcile it to divine providence to have permitted so pernicious and artful a being to have transformed himself into the likeness of a serpent, thereby capacitating himself to work his premeditated villainy with a woman who just before had been taken out of Adam's broadside, whose experience had been none, or trifling, and by deluding her, pave the way to ensnare Adam also, together with their numerous offspring.[28]

[26] In all quotations I have changed s's, and made the use of capitals and punctuation marks conform to modern practice.

[26a] *Oracles,* 356.

[27] *Ibid.,* 178.

[28] *Ibid.,* 377.

However, the book is, unlike Tom Paine's, occupied chiefly with metaphysical discussion.[29] Its religious system is closely akin to the Unitarianism that came into vogue after Emerson and Theodore Parker had carted away a few heirlooms from Puritan days.

The sources of Allen's philosophical notions are not to be readily stated. His main inspiration, according to his chief critics, seems to have been the mental *Sturm und Drang* of the Revolution. But, like most concocters of "systems" of the day, he owed much to the "exalted reasonings of a Locke or a Newton."[30] Allen's ideas on supernaturalism and creation are "substantially the same" as Newton's; and the indebtedness of his psychology to that of Locke is not to be questioned.[31] There are in the *Oracles of Reason* apparent references to Jonathan Edwards,[32] to Pope,[33] and to Warburton's *Divine Legation of Moses.*[34] Of the "certain authors" mentioned in the preface as being "transcribed with proper quotations" only a few can be identified. Allen is not above quoting from Watts,[35] and refers to a pamphlet, by "a Mr. Rathburn," dealing with the Shakers, who are made to feel the weight of his scorn for "enthusiasm."[36] The longest quotations are from "Mr. Ditton, a celebrated writer in vindication of the Christian revelation."[37] In the final work of composition most assuredly he depended upon the Bible and the dictionary.[38]

Conway asserts that the mountain philosopher borrowed his title

[29] Cf. Moncure D. Conway, *Life of Thomas Paine,* Putnam's, 1892, II, 193. Conway is "doubtful whether Paine ever read Allen."

[30] *Oracles,* 182.

[31] See Riley, *Am. Phil., Early Schools,* 49; and M. D. Conway, "Ethan Allen's Oracles of Reason," *Open Court,* VI (Jan., 1892), 3119.

[32] P. 232. Cf. Riley, *op. cit.*

[33] P. 278. The *Essay on Man* was frequently advertised in the *Vermont Gazette,* 1783—.

[34] P. 269.

[35] P. 94.

[36] P. 328.

[37] P. 429ff. Humphrey Ditton (1675-1715) was a writer on Mathematics, etc., whose treatises were approved by Newton. In 1714 he brought out a *Discourse on the Resurrection of Jesus Christ* (*Enc. Brit.*). This is probably the work referred to by Allen. The *Discourse* is a "discussion of the principles of 'moral evidence,' with an appendix arguing that thought cannot be the product of matter." By 1727 it had gone through four English editions. (*D. N. B.*). The appendix may also have been used by Allen.

[38] Allen refers to two dictionaries, Samuel Johnson's (428), and Fenning's (452). The latter is probably Daniel Fenning's *Royal English Dictionary,* London, 1741(?).

from Charles Blount's *Oracles of Reason,*[39] London, 1693. However, I do not believe that Allen read the work, not only because he stated in his preface that he had never perused the writings of the deists, but because what he could have understood of it would have aroused his scorn. "I do not understand Latin, Greek or Hebrew," Ethan Allen states;[40] and as a consequence a large part of Blount's tract would have been unintelligible to him. Its partial acceptance of the Manichean explanation of Good and Evil[41] would have had no reception from Allen other than that of hearty contempt. A similar reception would have awaited such astute reasoning as is exhibited in the following:

> Who knows but this race of men was first of angelic degree, till by the bewitching smiles of women (the most lovely brute of the universe) betrayed to mortality in her embraces. Or, then, perhaps Columbus might be the first of the sons of Noah that enter'd the new discover'd world of America, which might be a race deriv'd from some other deluded angels, won by the same destructive bait.[42]

If Allen got his title from the work of Blount, it must have come indirectly, possibly through some attack on deism that made its way to the Green Mountains.[43]

The facts that we have that deal with the early life of Allen also are meagre and do not afford an adequate explanation of his sudden blossoming out as a philosopher. That he was educated far better than the average New Englander of his day cannot be questioned. From an early age he resided with his mother's relatives till the "early years of manhood."[44] His mother's family was altogether above the average in intelligence, if one is to judge by such of its number as Remember Baker and the group of physicians who came in the following generation. In a letter from Ira Allen to Dr. Samuel Williams, written in 1785, it is stated that Ethan began to prepare for college, but that "the death of his father left the family

[39] *Life of Thomas Paine,* II, 192.

[40] *Oracles,* 426.

[41] *Miscellaneous Works of Charles Blount,* n. pl., 1695, 194.

[42] *Ibid.,* 191-192.

[43] Leslie's *Short and Easie Method. . .* was prompted by Blount's work, but the title of it does not appear in the editions I have seen. Cf. Stephen, *op. cit.,* I, 194.

[44] Wm. Cothren, *History of Ancient Woodbury, Conn.,* Waterbury, 1854, I, 414.

in such circumstances that the design was not pursued."[45] Two of his brothers, Ira and Heman, were authors of printed works. Indeed, the former was not only the foremost political figure of his state during his day, and the man directly responsible for the founding of the University of Vermont, but his *History of the State of Vermont,* London, 1798, has been called by Daniel P. Thompson "in many respects the best ever published."[46] That another brother was capable of commanding a worthy style is indicated by the following excerpt from a letter of Levi Allen to Ira, dated June 28, 1793:

> If you are deficient in lands I can help you to one hundred thousand acres, which will soon come in course, and shall not have the least objection on proper condition, for I am not over-anxious as to the property I leave after Time with the crooked scythe makes his last stroke; for who knows whether it shall be left to a wise man or a fool, a penurious wretch, or a gasconading spendthrift who will laugh at and deride the memory of him whose early labour, industry, and frugality enables the thoughtless and thankless villain to be a genteel blackguard, or a Ceaux de Ville.
>
> These things may be worth casually thinking of in the midst of our pursuits in the worldly way; yet I would not have you think I have turned Methodist preacher nor set up a praying school. . . .[47]

There can be no reason for the frequent claim that Ethan Allen was no more than an ignorant mountaineer with a smattering of education as a surveyor.

In the account of his captivity, which extended from September, 1775, to May, 1778, Allen tells his readers that he began to learn the French language, about 1777;[48] but there is no evidence of his having done more than the then fashionable reading, since no material is at hand to indicate that Voltaire and the like interested him. He also gives an account of a visit of two English clergymen who were most anxious to see the notorious rebel who had captured Ticonderoga. Speaking of the interview, he writes:

[45] Hiland Hall, *Early History of Vermont,* Albany, 1868, 452.

[46] "Ira Allen," *Proc. Vt. Hist. Soc.,* 1908, 91. Ira Allen in 1791 gave 4000 pounds to start the university.

[47] *Proc. Vt. Hist. Soc.,* 1917-1918, 155.

[48] *A Narrative of Col. Ethan Allen's Captivity. . . ,* Walpole, N. H., 1807, 44.

> We discoursed on several parts of moral philosophy and Christianity; and they seemed surprised that I should be acquainted with such topics, or that I should understand a syllogism or a regular mode of argumentation.[49]

His ability to fashion neat premises must have astonished his hearers, if the following quotation from the *Oracles of Reason* is typical:

> God is perfect.
> The laws of nature were established by God.
> Therefore, the laws of nature are perfect:

or, admitting miracles,

> The laws of nature were in their eternal establishment perfect.
> The laws of nature have been altered.
> Therefore, the alteration of the laws of nature is imperfect:

or,

> The laws of nature have been altered.
> The alteration has been for the better.
> Therefore, the eternal establishment thereof was imperfect.[50]

Like Hudibras, Ethan Allen was "in logic a great critic"; his skill in "analytic" is another matter.

As for his religious training, again only a few facts and inferences provide the bulk of the information that we have. Those not inclined to adhere to the principles of the modern philosophical Calvinism, known as Behaviorism, might give some weight to the fact that one of his paternal ancestors left Massachusetts in company with Thomas Hooker,[51] or consider the possible influence of the original proprietors of the country around Bennington, who were "chiefly Congregational Separates . . . weary of the restraints of authority."[52] More pertinent, however, is Allen's own statement that he was brought up in what are "called the Armenian principles,"[53] and that he had frequently discussed religion with Armenian ministers.[54] Still more significant is the information that in the

[49] *Ibid.*, 63.

[50] P. 235-236.

[51] "Ancestry of Gen. Ethan Allen," *Salem Press Hist. and Gen. Register,* Jan., 1892, 102 (later, the *Genealogical Magazine*).

[52] David Avery, *Narrative of the Rise and Progress of the Difficulties . . . between the Minister and People of Bennington. . . ,* Bennington, 1783, 5.

[53] *Oracles,* 386.

[54] *Ibid.,* 185.

"early years of manhood" he "dared not distrust the infallibility of revelation, much more to dispute it."[55] One can only express a wish to know just what came into his intellectual horizon to embolden his spirit to write this:

> His Song of Songs appears to be rather of the amorous kind, and is supposed to have been written at the time he was making love to the daughter of Pharaoh King of Egypt, who is said to have been a princess of exquisite beauty, and exceedingly coy, and so captivated his affections that it made him lightheaded, and sing about the 'joints of her thighs' and 'her belly.'[56]

There was in Ethan Allen's nature a rugged capacity for profanity of the most eloquent quality, and a coarse frontier humor that puts one in mind of the Elizabethan apprentices shouting "Clubs," and merrily battering the doors of the bawdy-houses on Shrove Tuesday. Alexander Graydon, who was a fellow captive to the British, observed that the Vermonter's style of speech was "a singular compound of local barbarisms, scriptural phrases, and oriental wildness, and though unclassic and sometimes ungrammatical, highly animated and forcible."[57] Yet, with all his impetuosity and reckless border manners, he must have displayed qualities of sterner stuff to attract the friendship of such men as Thomas Young[58] and St. John de Crèvecoeur.[59]

Like the Squire in Howells' *Leatherwood God,* Ethan Allen was, quite naturally, a notorious backwoods "atheist." He is supposed to have engaged in frequent altercations as a result of his opinions;[60] and at times, the legends have it, he inflicted his ideas upon his hearers under most inopportune circumstances. Among the stories that survive, "not exactly credible," is this one:

> It is related that on one occasion, when Ethan Allen was in the congregation, and Mr. Dewey was preaching on the char-

[55] *Ibid.,* 387.

[56] *Ibid.,* 314.

[57] *Memoirs of His Own Time. . . ,* Phila., 1846, 243. Washington remarked in a letter that there was in Allen "an original something that commands attention," Irving, *Life of W.,* N. Y., 1856, III, 408.

[58] E. S. Isham, "Ethan Allen, a Study of Civic Authority," *Proc. Vt. Hist. Soc.,* 1898, 36.

[59] See, for example, J. P. Mitchell, *St. Jean de Crèvecoeur,* Columbia Press, 1916, 19ff.

[60] H. W. De Puy, *Ethan Allen and the Green Mountain Heroes of '76,* Buffalo, 1853, 426.

> acter of God, some remark in the discourse displeased Col. Allen. He arose in his place at the head of a prominent pew in the broad aisle, and saying with an audible voice, "It's not so," started to go out of the pew, evidently with the intention of leaving the house. Mr. Dewey, lifting up his right hand, and pointing with his fore-finger directly at Col. Allen, said, "Sit down, thou bold blasphemer, and listen to the word of God." Allen, who had too strong a taste for that style of doing things not to like it under any circumstances, immediately resumed his seat and gave respectful attention to the remainder of the discourse.[61]

Another anecdote describes the marriage ceremony of Allen and his second wife, the handsome widow Mrs. Buchanan. Conforming to the "customs of society," he is said to have hastily engaged a judge to perform the rite, whom he interrupted with a shout when the words of the service did not suit his own views.[62]

The records of the General Assembly of Vermont, according to B. H. Hall, prove that he refused to accept and subscribe to a test creed required of the members of the legislature. However, his participation in the deliberations of the session (1778) indicate that his non-conformity did not stand in the way of his acting as the representative of his constituents in Arlington.[63]

But Ethan Allen was famous in his day not only as a military hero and a heretic, but as an author of no mean ability—some years before he went through the "wearisome reasoning of the philosophers" and "pursued the old natural road of raciocination."[64] His first work, *A Brief Narrative of the Proceedings of the Government of New York. . . ,* Hartford, 1774, prompted one of the Green Mountain Boys to produce one of the earliest specimens of bad verse made in the district. Here it is.

On Reading Gen. Ethan Allen's Animadversions on the Proceedings of the Senate of New York against Vermont.

By T. Rowley, Esq.

May Allen live to use the quill,
While York in envy reigns,

[61] J. Jennings, *Memorials of a Century,* Boston, 1869, 86. This work contains a number of very entertaining anecdotes about Allen.

[62] H. W. De Puy, *op. cit.,* 426.

[63] *History of Eastern Vermont,* Albany, 1865, II, 570.

[64] *Oracles,* 471.

With ready mind and active will
T'expose their wicked plans.
May all contagion flee away,
And at a distance stand;
No hypochondrics plague his mind,
Nor palsy shake his hand,
Till nature's great diurnal wheel
Some future day rolls on,
When all the Yorkers' courage fail,
And all their hopes are gone.
Then may our Allen have repose,
Before his days shall cease,
And sing and see his labours close,
And leave Vermont in peace.[65]

Two other political pamphlets came from the pen of the mountain philosopher;[66] he was responsible for part of a third, and still another is sometimes attributed to him.[67] But his literary fame rested most of all upon the lively narrative of his captivity, which came out at Philadelphia, in 1799, and seems to have been a best-seller despite the price of "ten paper dollars." So popular was it that another edition appeared in the Quaker City the same year. Editions followed at Boston, Newbury, Norwich, and so on. Gilman's *Bibliography of Vermont* mentions altogether twelve editions, the last one, apparently, having been brought out in 1849, at Dayton, Ohio. The popularity of the account of his captivity, no doubt, was partially responsible for Ethan Allen's philosophical treatise and for his purpose to write a subsequent volume on the "subject of human agency."[68] That it served as an effective preparation for more extended composition, and saved Priscian more than the casual scratching he received in the *Oracles,* is also apparent.

"No thought is contented"—and particularly unsatisfactory is the material at hand which throws such a dim light on the mental hinterland back of *Oracles of Reason.* However, enough facts

[65] *Coll. Vt. Hist. Soc.,* II (1871), 420-421. For Rowley, see P. H. White, "Early Poets of Vermont," *Proc. Vt. Hist. Soc.,* 1917-1918, 96.

[66] *An Animadversory Address to the Inhabitants of the State of Vermont. . . ,* Hartford, 1778; and *A Vindication of the Opposition of the Inhabitants of Vermont to the Government of New York,* n. pl., 1799 (printed by Alden Spooner, printer to State of Vt.).

[67] See M. D. Gilman, *Bibliography of Vermont,* Burlington, 1897, 6.

[68] *Oracles,* 101.

have been presented to show that Allen's work was not the result of a sudden brain-storm induced by contact with the skeptical officers who directed the war against the Indians, or the free-thinking followers of Lafayette.

When Allen's chief work was ready for the press, it seems, he was confronted with the problem of finding a printer, because the owner of the publishing company at Hartford, who had brought out his earlier effusions, refused to have a part in the spreading of such a book.[69] The fact that the preface is dated 1782 also seems to give some basis for the assertion. Moreover, after he had prevailed upon Haswell and Russell, at Bennington, to print the work, a fire, said to have been caused by lightning, destroyed all of several signatures, thus delaying binding until the fall of 1785. From the following portion of Allen's letter, addressed to Benjamin Stiles, November 16, 1785, it will be seen that the date 1784, which appears on the title page, needs correction:

> As to my Philosophy, that you mention, forty of the books are bound and will be sent to New York tomorrow; 1500 are printed, and contain 487 pages [477], in large octavo. The curiosity of the public is much excited, and there is a great demand for the books. They will in all probability reach Woodbury in the course of the winter. In one of them you read my very soul, for I have not concealed my opinion, nor disguised my sentiments in the least; and however you may, as a severe critic, censer my performance, I presume you will not impeach me with cowardice. I expect that the clergy and their devotees will proclaim war with me in the name of the Lord, his battles they effect to fight, having put on the armour of Faith, the sword of the Spirit, and the artillery of Hell Fire. But I am a hardy mountaineer, and scorn to be intimidated by threats. If they fight me they must absolutely produce some of their tremendous fire, and give me a sensitive scorching. . . .[70]

A portion of a letter to Crèvecoeur, dated March, 1786, is also delightfully revelatory,

[69] "It lay a long time in the hands of a printer at Hartford, whom the writer of this has heard the author abuse for want of moral courage," *Reason, the Only Oracle. . . ,* published with critical remarks on the four Gospels. . . by a free-thinker, N. Y. and Phila., 1836, Introduction. (This work is an abridged edition of the *Oracles*).

[70] Wm. Cothren, *op. cit.,* 415.

Sir, after many difficulties and procrastinations, last fall I published my theology entitled "Oracles of Reason," and have sent a number of books to sundry capital places and parts of America. One of the volumes I herewith transmit to Mr. St. John, in consequence of the unexpected correspondence with which he has been pleased to honor me. Though it may be repugnant to the policy of the monarch of France that such kinds of writings (whether true or false) should circulate among the commonalty of his subjects, yet I am well apprised that the independent literary gentlemen of France think and converse with one another and with foreigners as freely and liberally as any in the world, and as a nation have cultivated and extended the arts and sciences at least equal to any people in the annals of mankind, have encouraged genious and learning in other nations, and, finally, in a great variety of instances have become the patrons of the improved part of our species.

I am not so vain as to imagine that my theology will afford any considerable entertainment to the enlightened mind of Mr. St. John or to any learned gentlemen in France, yet it is possible that he or they may be somewhat diverted with the untutored logic and sallies of a mind nursed principally in the mountainous wilds of America. And since it is the almost universal foible of mankind to aspire to something or other beyond their nature or acquired abilities, I feel the infection. I desire that Mr. St. John would lay the "Oracles of Reason" before the Royal Academy of Arts and Sciences at Paris.

Should my productions meet with the disapprobation of the capital of science in the old world, I shall have the satisfaction of reflecting that I have made a bold attempt in philosophy, though unsuccessful.

The clergy of this country reprobate the work and anathematize the writer of it, but they have not so great power in America as they had previous to the late Revolution. On its first publication it has pleased more individuals than I expected, and caused considerable speculation and argumentation. I am, however, sensible that my reputation as a reasoner (even in America) will depend in a great measure on the re-

> ception that the work may meet with in the learned cities of Paris and London. . . .[71]

When Marlowe wrote that nature has taught all of us to have "aspiring minds," he was not in a falsifying mood.

The chief critics of Allen's work have been content with passing by his ambitions, and, instead, remarking upon his indebtedness to Newton, Locke, and their like. The similarity of many of his opinions to those of Spinoza has also been pointed out.[72] The most vulnerable portion of Ethan Allen's system has generally been considered to be his discussion of free will and moral agency.[73] To my knowledge, no treatment of this phase of his argument has based any of its conclusions on the proposed appendix to the *Oracles of Reason* which Allen intended to supplant Chapter Two, Section Eight, of his work. This essay, first printed in 1872-1873, has this title: "On the Universal Plenitude of Being and on the Nature and Immortality of the Human Soul, and Its Agency, by Ethan Allen, Esq. Proposed as an appendix to a system of moral philosophy, lately published at Bennington, entitled 'Oracles Of Reason.' To which is subjoined a letter to Dr. Benjamin Gale in answer to one of his on the subject of eternal creation."[74] In accordance with his promise made in the preface to the *Oracles,* Allen sought to revise his assumption that the soul was incapable of occupying space. He used the essay, however, to set at rest various doubts about the cogency of his arguments involving other matters, principally that of free will.

Lest there be any misunderstanding about the sincerity of his efforts, I quote his introductory sentence:

> If we make any new discoveries we are wiser than we were before; and if we do not succeed in the investigation of the nature of the soul or of the universal entity, we shall have done the most that we could do to discover the truth; and we shall have the satisfaction of reflecting that, had we not been

[71] *Record of the Governor and Council of the State of Vt.,* III (1878), 390-391.

[72] Jonathan Edwards is also charged with having stated opinions akin to those of Spinoza. See, for example, James Dana, *An Examination of Edwards's 'Enquiry on Freedom of Will'. . . ,* Boston, 1770, 128.

[73] Cf. Riley, *op. cit.,* 54; and Conway, *Open Court, VI,* 3120.

[74] Published in *Historical Magazine. . . ,* ed. H. B. Dawson, Third Series, I, 194, 274, 330; and II, 29 and 76. The MS. of the "subjoined letter" seems to have been lost.

> thus inquisitive, we should not have improved so far in knowledge as to have known but that we might have gone farther.[75]

But, however interesting the appendix may be as an example of what we call the scientific spirit, its chief value, to my mind, lies in the fact that Allen's philosophy tended more and more to fall back upon intuition as an aid in the explanation of metaphysical problems.

"That the soul resides in the body in this life," he says, "we have an intuitive certainty."[76] Moreover, he is also "intuitively certain" that the soul is a "thinking being,"[77] although it is composed of "some specific substance mysterious to us" which makes it capable of "possessing place."[78] There are two means of acquiring knowledge, he explains, one gained by immediate "consciousness," and the other by reason. The promptings of the former are always right.[79] With this in mind, he approaches the subject of moral agency. A conviction of the fact of free or spontaneous agency, he insists, "does not result from reasoning or argumentation, but from a conscious intuition of it to all mankind."[80] The shrewd old bear Samuel Johnson dodged the same issue by silencing Boswell with the words, "All theory is against the freedom of the will; all experience for it." More piously, Ethan Allen wrote,

> All our argumentations and conclusions that militate against the intuitive (or conscious) knowledge that we have of our spontaneous agency are so many blunders, mistakes or deceptions of our own making, for the intuition of natural conscience is God's revelation to us, who cannot, and will not, deceive us. . . .[81]

However, Allen did not give up altogether his method of arguing from neat premises. Just two syllogisms clinch the matter of the soul's immortality. Here they are:

> God is infinitely good.
> The immortality of the soul is the greatest possible good that God could bestow upon the soul.
> Therefore, the soul is immortal:

[75] *Ibid.*, I, 274.
[76] *Ibid.*, I, 275.
[77] *Ibid.*, I, 276.
[78] *Ibid.*, I, 276-277.
[79] *Ibid.*, II, 29 and 31.
[80] *Ibid.*, II, 31.
[81] *Ibid.*, II, 81.

and

> God is ultimately just.
> Justice in all events does not take place in this world.
> Therefore, there must be an existence beyond this life wherein the ultimate justice of God will take place.[82]

Sic probatur!

The appendix is, to my mind, more interesting than any part of the *Oracles* proper, because it reveals so plainly Allen's appreciation of the failure of "reason" to get him out of many a blind alley of thought. His consequent dependence upon intuition, if put upon its inferences, indicates that his beliefs about nature and God were not altogether "dualistic." The full reconciliation of the two aspects of his thought may not have been effected in America before the days of Emerson,[83] but his final words relative to his philosophy show no ordinary appreciation for what the Sage of Concord termed "the untaught sallies of the spirit."

But what was the result of the attempt of the hardy Vermonter to bare his soul and take his fling at "Reason and Truth"? His letters already quoted indicate how well justified were his expectations of receiving the full broadside of the *odium theologicum* that he had anticipated even in the preface to his work. His own Green Mountain folk seem to have been little surprised at his philosophical effusion. But he was already a notorious "atheist." And, too, there were in the hills of Vermont men of sufficient breadth of interest and freedom from merely parochial problems to found a medical society and a philosophical association deep in the backwoods.[84]

However, a certain G. V. conceived a novel plan of genially annoying the Vermont philosopher, as well as sundry others of his fellow citizens. In the *Vermont Gazette* for September 19, 1785, he inserted a mock advertisement bearing the following caption:

> Just imported in the Balloon Sarcastic (Imported from France) and now opening for sale . . . by the Genius of Vermont at her store on the top of Mount Anthony in Bennington, a large assortment of valuable books, among which are the following. . . .

"The following" included titles of treatises on drunkenness, "money catching," and the like—and each bore after it the initials of a

[82] *Ibid.*, I, 332.

[83] Riley, *op. cit.*, 57.

[84] See *Vermont Gazette*, Bennington, Jan. 31, and Dec. 27, 1784.

member of the community whose characteristics seemed to fit. This one heads the list,

> Deism Confessed and Good Manners Defended, with a chapter in favor of Oracles and a section on the heat of good blood near the grand clymacteric, and the animation of youthful charms. By E. A.

The last thrust seems to have been directed at the "most amiable young widow" whom Allen had married not long before.

In the *Vermont Journal* for October 2, 1786, appeared an unsigned bit of verse,

On General Ethan Allen

Lo Allen 'scaped from British jails,
His tushes broke by biting nails,[85]
Appears in hyperborean skies,
To tell the world the Bible lies.
See him on green hills north afar
Glow like a self-enkindled star,
Prepar'd with mob-collecting club
Black from the forge of Belzebub,
And grim with metaphysic scowl,
With quill just pluck'd from wing of owl,
As rage or reason rise or sink
To shed his blood or shed his ink.
Behold, inspired from Vermont dens,
The seer of Antichrist descends,
To feed new mobs with Hell-born manna
In Gentile lands of Susquehanna;
And teach the Pennsylvania Quaker
High blasphemies against his maker.
Behold him move, ye staunch divines!
His tall head bursting through the pines;
All front he seems like wall of brass
And brays tremendous as an ass;
One hand is clench'd to batter noses
While t'other scrawls 'gainst Paul and Moses.[86]

The author of the satire was Doctor Lemuel Hopkins, of Hartford, Conn., now remembered as a lesser light of the Pleiades known as the Hartford Wits.

[85] "He used to show a fracture in one of his teeth, occasioned by his twisting off with it, in a fit of anger, the nail to which was fastened the bar of his hand-cuffs. . . ," Graydon, *op. cit.*, 243.

[86] This effusion is included in *American Poems, selected and original,* Litchfield, 1793, 142.

A more famous member of that group, Timothy Dwight, the renowned Yale hammer of heretics, not only called Allen "the great clodhopping Oracle of man" in swinging metre,[87] but delivered himself of a more extended attack in better prose. He sums up matters in these words:

> Sunderland formerly was the residence of Col. Ethan Allen, a man who as a prisoner excited some interest in Great Britain, and who for many years was notorious in the United States. This man was born at Salisbury in Connecticut. His education was confined, and furnished him with a mere smattering of knowledge; but his mind was naturally haughty, restless and enterprising. Licentious in his disposition, he was impatient of the restraints either of government or religion, and not always submissive to those of common decency. In his conversation he was voluble, blunt, coarse and profane; in his pretensions to knowledge, daring; and in his assertions, bold and peremptory. The confidence which he seemed to possess in himself naturally inspired confidence in others still less informed; and they readily believed that he, who asserted so positively, must be sure that his assertions were true. With these advantages, and these only, he early obtruded himself upon the public as an opposer and ridiculer of Christianity; and gloried in the character of an infidel. A little circle of loose persons will always gather about a man of this description. "Qui fidit sibi, dux regit examen" is a maxim extensively applicable; but in no case more so than where profligate principles have become necessary to shelter the character and quiet the conscience of licentious men. . . . At length he assumed a bolder tone, and determined to become an instructor of the public. This was a fatal step. He neither understood the subject, nor knew how to write, and therefore, although not destitute of native talents, he appeared as a pigmy in the field of literary contention. He named his book the Oracles of Reason, after a wretched publication of Charles Blount, one of the pertest and weakest of all the British infidels, but probably Allen's favorite author, and not improbably the only one whose works he had ever read. This was the first formal publication in the United States openly directed against the

[87] *The Triumph of Infidelity,* printed in the world, 1788, 23. Dwight did not mention Allen in his *Nature and Danger of Infidel Philosophy. . . ,* New Haven, 1798.

> Christian religion. When it came out I read as much of it as I could summon patience to read. Decent nonsense may possibly amuse an idle hour; but brutal nonsense can be only read as an infliction of penal justice. The style was crude and vulgar, and the sentiments were coarser than the style. The arguments were flimsy and unmeaning, and the conclusions were fastened upon the premises by mere force.[88]

The Reverend Josiah Sherman, who signed himself "Common Sense, A. M.," brought out at Litchfield a tract with the title,

> Oracles of Reason as formed by the deists are husks for deistical and heathen swine; but the truths of the Gospel are bread for God's children. A concise but plain answer to Gen. Allen's Oracles of Reason.

He soon followed this up with another, "Sermon to Swine. . . ." But, as Allen wrote to Crèvecoeur, more people were pleased with his *Oracles* than he had counted on.[89]

The biographers of the Hero of Ticonderoga usually "regret to say" that their subject promulgated heterodox sentiments, and provide a sop by asserting that only a few copies of his book escaped the fire at the printer's office.[90] Frequently, also, there appears an anecdote calculated to show that, after all, the rugged border leader suffered a change of heart. The story goes that one of Allen's daughters was sick in bed. A sudden relapse in her condition was noticed, and the father was hastily summoned from an adjoining room, where, fittingly enough, he had been expounding deistic sentiments to a friend. Distracted in mind by the incompatibility of her mother's religious views and the ideas expressed by her father, the child asked which she should believe. "Believe what your mother has taught you," the reply is supposed to have been.[91]

But other biographers have not made the attempt to palliate the enormity of his errors. Like Tom Paine, Ethan Allen has been

[88] *Travels in New England and New York,* New Haven, 1821, II, 406. (Allen is usually considered to have been born in Litchfield, Conn.).

[89] In Jefferson's letter to his nephew, dated Paris, 1787, this sentence appears: "Your own reason is the only oracle given you by heaven, and you are answerable not for the rightness but uprightness of the decision," *Writings of J.,* ed. P. L. Ford, 1894, IV, 432. Had he read Allen's work?

[90] The story is also told that Haswell regarded the fire as a judgment of God, committed what was left of the edition to the flames, and joined the Methodist Church. Cf. Int. to the 1836 (abridged) edition of *Oracles.*

[91] Cf., for example, H. W. De Puy, *op. cit.,* 423; and Hugh Moore, *Memoirs of Col. Ethan Allen,* Plattsburgh, 1834, 244.

very frequently the victim of an almost inconceivable prejudice based upon mere legend, and surviving for an equally incredible period of time. Less vitriolic than the attack of Dwight are these words of Jared Sparks, referring to the Vermonter's *magnum opus:*

> It is nevertheless a crude and worthless performance, in which truth and error, reason and sophistry, knowledge and ignorance, ingenuity and presumption are mingled together in a chaos, which the author denominates a system. Some of the chapters on natural religion, the being and attributes of God, and the principles and obligations of morality should perhaps be excepted from this sweeping remark. . . .[92]

At any rate, the worthy Harvard saint had discretion enough to save himself from an altogether unmitigated disparagement of his own Unitarianism.

Almost a hundred years after *Oracles of Reason* was first carried by the post out of the mountains of Vermont, its author was thus described:

> He was an infidel of the Tom Paine-Voltaire school, and seemed to take pleasure in offending public opinion by expressing views that, to most people of 'orthodox' sentiments, were abhorrent or distasteful. His nature was so essentially offensive and belligerent that he apparently took up the heterodox merely to have the pleasure of a word contest with the orthodox. Being a person of limited education, narrow reading and not extensive observation, his influence on the religious thought and feeling of his day was small.[93]

But the choicest bit of biographical sculpturing is done by Allibone's so-called *Critical Dictionary,* which states,

> As might be expected of one silly enough to espouse the absurdities of infidelity, Mr. Allen held some very foolish opinions; viz., that man after death would transmigrate into beasts, birds, fishes, reptiles, etc., and that he himself should live again in the form of a large white horse.[94]

It was Irving, I believe, who first dubbed the mountain philosopher "The Robin Hood of Vermont"—and such he is, if legends are a criterion.

[92] *Memoir of Col. Ethan Allen,* Middlebury, 1848, 220.

[93] O. J. Victor, *Life and Times of Col. Ethan Allen, the Hero of Ticonderoga,* N. Y., co. 1876, 77.

[94] 1858, I, 53.

THE OPEN TOMB OF JESUS

BY A. KAMPMEIER

THE open tomb of Jesus, which all the gospels report in spite of their many other divergencies concerning the resurrection of Jesus, differences which can never be harmonized, has always been a matter of speculation for those, who can not accept a miraculous supernatural opening of the tomb, especially since the transformed body of Jesus did not need an open tomb according to the Pauline theory, as he expresses it in 1 Cor. XV to the doubters respecting the resurrection in the church at Corinth.

According to Paul's theory the bodies of the dead believers in Christ, as also the bodies of those believers yet living at the time of the consummation of all things, which Paul also hopes to see living according to 1 Thess. 4:17, and other places, will be transformed in the twinkling of an eye into spiritual uncorruptible bodies without any trace of the mortal corruptible, in order to be carried into the clouds to meet the Lord. If the bodies of the believers, analogous to the transformed resurrected body of their Lord, would not be hindered by any law of gravitation to be carried to the skies, naturally no closed tomb would have hindered the transformed body of Jesus to escape the final resting place of his mortal remains.

In that noted chapter addressed to the Corinthian doubters we have the oldest and authentic report on the resurrection story, written only about thirty years after the death of Jesus. Paul gives his report on the basis of what has been delivered to him, probably by Peter and the brother of Jesus, James, whom he met, as he says Gal. vi. 18, for the first time, three years after his conversion. Paul may have had also other sources. Although he speaks of the burial and resurrection of Jesus, he does not mention the open tomb. What he stresses mainly are the appearances of Jesus after his resurrection, which he gives in the following order: first to Kephas

(Peter), then to the twelve, then to 500 brethren at the same time, of which the most were still living up to his time, then to James, then to all the apostles, meaning by this not only the original disciples, but including also such persons, as James, the brother of Jesus, according to Gal. 1;19, where James is called an apostle, finally to Paul himself. As the last appearance, happening several years after the death of Jesus, was apparently a vision, due to the peculiar state of mind, in which Paul then was, and Paul places as much value in it as upon the previously mentioned, we are justified to assume these latter also as being of that character, and as also being brought about by the peculiar state of mind into which the earliest followers of Jesus had been thrown by the unexpected terrifying execution of the master, through which all their hopes seemed to have been shattered, but still coupled with the intense wish and belief, that all was not in vain but that Jesus was still living, even though not in a material body any more, and that he would come again. This firm belief and the wish to see him again brought about the visions. What we wish to see, we see in a transported and agitated state of mind. Even the appearance of Jesus to the five hundred is explainable in this way. Every year at Naples the assembled people, believing in the possibility that the dried blood of saint Januarius will become fluid again in the vial containing it, sees this happen at the fixed hour, carried away by repeated prayers in their self-hypnotized state of mind. All religions, even the highest and purest, Christianity included, have started by visions, which were as real to the founders, experiencing them, as any experience in material life. We might almost call visions the necessary forms of religions revelation, at least in antiquity. And as to the continued existence of their leaders after death, other religions were as firmly convinced of this, as the first followers of Jesus were of his continued existence, though crucified. The Shiitic Mohammedans, i. e. the followers of Ali, the son-in-law of Mohammed, believed firmly, that Mohammed the Holy, the seventh descendant of Ali, was not dead, but that he will once come again from his subterranean concealment as the true *Mahdi* (Messiah).

Though Paul speaks of the mentioned appearances of Jesus, as told to him, it is very questionable though whether he had heard of those materialistic appearances in flesh and bone, which already make a faint beginning in Matthew 28, 9, and then come out strongly

in Luke and the fourth gospel. It is very significant that the later the gospels are in point of time, the more materialized the appearances become. We must not forget that all the gospels are much later than Paul. Still even the oldest gospel, Mark, speaks only in a very general way, even the later addition to it (XVI, 9-20), of the appearances. It is also questionable, whether Paul had heard the story of the open tomb. But though he does not mention it, this does not mean, that he did not hear the story. Probably he knew it, but being of less importance and of less convincing power to the Corinthian doubters in comparison with the many appearances of Jesus, Paul did not give it any place. He may have accepted the open tomb as being an external miraculous testimony and symbol to the first followers that their master was risen. Still even in spite of the open tomb, all the gospels tell us that there was much doubt and unbelief in the first circles about the resurrection, till they were convinced of the living master by his appearances.

If then there were doubts among the first disciples about a resurrection of Jesus with flesh and bone, which an open tomb would pressuppose, provided it was brought about by a miraculous supernatural event and not by natural causes, though these doubters surely did not disbelieve in a continued existence of the spirit and soul of Jesus beyond death, because such an existence was a general belief in antiquity, as is yet today, and if the doubters in Corinth very probably also only doubted a materialistic resurrection of the body, it is not astonishing that ever since a sceptical attitude has been always evinced with many concerning the open tomb. The question always arose: Was the opening of the tomb not due perhaps to natural causes?

According to Matthew (the second gospel in time) the Jewish enemies of the first Christians already at the time of the composition of the gospel declared, that the disciples had stolen the body of Jesus and interred it elsewhere, and then spread the report that he had risen. This was answered by the Christian legend, that the stealing was not possible, as the tomb had been guarded on the suggestion of the priests.

The possibility of the body being taken out of the tomb by someone and laid elsewhere is even hinted at in the latest gospel. The unknown writer of the second century pictures Mary Magdalene as believing that the body of Jesus had been taken from the tomb. She suspects the gardener of the garden, where the tomb was

according to the fertile imagination of the writer. This opinion of the Magdalene, that the body had been laid somewhere else by somebody seems peculiar in a gospel like the fourth, which relates the story of the resurrection of Lazarus already in a state of decomposition, the greatest of all miracles of the gospels, even going beyond the resurrection of Jesus. But if we consider that this gospel was written on the principle of the words spoken to the unbelieving Thomas: "Blessed are they that have not seen, and yet have believed," the opinion of the Magdalene is not so strange. The fourth gospel was intended not only as a rebuke to the Jews who were not even convinced of the godship of Jesus by the resurrection of Lazarus, thus substantiating the words in the parable of the rich man and the poor Lazarus in Luke, upon the basis of which the writer of the fourth gospel formed his symbolic story of the resurrected Lazarus: "If they do not believe Moses and the prophets, they will not believe if any one is raised from the dead," but also as a rebuke to the christian *Docetae*. These believed either, that the redeeming *aeon* (an emanation from the supreme Deity) only entered into a temporary connection wtih the historical human Jesus at the time of his baptism and left him at his death; or that the earthly Jesus only was the appearance of the heavenly redeemer, who had to assume a body to become visible, or finally the whole appearance of Christ, his birth and his life was only semblance. To such a doctrine, the belief in a bodily resurrection, which required an open tomb, was not necessary. It may, by the way, be remarked that Paul's theory of the heavenly Christ coming down on earth, was dangerously near to the first of these three docetic views. To the *Docetae* therefore it must not have been of any importance, whether the body of Jesus remained in a closed tomb or whether it was taken from it by some natural cause.

On the assumption that the open tomb was a fact, different theories have been proposed by those averse to a miraculous supernatural opening of the tomb.

The theory of the stealing of the body by the disciples was again renewed in modern times by Reimarus in the eighteenth century in the *Wolfenbuettler Fragmente* edited by Lessing. But it is a very clumsy one. The disciples were not in a state of mind upon the terrifying blow of the execution of Jesus, which scattered them in all directions, to do such an act. Besides a religion of the highest order in its essentials and of the loftiest morality like Christianity

could not have started with a low and at the same time clumsy fraud.

Another assumption was that Jesus had only been apparently dead, since he died so quickly. while the death on the cross was a very slow death. It is pointed out, that Josephus reports in his *Life* a case of one of his friends crucified by the Romans, who was saved to life again on the permission of Titus by the assistance of doctors. But this theory of an apparent death of Jesus, and that, when he awakened from it, he left the tomb and was seen for a short time again by the disciples, suffered under the drawback, besides being extremely doubtful, that such a Christ, who lived an earthly life again for a while, could never match the vision of an exalted glorified Christ with all that it implied for the believer.

Another theory, upon which the writer hit himself, is that the tomb was opened by an earthquake, the stone closing the tomb, having been moved from its position. Such things have happened in historical earthquakes; graves were opened by them. And Palestine has always been subjected to earthquakes. A very great one occurred during the reign of Herod the Great, as Josephus tells us. Upon this theory the body of Jesus would have become a prey to hyenas, who live in old ruins and caverns, and roam about in packs. But the earthquakes at the death of Jesus and on the morning of the resurrection, of which Matthew tells us, are probably only poetical embellishments, since there are many extraordinary natural phenomena reported as having taken place at the birth and death of great men in antiquity. And thus this theory has very little basis.

Another theory is, that Joseph of Arimathea had put the body of Jesus only temporarily in the tomb and that he secretly laid the body somewhere else, for the reason of not being compromised in public opinion by having in his tomb an executed man, who was considered accursed according to the Mosaic law. But it is only Matthew, who says the tomb was Joseph's. And if it was Joseph's, we should expect, that a man who braved public opinion by daring to ask Pilate for the body of Jesus, as Mark tells us, would not have cared further on to brave public opinion by leaving the body, where he laid it. Besides we must also not forget, that the author of Matthew very probably wrongly attributed the tomb to Joseph on the basis of Is. 53:9, where it is said "the grave of the servant of Yahve was made with the rich," because he calls Joseph

a rich man. None of the gospels applies Old Testament passages to Jesus and his work so frequently as Matthew, and often very wrongly, even absurdly, as in the case of the ass and the colt at the entry of Jesus in Jerusalem, showing that he did not understand Hebrew phraseology at all. It is likewise so in regard to the mentioned Isaiah passage. In that passage in the original Hebrew "wicked" and "rich" mean the same, because the rich were considered as overweening and violent. Thus the tomb, in which Jesus was laid, was very likely not Joseph's at all. The garden with the tomb in the fourth gospel does not count. That gospel has little historical worth but is purely speculative and symbolic.

Another theory of mine is the following. Up to modern times the superstition has existed that a special healing and conjuring power attaches to the remains of an executed person. This opinion rests upon the idea of sacrifice. The executed is an appeasing sacrifice to the avenging and justice seeking spirits. If human sacrifices have the power to appease some deity, their remains must also be of value otherwise, to conjure with. Sacrifice always partakes, according to ancient opinion, of the nature of the powers to which it is offered, it has miraculous power. Hecate, the Greek goddess of the underworld, was supposed to teach sorcery and witchcraft. The blood of an executed criminal was believed to cure the falling sickness, likewise the fat was especially valuable. The witches in Shakespeare's *Macbeth* make use of it. In the reign of James I of England (1603-25) in consequence of his work on *Daemonologie,* one of the acts of parliament was: "That if any person shall take up any dead man, woman or child out of the grave, or the skin, bone or any part of the dead person, to be employed or used in any manner of witchcraft, sorcery or charm or enchantment, such a person being convicted shall suffer death." If such practices existed in antiquity, may it not have been possible, that the Roman soldiery, recruited at that time to a great extent from barbaric peoples, and who attended to the crucifixion of Jesus and had to remove the other malefactors from the cross before nightfall, according to Jewish law, that no criminal was to hang overnight, Deut. XXI, 1-23, rifled the tomb of Jesus, especially because he was a distinguished criminal in their eyes? They perhaps disposed of his corpse otherwise.

Finally I offer a theory, which is perhaps the most plausible of all. Pilate, according to Philo, a contemporary of Jesus, and

Josephus, was a man, on the one side cruel, unjust, insolent, corrupt, rapacious, obstinate and trickish, continually having to do with tumults of his subjects brought about by disregarding the customs of the Jews and insulting them, on the other side he was at times yielding, timid and full of fear of losing his governorship, which he did finally on the complaints of the Jews and Samaritans. Though he knew that the Jews objected to having the imperial ensigns with the image of the Roman eagle or that of the emperor within Jerusalem, claiming their law forbade images in the holy city, he brought these ensigns at night into the city. Former governors had avoided this vexation. When the stealthy act came out and a tumult arose, he finally yielded and removed the ensigns. In the matter of Jesus we also see him yielding to the hierarchy, because his conscience was not free otherwise, though it surely vexed him to be drawn into a religious question of the Jews. He took his revenge by his inscription over the head of Jesus, an insult to the Jews. Probably he was glad when the whole affair was over and Jesus was dispatched. But when Joseph of Arimathia asked for the body of Jesus, to give him a decent burial, Pilate saw that the Nazarene had perhaps more adherents, than expected and that his tomb would perhaps become honored by his followers. Such a thing might renew the trouble about Jesus. Pilate may therefore have given secret orders to his officers to remove the body by night to another place, in order to forestall all further trouble.

We do not claim to have solved the question of the open tomb. But we must not forget that sometimes very insignificant things, which came about in a very natural way, have been the cause of starting important things, which were in the air, in human history and to hurry them on. The work which Jesus had begun, would not have been in vain, even if his tomb would have remained closed. The belief that Jesus was still living and not dead and that he would come again in glory, just as in the case of the aforementioned Mohammed the Holy and similar other cases of Messiahs in history, did not depend on the open tomb, but the open tomb, if it was a fact, and the mysterious disappearance of the body of Jesus perhaps gave the movement started more impetus.

Antiquity was ripe for a new religion. Much of the old religions had outlived itself. Many new cults and philosophical and religious brotherhoods had started which promised to answer questions, which the old religious forms did not answer. Christianity

was not the only new religion and brotherhood, but it overcame its rivals, in spite of still much admixture of ancient mythical and superstitious thought, by its faith in a redeemer, who was not mythical like Mithra and other such redeemers of new cults, but who had actually lived as a human personality and who had given an example, that he did not come "to rule and lord it over," whether like the hierarchy, who brought him to trial, or like the tool of secular authority, who acted as his executioner, but who had come to serve and be faithful in this service unto death. About that personality a community gathered who strove to put into practice all that was best in antiquity, whether it was taught by Pagan or Hebrew teachers and prophets, a brotherhood, in which there was to be neither Greek nor Jew, neither freeman nor bondsman, neither master nor slave, neither man nor woman but all one in Christ. And to such an ideal of a new humanity as expressed in these words of Paul, his vision long after the death of Jesus, and his gnostic, metaphysical, mythical view of a "heavenly Christ," or a "heavenly," "second man," the ideal man, in distinction from the first man, coming down upon earth and dwelling in the human Jesus, has contributed more than the open tomb.

ON SPINOZA AND MAIMONIDES

BY MILTON R. KONVITZ

"I WISHED to show," wrote Karl Pearson, "that the study of Maimonides was traceable even in Spinoza's most finished exposition of his philosophy."[1] To the same effect wrote Dr. M. Joël in his *Zur Genesis der Lehre Spinozas.* *."Man weiss es heute, dass Spinoza nicht oberflächlich, sondern auf's genaueste vertraut war mit den Schriften des Maimonides. Man muss aber die Lektüre dieser Schriften nicht beschränken auf die Jugendzeit des Spinozas, so dass ihm etwa blosse Reminiscenzen in Kopfe hängen geblieben wären."* Joël's monograph, which preceded Pearson's paper, was published in 1871, but the question of the probable influences of the Rabbi of Cordova on the excommunicated Jew of Amsterdam has not yet been resolved, if ever it will be. In 1924 Dr. Leon Roth, of the University of Manchester, published his engrossing study on Spinoza, Descartes, and Maimonides, in the Preface to which he says: "In the following study I have endeavoured to show that (1) in the relation to Descartes, Spinoza represents the radical opposition of monism to pluralism; and that (2) this same opposition, in a precisely similar context and with identical presuppositions and consequences, is to be found in a work which on other counts may be shown to have deeply influenced Spinoza, the *Guide for the Perplexed* of Maimonides." In concluding his study, Roth solves for himself the problem by equating the *Ethics* and the *Guide.* "Maimonides and Spinoza speak through-

[1] Pearson's essay can be found in *Mind,* volume VIII. He takes his stand with Joël and against Sorley. (The latter attacked Joël's position in an article in *Mind,* volume V.) But Pearson argues from a knowledge of the *Yad Hachazoko,* not of the *Moreh Nebuchim.* Yet what is said here applies to him no less than to the others; for though he quotes different expressions, they display no more cogency.

The reader might find it to his interest to contrast the present article with one by Benjamin Ginzburg on "Spinoza and the Jewish Tradition," *Menorah Journal,* February, 1927.

out with one voice," he says. "The monism of Spinoza is a direct derivative of the characteristic from which the monotheistic idea, in opposition to the current mythological pluralism, had assumed in the mind of Maimonides. The *Guide for the Perplexed,* therefore, is the key . . . to the growth of Spinoza's system in Spinoza's own mind, comprising as it does both his own positive philosophy and the grounds of its opposition to and rejection of Cartesianism. . .[2]

It is not within the province of this essay to consider the arguments advanced by either Joël or Roth in support of the position they take, to weigh them in the balance of reason and pass judgment on them. It must suffice if we say that whatever similarities and parallelisms they find between the two systems, are likenesses or agreement only of accident and language, but not of essence. The Pope speaks of God and the mystic speaks of God: do they speak of the same God? And yet they use much the same words in speaking of Him, each describing Him as perfect and good, loving and just and merciful. But is their reference to the same God? The sky looks blue, and so does water, yet sky is not water. Even so is it with Spinoza and Maimonides; to the God of neither can be ascribed human passions and qualities, but one God is Spinoza's and the other God is that of Maimonides.

The only heritage that Spinoza took from the Synagogue is the term God, and the term only. Spinoza emptied it of the meaning to which the thought and life of manifold centuries had made contribution and refilled it with an import all his own. It is from that act of genius that the remembrance of his name springs; and it is for that act that his name will be forgotten, but to be recalled again. In an age when men are torn between their thoughts and emotions, between, as Unamuno says, the nay-saying of their minds and the yea-saying of their hearts, between belief in the most extravagant catch-at-straws and the shallowest of materialisms, for men of such an age the gilded phrase of Spinoza's, *Deus sive Natura,* may have its allurement. "God is Nature" or "Nature is God," they are apt to

[2] It is of interest to note that in a later essay, called "Jewish Thought in the Modern World," which appears in *The Legacy of Israel* (Ox-ford, 1927), Dr. Roth does not speak with so assured a temper. "The contention that Spinoza is a *Jewish* [sic] philosopher," he writes, "Jewish, that is, not only in origin but in inspiration, needs to be limited carefully. 'Spinozim,' it has been happily remarked [by Pollock], 'is not a system but a habit of mind.' Now it is this 'habit of mind,' not any specific system of doctrine, which divergent opinion in the modern world has found valuable in Spinoza, and it is this 'habit of mind,' again apart from any question of specific doctrine, which Spinoza derived from the Hebraic tradition."

say, and autosuggest themselves into a soundless peace. But there may arise a generation which will not know Couè, and which will not be satisfied with compromises that are substanceless and conciliations that can quiet only the tongue; men who will look upon themselves in no false mirror, who will know that they are constituted of irreconcilable elements. They will find no content in a fictional truce, and to them Spinoza's phrase will have a totally different purport. "Deus SIVE Natura," they will say. There is God and there is Nature, and the twain are not one. We shall render unto God what is God's and unto Nature what is its due. It was Goethe who said, "As a poet, I am a polytheist; as a naturalist, a pantheist; as a moral man, a deist; and in order to express my mind I need all these forms." He follows a misleading scent who would find God by way of science or philosophy. God can be known only in religion.

Maimonides was a pious man thinking the thoughts of a philosopher; Spinoza was a philosopher trying to feel pious. One presents the spectacle of a man rationalizing his beliefs; the other, of one trying to believe his thoughts. Maimonides starts with the belief in a transcendental God which he attempts to translate into logical propositions; Spinoza starts with logical propositions which he attempts to vitalize by referring them to—

> " 'I don't know what you mean by *glory*,' Alice said.
>
> 'When *I* use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose to mean—neither more nor less.'
>
> 'The question is,' said Alice, 'whether you *can* make words mean so many different things.'
>
> 'The question is,' said Humpty Dumpty, 'which is to be master—that's all.' "

Spinoza, too, like Jacob, strove with God, and it was God who won—but not the God of the Patriarchs or of Psalms, but the WORD. Spinoza thought he would vitalize the Universe by naming it God. It became his *Schlagwort*. "Metaphysics," William James has said, "has usually followed a very primitive kind of quest. You know how men have always hankered after unlawful magic and you know what a great part in magic *words* have always played. If you have his name or the formula of incantation that binds him, you can control the spirit, genie, afrite, or whatever the power may be. . . So the universe has always appeared to the

natural mind as a kind of enigma of which the key must be sought in the shape of some illuminating or power-bringing word or name. That word names the universe's *principle,* 'God,' 'Matter,' 'Reason,' 'the Absolute,' 'Energy,' are so many solving names. You can rest when you have them. You are at the end of your metaphysical quest."

By naming the Universe God, Spinoza thought that he thereby resolves all riddles, answers all queries, makes life worth living by setting before man an object which he could love and joy in the loving. These had been the functions of God for his predecessors, and being faced by problems which had been theirs, too, he offered the same solution. . . . "Thinking is the attempt to satisfy a special impulse," said Bradley, "and the attempt implies an assumption about reality." Even before he became a metaphysician, Spinoza felt that *somehow* the Universe *must* be divine, that man must love something, and that "we cannot have too much of merriment"—and the only key to the solution is, God. And so we have *"Deus sive Natura . . ."* But have we, really? . . .

> "Ah, love, let us be true
> To one another! for the world which seems
> To lie before us like a land of dreams,
> So various, so beautiful, so new,
> Hath really neither joy, nor love, nor light,
> Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain;
> And we are here as on a darkling plain
> Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight,
> Where ignorant armies clash by night."

If the taint of a philosophical system is dependent upon the temperament of the interpreter, why should Arnold's reaction to the Spinozistic Universe be less valid than even Spinoza's own?

The basic assumption about the Universe for both Spinoza and Maimonides is that it is knowable. To repeat our quotation from Bradley, "Thinking is the attempt to satisfy a special impulse, and the attempt implies an assumption about reality." He who assumes the least and goes the farthest is the greatest philosopher.

But our philosophers did not agree in much else. They soon reached crossroads and parted company. To Spinoza, in order that the real be knowable, it must be simple, a unit, and, though infinite, yet all-inclusive. (Whatever that may mean, I know not.) But

Maimonides went beyond this: Nature to be knowable, must be one; but to be one, it must have been created by One. In other words, there is a Universe only if there is a God; the Universe is; therefore God is.

The God of Maimonides is not He whom the vulgar worship. What can *they* know about Him? Maimonides quotes the words of the cynical Preacher: "For God is in Heaven, and thou upon Earth; therefore let thy words be few." Being a rationalist, he attempts to give religion a rational content, and in so doing inadvertently empties it of its real burden, and leaves it without a sufficient *reason d'etre*. "You must therefore consider the entire globe as one individual being. . . This mode of considering the universe is, as will be explained, indispensable, that is to say," says the Rabbi, "it is very useful for demonstrating the unity of God; it also helps to elucidate the principle that He who is One has created only *one* being."

From His unity we must deduce His incorporeality, for "without incorporeality there is no unity, for a corporeal thing is in the first case not simple, but composed of matter and form [which Pearson, in another connection, translates as extension and thought, respectively, forgetting, seemingly, that Maimonides is an Aristotelian], and secondly, as it has extension it is also divisible."

But that God is one and incorporeal are the only things we can assert of Him and remain rational. As we shall see, we must not say even that He exists, unless analogically, and "we use 'one' in reference to God to express that there is nothing similar to Him, but we do not mean to say that an attribute of unity is added to His essence."

God is the Place of the Universe, but the Universe is not His place. It is in Him that everything lives, and moves, and has its being. He is the source of reality and as such transcends reality and is wholly-other than anything known or knowable. We can affirm nothing of Him except that, in some way, He is our Creator and of all we see. "All must be taught," holds Maimonides, "that there is no similarity in any way whatsoever between Him and His creatures; that His existence is not like the existence of His creatures, His life not like that of any living being, His wisdom not like the wisdom of the wisest of men; and that the difference between Him and His creatures is not merely quantitative, but absolute; I

mean to say that all must understand that our wisdom and His, and our power and His, do not differ quantitatively or qualitatively, or in a similar manner, for two things, of which one is the strong and the other weak, are necessarily similar, belong to the same class, and can be included in one definition. The same is the case with all other comparisons; they can only be made between two things belonging to the same class. Anything predicated of God is totally different from our attribute; no definition can comprehend both; therefore His existence and that of any other being totally differ from each other, and the term existence is applied to both homonymously."

Unlike the God of Spinoza, the God of Maimonides "has no positive attribute whatever. The negative attributes, however, are those which are necessary to direct the mind to the truths which we must believe concerning God; for, on the one hand, they do not imply any plurality, and on the other, they convey to man the highest possible knowledge of God; e. g., it has been established by proof that some being must exist besides those things which can be perceived by the senses or apprehended by the mind, when we say of this being that it exists, we mean that its non-existence is impossible."

It is difficult, if not impossible, to grasp Maimonides' meaning in these words. As has been already pointed out by both Gersonides and Grescas, he argues as though not—non-existent could possibly mean anything else than existent, or not-plural anything else but simple. Perhaps all he means is that we are to take our qualifications of God as we are to take the myth of the cave in Plato's *Republic:* only analogically, as imperfect approximations to the truth. But for the purposes of metaphor, why should positive assertions be less admissible than negative ones?

Yet, if we are unable to know anything of His attributes—not alone because "a boundary is undoubtedly set to the human mind which it cannot pass," but also because God *ex hypothesi* can *have* no attributes—we may, however, know Him by His actions. God is known by what He does, not by what He is. "This kind of attribute," says Maimonides, "is separate from the essences of the thing described, and, therefore, appropriate to be employed in describing the Creator, especially since we know that these different actions do not imply that different elements must be contained in the substance

of the agent, by which the different actions are produced. On the contrary, all the actions of God emanate from His essence, not from any extraneous thing superadded to His essence." Fire bleaches certain things and blackens others, melts and makes hard, boils and burns; and yet fire does not accomplish each of these acts by a different element or peculiar property, but only by its heat. As Saint Paul has it, "There are diversities of operations, but the same spirit."

In this Maimonides would be quite correct if he had also said that we could know God as well as we know the nature of fire. If we did not know that it was the *same* fire which both melts and hardens, would it be unreasonable for us to believe that each of these operations was performed by a different fire, or that it was from different elements in the flame that the different effects followed? Maimonides posits the unknowability of God, like the Godhead of Meister Eckhart, and then says, "His works give evidence of His existence, and show *what must be assumed* concerning Him, that is to say, what must be attributed to Him either affirmatively or negatively." Can we justifiably assume anything about the cause if our knowledge is limited solely to the effect? Unless we *know* that God produces everything, why can we not say that the thunder comes from Thor, that rain is sent by Frey, and that our garden flowers are cared for by Freya and the Elves? From diversity of operations we may infer a diversity of spirits, or a diversity in spirit; unless, of course, we *know* that they all and singularly issue from one ultimate and simple cause. But to Maimonides the existence of God is never more than an assumption from which the unity of Nature incorrigibly follows. However, since God is unknowable, and "since the existence of a relation between God and man, or between Him and other things, has been denied"—what is He that we should be mindful of Him? If God exists, then Nature is one; but perhaps all the host of Olympus or of Asgard exist, and Nature is not simple. It is a rather dangerous business to make one assumption in order to establish another assumption.

The Universe is knowable and all its ways are reasonable. It is on this assumption, to them a postulate, that both Spinoza and Maimonides construct their respective cosmologies. So far do they agree; but Maimonides went farther: he would bind even the Infinite Wisdom—which, by hypothesis, can have *nothing* in com-

mon with what we call our wisdom,—he would subject even the Omniscient to our so-called Laws of Reason to what we at present look upon as Eternal Verities. "We do not call a person weak," he says, "because he cannot move a thousand hundredweights, and we do not say that God is imperfect because He cannot transform Himself into a body, or cannot create another being like Himself, or make a square whose diagonal should be equal to one of its sides . . . there are things which are impossible, whose existence cannot be admitted, and whose creation is excluded from the power of God." Even God cannot contradict the Laws of Reason, yet it is blasphemy to assert that His reason resembles man's!

In Spinoza the law of thought becomes the law of reality; in Maimonides the law of thought becomes not only the law of Nature, but of God, too—though he would be the last to admit it. To view God *sub specie homonis,* he would say, is the greatest of sins.

The answer to the problems our philosophers raise can best be given in the words of Maimonides himself: "The infinite cannot be comprehended or circumscribed." Spinoza has as one of his first definitions that the Real is infinite and consists of infinite attributes; but too soon did he forget this and constructed a universe of which thought and extension alone are attributes. In a universe which is infinite and includes infinite possibilities, what avails it to us if we know but one or two of them? Are we made blessed by the possession of such piece-meal knowledge? Can the sound of two notes soothe our ears when we know that an entire and endless symphony is being played, on a cithern and Aeolian harp, viol and psaltery, dulcimer and Pandean pipes? Fire bleaches and blackens, that we know and nothing else. But some day it may burn us, and what then?

Ultimately was it not the Law of Contradiction that both Spinoza and Maimonides worshipped, though the former raised an altar to Substance and the latter to the *Primum Mobile?* Neither called his god by his right name; their religious natures made it ineffable.

"And they shall say unto me, What is His name? What shall I say unto them?" . . . Why, say, the Law of Contradiction. . . "But, behold, they will not believe me, for they will say, The Lord hath not appeared unto thee."

Creation names Him, say Spinoza and Maimonides; especially the mind of man. "Before the Universe was created, says the

Talmud, "there was only the Almighty and His name." None but the "little gnostics," of whom Santayana speaks, can undertake to call Him by His *nomen proprium;* and the rest of us still believe that "the infinite cannot be comprehended or circumscribed," that Life and its Setting overflow the articulate. God is not an hypothesis, but a conjecture, and only in a mystical moment does it fulfill itself.

It were time that we, too, like the Romans of yore, raise an altar to the Unknown God—but not in the spirit of Rabbi Moses ben Maimon.

AGNOSTICISM AND THE NEW TENDENCIES IN SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

BY VICTOR S. YARROS

IT is high time some plain-spoken and candid Agnostic, a vigorous follower, say, of Professor T. H. Huxley and Professor John Tyndall, should challenge some of the loose and vague assertions to be encountered on every side concerning the alleged repudiation of the whole agnostic attitude by the true scientists of today, the alleged new idealistic spirit being manifested by the most exact sciences, the revival of mysticism in philosophy, etc.

We have been told lately that, at last, science is abjuring materialism and becoming at once spiritual and humanistic. We have been felicitated on the re-emergence and recognition of "values"—moral quantities—in a world that threatens to become blind to anything that could not be described in mechanistic terms.

The informed agnostic is wearied—when he is not amused—by such rhetorical and gratuitous statements.

Science *was never materialistic* or anti-social, and nothing has taken place in the scientific world that requires a serious revision of the true Agnostic position.

Our conception of matter has changed, as has our conception of the ultimate atom. The contemporary physicist regards—or has regarded the atom as a center of force. Well, what of that? What is there that is "spiritual" about the sort of forces the physicists deal with—negative and positive electricity, for example? The atom is known to be a miniature solar system, rather than an irreducible quantity of something hard and solid. Again what of it? The solar system itself is not in the least "spiritual"; we do not attribute *mind* or *soul* to the suns and their satellites.

Some thinkers take the position that what we have called the

material is not as material and what we have called the mental is not as mental as we have supposed. This means that there are mental elements in the material and material in the mental. Granting the probability of this statement, we have yet to define the terms material and mental. This, alas, has not been done by the newer physicists or psychologists. For purposes of practical discussion the terms are perhaps sufficiently intelligible, but they are not sufficiently clear or significant to supply a basis for a new theology, or a new philosophical system. Nor is the situation improved by asserting, as some do, that the ultimate stuff of the world is "neutral" neither mind nor matter, but something synthetic. Of the nature and function of that stuff we are wholly ignorant.

Professor Bertrand Russell, in a recent essay (published in the Saturday Review of Literature) briefly but lucidly described the changed relation between physics and metaphysics, including philosophy, due to late revolutionary scientific discoveries and theories. I may quote the following striking paragraph from that fine article:

"The older physics was based upon somewhat gross observations of large objects. (I mean by a large object anything bigger than an atom.) It was found that certain precise mathematical laws fitted the behavior of these large objects within the limits of observation as they then were, and it was assumed that these precise laws were not only precise, but exact. This latter assumption is being dropped, and the older laws are being regarded in the light of statistical probabilities analogous to the statement that if you toss a coin often it will come equally often heads and tails. In fact it seems that everything we see is a statistical probability. A colored surface, for example, represents the statistical probability of quantum changes in a certain region. Continuity, which used to be thought to be of the essence of nature, is now thought by some to be only a continuity of probability. The individual phenomena according to these men are discontinuous jumps within atoms, but the probability of a jump occurring in any particular place varies continuously with the place, and this probability is really what we see when we think we see a table or a chair. When Dr. Johnson kicked a stone in order to disprove Berkeley, he was, if we are to believe these physicists, kicking a statistical probability, and the consequent pain in his toe represented the statistical probablty of an upset to the atoms in that part of his foot.

"Let us not, however, suppose that we are still to be allowed to believe in atoms and electrons, except as convenient fictions like John Jones. An electron consists of a series of sets of phenomena in places where it isn't. What are these phenomena? The only ones of which we have any direct knowledge are our own perceptions. If there are others we know little about them beyond the mathematical laws which they approximately obey."

Materialism in its crude or naive sense is undoubtedly knocked on the head by such conceptions as these, but, pray, what sort of foundation do they offer to so called Vitalism, or Spiritism, or Mysticism? "Statistical probability" is baffling enough, but we know in a general way what it means. Beyond that meaning we are pathetically ignorant, and we have no alternative but to recognize our ignorance.

Modern physics and modern metaphysics are drawing ever closer together, as Mr. Russell points out, but neither has affected the case of the Agnostic.

What of the field of morals?

We are told that values are independent of the human mind and exist throughout nature. That may be true, but the point is that we do not *know* whether it is true or not, and that the assertion, moreover, is absolutely devoid of any *ethical* significance.

What moral values are to us human beings, we can know and do know. We know that life, health and well-being depend on our appreciation of our own moral values. War and peace, prosperity and adversity, harmony and discord in industry, tolerance and intolerance—these things we can control to a considerable extent if we have a proper sense of moral values. Our treatment of animals, of criminals, of mental and physical defectives depends on our moral ideals and ideas.

On the other hand, when we are assured that there are values in the Cosmos, we have no possibility of bringing them into any conceivable relation with our own social, economic and political values. Therefore, the very hypothesis of cosmic values is utterly futile.

Professor Huxley, we can now see, went too far when he postulated a *conflict* between cosmic ethics and human ethics. That contention is not in the least necessary to Agnosticism, and to make it, is to violate the scientific law of parsimony. Agnosticism merely

takes the position that ethical values are *a product of human evolution and have to do with human needs and human problems.* Humanity is part of the cosmos and obeys the laws of the cosmos. Human morality cannot be *hostile to cosmic laws.* All that reason permits us to affirm is that the conditions of human life—and even of sub-human life—have demanded and still demand a certain compliance with certain principles—justice, beneficence, altruism. Disregard of these principles leads to misery, strife and waste; the more we carry those principles into our conduct, the more happiness we attain and the more abundant and worthy is the life we lead.

Now, no supernatural sanctions are required to justify those principles to mankind. We need no alleged "revelations" from so-called heavenly regions to commend them to us. We may, in fact, love our neighbors as we do our own selves without loving God. Morality is not another name for religion, nor religion another name for morality. Love of one's neighbor is not a corollary from any theological dogma. The Agnostic cannot love God simply because he does not know what God is, or what he does. The old, childlike, anthropomorphic notion of God having been completely discredited, what meaning are we to attach to the old term? Words are not meanings, pseudo-ideas are not ideas. To say that God is a spirit, or that he is "love," is to say nothing that suggests even a faint idea. We are simply unable to form any conception of a creator or of a process of "creation." The Bible uses naive anthropomorphic terms when it speaks of creation, of rest on the seventh day, of God's appearance to man. The bible writers were not romantic symbolists; *they* thought of God as a sort of superman who could be swayed by prayer and angered by sin or misbehavior.

To us such intellectual babyhood is impossible. We have outgrown the only definite systems of theology we know anything about, and no new system consonant with science and common sense has as yet been vouchsafed us. What but Agnosticism is left to us?

Whether the truth he frankly faced or blinked at, it is undeniable that the modern world is becoming Agnostic. The loud and pathetic complaints of the orthodox—that civilized and educated people are "forsaking religion and philosophy" and putting their faith in the exact sciences alone, sufficiently demonstrate that proposition. But the world is *not* forsaking either religion or philosophy; it is merely

and unavoidably seeking a religion and philosophy it can comprehend, take seriously and apply to life. Science is not worshipped as a fetich; science is found useful and significant, and men live by it. They have little understanding of the assumptions of science, of the metaphysics behind science, but they know that the most abstract and disinterested scientific discoveries sooner or later affect practice. Science verifies its conclusions in the laboratories and clinics of life; it readily abandons disproved ideas or modifies them freely. Why, then, should not humanity trust science? Where has it failed?

Ah, science has not made men completely moral! Science has not answered our ultimate questions regarding purpose in nature, the destiny of man, the relation between nature and the supposititious creator of nature. But when has science promised to do these things? Talk of the bankruptcy of science in the ethical and religious realms is the sheerest moonshine. Science does not *set out to prove anything;* it sets out to investigate and explain phenomena, and in the course of its tasks it is compelled to frame hypotheses or theories. Science has certain theories respecting the origin and development of religion and of social ethics, and that is all. Science traces causal relations when the data are sufficient. Science may predict certain events on the strength of past experience. But all this is tentative and subject to correction. A hypothesis is not a dogma. No theory is sacrosanct.

It is not so much science as the scientific method applied to religion and philosophy that has undermined those branches of speculation. We cannot reason after one fashion about chemistry and physics, biology and psychology, and in another fashion about religion and philosophy. We demand that a formula in religion or philosophy have a definite meaning and offer evidence in its own behalf. To affirm that the existence of God, or the divinity and sonship of Jesus, can be demonstrated in some peculiar way unknown to science, or to common sense, is to talk nonsense.

The editor of a theological journal, in a series of candid essays, once attempted to vindicate Christian ethics by appealing precisely to evidence, to experience, to sound sense. "Try me," he virtually made Christianity say, "see whether or not my precepts and doctrines are sound and beneficial; try to live up to them and compare the actual results with those of any other system; I do not ask

you to believe without evidence or contrary to evidence. I only ask you to submit me to the test of evidence."

Nothing could be more fair or scientific in spirit. Unfortunately no community *has accepted the challenge.* No community has ventured to practice Christian ethics. Indeed, every so-called Christian community proves by its practice that it does *not* believe the basic doctrines of its professed creed to be feasible or possible.

Today a Christian, apparently, is a person who says he believes in God and in Jesus but does not care or dare *to apply in a single direction* the teachings of Jesus, the divine! Was a greater paradox ever known in religion?

However, Christian ethics and Christian theology and mythology are by no means interdependent or organically connected. If a society should practice rigorously and faithfully the teachings of Jesus, and should thrive and prosper morally in consequence, it would not thereby prove the existence of a God or the divinity of Jesus. It could still be maintained that the teachings of Jesus were based on insight into the nature of man and the conditions of human welfare. There *is* such a thing as moral genius, and some religious or ethical teachers possessed it. They were "seers" in the true sense of the term; they saw life steadily and whole; they formulated principles which their contemporaries thought Utopian but which ampler experience may vindicate. These principles do not require any assumption as to the divinity of Jesus, the inspiration of Mohammed, or the inerrancy of this or that book.

I return to my contention at the outset—that nothing in modern science or modern philosophy necessitates a revision of the agnostic position. As Professor J. B. Haldane said recently, *the world believes too much and doubts too little.* Science spells doubt where proof is not abundant and conclusive. Science has no need of mysticism or supernaturalism; it stops where evidence stops. Relativity, the quantum theory, the discoveries of astronomy and astrophysics have already wrought revolutionary changes in some of the sciences, and may produce more such changes; but they have not furnished any new justification for crude, meaningless or empty theological propositions. The Agnostic is watching every move made by science and philosophy, but so far he has not perceived any development in either that dictates the abandonment of doubt, skepticism and agnosticism.

Ah, say some thinkers—Professor James Thurlow Adams, the historian and Pulitzer-prize-winner, for instance—science, then, you admit, is so far "a bind alley!" It has not thrown any light on the why and wherefore of things; it has failed to answer the questions concerning the meaning of life, the purpose of creation, the future of the Universe, the destiny of man. Do not human beings seek such answers? Will they ever be satisfied with science if it admits ignorance of and inability to deal with the deepest, most vital and ultimate problems, Professor Adams thinks they will not, and he is disposed to predict a strong reaction against science and a revival of religion and religious philosophy. Science, he says, will never be discarded, of course, since its utility is indisputable, but it will be used merely "as a tool." Religion and philosophy will be again preferred and invoked for guidance and for illumination and support.

The comments to be made on Professor Adams' plaint and forecast are fairly obvious. In the first place, science does not claim to be anything other than a tool. It is justified of its own children. It asks to be judged by its fruits. It advertises and emphasizes its own limitations. It does not answer the ultimate questions simply because it cannot answer them—it has no data, or very few data concerning them and cannot even adopt a tentative hypothesis. This is regrettable, but there is no help for it. Science cannot overstep its bounds and remain science.

In the second place, if philosophy and theology *can* answer the profound, vital and ultimate questions just referred to, *by all means let them do so.* Science will heartily join average humanity in calling them blessed. However, the answers must be real answers, not mere words without meaning. To repeat, science and scientific method have made superstition, juggling with terms, false pretence, self-deception in the name of religion or philosophy practically impossible for intelligent and trained persons.

Agnosticism, finally, is not a child of science alone. Huxley, Tyndall, Spencer, Lecky, Stephens and a hundred other thinkers became Agnostics not because science stopped where it did in their day, but also because they were convinced *that philosophy and theology had nothing of value to offer beyond the limits of science.* Has the situation changed since? Are philosophy and theology today better off as it were, the happy possessors of new knowledge denied

to science? They certainly are not. They have done nothing, discovered nothing, as I have said, that requires the Agnostic substantially to modify his position. There is nothing in the new physics, the new psychology, the new biology, the new metaphysics that takes us one little step beyond agnosticism. As to the future, it will have to speak for itself.

A MINISTER'S SON RUMINATES ON RELIGION

BY JOHN GUY FOWLKES

By Way of Getting Started

EDUCATION, politics, and religion are three of the social agencies that influence human life most. Consequently, it is but natural that these three institutions should be under the spotlight of public interest and discussion. Logically, it would also follow that constant and diligent effort would be made in analyzing, evaluating, and reconstructing these powerful determiners of society. Education as a profession has enjoyed more scientific progress in the past twenty-five years than during any preceding century. The work of professional organizations such as the National Education Association, The National Society for the Study of Education, and the National Research Association bear telling evidence of this progress. Likewise, some concerted effort is being made through such agencies as the National Municipal Research Bureau to place political structures on a scientific basis. However, curiously enough, in most quarters this attitude of challenging inquiry has not been directed toward religion and its operating agencies. Individuals as a whole seem either to be complacently satisfied with existing religious tenets, or simply entirely indifferent to the fundamental experiences encountered in the realm of spiritual exploration. The following discussion is an attempt to point out some of the most urgent problems in the field of religion at present. In no sense has the writer attempted to pronounce a benign benediction, or to offer an inflexible solution to the baffling questions that arise. If the following observations are provocative of thought, the author will feel fully repaid.

Some Fallacious Notions of Religion

Church Attachment and Religion. In the minds of many regular church-goers, religion, denominationalism, and God represent one and the same thing. Church membership, even though such affiliation be no stronger than having one's name on the roll, immediately furnishes the fortunate individual with the joys, rewards, and immunities of the blessedly chosen few. Credal politics as evidenced by malicious slander and insinuating gossip become the inspired tools of the elected sect or faction. And so I might go on calling attention to the undeniable fact that religion in the consciences of many has never meant more than a mere title to a world unknown. May such believers soon disappear.

Religious Goodness. "Damned by faint praise," could never be better illustrated than by the statement, "He is such a good man." Passive goodness is the complete fulfillment of a religious life to many people. Such naivete is as stupid as it is lamentable. Carl VanDoren said some two or three years ago that, "Goodness by itself is a drug on the market," and that professional workers, particularly teachers, need intelligence as badly as virtue. Certainly unwise piety can be no better than misdirected intelligence. Negative goodness is a questionable virtue. May the plea of VanDoren soon be answered.

Evolution or "Devilution." It seems incredible that so many fine people in the United States should be guilty of the perpetuation of spreading scientific untruth. And yet with a radical hysteria that would have done credit to the Crusaders on their rampages, thousands of our citizens are doing everything in their power to prolong a state of scientific ignorance among as large a portion of the population as is possible. "Silver Dollars" and "Crosses of Gold" were even deserted by the Great Commoner when a "Monkey Trial" held forth, and emotion rather than reason was the basis of the court decision when a Tennessee school teacher was tried for teaching the truth. Not content with banishing those miscreants who object and rebel against a literal interpretation of "Genesis," the devotees of the biblical story of mankind are attempting to enact statutory provisions that will prevent the alleged pollution of school textbooks by the findings of reputable scientists. Such bigoted and pernicious attempts to tamper with the curriculum of public schools should be

stamped out in their infancy, since the only hope for even the partial attainment of our national educational objectives is a course of study abundantly rich in the gripping accounts of modern science and its applications. Legislative interference with the details of classroom teaching is nothing short of "Devilution" and should be treated accordingly.

The Identity of God and Religion. Many human beings "have religion" only in the matter of attempting to identify the divine "Being" and pronouncing such convictions on their contemporaries. It seems to be perfectly sufficient for some people to be able to shriek from the housetops that God "The Father," "The Son," and "The Holy Ghost" as revealed in these mere words alone represents the apex of religious values in life. Weird imaginings of the appearance of the Supreme Ruler with just as far fetched guesses as to his abode and mode of life are strangely comforting to these called disciples. And thus we see these negative conceptions of religion interpreted in curious and devious ways, such interpretations seething with incongruities and contradictons as hollow as they are unsound. Well might one cry, "How long, Oh Lord! How long!" but such an exclamation without any effort at clarification is probably the besetting sin of the majority of people.

As a matter of fact, the weird and fantastical illusions are decidedly less harmful than the apathy of that large group of highly decent, and at the same time unthinking folk, who "can't be bothered" to expend any mental energy in an attempt to analyze and identify the principles of religious thought and action.

Some Characteristics of Real Religion

Religion as an Interpretative Power. Regardless of how much or how little factual knowledge is possessed by an individual, if such knowledge is to be completely used, it must be interpreted in terms of pulsating humanity in which the individual lives. This power of interpretation should include the ability of sympathetic appreciation. Such qualities of appreciation and interpretation involve the ability of discriminating analysis on the one hand and the force of unifying synthesis on the other. These processes of recognizing, indentifying, and translating the component elements of life must be acquired and cultivated in respect to all human activities and projects. The spiritual power by which this full

interpretation can be accomplished is religion. Religion is a categorical term because it is the storage battery of all the traits, personal characteristics, and qualities which become the agencies or devices through which life is interpreted. In other words, religion is the clearing house chamber through which the "I" in a human being must constantly be charged in order that one's real self may reach its richest fulfillment in wearing the story of human life. In brief, then, religion is that spiritual force or power because of which individuals acknowledge the existence of and pay homage to a divinity trying to interpret human life in terms of personality and personal relations.

A Spiritual Matter. In the first place, it must be realized and freely admitted that religion is a spiritual matter. By this I wish in no way to refer to anything of a visionary, ethereal nature. But rather it is my purpose to drive home the undeniable and irrefutable fact that each of us has a distinctive spiritual side. True it is that human beings never penetrate farther than the periphery of this realm, but nevertheless, this spiritual side is there latent or active as the case may be. Indeed, it becomes more and more apparent to me that this spiritual side is the background of human lives, absorbing crudities, till such flaws become traits, or embracing and developing strength till such become the cardinal virtues of the individual involved. Religion, therefore, must and does pertain to a distinctly spiritual side, and it is my belief that it is only by the frank and open recognition of this that religion can survive. Truly, "Man does not live by bread alone," and the other items of his subsistence are just as real as is the staff of life.

Religion a Reality. Just because religion is a spiritual matter, and, therefore, subjective, it is no way less real. There is grave danger of passing through life and failing "to see" that which is by its nature intangible. Just because a quality or element cannot be reported in terms of the meter stick or the apothecaries scale in no way justifies a declaration of its non-existence. The charm of a rose can be separated into such elements as color, size, petal formation, fragrance, etc., and yet there is something about the ensemble of that bud, which, while none the less real, at the same time cannot be identified in terms comparable to those just used in analyzing the flower. The compelling fascination of a lovely woman, beautiful both in body and character, can be isolated by such words as com-

plexion, wit, vivaciousness, spontaneity, and what not. And yet there is something else—something that makes her "She," which while tantalizing in its elusiveness, is none the less real. And so it is with religion, whether a soul has acknowledged it or not. It is with us. It is around us and will operate on us to some extent at least whether we will or no.

A Personal Affair. Naturally, in the light of the preceding paragraphs, religion is a personal thing. It is as intimately entwined with one's mental and spiritual adventures as is the husband with his wife. Because of this, there must perforce be some experiences in connection with this phenomenon that are related or revealed if only by a transitory glance to a few precious companions as evidence that kindred souls have struck. But just as it is imperative for the enhancement of marital conditions that there be a proper exchange of fundamental explorations, so for the crystalization and capitalization of religious exploits must there be much more honest and open discussion. This suggestion in no way tends to cheapen or vulgarize either the sacred annals of wedlock or the gripping excursions of religion, but it does propose to perpetuate those things that are satisfying and perchance reveal realms unknown to the majority of human beings.

Of Individual Concern. Certainly anything as directly related to personality as religion must be of great individual concern. True this is, especially in regard to the single human being finding himself. How many people repeat,

"Out of the night that covers me,
Black as the Pit from pole to pole,
I thank whatever gods there be
For my unconquerable soul.

In the fell clutch of circumstance
I have not winced nor cried aloud.
Under the bludgeonings of chance
My head is bloody, but unbowed.

Beyond this space of wrath and tears
Looms but the Horror of the shade,
And yet the menace of the years
Finds and shall find me unafraid.

It matters not how strait the gate,
How charged with punishment the scroll
I am the master of my fate:
I am the captain of my soul."[1]

But how few people have ever glimpsed the real meaning of "I am the master of my fate, the captain of my soul?" Unless such a spirit be sublimated with the desire of helpful interpretation, it is likely to be a menace and liability, rather than a blessing and an asset.

Of Social Significance. At the same time that religion is a personal affair and an individual matter, it is also of momentous concern to the group. Indeed, unless there be frequent communion among congenial and kindred groups, religion is likely to dwindle and perchance be lost to the individual, and therefore to society. The recognition of the pertinence of religion to the group is essential for the full development of spiritual power in individuals. Just as the personality of men and women is the agency through which religion functions in the individual, so the group is the channel through which this spiritual power flows into the sea of human endeavor. In order that the flow may ever strike a high tide mark, it behooves the component members of society to make definite provision for group cultivation and expression of religion.

Religion and a Changing World. That the earth was flat was accepted with serene calm for ages. For an equally long period of time, it was implicitly believed that babies come into this world filled with "original sin." This conviction that infants are incarnated with the spirit of Satan at birth has produced such rites as infant baptism, certain phases of the theory of foreordination and predestination, and child salvation. But the geographers and explorers produced evidence and dared journeys that destroyed our saucer picture of the earth, and the psychologist has shown us very clearly that the inherent tendencies of human beings as individuals are just as likely to be "good" as bad. As a consequence of this geographical and psychological enlightenment we have changed our practices. No longer do we serenely admonish children to be good in general, but rather good for something. What a person does naturally is no longer trusted as a dependable guide for behavior. Indeed, our most noted students of child behavior, tell us that the

[1] "Invictus" William Ernest Henley.

function of education is to modify some original tendencies, eliminate some original tendencies and perpetuate other original tendencies, all of which is fundamentally different from the older principles of child training. But the parent who has accepted and practices the new principles of education is no less loving, no less tolerant, no less a father or mother because of a changed point of view as to what is better or worse for the boy or girl.

In other words, our scientific knowledge is increased. Our familiarity with human conduct becomes more intimate. But such advancement reflects expansion and enhancement rather than replacement and contraction. Bitter controversies rage in some quarters as to whether there is as much religion now as was possessed by the generation of half a century past. These heated disputes cluster around such external elements as mode of dress, the wooing of lady nicotine by the fair sex, bobbed hair, or the Charleston. But after all, even though these practices do differ radically from hoop-skirts and the minuet, are they not entirely irrelevant to the matter under consideration? True it may be that religion does affect our clothes, speech, and means of recreation, but surely no one would for a moment wish to keep these things immutable. No, it must be remembered that religion is the spiritual power of life interpretation, and it is this inexhaustble reservoir that human souls must constantly tap in order to generate the currents of human hopes, ideals and aspirations that will crystalize into an unquenchable desire to serve. Inasmuch as religion does pertain to spiritual matters, since it is a personal affair of great individual concern, and at the same time of tremenduous group significance, certainly to remain essential, it must change in its fashions, but not its functions. Its generating power must remain the same as ever. Therefore, may there be a cessation to needless agitation over the fact that our canons of religion differ in form from those of the past. And instead may there be a constantly surging urge in all human souls to be the proud but humble possessors of real religion.

Possessors and Dispensers of Religion. Countless people, who would put the publican to shame in their vehement declarations are frequently most devoid of religion. Rituals are too often confused as ends rather than symbols. As has been indicated, membership and attendance in and of themselves are considered the sine qua non of religious expression. The conscientious adherence to an observ-

ance of such forms is entirely praiseworthy if such allegiance is made to what such forms represent, rather then to the styles themselves. But, "Be ye doers of the word and not hearers only," surely applies to that rather insipid group of professional religionists who are so wrapped in the symbolism of religion that the power is never gained or used.

Hundreds of real people who modestly disclaim any religious qualities most beautifully typify the constant glowing reflections of magnetic power of interpretation. Such folk are not ostentatious. They do not stand in public places and pray, neither do their names grace local newspapers in heralding headlines when they subscribe to the Community Chest or Far East Relief. But for consistent, sympathetic understanding of life in its innumerable puzzling paths these people may be counted as the proud but humble holders of the key to life.

By Way of Stopping

The Source of Religion. The intent has not been mine to cast innuendoes against anything or anybody. Neither do I feel the need for dismal hopelessness about religion, but in order for religion to exert its rightful influence over the lives of men and women, it is essential that individuals take full cognizance of and make adequate provision for the adoption and cultivation of this force. The first basic requirement for this is the personal recognition of a God. The interpretation of this divine authority must be an individual matter, hingeing not upon such conceptions as a personal God and the divine Triumvirate just because such descriptions have been imposed by religious formulas, but rather on what this God means to the particular man or woman involved.

The Leaders of Religion. In the practical accomplishment of religious ideals, it is apparent that there must be a more generous and whole-hearted recognition and support of the efforts of some of the leaders of religious thought today. Fosdick in New York, Arbuckle in Newton Center, Barstow in Madison, Gilke in Chicago, and Henderson in Los Angeles, bear striking testimony to the fact that the pulpit at its best senses the need for fresh religious guidance. These men are outstanding in the transmittal of spiritual power by the church. Frank at Wisconsin, and Hall at Oregon,

bear equally potent evidence of the recognition of the place of religion in university life.

Because of the inspired work of these men and their like, it is my firm conviction that religion will flourish. But such development, to be of value must be one of functional import, directly affecting contemporary life and not a story of exegetical dispute.

THE BALANCE

BY PETER J. POPOFF

THE Egyptians, the Greeks and other ancient nations considered *the balance* as the most reliable means for determining *the moral worth* of both the individuals and the nations. Yet it may be questioned what the balance, a mechanical apparatus, might have to do with human morals? Yes, but Job put that matter squarely: "Let me be weighed in an even *balance,* that God may know mine *integrity.*" (Job xxxi, 6)

But was not Job's integrity known to God without a balance? And could not Zeus know, without his golden balances, which of the two contending nations, Greece and Troy, merited to live and which should perish? Again, how the Egyptians could explain that it was only by means of the great balance that the degree of righteousness of human heart was determined?

Perhaps one may say, the balance is but a figure of speech, a metaphor or an allegory, a simile or a mere symbol, a convenient and generally comprehensible manner of presenting *pro* and *contra* in a matter under consideration? Let it be. Even be it a mythical balance, yet it shall retain its interest and significance as a peculiar manner of human thought, if nothing else, nothing more. St. Paul considered it an allegory (Gal. iv, 24).

The ancient Egyptians had held that *the heart,* embracing the *love* of God and man, was the very substance of morality. Thus they represented the last judgment before Osiris, the Supreme Judge of the dead as the weighing of the heart. In the great balance, shown in an ancient Egyptian papyrus, the heart of the deceased was placed in one of its pans, and the feather of the Right in the other. Anubis, the jackal-headed divinity, attended to the process of weighing, touching the balance in two points, while Thot, the Ibis-headed divinity, recorded on a tablet the result of the weighing

and presented it to Osiris, sitting on his throne. Isis, the wife of Osiris, is represented there as holding a heart in her right hand, and with her left hand extended towards the balance she seems to control its working. Thus that papyrus picture shows clearly that the great balance was manipulated by the two divinities, guided of course by moral considerations. If the heart was found righteous, the deceased was considered as "justified" and was called a "little Osiris," that is, the son of the great Osiris, and was entitled to the right of swimming eternally in the golden boat of his Father. Placing the heart, the love of God and man, at the very centre of moral being, the Egyptians seems to have anticipated the Christian doctrine of love at least by twenty centuries.

The Egyptian mummies were made as if capable of feasting, for their mouth could be opened and closed. And in the Book of the Dead it is said: "He will eat and drink every day with Osiris; he will be living; he will be like God."

We read in the Iliad, when Achilles and Hector were about to engage in the final fight:

"Jove lifts *the golden balances* that show
The fates of mortal men, and things below:
Here each contending hero's lot he tries,
And weighs the *scale* surcharged with Hector's fate;
Heavy with death it sinks, and hell receives the weight."
(Book XXII, p. 264)

And on another occasion:

"The sire of gods *his golden scales* suspends,
With equal hand: in these explored the fate
Of Greece and Troy, and poised the mighty weight,
Press'd with its load, the Grecian balance lies
Low sunk on earth, the Trojan strikes the skies;
Then Jove from Ida's top his horrors spreads;
The clouds burst dreadful over the Grecian heads;
Thick lightnings flash; the muttering thunder rolls;
Their strength he withers, and unmans their souls.
Before his wrath the trembling hosts retire;
The gods in terrors, and the skies on fire."
Book VIII, p. 98.

Jove's golden balances seem to be equivalent to Destiny's decrees

concerning the lot of gods and men. We read in the Bible: "Job maketh a solemn protestation: Let me be weighed in an even balance, that God may know mine integrity. If my step hath turned out of the way, and mine heart have been deceived by a woman, or if I have laid wait in my neighbor'd door. . . . Or I eaten my morsel myself alone, and the fatherless hath not eaten thereof." (Job xxxi, 6-17.)

"Surely men of low degree are vanity, and men of high degree are a lie; to be laid in *the balance,* they are altogether lighter than vanity." (Psalm lxii, 9)

"A false *balance* is abomination to the Lord; but a just weight is his delight." (Proverbs xi, 1)

"Divers weights are an abomination unto the Lord; and a false balance is not good." (Proverbs xxi, 23)

"A just weight and balance are the Lord's; all the weights of the bag are his work." (Prov. xvi, 11)

"Who hath measured the waters in the hollow of his hand, and meted out heaven with the span, and comprehended the dust of the earth in a measure, and weighed the mountains in scales, and the hills in a *balance?* . . . . . Behold, the nations are a drop of a bucket, and are counted as the small dust of the balance; behold, he taketh up the isles as a very little thing. All *nations* before him are as nothing; and they are counted to him less than nothing, and vanity." (Isaiah xli, 12-17)

"They lavish gold out of the bag, and weigh silver in the *balance,* and hire a goldsmith; and he maketh it a *god;* they fall down, yea, they worship." (Isaiah xlvi, 6)

"Just *balances,* just weights, a just ephah, and a just hin, shall ye have." (Lev. xvix, 36)

"And this is the writing that was written, Mene, Mene, Tekel, Upharsin. This is interpretation of the thing: Mene; God hath numbered thy kingdom, and finished it. Tekel, Thou art weighed in the balances, and art found wanting. Peres; thy kingdom is divided, and given to the Medes and Persians. . . . . In the night was Belshazzar the King of the Chaldeans slain. And Darius, the Median, took the kingdom." (Dan. v. 25-31)

"He is a merchant, the balances of deceit are in his hand; he loveth to oppress." (Hosea xii, 7).

"Saying, When will the new moon be gone, that we may . . . . .

making the ephah small, and shekel great, and falsifying the balances by deceit? (Amos viii, 5).

"Shall I count them pure with the wicked balances, and with the bag of deceitful weights? (Micah vi, 11).

"And I beheld, and lo a black horse; and he that sat on him had a pair of balances in his hand." (Rev. vi, 5).

Libra, the Balance, is one of the twelve constellations of the Zodiac.

CALVIN AND THE REFORMATION

BY BIRGER R. HEADSTROM

IN its development under Luther, the Reformation gradually acquired a temper that would eventually have defeated its own purpose had not Calvin, according to the scheme of things, bridled its tempestuous spirit and by understanding and power prevailed upon a confused world to accept it as an inspired escape from the bondage of Catholic Christianity.

For this task, of leading the world out of the religious darkness into which it had been plunged by Luther and of confirming the work begun by the Wittenberg monk, Calvin was eminently fitted. Of a depth of mind which enabled him to think clearly on almost every subject, scientific and methodical, and endowed with the systematic power of order, he was able to give expression to his views in a clear and simple manner yet with such force as to command attention; this, together with the ardent zeal with which he could plunge into the mysterious depths of the Godhead, although he cared little for the outward works of nature, a sublime piety founded on the deep consciousness of guilt, an earnest impressive sentiment, a faith supported by the conclusions of the understanding, and a passionate abhorence of whatever seemed to obscure the

glory of the Lord, were the qualities which distinguished him in the work he was destined to perform. In a word, he was an exact contrast to Luther, yet this antithesis was necessary, for his commission was one of peace. Where Luther had aroused, Calvin tranquillized; where the watchword of one had been war, that of the other was order. In a sense, one stormed, the other furnished the citadel of God. In that Luther had, so to speak, uprooted life, Calvin felt drawn to effect a reconciliation among all around him, to establish the Reformation on a firm foundation, and especially to defeat the spirit of Antichrist which he saw growing up among the protestants.

When Calvin undertook his office in Geneva, though he was aware to some extent of the work he was to do, he did not at that time realize its importance. As an instrument of God he wanted to do his duty; and this duty he felt consisted in securing the religious freedom, gained after so bitter and long a struggle, by church government and discipline. With the example of Zurich in mind, he recognized the need of subverting the various heresies of the age as well as the means to satisfy this end. What more proper scene for his efforts could be found, then, than the little state of Geneva where the rude licentiousness and antichristian disposition of the age were more prevalent than anywhere else? And as the capital of the Reformation, commanding the attention of the world, it can readily be seen, when after the death of Luther and the convulsions in the German church Calvin was to stand alone and become the center of all observation in connection with the great historical events of the time.

That his mission was in fulfillment of the plans of Providence is proved by the great influence which his doctrine exerted. The world needed and expected him; and this explains the rapid diffusion and easy victory of his system. It was for him to effectually oppose, by the development of protestant Augustanism, the catholic power of the deep-rooted errors of Pelagianism, in which mankind had become too deeply absorbed, and which the Lutheran and Zwinglian Augustinism had not been sufficiently powerful to break, as well as to perfect the work begun by Luther and Zwingli and to establish a more spiritual understanding of the Lord's Supper. That he had a difficult problem to solve is testified by the opposition which he encountered, yet at all times he felt instinc-

tively impelled to uphold his principles. And that Calvinism actually influenced the civilization of Europe can be discerned through the exaltation of believing souls at one time, and at another, through the practical effects by which it was attended, the sound eloquence, and the careful criticism and study of language. Calvin's exegetical method, especially, founded upon philosophical and scientific knowledge, startled France and Geneva, and awakened the spirit of reflection. In fact, he inspired to a large extent that spirit of inquiry which has been so successfully cultivated by modern times, and by means of which so many errors and abuses have been banished.

Though Calvin's most effectual efforts were for France, his influence extended far beyond its borders, to Holland, England, and Scotland, where Knox displayed the true courage of a reformer, and even to Germany, where the weaker spirit of Zwingli, or the vacillating voice of a Cranmer were powerless to contest so salutary a doctrine, whose appearance was viewed by so many as the support and comfort of needy souls. And what secured to this spirit so comprehensive an authority, was the power with which it not only propounded, but supported by argument as well, the grandest principles of Christian doctrine; it impressed upon the soul the sublimest notion of the living God and of eternal salvation. And though it directly opposed the ruling principles of the age, and the prevailing ideas of the godhead, so darkened by scholasticism and vain imaginings, it was precisely the powerful operation of this element which the world needed. Many souls longed for it and were happy to embrace a doctrine that seemed to come from God.

In Holland, especially, this desire for the spiritual influence of Calvinism went far towards promoting the establishment of the Calvinistic doctrines, an end which was finally accomplished by the famous synod of Dort; and to whose solemn decree even the Huguenots in France felt compelled to yield. This victory of Calvinism, however, achieved through the political disturbances which marked the country's destinies at that time, revealed, not only the blending of politics with the pure Calvinistic element—an essential blending, for the theocratic spirit of Calvin required the state's assistance in the government of the church—but as well the dangerous influence of the new power, disclosed so impressively by the remarkable history of England at the time of Cromwell, when the per-

verted view of the doctrine of election led to so many horrible excesses. Yet, equally, when rightly understood, it gives peace and order to the world, for when the storm was spent and the Calvinistic system in Scotland remained victorious in its holiness, it has continued to bestow upon the people the greatest and surest blessings.

In Germany, the divine influence of that pure spirit was more clearly demonstrated, where it gave a new life to the old, dead form of Lutheranism by the instruction and practical character which appeared in the schools of Calixtus and Melancthon. And even to-day, we may discover the operation of that powerful Calvinistic spirit, founded upon conviction and producing conviction, especially in the manifestations of Methodism, diffusing the severest doctrines of Calvinism. In fact, in the history of the reformed churches we find this powerful spirit present in all its phases, and everywhere meet with traces of the man by whose indefatigable labours in the cause of order the opposition in protestantism was finally overcome and a unification of the churches accomplished. And it is by this influence, which he has continued to exert through the centuries, that his position in the Reformation is measured.

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THE LEGEND OF LUCIFER[1]

BY MAXIMILIAN RUDWIN

THE legend of Lucifer has no biblical basis. The ancient Hebrews knew of no devil whatever. Satan in the Old Testament is no devil in the accepted meaning of the word. He was originally not an adversary but an adjutant of the Almighty. Satan was a member of the celestial court and stood high in the councils of Jehovah. He belonged to the assembly of the sons of God, but sat on the opposition bench. He was a sort of prosecuting attorney attached to the judgment seat of the Eternal (*cf.* 1 Kings xx, 1-23; Job ii, 1-6).

A certain group of historians of religion maintain that the Devil is the creation of Christianity. Just as the French phlosophers of the eighteenth century held that the theologians had invented the Lord, they affirm that the Devil has been expressly created by the priests for the greater glory of God. Lucifer, they claim, has been limned after the Lord as His left hand, so to speak. They call to witness the Church fathers, who baptized Beelzebub as *simia Dei.* The Christian Devil is, in their opinion, *sui generis,* without precedent. Satan is, according to this view, all by himself and has nothing to do with the evil spirits of the ethnic religions. These students of religion fail to see that no discontinuity exists in the evolution of human beliefs and institutions. In fact, the belief in a movement of rebellion within the family of gods is common to the

[1] Two mythological accounts of the origin of the demons and evil spirits may be mentioned in connection with our discussion. According to a belief current among the ancient Norsemen, the demons were produced by the ash-tree named Iggdrasil, also called the tree of life, the roots of which reach to the lowest depths of the underworld. A curious Jewish tradition teaches that the Devil and woman had a common origin in Adam's rib. Old Nick is believed by certain rabbins to have come out of the hole left by the removal of the rib from Adam before it was closed.

mythologies of all races. The opposition of Lucifer to the Lord has an anology in that of Vrita to Indra in Hindu mythology, of Ahriman to Ormuzd in Persian mythology, of Set to Horus in Egyptian mythology, of Prometheus to Zeus in Greek mythology and of Loki to the gods of Asgardh in Scandinavian mythology. The conception of the imprisoned empyrean rebel may also be found in many of the ancient ethnic religions. Ahriman, who fought against Ormuzd, was bound for a thousand years; Prometheus, who assailed Zeus, was chained to a rock in the Caucasus; and Loki, the calumniator of the northern gods, was strapped down with thongs of iron in Nastrond (hell), out of which he will come in the "twilight of the gods" to do battle with them and their servants in Valhalla. He will at last be slain by the son of Balder, and then there will be a new heaven and a new earth, and Allfather will reign once more.

The fact of the matter is that the Devil is as old as is man himself. He may be traced back to the animistic conception of Nature, which saw behind natural events active creative spirits. With primitive man to think of good and evil powers was to personify them. The good events were believed by him to be animated by good spirits, the bad events by evil spirits. In a later stage of the evolution of the human mind, the demons behind good acts were subordinated to a good god, and the demons behind evil acts were subordinated to an evil spirit. In this manner, the Devil entered into human thought and has remained to this day. The Fiend is thus the incarnation of human frenzy. The human mind fell a prey to its own fear.

As far as the Devil of the Christian religion is concerned, his ancestry reaches back into the history of religions. He seems to hail from India where he tempted the Buddha, and whence he migrated to Persia in the person of Ahriman. The Jews learned to know him during their Babylonian captivity under Zoroastrian kings, blended him with their own Satan, who, as has already been stated, originally had no sulphurous odor whatever. After having thus turned Satan into a regular Devil, the Jews handed him over to the Christians, who, sad to say, show themselves no more grateful for Satan than for the Savior, whom they likewise owe to the sons of Israel.

But Satan, as we know him, is not of pure Semitic stock. During

the triumphal march of Christianity through the European countries, he assimilated many of the characteristics of the discarded gods of the old religions. All the rich wealth of ideas which the primitive European peoples associated with their ancient good and evil spirits, they ultimately distributed over the Christian Pantheon. A certain detail of dress, trait of character or trick of manner shows how Satan, in wandering over the face of the earth, has caught a trace of this or that local spirit. The Devil's identification with the uncouth Northern giants was especially momentous for the transformation of his character. It brought down the stern Satan of Judea from the height of his terrible power to the plane of pictured grotesqueness. The Devil, as he has come down to us from the Middle Ages, is a *mélange* of various elements. "He is at once," as it has been said, "of Jewish, Christian, heathen, elfish, gigantic and spectral stock."[2]

The New Testament account of a war in heaven which resulted in the defeat of Satan and his fall like a lightning from heaven (Luk. x, 18; *cf.* Rev. ix, 1) was not derived from the Old Testament, which has no hint whatever of a rebellion and expulsion of angels from heaven. This belief was brought back by the Jews from their Babylonian sojourn and first finds expression in the non-canonical Hebrew writings, particularly in the Book of Enoch. It is from the Old Testament apocrypha that this idea found its way into the New Testament.

The Gospel writers also identified Beelzebub (=Baal-Zebub), the fly-god of the Pœnicians, with Satan, (*cf.* Matth. xii, 24), inasmuch as the latter was modelled after the Persian Ahriman, who entered the world in the form of a fly.

The substitution of Lucifer for Satan as the rebel angel is a contribution by the Church fathers. It is the result of a wrongly interpreted biblical passage. The prophet compares the king of Babylon, on account of the worldly splendor by which he was surrounded prior to his death, to Lucifer ("light-bearer"), the Latin equivalent of the Semitic term for the "morning-star," *i. e.* the planet Venus when it appears above the Eastern horizon prior to day-break. Just as the brilliancy of Lucifer ("day-star" A. V.) surpasses that of all other stars in the firmament, so the splendor of the king of Babylon surpasses that of all other Oriental monarchs.

[2] *Cf.* Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm: *Teutonic Mythology.* Translated from the German. 4 vols., London, 1880-1888.

Eusebius of Cæsaria, Tertullian, Jerome, and Gregory the Great erroneously understood the passage: "How art thou fallen from heaven, O Lucifer, son of the morning, how art thou cut down to the ground, which didst weaken the nations" (Is. xiv, 12) to refer to the fall of the rebel angel. In consequence of this misinterpretation, the name of Lucifer has been used as a synonym for Satan. The two, however, were not generally identified until the time of St. Anselm, archbishop of Canterbury (1034-1093), who, in his treatise, *Dialogus de casu Diaboli,* has considerably elaborated the account of the Devil's fall from heaven.[3] In popular belief, however, Lucifer and Satan are not blended, though they are thoroughly in agreement.

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The legend of the rebellion and expulsion of Lucifer, as formulated by Jewish and Christian writers, is as follows:

Lucifer was the chief in the hierarchy of heaven. He was preeminent among all created beings in beauty, power and wisdom. What better description can be given of him than the following portrait penned, according to patristic exegesis, by the prophet:

"Thou sealest up the sum, full of wisdom, and perfect in beauty. Thou hast been in Eden, the garden of God; every precious stone was thy covering, the sardius, topaz, the diamond, the beryl, the onyx, and the jasper, the sapphire, the emerald, and the carbuncle, and gold: the workmanship of thy tabrets and of thy pipes was prepared in thee in the day that thou wast created. Thou art the anointed cherub that covereth; and I have set thee so: thou wast the holy mountain of God: thou hast walked up and down in the midst of the stones of fire. Thou wast perfect in thy ways from the day that thou wast created, till iniquity was found in thee. By the multitude of thy merchandise they have filled the midst of thee with violence, and thou hast sinned: therefore I will cast thee as profane out of the mountain of God: and I will destroy thee, O covering cherub, from the midst of the stones of fire. Thine heart was lifted up because of thy beauty, thou hast corrupted thy wisdom by reason of thy brightness: I will cast thee to the ground, I will lay thee before kings, that they may behold thee" (Ez. xxvii, 12-17).

[3] Reprinted in J. P. Migne's *Patrologia latina,* vol. CLVIII, col. 325-343.

WAR IN HEAVEN
After the Revelation of St. John
(By Albrecht Dürer)

To this "anointed cherub" was apparently allotted power and dominion over the earth; and even after his fall and exclusion from his old domain, he still seems to retain a part of his power and ancient title to sovereignty (Luk. iv, 6; *cf.* also John xiv, 30; II Cor. iv, 4; Eph. ii, 2).

The downfall of the Devil is, according to Church authority, attributed to self-conceit. From the fact that "the Devil sinneth from the beginning" (I John iii, 8) and that "Pride is the beginning of all sin" (Ecclesiasticus x, 15), it was inferred that the Devil's sin was pride. Eusebius, in the third century, advanced *superbia* as the motive of the Devil's rebellion, to which Nazianzus, in the following century, added envy. This accounts for the familiar phrase "as proud as Lucifer." Cædmon, in his poem on the fall of Satan, sees the cause of the revolt of Satan in pride and ambition. Marlowe, following tradition, also affirms that Lucifer fell, "by aspiring pride and insolence" (*Dr. Faustus* iii. 68). We recall Coleridge's quatrain:

"He saw a cottage with a double coach-house,
A cottage of gentility,
And the Devil did grin, for his darling sin
Is pride that apes humility."

Various versions exist in the writings of the rabbis and Church fathers as to the way in which Lucifer's conceit showed itself. According to certain authorities, Lucifer's sin, which brought tribulation into the fair world, consisted in the fact that, in the haughtiness of his heart, he refused to bow before the Great White Throne. Others hold that his audacity went so far as to attempt to seat himself on it, and still others ascribe to him the bold project of seizing it and thus usurping the power of the Most High.[4]

In the medieval mysteries, Lucifer, as the governor of the heavens, is represented as seated next to the Eternal, who warns the high official of heaven: "Touch not my throne by none assent." But as soon as the Lord leaves his seat, Lucifer, swelling with pride, sits down on the throne of heaven. The arch-angel Michael, indignant over the audacious act of Lucifer, takes up arms against

[4] In *De partu virginis* written by Sannazaro, the "Christian Virgil," in 1526, Satan is also represented as attempting to usurp the throne of heaven.

him and finally succeeds in driving him out of heaven down into the dark and dismal dwelling reserved for him from all eternity. The Mont St. Michel on the Norman coast is the eternal monument to the victorious leader of the hosts of heaven in the war against the rebel angel.[5]

THE FALLEN LUCIFER (After Dore)

According to the Talmud, Satan's sin lay not in his rivalry with God but in his envy of man. When Adam was created, so say the rabbis, all the angels had to bow to the new king of the earth, but Satan refused; and when threatened with the wrath of the Lord, he replied: "If He breaks out in wrath against me, I will exalt my

[5] An interesting treatment of this legend is Maupassant's story "Légende du Mont St. Michel" (1888).

throne above His, and I will be higher than the Most High." At once God flung Satan and his host out of heaven, down to the earth. From that moment dates the enmity between Satan and Jehovah.[6] The Koran has a similar account of the revolt of Eblis against Allah. When Allah created man, so runs the Mohammedan version of the war in heaven, he called all the angels to worship this crowning work of His hands. Eblis, in his great conceit, refused to worship Adam and was banished from heaven for failing to obey the command of Allah.[7] Irenæus is of the opinion that the angels rebelled as soon as they learned of the proposed creation of man. "When the angels were informed," says this father of the Church, "of God's intention to create man after His own image. . . , they envied man's happiness and so revolted." The orthodox teaching, however, is that man's creation followed the Devil's rebellion. Adam was created by the Lord to fill the vacancy caused in the celestial choir-stalls by the fall of the angels. This act of substitution increased still further the Devil's hatred toward the Deity, and the temptation of Eve in the Garden of Eden was a successful effort on the Devil's part to balk the will of the Lord.

There have, however, been writers who advanced other reasons for the Devil's difference with the Deity. The German mystic Jacob Bœhme, as far back as the seventeenth century, relates that when Satan was asked to explain the cause of God's enmity to him and his consequent downfall, he replied in justification of his act: "I wanted to be an author." Like the son of many a good family, he was driven out, he claims, for having had literary ambitions.[8] Anatole France suggests that Satan was banished from heaven for the reason that he wished to think for himself instead of accepting everything on authority. "Thought," says this latterday diabolist in his book, *le Puits de Sainte-Claire* (1895), "led Satan to revolt."

The Devil's fall from heaven according to legend, occurred on the first of August. A description of the anniversary festival of this great occasion, when all the devils appear in gala dress, is given by Heywood in his comedy *The Play called the Four P. P.* (1543-1547).

[6] *Cf.* Louis Ginzberg: *The Legends of the Jews* (4 vols., Philadelphia, 1909-1925), I, 64. In Voldel's *Lucifer*, the revolt of the angels is also caused by their jealousy of the privileges enjoyed by man.

[7] *Cf.* M. D. Conway, *Demonology and Devil-Lore* (2 vols., London, 1879), II, 143.

[8] The word "author" is used in this connection in its current meaning.

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The legend of Lucifer, as solving the problem of the origin of evil and of the birth of man, and as presaging the goal of human destiny, has always been a matter of great human concern, and a subject full of fascination for the poet. Nearly all the great minds of Christendom have attempted to treat this theme. Beginning with the account of the Creation by the Spanish monk Dracontius, the Latin poem of Avitus, Bishop of Vienne, in his work *De laudibus Dei* (5th century), which carries the history of the world from Creation through the fall of man to the Flood and the Exodus, and the transcript of the biblical text of creation by the old English poet Cædmon of the seventh century, we have had at different periods various treatments of this subject. The medieval passion plays in the end reached back to the creation and fall of the angels and the temptation of man which necessitated his salvation through Christ. In the seventeenth century, the Netherland imagination was fired with this theme. The youthful Hugo Grotius was the first to attempt it in his *Adamus exul*, a Latin drama, written in 1601, which is supposed to have given hints to Milton. Two other Dutchmen of that period, both far greater poets than Grotius, were also attracted by this subject-matter. The distinguished Jacob Cats treated it in his idyll "Gront-Houwelick" (the Fundamental Marriage of Adam and Eve),[9] and Vondel in his tragedy of *Lucifer* (1654). So many poets of so many different nations during that period chose this subject of such historical and symbolical significance. In addition to the poets just mentioned we may refer to the following: the Scotchman Andrew Ramsay, the Spaniard Azevedo, the Portuguese Camoens, the Frenchman Du Bartas and the Englishmen Phineas Fletcher and John Milton.

The Puritan poet surpassed all his predecessors in his treatment of this old subject. He overlaid the original story with a wealth of invention and imagery. It may be said without any exaggeration that he produced the greatest of all modern epics. What fascinates us primarily in his poem is the personality of the Prince of Darkness. "The finest thing in connection with this [Milton's] Paradise," says Taine, in his *Histoire de la littérature anglaise* (1863), "is Hell; and in this history of God, the chief part is taken by the

[9] This story is the first of a long poem, which bears the title of *Trouring* and which was published in 1637.

Devil." It is generally agreed that the hero of *Paradise Lost* (1667-1674) is none other than Satan. Daniel Defoe, in his *Political History of the Devil* (1726), remarks that "Mr. Milton has indeed made a fine poem, but it is a devil of a history." The Miltonic Satan is the greatest personification of evil in all Christian poems. In the opinion of many critics, there is no poetic character, ancient or modern, that equals Milton's Satan in grandeur. The irreconcilable and irremediable archangel is an incomparable creation,—a mighty angel fallen! The reader cannot but be affected by a sense of sorrow for this fall.

It is a curious fact, indeed, that Milton, who started out in his poem "to justify the ways of God to men" (*Par. Lost* i. 26), ended by conferring lustre upon Lucifer. The Puritan poet portrays the Devil with such a passionate concern that the reader is not at a loss where to find the author's sympathies. The fact of the matter is that Milton himself was, as William Blake has said it, "of the Devil's party without knowing it."[10]

Milton's Satan is a great spirit fallen from heaven and clothed with a certain tragic dignity. The emperean rebel in *Paradise Lost* still holds his glory and his star. The ridiculous Devil of our ancestors has become in Milton's hands a giant and a hero. He is not the stupid good-natured lout of the medieval peasant. Nor does he answer to the feathered clown of the medieval mystery plays. He is really an epic, majestic figure, a Promethean character, who vainly but valiantly opposes a power which he knows he can never conquer.

It must be admitted, though, that this conception of Satan is not wholly original with Milton. The Devil had already been drawn by Avitus as an imposing figure reminding one of the Miltonic hero. In the Eger Passion play of 1516, we also have an approach to a higher dramatic conception of the Devil, that of a glorious, large hearted rebel Satan.

Milton's Satan is usually regarded as the mighty fallen, majesty in ruin, something to be admired and feared. We must, however, not overlook his awful grief, his wild despair. Milton knew how to render in words of surpassing beauty the impressive sorrow and the introspective pangs of the Archangel ruined. The expression of

[10] "The reason Milton wrote in fetters when he wrote of angels and God and at liberty when of devils and hell, is because he was a true poet and of the Devil's party without knowing it". (William Blake).

human emotions which Milton imparts to his Satan when this fallen angel descends into his doleful domain to summon his infernal council has aroused the admiration of readers to this day. Satan's pity for the sad plight of the spirits who fell with him, and his compassion for man, to whom he must bring destruction, are lines in *Paradise Lost* which cannot be easily forgotten.

In what beautiful terms is Satan's self-condemnation clothed by Milton! The poet follows tradition in describing Satan's punishment in hell (*Par. Lost* ii. 88). But this material pain is in Milton very insignificant as compared with the Devil's spiritual sufferings. It is the inward torments on which Milton lays chief emphasis, and this inner pain shows itself in the face of his Fiend. "Myself am Hell," Satan cries in the anguish of his soul (*ibid.,* iv. 75). What gnaws at his heart is not a serpent, but "the thought both of lost happiness and lasting pain" (*ibid.,* i. 54-55).

The pain of Milton's Satan is psychical rather than physical. His is the boundless horror and despair of one who has known "eternal joys" and is now condemned to everlasting banishment. Marlowe's Mephistopheles also complains of moral rather than material sufferings. His torment is to be hopelessly bound in the constraint of serfdom to evil. There is a suggestion of peculiar horror in the tortured protest which bursts from his lips when asked as to his condition:

> "Think'st thou that I, that saw the face of God,
> And tasted the eternal joys of heaven,
> Am not tormented with ten thousand hells,
> In being depriv'd of everlasting bliss?
> O Faustus! leave these frivolous demands,
> Which strike a terror to my fainting soul!" (iii. 78-83).

The idea of the repentant rebel is also not original with Milton. It is of pre-Christian origin and was also acquired by the Jews from the Persians. The writer of the Book of the Secrets of Enoch (written between 30 B. C. and 50 A. D.) already represents the apostatized angels as "weeping unceasingly." This conception is also found in the apocryphal Vision of St. Paul. In his lamentations over his expulsion from heaven in the medieval mystery plays, Satan has often given a very poetic expression to his deep yearning for the heaven which he has lost. In the Eger Passion Play, the Devil ex-

presses his willingness to perform the most terrible penance if he can but obtain his forgiveness. A modern version of Satan's *de profundis* has been given us by Frieda Schanz:

Der Teufel hat immer mit frechem Munde
Den Himmel verflucht und Gott verklagt.
Aber einmal in wunderbarer Stunde
Hat er gesagt:
"Und läge der Himmel noch tausendmal weiter
Ueber dem Höllenmoor
Und führte eine glühende Leiter
Zu ihm empoor,
Jede Sprosse aus eisernen Dornenzweigen,
Jeder Schritt unausdenkbares Weh und Grau'n,
Tausend Legionen Jahre möchte ich steigen,
Um nur einmal Sein Angesicht zu schau'n."

It does not seem, though, that Satan is wholly satisfied with Milton's account of the events that led to his expulsion from heaven. The reader will recall Bernard Shaw's account of Satan's indignation over the Miltonic version of the celestial war. "The Englishman described me as being expelled from Heaven by cannon and gun-powder, and to this day every Briton believes that the whole of this silly story is in the Bible. What else he says, I do not know, for it is all in a long poem which neither I nor any one else ever succeeded in wading through" (*Man and Superman,* 1905).

Milton's delineation of the lesser lights of hell is not less to be admired. In *Paradise Lost* there is a distinct differentiation of demons. The personality of each devil reveals itself. Baal is not merely a devil; he is the particular devil Baal. Beelzebub, we feel, is distinct from Belial; Moloch is not Mammon, nor is Dagon, Rimmon. Milton's devils are not metaphysical abstractions. A personal devil is always a lot more interesting than an abstraction. Even his allegorical figures are living symbols. The demons in *Paradise Lost* are not ugly beasts. They have no horns, no tails. Nor are they wicked men, either. But they act in a manner which men can understand. The Devil should not be human, but he must have enough in common with human nature to play a part intelligible to human beings. In the artistic treatment of diabolical material,

the chief difficulty lies in preserving the just mean between the devil-character and the imparted element of humanity.

Milton had many imitators, all of whom fell far short of their model. Klopstock tried to give to Germany what Milton had given to his country. His *Messias* (1748-1773), which treats of the Christian system of salvation, was intended to parallel the epic of the Puritan poet. But his Satan is so much below Milton's Satan that we blush to think how this Satan of Klopstock could ever sustain a conversation with the Satan of Milton or even appear in his

Milton's Satan (After Dore)

company. He has neither the greatness of intellect nor the charm of personality with which Satan was clothed by Milton. The Devil of Klopstock is indeed a Miltonic Devil, "but oh how fallen! how changed!" (*Par. Lost* i 84). It will be recalled that when somebody once called Klopstock the "German Milton," Coleridge promptly retorted that Klopstock was a very German Milton.[11]

The subject of Satan's revolt has not failed of fascination even for the writers of the modern period, which has discarded the Devil into the limbo of ancient superstitions and in which his very mention, far from causing men to cross themselves, brings a smile on

[11] Albrecht von Haller's play *Vom Ursprung des Uebels* (1734) likewise contains many reminiscences of Milton's *Paradise Lost.* A tragedy called *Lucifer* was also published, in 1717, by a Jesuit father in Silesia Manz Noel.

their faces. It cannot be denied that most of our ideas in this realm of thought are quite different from the views that the contemporaries of Milton entertained. The tremendous belief in the personality of the Devil that had grown up during the Middle Ages flourished just as vigorously in the middle of the seventeenth century. Milton himself fully believed in the existence of the diabolical beings whom he described. He was as firm, althought not as fantastic, a believer in a real, personal Devil as Luther was. We never think of doubting Milton. "As well might we doubt the reality of those scorching fires of hell that had left their marks on the face of Dante; or of the fearful sights and sounds that beset Christian on his way through the Valley of the Shadow of Death." Even Christopher Marlowe, in telling the story of the bargain between Faustus and Mephistopheles, believed that he narrated established facts. The conception of the Devil of a Marlowe, a Milton, a Bunyan, still represents the seriousness of the medieval fear of the Fiend. These men lived in an age of faith in which angels and demons were not abstract figures, but living realities. In our modern times, however, heaven and hell have lost their "local habitation," and angels and demons are considered as figments of the human imagination.

Contrary to all expectation, however, the legend of Lucifer has not ceased to exert a strong attraction upon the mind of man to this day. As a matter of fact, the Devil has perhaps received his greatest elaboration in modern times at the hands of writers who believed in him no more than Shakespeare did in the ghost of Hamlet's father. The treatment of this ancient legend, however, differs radically from that given to it by the poets of former times. It has been reserved for the last century to bring about a reversal of poetic judgment with regard to the events which supposedly happened in the heavens in the dim beginnings of history. It must not be forgotten that the accounts of the celestial war given by the rabbins and Church fathers came from partisans of heaven. The other party could perhaps furnish a different version of those events. Samuel Butler has remarked in his *Note-Books,* published posthumously in 1912, that we have never heard the Devil's side of the case because God has written all the books. It is apparent that he was not familiar with the writings of a number of men in different European countries who constituted themselves, during the last

century, as the spokesmen of the Devil and advocated a revision of his process. These *advocati Diaboli* endeavored to show that the Devil was after all not so black as he has always been painted.

During the period of the Romantic revolt in all European countries Satan was considered as a Prometheus of Christian mythology. He was hailed as the vindicator of reason, of freedom of thought, and of an unfettered humanity. The French Romantics saw in Satan the greatest enthusiast for the liberty and spontaneity of genius, the sublimest and supremest incarnation of the spirit of individualism, the greatest symbol of protest against tyranny, celestial or terrestial. They predicted the day when Satan would return to his former glory in heaven.

Satan received ample vindication in England from such poets as Byron, Shelley, Swinburne and James Thomson. Byron portrayed Lucifer as a rebel against celestial injustice. Shelley took his transmuted Lucifer from Milton's Satan, and deified him a little more. The imagination of the poet of *Prometheus Unbound* (1820) made of the Devil the benefactor of man and the light of the world. George Du Maurier averred that no tongue had yet uttered what might be said for the adversary of the Almighty.

In Germany, as far back as the eighteenth century, Count Stolberg, in his *Iambs* (1783-1784), celebrated Lucifer as the Morning-Star, the Light-Bearer, to whom man is indebted for truth and enlightenment. Richard Dehmel's pantomimic drama *Lucifer* (1899) is a glorification of the Devil, whom the poet calls by such beautiful epithets as *Glanzbringer, Gluthüter, Lichtschöpfer, Mutwecker, Weltbegeistrer.*

In Scandinavia, August Strindberg, in his play, *Lucifer or God* (1877), reverses the roles between the Almighty and His adversary. Lucifer is represented in this play as a compound of Apollo, Prometheus and Christ. This divinization of the Devil has for its counterpart the diabolization of the Deity.

In Italy, Carducci, in his *Hymn to Satan* (1863), describes the Devil clothed with such mighty and beautiful splendor that his glory almost compels the knee to bend. This bold writer represents Satan as "the immortal enemy of autocracy and the banner-bearer of the great reformers and innovators of all ages." His contemporary, Rapisardi, similarly celebrates, in *Lucifer* (1877), the Devil as the bringer of light to the world.

The last to report on the revolt of the angels is Anatole France, who, in his book *la Révolte des anges* (1914), presents us with an account of a second angelic rebellion against the Ruler of the Heavens. This work contains also a new version of the first war in the skies. A number of the inhabitants of heaven, who were hurled down to earth, form a conspiracy to storm the heavens and set up Satan as ruler. After having organized their forces and equipped them with the most modern instruments of war, the leaders of the revolt seek out Satan by the waters of the Ganges and offer him the leadership. But he who first raised the flag of rebellion in heaven refuses to lead another attack against the celestial citadel. In a dream he has seen himself becoming as harsh, as intolerant and as greedy of adulation as his eternal enemy Jehovah. The successful rebel would only turn a reactionary. He will rather remain the oppressed than become an oppressor.

CHINOISERIE AND VERS LIBRE

BY ARTHUR E. CHRISTY

ONE of the results of our rising contemporary interest in the ethnic cultures of the world is the very obvious debt our poets owe to the Orient. The individual poet may be conscious or not of this indebtedness, but the leaders of the new movement have recognized it, and written of it. It is my purpose to compare the spirit and general poetic theory of modern English prosody with the Oriental, from which it is assumed much has been derived.

No river can be traced to any single source. Its water comes from numerous fields and woods and springs, slowly filtering down to join in a score of streams, which in turn join to make a river. In the history of English poetry, no single origin can be designated as strictly the only source of any movement. Generally, in each literary generation, one may witness a growth of oratorical and discursive writings, followed by a reaction in favor of concision. This is true of most literatures; the pendulum is never still.

The significant thing in our present discussion of the poetic relations of the East and West is that the reactions of English and American poets from the profuseness of the Victorian vogue to the concision of modern imagistic and vers libre movements was developing simultaneously with Occidental interest in the Pacific-Asian religions and literatures. There appears to be an identity of interest between the Oriental and the modern Occidental. Their affinity is marked. To the initiated eye the potency of the Oriental leaven is everywhere evident, in the output of the founders of the vers libre movement, the imagists, and subsequent contemporary poets. Everywhere appear poems after the Chinese manner, adaptations, parodies, translations spurious and accurate, attempts to capture the subtle method, or the fragile thought, or the psychology of the Oriental. This stream of Orientalism in English poetry has

been welcomed by the leaders whenever they have understood its significance and beauty fully. Some poets have had a mere superficial liking for the methods and work of the Oriental, their own work in turn showing the results of this superficialty. Others have sincerely studied the language and philosophy of the people. From such work much may be expected.

II

The first English translator from Chinese poetry, and the first to prophesy of its results, was Sir John Davis, the first governor of Hong Kong. He gave to the English speaking world its initial insight into Chinese poetry when he published *The Poetry of The Chinese* in 1829. In it he wrote this prophecy:

> "As our gardens have already been indebted to China for a few choice flowers, who knows but our poetry may some day lie under a similar obligation?"

A half century later, in 1883, before Lafcadio Hearn had made Japan the land of his adoption, he wrote of his interest in Oriental verse and prophesied in the editorial columns of the *New Orleans Times-Democrat*:

> "The ideas of the Orient are only now being fully understood and appreciated; they are certainly destined to influence Occidental thought more than superficially. The flowers of Western idealism will be marvellously improved by crossing with Eastern literary growths."

But the words of Harriet Monroe, editor of *Poetry*, and high priestess of the new movement, who wrote when it was well under way, will best show the rise of a consciousness among the poets themselves of the affinity existing between their methods and the Oriental:

> "This Oriental influence is to be welcomed because it flows from deep and original streams of poetic art. We should not be afraid to learn from it, and in much of the work of the imagists and other radical groups, we find a more or less conscious, and more or less effective yielding to that influence. We find something of the Oriental directness of vision and simplicity of diction; also now and then a hint of the unobstrusive Oriental perfection of form and delicacy of feeling."

Thus the rise of Orientalism in modern English poetry was foretold and welcomed.

III

There is no better way I know of, to take a just measure of the extent this influence has been effective, than to consider the cardinal principles governing the writing of the new poetry and to draw parallels between these and the Oriental. There one may see where the differences and similarities lie.

Since Amy Lowell has done most of the pleading for imagism and the new school, the six rules she laid down in the preface to one of the first anthologies of the movement, entitled *Some Imagist Poets*, may well be used as a basis of comparison. The principles of imagism, she tells us, "are not new; they have fallen into desuetude. They are the essentials of all great poetry, indeed of all great literature. . . . . ."

The first principle was—"To use the language of common speech, but to employ always the exact word, never the nearly exact, nor the merely decorative word." Every school boy now knows that the phrase "language of common speech" is an echo of Wordsworth's *Preface to The Lyrical Ballads*, but the remainder of the rule shows well enough, paradoxical as it may seem, why the new school found an affinity in the Chinese and Japanese. In the revolt against the merely decorative word, in the search for the word with its sharp edges undulled by much mouthing and meaningless association, they found in the simplicity of the Chinese image, the root-idea of the character, an answer to their desires.

There is no similarity between the poetic method of the Chinese and the English. The poet of the latter culture has traditionally tried to make of his poem "an orchestra of words." I know of nothing in Chinese or Japanese poetry that can be compared to Tennyson's *Lotos Eaters* or Poe's *Bells*. The Chinese poet strove for his sound effect, but it was based on "tones" of the language and a strict adherence to the rules of stressed and unstressed syllables. These are distinguished in poetry by two tones. They are either flat, that is, pronounced with level or even utterance, or deflected upwards or downwards or cut short. The latter correspond crudely to our accented syllables in Greek and Latin. The Chinese poet constructs the most ordinary stanza with an ear for the utmost symmetry, as, for instance, if A stands for stressed and B for unstressed syllable, it will run as follows:

A A B B A
B B A A B
B B B A A
A A A B B

John Erskine has pointed out that there are even now diverging language movements in English poetry. The cadence of American speech is no longer that of the English, and since it was from the English models that the best American poets fifty years ago learned the cadence of both their speech and verse, it is not surprising that the American ear today detects a strange, almost foreign note in the fall of the lines of such poets as Tennyson, Lowell and Longfellow. Americans speak with more directness, with less subtlety and delay. Our conversation is a series of hammer strokes. We seem hungry for verse the cadence of which will be native to our ears.

One of the reasons why our poets find such a fascination in Oriental verse may be discovered here. The monosyllabic, steady, hammerstroke fall of words captivates their ear—if they know of Chinese and Japanese poetry in the original. Few of them do. And yet, by and large, there is the paradox that the Chinese literary renaissance is turning from that in which our modern English poetic renaissance finds such inspiration. We must look elsewhere for the source of the poetic sympathy between East and West. The language of Chinese classical poetry, in which Western interest has been centered, is not the language of common speech. Commonly designated as the "wen-li," it is the language of the sages and pedantic scholars, a language without inflection, a language of terse, concentrated root-ideas.

The story is told of Browning's introduction to a Chinese ambassador in London. Browning affably enquired of him what style of poetry he most affected and was answered the *enigmatical.* "We felt," he says in telling the tale, "doubly friends after that." Not only the Chinese literary language, but the poetry itself, with its classic allusions, is enigmatical. It does not employ the vernacular of the common man. Furthermore, it constantly uses the conventions of the ancients, and eschews realism and the commonplace. The source of the poetic sympathy between the East and West is not to be found in the first of Miss Lowell's principles.

IV

The second rule was—"To create new rhythms—as the expression of new moods—and not to employ old rhythms, which merely echo old moods. We do not insist upon 'free verse' as the only method of writing poetry. We fight for it as a principle of liberty. We believe that the individuality of a poet may often be better expressed in free verse than in conventional forms. In poetry a new cadence means a new idea."

On this principle I can again see no common ground on which the new spirits of the West may meet with the classical poets of the East. Chinese poetry is iron bound in laws and principles, with never the freedom exercised in the history of English prosody. The art of poetry in China has had a long evolution. It has been raised through the centuries by the genius of its makers to a standard of excellence which can be favorably compared with that of any civilization. But the Chinese have also developed the most rigid and traditional patterns and verse forms. The character of the language has determined some of the structural peculiarities of its verse. In early times four words to a line was the rule, but any number up to eight was allowable. Even one word lines were found. The stanza was usually in the form of a quatrain, although it could consist of any number of lines up to sixteen or seventeen. Every line did not rhyme, although rhyme was considered an essential part of all verse. Blank verse in the Miltonic sense was unknown. It may moreover be noticed that in connection with the structure of Chinese poems, the sense generally runs in couplets, and the moral or finale of the thought is given in the last two lines, much in the same way as in Shakespeare's sonnets the concluding lines sum up the sense of the whole.

The complaint frequently made against Victorian poetry, by our contemporary poetic radicals is that it is vague, that its eloquence springs from pomposity and verbiage, that it has no individuality or personality of its own, because everything, diction and rhythm, all are subservient to a definite pattern. It was to be free from the many rules and formulae which encumbered poetry that Miss Lowell lead the fight as "a principle of liberty." These innovators then turned to Chinese and Japanese poetry, thinking that there would be found the embodiment of their ideas. The interest was first centered in the Japanese hokku, later in the uta, and now in

the many forms of Chinese poetry. These forms, they declared were the prototypes of many new ideas among their contemporaries. Yet these forms were bound by the most rigid of century-old formulae and rules. The Chinese and Japanese are turning from them in their own renaissance. Consistency should have kept our Western poets from a whole hearted turning from one iron bound system of prosody to another. Possibly it was but a passing fancy, a fad. Still there was sufficient charm in this poetry of the East to attract our best minds. It of necessity was something more than form, for here the two systems are diametrically opposed.

V

Miss Lowell's third rule was—"To allow absolute freedom in the choice of subject. . . . ."

Other than the prejudices and taboos of conventional society, no acts of parliament control the poets' choice of subject. This is true of any literature. However, few writers are able to transcend their own times. Anyone who will read consistently in Chinese poetry cannot but be impressed with the ever present farewell poem written when leaving for a foreign province upon some mission of state, or the ubiquitous drinking song, conventional types that run through the entire history of Chinese literature. These were the most common and were molded by circumstance. But there are other impressive aspects. A love of birds, flowers and clouds, of mists, waters, hills and the moon are ever present characteristics of Chinese poetry and art in every age. Nature—the universe is the Chinese poet's field. And he exercises the widest liberty in indulging his passion for the things of nature. What he produces is not primitive or elemental in feeling, nor is it mere enjoyment of the sensuous. If a comparison may be permitted, he is more Wordsworthian than Keatsian. His poetry is a chastened and subdued product of reflection, for he regards Nature not merely as a physical phenomenon with sensuously enjoyable qualities, but as an animating soul which is in intimate relation with life itself. For him spirit interpenetrates matter. He is a thoroughgoing mystic. He is not satisfied with merely a faithful reproduction or presentation of what he sees and feels, although he does this supremely well. His desire is to render Nature's more subtle and essential aspects, for in them he believes he finds the way towards an appreciation of the laws of our being and the universe as a whole.

The Chinese poet obtained his view of the cosmos from Lao Tzu, the founder of Taoism. With it is possibly an infiltration of the monism which came from India through Buddhism. But Confucius also had a hand in molding the poet. Confucius' insistence on this world and the benefits of practical propriety exerted a tremendous influence on the common people, and the poet did not escape it. In him is traceable the influence of these three religions. He devotes himself to this world, its cosmic laws, its sensuous beauties, and the serious problems of statecraft and social propriety enjoined by Confucius. But he constantly aspired to a larger vision of things. He felt the limitations of a regulated life; he strove to relate his own existence to a more comprehensive whole. Here he resorted to the philosophy of Lao Tzu which conceived of Nature as an infinite process of self creation, one stage of development succeeding another more perfect in its greater proximity to the ultimate reality. To Lao Tzu the way to solve human life was to do nothing, to be carried along by the mighty current of the cosmos. The way, he said, to clear the world of its dirt and muddy aspect was identically the way one cleared a bucket of muddy water. Agitation, an attempt to be rid of the impurities, merely prolonged their evil influence and presence. The thing to do was to do nothing. The sediment would settle to the bottom, the water would clear itself. So with man and his world. With a wise passivity the eternal Way would exert itself.

But the humanizing influence of Confucius who was preoccupied with man himself, and declared that man began where Nature left off, was accepted by many of the poets. This acceptance saved them from the inevitable passivity of a consistent following of Lao Tzu. The merging of these two views of life sometimes produced a poetry of great profundity. Their imaginations synthesized the idyllic view which Toaism tends to exalt, with a human element and an interest in a phenomenal world, as well as cosmic principles. The Chinese poets varied in the degree and intensity with which these views predominated, but the result in many cases was a great and deep poetry. In constant touch with the Over-Soul, and with their feet planted firmly on the ground, they had a universe in which to breathe and write. Many made use of their privileges and opportunities.

There is no wonder that the modern Occidental poets, few of whom have managed to keep in touch with the empyrean and the

world at the same time, yearned for the freedom and air in which the Chinese poets breathed and wrote.

VI

The remaining three precepts laid down by Miss Lowell may be discussed together. They were:

"4. To present an image (hence the name: Imagist). We are not a school of painters, but we believe that poetry should render particulars exactly and not deal in vague generalities, however magnificent and sonorous. . . . .

"5. To produce poetry that is hard and clear, never blurred nor indefinite.

"6. Finally, most of us believe that concentration is the very essence of poetry."

It was quite natural that English poetry, which had long been under the influence of periphrastic verbosity, should find much to admire in the brief and concise images of Oriental verse. It was equally natural that the Chinese themselves should react from that which had long been petrified by an over-emphasis upon a contentless formalism. Arthur Waley has pointed out that the bane of Chinese poetry was classic allusion. In general, however, Chinese poetry at its best is in the lyric form. Their posts anticipated Edgar Allan Poe in the thought that there in reality could be no such thing as a *long* poem. When we examine the Chinese lyric at its best, what impresses us is the unusual economy of words with which the most elusive thoughts are expressed. The number of words to a verse varies from three to nine, the most common being five and seven, four such verses often going to make up a complete poem. The form, then is far more restricted than the sonnet. But within the limit of such verses a skillful artist is able to reveal his whole personality, and the intensity and magnitude of the mood which possessed him when he wrote. Every poem he composes is the expression of a whole range of feelings which he has pondered over and recollected in tranquility. What he aims at is not the pure expression of his feelings, because he knows that too much spontaneity in such expression without due regard to their careful adjustment and synthesis is apt to be crude and finally to defeat its own end; for an excessive outpouring of the natural temperament would soon exhaust itself.

The Chinese critics have told him from time immemorial that

the primary interest in poetry is to be found in the feelings and passions. He subjects, however, these feelings and passions to the imaginative reason. When they emerge, they are no longer in their original state of crudity; they have been suffused, transmuted, refined. The product is new and rich in content. His feelings and passions have been delicately fused together and unified. Furthermore, in expressing them, he has taken care not to give a complete account of that with which he deals: he leaves it to the reader to create in his own mind that impression of completeness and totality which he wishes to give. The reader is not a passive recipient; the Chinese poet expects him to be a creative artist himself, willing to be personally as much attached to the poem as the poet.

The poem, the link between the poet and his reader, is thought of as something supple and flexible, consisting of only a few flashes of insight or intuition into the mysteries of life and nature. It is a comprehension of the underlying forces of human nature, of the cosmos, which the poet wishes to attain. All he does is to express a few of the significant phases of the understanding he has attained. From these the reader constructs for himself the complete experience which these phases represent. This is best represented in the poetic form most commonly known as the "stop-short," a four line poem. In it, the poet leads his reader up to the gates of Infinity, as it were; it is for the reader himself to go through those gates.

A great deal of poetic appreciation thus depends on the reader. He must be sensitive to all fine touches; he must be susceptible to the delicate impressions furnished to him; above all, he must be a poet himself, to build for himself from the casual notes presented to him, the beauty and real meaning of the original experience. The Chinese do not consider it the poet's function to give a careful account of his experiences. In order to feel the real intensity and power of that experience, they say, the reader himself must be in direct contact with it, he must be as it were a human Aeolian harp, delicately catching the notes which the poet lets loose, and in turn rendering them again into mellow music and harmony.

This very quality, I think it is, which attracts the Western imagists and vers librists. It has infinite variety and power, and an inexhaustible charm extremely elusive to the understanding. A poetic gem of this sort, dealing with the essence of life, may be interpreted both by the reader and the poet to embody so much

truth and beauty that the more they ponder over it, the more they find it limitless and unfathomable. The poem suggests far more than it says—the very quality for which most moderns desperately strive. It is all the while simple, the substance with which it deals apparently sensuous, and yet there is a profundity and an intimate contact with cosmic, ultimate reality, which it reveals only in parts, allowing the reader himself to comprehend the whole. One will look far before a higher type of lyric poetry is found.

Returning once again to the rules laid down by Miss Lowell, we find that the Chinese poet might almost have consciously followed the injunction to "present an image, not vague generalities, however magnificent or sonorous." He gives us our image. And it is also "hard and clear, never blurred and indefinite." Miss Lowell would also have concentration, for it is "the essence of poetry." The Chinese poet, through the nature of his language, has concentrated with a vengeance.

The elements which have been infused into our poetry from the East are not principally matters of form and meter, although we have experimented with the hokku, uta, and stop-short. The things we have received are chaste simplicity, unaffectedness, directness, and delicacy of feeling. Kipling's declaration that the East and West would never meet is being disproven, for the twain *are* meeting—in poetry. But the East did not send us missionaries, telling of its poetic wealth. The West stumbled upon it and fell in love with it.

IMMORTALITY AS A BIOLOGIST SEES IT

BY R. A. HEFNER

THE mysteries of life and the fears of death have actuated the activities of man since the first fragmentary records of his existence and, without doubt, dominated the behavior of his prehuman ancestors in a manner similar to observable reactions of modern animals. Three activities, (a) self preservation which retains life, (b) food getting which sustains life, and (c) reproduction which perpetuates life, constitute practically the sum-total of animal existence. With the dawn of reason, these primitive instincts were conditioned by studied desires and the fear of death was alleviated by conceptions of immortality.

The older ideas of immortality probably preceded any notion of a soul or spirit and the *body* was supposed to continue its existence in some realm beyond the earthly life. Thus the burial of food, weapons, a horse, and even the servants and wives of the deceased was practiced wholly or in part by many primitive peoples. The idea of the soul or spirit seems to have arisen spontaneously in many creeds. The immortality of the soul was for a time considered with the resurrection of the body, but the rising tide of observation which marked the late Middle Ages, discountenanced the restoration of a body which had decayed and dissociated into its constituent elements, and the conception of an immortal soul and a temporal body gained general recognition in the Renaissance, though not without attendant danger to its early adherents. Descartes and Pascal were of one judicious opinion in the expression that, "The soul is not a part of the body and therefore does not perish with the body, and since it is not conceivably capable of perishing in any other manner, it must be immortal"; a splendid argument to those who grant the premises leading to the conclusion. Rosseau cites the necessity of an after life to give

restitution for the earthly trials of the just and the triumphs of the wicked. The ideas of these three philosophers are quite generally held by Christian adherents today, but the Catholics and many Protestants still drone a meaningless credo in which the resurrection of the body is included.

But whether immortality be that of body or soul, the place of the after life is ever a region where earthly desires and pleasures are continued and amplified; in witness of which, consider the Happy Hunting Ground of the American Indian, the peaceful Nirvana of the lethargic Hindu, the seventy heavenly wives of the sensual son of the desert as promised by Mohammed, and the golden streets and pearly gates of the avaricious Hebrew. It it to be presumed that the money grabbing propensities of the modern Christian have held him faithful to the Jewish vision in spite of the allurement of rival sects?

Historically, the idea of immortality seems to have prevaded nearly all religions. Confucius mentions a heaven but is noncommital regarding immortality. His teachings are, however, more properly a philosophical system than a religion. In five tedious pages of characteristic Hindu harange, Buddha declines to explain whether or not the world is eternal, whether or not the soul and body are one, and whether or not there is an existence after death; this without any admission of ignorance on his part and the reputation of the Enlightened One remains unscathed. Creation or a creator are likewise ignored by Buddha and his transmigrations of the soul end in Nirvana, an extinction of existence and hence no immortality. Herodotus recounts an elaborate belief in transmigration among the Egyptians during the fifth century B. C. Here the soul was supposed to pass through all types of animals and return to man during a course of 3000 years. The influence of some of the Egyptian beliefs was to be noted among the Greeks whose ideas of Hades for departed souls were vague and ill-defined. The Epicurean school denied all after life and proceeded to live accordingly. Plato, by a queer twist of the philosophy of dualism, makes Socrates to say, "Since for each life there is death, for each death there must be life." Cicero voices a Roman conception of a soul which was imperishable and separate from the body, and the Roman dead were often burned by way of disposal.

The long struggle between science and the firmly intrenched

dogmas of Medieval religion is a familiar story which needs no recounting here. The church has conceded many points formerly contested, but the nature of such concessions might be well summarized in the following extracts from the Catholic Vatican Council of 1870. "The Church has the divine right and duty of proscribing false science, lest any should be ensnared by philosophy and vain fallacy. All Christians are forbidden to defend as legitimate conclusions of science such opinions as are known to be contrary to the teachings of faith, more especially if they have been condemned by the Church. . . . The Church does not forbid that any science should in its own circle use its own principles and methods; but while recognizing this liberty, it is vigilantly on the alert lest sciences, by opposing the divine teaching, should take to themselves errors, or, skirmishing beyond their own spheres, should usurp and disturb the functions of faith."

Thus would be closed to science the only avenues whereby an approach to evidences of an immortality might be made. Religion would ask us to accept immortality through faith in revelation, but revelation has no place in scientific procedure; the lust for first causes would demand an investigation and analysis of the revelator, so the only method of approach is through the forbidding door of psychical investigation. The practices and results of such investigations are at present so connected and infused wth chicanery of every sort that sensible or scientific conclusion can hardly be deduced.

It is not the purpose of this paper to go into detail concerning the postulates of probability of an imperishable soul which survives the body. A word from Dr. Leighton, Professor of Philosophy at The Ohio State University, summarizes a rather extensive philosophical view of these contentions. "The possibility of the continued existence of the self after bodily dissolution clearly depends on the nonidentity of the conscious or spiritual individual with the body. . . . . .The self, as an active synthesizing principle, is an immaterial, rational, or spiritual individual which is so intimately associated with the body as to form with it a complex individual whole. The mental self is partially dependent on the body and *perhaps* partially independent of it. From this standpoint individual immortality is *possible*." This quotation is passed with the remark that the question here raised does not admit of scien-

tific treatment. To the scientific mind there is absolutely no evidence to indicate the material continuity of any part of the living body, nor is it possible for the present informant to conceive of the continuity of any self, personality, spirit, or separate activity without the material attributes which we associate with life. If, then, religion and philosophy can do no better than to create a doubt as to the non-existence of an immortality, where shall we turn for the evidence which man has long sought? May not biology, that science which deals specifically with the many intricate processes of life, be entrusted with the problems which concern its perpetuation?

Although founded upon a vast collection of specific investigations, the ultimate philosophies of biology are of necessity generalized. Therefore, any evidence of immortality from this source must be collectively applicable to various species rather than to groups or individuals. Not for one moment does biology tolerate that colossal egotism which makes of man the life apart, and reaches its culmination in the creation of manlike gods who determine the course of the universe. To paraphrase a familiar line, "Hath not a man eyes, limbs, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions? Is he not fed with like food, hurt by like weapons, subject to like diseases, healed by like potions, warmed and cooled by the same summer and winter as are other creatures of the animal kingdom?" Or to modernize the statement, is not man burned by the same acids, suffocated by the same gases, shocked by the same voltages, or buoyed up in water according to the infallible principle of Archimedes? Why then should life, the sum of the chemical and physical reactions of an organism, find in man any expression different from that found elsewhere in the living world?

To our previous objections for considering the individual as a unit for immortality, must be added the biological question as to the nature of the individual. Is a tree an individual? If so, what of its numerous twigs which may each reproduce the whole if thrust into moist soil? The hydra, a tiny animal familiar to all students of elementary biology, may be cut into twelve pieces each of which will become a complete hydra, and even a fragment of a leaf of a Begonia plant will send up several entire plants. Is not the fertile egg or seed the new individual? From a single egg may develop a dozen or more tapeworms, each with its own problem of individuality, since its recurring segments may each have a complete set of

the sex organs which constitute the major portion of a mature section. The egg of the armadillo develops into quadruplets, always of the same sex, and how familiar are the identical twins, likewise from a single egg, in human families. If such twins are individuals, what of Siamese twins or two headed monstrosities not infrequently reported in human and other mammalian births?

Biologically we must consider every living organism the present representative of a continuing stream of life proceeding from a single source or many sources in the veiled, mysterious past and extending in unbroken line to its recent expression. But not without change. The physical basis of every living thing is *protoplasm*, that unstable and complicated material which causes Huxley to remark, "Paradoxically, the most constant feature of living material is its eternal changefulness." There must be in this remarkable, changing protoplasm some exceeding stable element which determines the continuity of a species through periods of time that blur into vague eons. Many Globigerina, small, one celled, beautifully shelled animals, found in all seas today, are identical in form of shell to those which formed the chalk cliffs of England, millions of year ago, and Baltic amber (fossil resin) estimated to be six million years of age, contains perfectly preserved specimens of ants so like modern species that only an expert can detect differences. Any part of the protoplasm which determines this relative fixity of species must of necessity proceed from generation to generation and *per se* becomes the agent of immortality.

This continuity of material is best observed in its simplest form as found among one celled organisms or *Protozoa*. Here the common method of reproduction is simple division of *fission*. One cell divides to form two smaller organisms which grow to the size of the original cell, this again divides and so *ad infinitum*, or at least for over nineteen thousand generations as Dr. Woodruff of Yale has demonstrated for a particular Protozoan, Paramecium. Here, then, we have an actual immortality since life is continuous through all generations and natural death is unknown. Fortunately, accidental deaths are frequent as Dr. Woodruff estimates that his Paramecia, had all been able to live and reproduce by fission during the sixteen years he has observed them, would now exceed the bulk of the earth by several thousand times. But among the many celled animals or *Metazoa*, simple division gives way to the formation of

specialized reproduction or *germ* cells, usually enclosed within the the body of *somatic* cells. In some lowly organisms any cell may apparently become specialized and perform functions of reproduction, but early in the animal series, particular groups of cells assume the reproductory role. Might we not better date the fall of man from that remote period when he sacrificed his actual immortality by becoming a Metazoan, rather than to some comparatively recent indiscretion in his choice of fruits?

The elaboration of a temporal body from the reproductive tissues is the common procedure among multicellular animals. This body may vary from the fragile, watery form of a jellyfish to the enormous, complicated bodies of some vertebrates. But in any instance the body is a temporary structure and the products of the generative organs are unique in their potential immortality. When these products are united in the act of fertilization the resulting fertile egg or seed is a new individual, capable of producing other reproductive cells in an infinite series. The question as to the origin of the body cells might well be raised at this point. Are not such body cells likewise derived from germinal tissue and hence immortal? All cells must of necessity arise from the fertilized egg or seed in organisms employing sexual reproduction. But in the complicated processes of differentiation which lead to specialized organs, such somatic cells lose the power of reproduction and are hence end products of living material. Death is the price of specialization.

But even the germ cells do not yield the ultimate secret of our immortality. Fragments of the microscopic sperm and pollen cells perish in the process of fertilization. The eggs of birds and the seeds of plants are largely food material which will be absorbed by the growing embryo. Only by an examination of the architecture of the germinal tissues can we hope to discover the ultimate units of immortality. Briefly described, the egg or female germ cell consists of the essential parts of a typical cell plus a varying amount of yolk or food material. The essential cell parts of a *cell wall* enclosing the *cytoplasm,* a semifluid substance of varying amount and the recognized seat of many cellular activities. Embedded in this cytoplasm is a *nucleus,* composed of a fluid bearing granules of dark staining *chromatin* enmeshed in fibers. The sperm or male germ cell is many times smaller than the egg, has no yolk material,

and comparatively little cytoplasm, but is equal to the egg in the amount of nuclear substance.

On account of the great difference in the amount of cytoplasm exhibited in the egg and sperm of a given species and for other reasons which we may ignore in this brief sketch, the cytoplasm is rejected as the possible carrier of the heredity units wherein we seek our immortality. The nucleus, by reason of its constant and similar size in sperm and egg and because of its peculiar behavior at critical periods in the life of both germ and body cells, is considered the seat of the perpetual units. If such self perpetuating units be within the nucleus, it is apparent that they must be capable of reproduction and transfer at each division of the cell into similar or dissimilar components. The behavior of the chromatin of a dividing cell meets this requirement; this chromatin becomes threadlike, then breaks into definite units called *chromosomes*. These split equally and the halves are distributed to the new cells arising as a result of division. But the ultimate unit of immortality is not yet defined. The next step in our search takes us beyond the range of direct observation and into the field of experimentation. Chromosomes are conceived to be made up of numerous smaller units known as *genes*. A gene may be defined as that portion of a cell which is responsible for an hereditary characteristic. Thus, for each character in the makeup of an organism there is in general a corresponding gene in most somatic cells and all the germ cells. The proofs for this contention are involved and will have to be treated briefly. Let us consider a group of characteristics which we usually regard as racial traits. According to the unit character conception of heredity, the straight hair, black hair, sparse beard, slant eyes, and high cheek bones of the oriental races are all due to specific genes in specific chromosomes, found in the fertilized egg from which the individual arises. Likewise the antitheses of these traits, as found in the Nordic peoples, are also due to similar genes in exactly the same regions as those mentioned for the oriental race. Now what will occur in crossing of races? Since every individual is double in his inheritance, having received a complete set of chromosomes from each parent, the hybrid of two races will have contrasting genes for many traits. Of the contrasting traits, some will blend and others will appear in their entirety or be completely masked. The racial

colors black and white blend to form the mulatto; the slant eyes of the oriental appear in the Mongolian-Caucasian hybrid; the blue eyes of the Nordic are masked by the brown eyes of the Mediterranean peoples when these groups blend. In the mating of these hybrids the original racial characteristics appear in a definite ratio. All of these problems lend themselves to ready solution when we study the behavior of the chromosomes of the germ cells preceding and during the initiation of a new individual in the form of the fertilized egg or seed.

Let it be understood that the gene as a unit is indiscernible and therefore a hypothetical structure. Certain knots of material appear definitely on many chromosomes at particular stages. These are termed *chromatophores* but efforts to associate their presence with specific genes have met with dubious success. Three questions relative to the gene hypothesis are especially deserving of our attention.

(1) What is the nature of the gene? To this query the *geneticists* are admittedly in the dark. Certainly the basis is chemical and molecular but any attempt at analysis is lost in the mysteries of protoplasm. Whatever their chemical nature, the constituent molecules must be exceedingly stable to pass unchanged through thousands of cell divisions in each of a succession of individuals reaching through remote geological epochs. On the other hand our second question deals with the instability of the gene.

(2) Since new traits and hence variations are essential to the conceptions of evolution which now dominate the sciences of the animate world, whence these changes if not from new genes? Many variations are known to be due to chromosome deficiencies and thus to accidental loss of genes. Breaks in chromosomes, extra chromosomes in the germ cell, triple sets of chromosomes and other abnormalities have registered their influence on the resulting organism. As to the actual addition of new genes, such must occur, but no conclusive explanation of their source is at present acceptable.

(3) If this hypothetical gene be our ultimate unit of immortality, what adjustments in our philosophical conceptions of life are essential to the acceptance of this view? Individuals become mere incidents in the scheme of life; mere rocks and banks which confine the stream yet without which the stream would not exist. The *summum bonum* of philosophical endeavor becomes not the suppression of desires of the humble Buddhist nor the doing of an ill-

defined good of the pious Christian but the perpetuation of those racial or individual traits worthy of continuity. The abolition of the religious conception of an after life where awards and inflictions are duly applied, is not a question whose merits properly fall within the scope of this discussion. If we accept William James' statement that religion *is* the hope of immortality, the disruption of the above idea would not be without far-reaching consequences.

The cult of the geneticist owns no published or publicly acclaimed creed. Were such to be expressed in the light of present knowledge, it might well follow, "Believing that these traits which I possess by reason of my inheritance are worthy of continued racial expression, I transmit them to my offspring, in the fervent hope of their further perpetuation for the good of mankind." Those who ascribe to this belief may supplement the words of Cornelia and say of their children, "These are my jewels, my life, and my immortality."

TRAGEDY, DEATH, AND DECAY

BY ROBERT SPARKS WALKER

ONE cannot find a treasure until it has been lost. When I was engaged in business and was forced to charge off so many hundred dollars at the close of each year, this question invariably came to me: Is it possible to make money unless some one is losing it? The question cannot be proved by test, because money will always be lost. We shall have to get rid of the bankrupt courts and change the nature of fire and floods, and even the very natures of many human beings before we can give it a fair trial.

With tragedies happening daily, many of which might be avoided, we can always depend on them calling for their quota of human lives. Often in our forgetfulness, we unconsciously become so selfish that it requires the most serious tragedy to arouse us to a sense of duty to our fellowmen. Sometimes I feel that we are permanently stupid, and that there are few, if any good movements launched and brought to a success but what have had their births in tragedy. Tragedy! the thoughts of it is the one single thing that will cause people to rise up and act with reasonable speed to do an unselfish act to protect the life and the virtue of another.

A few weeks ago, I went over a great battleground which covers many acres of land. During the three days fighting there, thousands of men lost their lives. For many years visitors have been coming from far and near to visit the place. As I stood on that great battlefield and watched strangers silently viewing the once bloody spots, this question arose spontaneously: After all, what is the one thing that brings people here?

There were thousands of men engaged on both sides in that conflict, and for three days each side struggled hard to conquer the other. If during that time there had not been a single life lost, although the Nation had won a most decisive victory, I dare say

that to-day the spot would not contain a single marker or monument, and the old battlefield would scarcely attract passing notice. But when in any great conflict men give their lives heroically, then and there that place becomes sacred ground for the generations of people that follow.

Life in itself is dependent on tragedy. For example, our physical bodies are entirely dependent on the simple green leaf. The green leaf is the one thing that may truthfully be said to stand firmly between man and eternity. The green leaf is the only thing under heaven that can take out of the earth that which is not food and convert it into a product that will sustain life. But as repulsive as the thoughts may be to some people, before a green leaf thrives, it must be connected directly with the relics and remains of the tragedies of the ages! If the naked eye is growing dim, then it becomes necessary to employ the microscope to see what this earthly fertile bed of soil contains, which is so constantly being reworked for the preservation of all animal life. Each particle adds its unimpeachable testimony to the facts in the case, and its history connects it somewhere with a tragedy the date of which may have been lost in the mists of the past. Do you agree with me when we examine together just a handful of what we regard as the precious leaf mold?

I found it in the shady wood,
Where oaks and maples long have stood,
And there the sable mass all lay
With not a hint of stone or clay;
The tender rootlets modest stole
Throughout the mold and took their toll;
And here and there I sometimes found
Small holes where beetles left the ground.

What can this fertile leaf mold be?
A fragrant bit of history,
That's printed plain in letters bold,
With illustrations pure as gold;
It once had life and beauty too,
It once had breath, and then could do
In wisdom's way with Nature's wit,
The work that God assigned to it.

Into a handful let us look:
Here are some leaves from last year's book
That felt the breeze on maple trees,
And here's a twig killed by a freeze;
A thousand insects' lives have run,
And here's a sparrow's skeleton,
In this black mass that quiet lay
A-yielding fast to death's decay.

No leaf mold rich on earth can be
Unless stern death runs wild and free;
Impossible is life on earth
Without cold death to give it birth;
Out of it all there shall arise
More creatures stronger that comprise
The good of all returned to dust
Where Nature long has held her trust.

And as I hold this rich leaf mold
Before my eyes, a phantom bold
Of mold composed of thoughts and deeds
Comes marching up and ne'er recedes;
This ghost of mine,—deeds of the past,—
In memory decaying fast,
Is fertile food for purer thought,
And noble deeds unselfish wrought.

In giving lectures on Nature subjects, I have often referred to an old tree as a creation that furnishes the best example of what an unselfish life should be. Yet when a tree is thrown under the spotlight of reason, then its altruism takes flight and disappears as stealthily as a shadow. It is true that the old tree gives its foliage back to the soil for the nourishment of new crops, and for making beds that animals may be kept warm and comfortable. It is true that it feeds and sustains animal life, and that its wood supplies fuel that keeps families from being snuffed out by blizzards. It is true that the body of the tree is sacrificed in the construction of homes, of vehicles, of ships and other useful devices. In a way the tree furnishes a good example how that a human being may spend his life unselfishly, but it is altruistic because the Creator has willed it so.

However, a tree sometimes really becomes altruistic. Altruism

is merely the performance of some act, the purpose of which is for the sole benefit of some other creature beside the actor. The performance of this act must draw on the energies and the resources of the doer, causing the creature to make a sacrifice from which it must not hope nor expect to receive any material reward.

The most of the vegetable citizens perform such acts, but it is tragedy that compels them to do it. For example, the one prominent altruistic act performed by the white oak tree is that of feeding and housing a small insect. This little wasp-like creature makes the well known Woolsower gall that is so often seen in summer on the white oak tree. It is a beautiful creation, indeed. In the hatching and the development of these galls on the twigs of the white oak, the tree is compelled to do something exclusively for the welfare of another creature. This is just what the white oak does, and to me the tragedy of a gall on any tree or plant is not short of being a miracle. The physical creation known as the Woolsower gall possesses an individual beauty that is not excelled by many flowers. The same thing is true of some of the other galls.

On the other hand, I regard as the greatest miracle in the human family is the sudden awakening of a man or woman, who forgets self, and turns his or her attention and resources, unselfishly to the welfare of the remainder of humanity. But it must be repeated, that it sometimes requires the hand of tragedy to arouse men from their deep selfish slumber.

Tragedy in the material world has a brother in the spiritual world. Tragedy in the former is a necessity to the latter, no matter how much we dread to face it. It has been so arranged that we cannot see beyond the bounds of the sepulcher, that the human soul may attain its fullest and finest development. In the meanwhile, the person into whose life tragedy enters, there is an afterglow of beauty that is wholly impossible without its experience.

Tragedy lurks about us, and in our efforts to prevent it, and in our attempts to heal the wounds and assuage the grief of those who have fallen within its wake, there is born within us what is known as pity, mercy, sympathy, humility, service, and unselfishness. Out of all these there is born that most precious of all treasures,—immortality!

And Death Came.

II

"Which one dear? Which one?" I doubled the question as I looked wonderingly into my young companion's blue eyes less than a year after we had been passing on life's trail together. I say "trail" because we did not often walk over smooth roads and paved highways, for ours were the meadows and the woods, among brambles where the birds and wild flowers stay.

We realized that unless by some fatal accident, that one of us would likely be compelled to go alone. The dread of separation was equally shared between us, for neither of us was really happy when not in the other's company.

She was well and strong, and so was I, but still we knew that according to the laws of Nature, that one of us would likely sooner or later be forced to look on the other through sorrowful eyes. And, we agreed that when that fateful moment came that we would meet it bravely, still we hoped that the dark hour might be delayed until both of us had reached the foot of the hill where all paths end naturally.

It was easy for us to help each other plan for the changed life that was certain to follow. At intervals for twenty years we discussed the question, and while we were sane enough to admit that such a thing was possible, yet it did seem that it would not strike us, for were we both not strong, happy, and young? Twenty years of unbroken affections between two persons and, life without the other becomes an unthinkable suggestion. But we were willing to go and, if perchance it was she, I was to hold her hand and kiss her as she passed out of my life to join our first born and wait with him until I caught up as they journeyed together on the trail in the Great Beyond.

Well, twenty years of uninterrupted happiness and our honeymoon was not well begun, but this morning the life cord suddenly snapped and how strange I felt when I sat on the bed by her side fondling for the last time a warm hand I had been holding so long, from which I was conscious that life was rapidly passing! Each time I caressed that soft hand in mine a wedding ring left its deep impression in the palm of my hand, which from sorrow seemed itself frantic. She could not speak, and probably was not conscious that I was living up to my agreement. Just two weeks previous, we little dreamed that this ordeal was on the way.

How often she asked me a few days before if I thought that we had taken our last tramp in the fields and woodlands together? To be among the wild flowers and hear the voice of the birds was one of her greatest delights. The answer clogged my throat.

This morning Death came and answered that question for me. Before my own eyes he took from me my rarest and dearest treasure. "Which one, dear?" That old, old question has been answered for us. It came, and our early strange question's answer places on me that most sorrowful task which we hoped would not come early in life.

All that she ever said that was so sensible to make me brave in this hour comes up before me, but how differently it sounds this morning! How difficult it is for me to think, feel, and do as we have planned in the event of a separation like this! All is silent. Now I must fall on faith and faith alone to bridge my feet across the strange chasm that will lead me safely across the abyss to where she has been transplanted. It is a dream pure and simple, and I find myself constantly trying to convince myself of this fact.

III

You have watched the form of a dear one as she departs until a turn in the road, to the right or to the left, when the strange curve swallows her form. When I saw that she was leaving me forever, as well as I loved the beauty spots of the earth and all the good things that life holds, I was desperately desirous of joining her on the adventure. How I did long to clasp her hand in mine and go romping along the winding path that leads into eternity as we had been doing on our tramps into the fragrant woodlands on earth! She did not dread to go alone except for leaving me and her boy behind. Not to have both by her side was the only unnaturalness of the journey.

She was gone. Gone forever. I was left standing on a desert island with eyes firmly fixed on space where I had seen her last. I tried to go to the same haunts where we had so often gone together. Out in the yard I see the Spiderwort that she and I dug with our own hands on a gravelly hillside two years before and transplanted. To me, this morning, this wild flower has a soul, for there surely is something about it that makes it immortal today. And, close by grows the clump of Robin's Plantain which she brought in from the woods, and somehow I can see images of her

face copied in this wild flower which also seems strangely immortalized!

Today the blue jay flew to the persimmon tree that grows in the front yard, and in my mind, how greatly he has grown in importance, for she always admired him and his beautiful dress. Despite the accusations brought against him, she was never able to see anything except the good, the pure, and the beauty in his life as she did her neighbors. To me the blue jay is dearer than he has ever been before.

The wren, the catbird, the mockingbird, the bluebird, the vesper sparrow, the robin, the cardinal, and the wood thrush can not come to me this morning without being exceedingly magnified in my estimation. How ardently she loved them, and now I find myself adoring even the mention of their names! The earth, where I know she has often stood, and where her hands have worked the soil for the flower beds, is holy ground. I go through the yard seeking the places where I know her feet have often pressed. How I do like to look at the spots where she liked to be, and I find myself being magically drawn into the nooks that were so dear to her.

This morning, I hate more than I ever did all forms of vice, all the ugly, all that is untrue, all forms of hypocrisy, I suppose for her sake. Whatever she disliked, I care not to think about, but whatever she loved is strangely associated with love eternal.

The first few hours each morning, I
Am normal, but soon as the day
Wears wearily along, and I
Can hear her soft footsteps as they
Come gently tripping to my room
Up stairs, but never enter in,
The memory of her becomes
So burdensome that I am plunged
Into a mental stupor; yet
I like to live amidst old haunts
Of hers, for there's a sweetness in
The comatose atmosphere; but
What I cannot endure, is to
Go to the woods, or church alone,
For there I am so strangely conscious
That pains from my old wounds become
Unbearable, because the anaesthetic
Has not the strength to put me to sleep.

THE AESTHETIC WRITINGS OF SCHILLER

BY BIRGER R. HEADSTROM

WHEN Schiller turned to Kant, he hoped to find in the Kantian philosophy an escape from the conflict between the principles of art and his creative impulses, to which his early philosophic studies had given rise, and to regain, as well, his inner life and artistic spontaneity which they had destroyed. Exactly how he felt about the matter can be seen from a letter to Körner, in which he says: "I am full of eagerness for some poetic task and particularly my pen is itching to be at 'Wallenstein.' Really it is only in art itself that I feel my strength. In theorizing I have to plague myself all the while about principles. There I am only a dilettante. But it is precisely for the sake of artistic creation that I wish to philosophize. Criticism must repair the damage it has done me. And it has done me great damage indeed; for I miss in myself these many years that boldness, that living fire, that was mine before I knew a rule. Now I see myself in the act of creating and fashioning; I observe the play of inspiration, and my imagination works less freely, since it is conscious of being watched. But if I once reach the point where artistic procedure becomes natural, like education for the well-nurtured man, then my fancy will get back its old freedom, and know no bounds but those of its own making." In short, what he sought, and did find, was a poetical modus vivendi between natural impulse and artistic rule.

It was at the academy at Stuttgart that Schiller obtained, from the "Institutes" of Ferguson, his first ideas on aesthetic philosophy. For Ferguson, in whom there was no distinction between the moral and aesthetic domain, all truth is beauty, "the most natural beauty in the world being honesty and moral truth." Also, for him, perfection was made to depend on harmony and proportion; moral beauty upon the harmony of the individual soul with the general scheme

of things; while wrong action was equally looked upon as imperfection. And virtue, inclining toward the general harmony, meant, necessarily, happiness. Such were the thoughts that defined Schiller's early philosophic writings, as the letters of Julius and Raphael, and the second book of *The Ghostseer*. But towards the end of his first year at Weimar, a new field of exploration was opened to him. For the author of *The Gods of Greece* and *The Artists* as one of the essential factors in human perfectibility, had assumed such vast proportions of importance that he felt it of the gravest concern to understand it, this feeling, in fact, largely influencing him to utilize the Danish pension to a thorough study of the Kantian aesthetics.

A course of lectures on the theory of tragedy was the initial result of this interest in art, and though they were never published their general import is contained in the two essays, "On the Rational Basis of Pleasure in Tragic Themes," and "On the Tragic Art." In the former, Schiller began by first contending that art has no higher aim than the giving of pleasure, saying that its aim is not morality but "free pleasure," by "free" meaning subject to no law but its own, and that if morality becomes its final aim it ceases to be "free." He then passed on to a discussion of the problem of our experiencing pleasure in painful representations. To him, all pleasure descends from the perception of *Zweckmäszigkeit* (the quality of adaptability to the furtherance of an end); and as man meant to be happy, human suffering must be a "maladaption" which affects pain. Since, however, we are incited to activity by this pain, reason recognizes in it a higher "adaptation" and therefore knowing it is good for us we take pleasure in our own pain. From which he arrived at the conclusion that the effect of tragedy is dependent upon the proportion in which this higher sense of adaptation is present.

The gist of this argument is that aesthetic judgments are considered to be dependent upon concepts of the mind, the reason, with its various abstractions, being viewed as the prior and dominating factor. In the other of the two essays we find, nevertheless, that emotional excitement may give pleasure in and of itself; and though numerous illustrations are given which indicate that Schiller did not neglect the non-rational element in the pleasure afforded by

tragedy, yet he attached little importance to it for he claimed that we are acquainted with only two sources of pleasure, the satisfaction of the inclination for happiness and the fulfillment of moral laws. After struggling with such hazy abstractions, he finally attempted a practical discussion of tragedy gradually coming to regard its sole aim as being the excitation of "sympathy."

By the year 1793, Schiller had become familiar with aesthetic speculations and moreover had found what he considered as a weak point in the system of Kant, that if it were futile to try to establish an objective criterion of beauty all aesthetic judgments must necessarily be reduced to a matter of taste,—a most undesirable conclusion. To Kant, the aesthetic faculty came under the jurisdiction of the "judgment," a judgment, according to him, being teleologic if implying a pre-existing notion to which the objective is expected to conform, aesthetic if the object gives rise directly to pleasure or pain; in other words, though we have an interest in the good and the agreeable, the beautiful is that which pleases us without appealing to any interest. However, this is merely its character under the category of quality, for under that of quantity it is universal pleasure, while under that of relation it is a form of adaptation. And, finally, under modality it is "necessary" because of the sensus communis of mankind, that is, it is determined rather by their agreement in taste than by any objective criterion.

Aesthetics, then, for Kant was a subjective matter. To him, it was not so much as what made objects beautiful, but rather as to how we "judge" them to be beautiful; in short, the essence of beauty was to please without reference to any intellectual concept such as objective attributes of form, proportion, harmony, etc. The fault with this is that a judgment which has no connection with the intellect is not a judgment but a feeling, but despite this he had, at least, the merit of distinctly showing the necessity of distinguishing more clearly between the beautiful and the good and agreeable. Furthermore, though insisting that beauty could not depend upon a mental concept, he recognized "adaptation," notwithstanding its being a concept of the mind, as a form of beauty, meeting this inconsistency, however, by making a distinction between free beauty (pulchritudo vaga) and adherent beauty (pulchritudo adhaerens). And, lastly, though he held that the highest use of beauty is to

symbolize moral truth, he claimed, at the same time, that pure beauty was impossible in a moral action since it does not please in and of itself.

With such a philosophy, Schiller could not be satisfied. In a letter to the Prince of Augustenburg, dated the 9th of February, 1793, he clearly expressed his attitude by saying in part: "When I consider how closely our feeling for the beautiful and the great is connected with the noblest part of our being, it is impossible for me to regard this feeling as a mere subjective play of the emotional faculty, capable of none but empirical rules. It seems to me that beauty too, as well as truth and right, must rest upon eternal foundations, and that the original laws of the reason must also be the laws of taste. It is true that the circumstance of our feeling beauty and not cognizing it seems to cut off all hope of our finding a universal law for it, because every judgment emanating from this source is a judgment of experience. As a rule people accept an explanation of beauty only because it harmonizes in particular cases with the verdict of feeling, whereas, if there were really such a thing as the cognition of beauty from principles, we should trust the verdict of feeling because it coincides with our explanation of the beautiful. Instead of testing and correcting our feelings by means of principles, we test aesthetic principles by our feelings."

In a series of letters to Körner, Schiller now set about to solve the problem which Kant had regarded as impossible of solution. Although he agreed with the latter's view that beauty cannot depend upon a mental concept,—the feeling of pleasure is the prior fact, he could not, at the same time, shake off the conviction that beauty must in some way fall under the laws of reason. He escaped from this difficulty, however, by removing the aesthetic faculty from the jurisdiction of Kant's "judgment" and giving it to the "practical reason," his argument being that the practical reason must have freedom just as well as the "pure reason" rationality, for freedom is the form instinctively applied by the practical reason upon the presentation of an object, and is satisfied when, and only when, the object is free and autonomous. Furthermore, practical reason, upon the presentation of an object, can discard all concepts of the pure reason and if then the object appears free, autonomous, it is satisfied, the effect thus produced is pleasurable and we call it beauty.

However, as Schiller pointed out, it is all a question of appearance for the object is not free as freedom is only possible in the supersensual world, yet the practical reason imputes this freedom to it. Hence he arrived to his solution that beauty is freedom in the appearance (Freheit in der Erscheinung).

This doctrine Schiller applied, in a letter of February 23, 1793, to an exposition of the relation between nature and art. According to the theory, the problem of an artist is to convey, in the representation of the object, the suggestion of freedom, which he can only do by making it appear to follow its own law; and which it must have and obey while seemingly free, this law (the basis of our impression of freedom) being that revealed by technique. Following Kant's saying that nature is beautiful when it looks like art, and art beautiful when it looks like nature, Schiller employed a large number of illustrations in support of his theory, finally concluding by saying: "Therefore the empire of taste is the empire of freedom; the beautiful world of sense being the happiest symbol of what the moral world should be, and every beautiful object about me being a happy citizen who calls out: Be free like me."

Schiller was aware though that this criterion of beauty was after all an idea of the reason, a difficulty which he promised to meet, but unfortunately his aesthetic correspondence with Körner was not continued. In May and June of the same year, that is, 1793, he was led to test his theory of beauty in the human form, in an essay on Winsomeness and Dignity, by Kant's dictum that there is no pure beauty to the human form because the human form expresses the moral dignity of human nature which is but an idea of the reason. As an illustration of his point, he made use of the girdle of Venus, saying that though Venus was pure beauty on coming from the hand of nature, her girdle made her "winsome;" winsomeness being then something distinct from beauty, something transferable, movable; defined as beauty of motion, as the element of beauty which is not possessed by nature but which is produced by the object. Schiller then went on to make a distinction between architectonic and technical beauty, the former being a beautiful presentation of the aims of nature, while the latter refers only to the aims themselves. And it is the former with which the aesthetic faculty is concerned, for in the contemplation of an object it is alone affected by its appear-

ance which it isolates irrespective of purpose or adaptation, though at the same time freedom is imputed to it by the reason. In a word, when the object is a human form this imputed freedom, by which it appears to assert its own autonomous personality, and which is furthermore added to the beauty which nature creates by the law-governed adaptation of means to an end, is winsomeness.

Fully satisfied that beauty consists of the two elements, sensuous pleasure, and rational gratification, caused by personality, and the adaptation to an end, Schiller next considered the questions of moral beauty and ideal of character. Of Kant's insistence upon the categorical imperative of duty, he disapproved, for a man, he claimed, above all else must be free, the slavery of duty being to him no better than any other kind of slavery. Inclination to duty is, however, virtue, the ideal being found in a perfect state of balance between the sensuous nature and the rational. And as winsomeness is the expression of a beautiful soul, so he defined "dignity" as the expression of a lofty mind,—the expression of that intellectual freedom which controls the impulses by moral strength, and manifested in suffering (πάδος) as winsomeness in behavior (χδος).

Following this essay, Schiller next published *On the Sublime*, in which was included a special chapter "On the Pathetic" and "Scattered Reflections on Various Aesthetic Subjects." Two other papers "On the Artistic Use of the Vulgar and the Low," and a second disquisition "On the Sublime," though written during the same period were not, however, published until 1801. Like Kant, he defined the sublime as the impression produced by an object which excites in man's sensuous nature a feeling of weakness and dependence, and at the same time in his rational nature a feeling of freedom and superiority. He objected though to the former's terminology, and proposed instead, for Kant's terms of the mathematical and dynamic which he had given to the two kinds of sublime, the names of the theoretical and the practical, by the former meaning that which tends to overawe the mind, by the latter that which tends to overawe the feeling. But the most important phase of the practical sublime is the subject of tragic pathos, and here Schiller took the view that the final aim of art is the representation of the supersensuous, declaring that the essence of tragic pathos is

the representation of moral superiority under the strain of suffering. The spectacle of suffering is in itself no end, for the sensuous has inherently no aesthetic value; it is the moral resistance alone that is of any account, the suffering being needed only to prove the necessity of resistance. In short, the hero's sufferings must appear real in order that he may receive proper credit for his moral triumph.

In his discussions on the sublime and the pathetic, Schiller felt at many times that he was on the point of being carried away into the region of barren speculation, and to offset this tendency he thought it necessary to present his ideas in a popular form as well as to show their relation to the practical concerns of human life. It was this thought that finally led him to undertake a series of letters to the Prince of Augustenburg, declaring, in a letter of July 13, 1793, that the political dream of the century, of recreating society upon a foundation of pure reason, had dissolved into thin air for "man" had failed to show himself fit for freedom. Though his chains mights be removed, he was still a slave,—a slave to unruly passion, despite what the century had done for the enlightenment of his mind; and what was needed was evidently rather a discipline of the feelings. In 1795, Schiller published, in the *Horen*, his "Letters on Aesthetic Education" of which his letters to the Prince had formed the basis, and which serve as the most agreeable expression of his aesthetic philosophy. The first ten were devoted to a discussion of the spirit of the age and to demonstrate the necessity of some form of educational process by which mankind could be prepared for the higher state of freeman, the problem being, in a word, the transformation of the state-ruled-by-force into a state-ruled-by-reason. To attain this end it was necessary that man should first learn how to overcome the despotism of sense, which leads to savagery, and the supineness of mind, which leads to barbarism, the savage, Schiller defining, as a man whose feelings control his principles, and a barbarian as a man whose principles destroy his feelings. The man *comme il faut* must not only establish but preserve a state of balance between his sensuous and rational natures. But how was this to be done? For neither the state nor philosophy could help him as the former treated him as if he had no reason, the latter as if he had no feelings. For the poet, his salvation lay, then, only in the aesthetic sense, the love of beauty.

To show how the aesthetic sense could accomplish this Schiller had recourse of two ultimate instincts or bents of mankind which he called the "thing-bent" *(Sachtrieb)* and the "form-bent" *(Formtrieb)*, the problem of culture being to bring them into harmony. As a means to this latter end, he then made use of the "play-bent" or "Spieltrieb," his idea being that in the moment of aesthetic contemplation both the sensuous and rational instincts find their reckoning; that is, the act of escaping from the pull of thought and feeling to a mental state which satisfies both without yielding to either was analogous to the act of playing, the word meaning, as he employed it, a surrender to the illusion of art. Play being thus symbolic of the highest self-realization, man becomes completely man only in playing.

Schiller then went on to say that the natural corrective to the emotional excess which leads to savagery is what he called like Kant *schmelzende Schönheit* (melting beauty); while the antidote to the mental inertness which leads to barbarism is *energische Schönheit* (energizing beauty, that is, the sublime), the aesthetic state being recognized as being neutral as far as it concerns the influencing of the will. But it is because of this that it is valuable morally, for when a man is under the exclusive domination of either principles or feelings he is in danger of becoming a slave, and must be redrawn to the neutral zone of freedom. "In a word," said Schiller, "there is no other way of making the sensuous man rational except by first making him aesthetic." The pith of all this is that sanity and refinement being exigencies good art serves to realize them and in so doing indirectly furthers progress in right living and right thinking, a seemingly small result to have been obtained by so much laborious logic-chopping, yet after all the value of the "Letters" is not to be found in the logic-chopping nor in "the dreadful array of first principles, the forest huge of terminology and definitions where the panting intellect of weaker men wanders as in pathless thickets and at length sinks powerless to the earch, oppressed with fatigue and suffocated with scholastic miasma,"[1] but rather in their wealth of suggestive comment.

In conclusion, we have only to mention his later minor papers as "On the Necessary Limits of the Beautiful," in which he took

[1] Carlyle's Life of Schiller.

the view that the philosopher, aiming at truth, should not try to write beautifully, for being concerned rather with fact and logic the lure of beauty may endanger truth by relaxing the mind, just as it may relax the will and endanger morality, this latter thought being carried still further in his essays "On the Dangers of Aesthetic Culture" and "On the Moral Benefit of Aesthetic Culture" which are, however, merely an extension of ideas contained in the "Letters."

THE GROWTH OF THE MESSIANIC IDEA

BY DR. H. OSCHEROWITZ

I. THE PROBLEM AND METHOD.

IN any discussion of the Messianic idea the first problem is one of delimitation. To what phenomena in history may the term Messianic be significantly applied? The proper distinction between the messianic idea as an answer to the hopes of the future and other ideas found in the eschatological literature must be made. To do this the messianic idea, regardless of how closely it may be directly or indirectly related to other phenomena, must be made to stand out in significant contrast. It is true that any concept has a technical content, which may in another period be replaced or modified. It is furthermore true that a technical concept is surrounded by a fringe of ideas which are not *directly* related to it. So, for example, many ideas are called "socialistic" which have nothing to do with socialism in any narrow sense of the term. Similarly there has been the growth of the messianic idea in both the narrower and the wider sense. To determine then what is messianic, and what is not, depends largely on how we select our material. We may first try to get a technical core of the concept and follow that through its history to the exclusion of other material. We may, secondly, suggest similarly with other allied phenomena thus broadening the scope of the concept. Thirdly, we may include phenomena which suggested by the "original" or narrower concept.

The Discussion of the Method.

The method employed by Gressman, Gunkel, Jeremias and Oesterly, showing the similarity between the messianic idea of the Jews, the idea of a "Heilbringer" is valuable for a comparative study of religion, but its weakness lies in the fact that it apparently

gives more significance to a *general* concept than to a particular phenomenon which has its own distinctive characteristics. What shall be done in the following pages is to show, if possible, the growth and crystallization of the concept in its narrower aspect, its use and its decay, omitting all the outer fringe of ideas which ought to be classified as eschatological, not as messianic, and all attenuated similarities, as suggested by Oesterly, who identifies the messianic idea of "Heilbringer." He makes messiahs of Marduk and Osiris. He discusses Indra in India, but fails to discuss Rama and Krishna. He relates the "helper-gods" of the Zuni and Algonquin Indians to the Hebrew messiah. Those figures discussed are, however, characterized more by their differences than by their similarities. In nearly all these cases the only common element in them is that they "help" men and when we recall that that element is really the criterion of a god the whole attempt loses force, and falls off into the meaningless void of a single general concept. The term messiah is in this method applied to all religious figures who are obviously and outstandingly beneficient. The Jewish Messiah was not Messiah because he was outstandingly beneficient. He was beneficient because he was Messiah. But what was he as Messiah?

The word Messiah means the "anointed one." It is derived from the word *mashah* which means "to smear." It was used both in a religious and non-religious sense. In Jeremiah xxii. 14, it is used in painting a house vermillion. In other places it means to smear or wipe for the purposes of consecration (Gen. xxxi. 13; and especially Exod. xvix. 36, xxx. 26-29 and Dan. ix. 24). In the sense in which it later became classical or technical it applies to the "smearing" of persons to consecrate them. As such the term is used of kings or future kings, prophets and priests. We read that Samuel anointed Saul (I Sam. xii. 3) and David (I Sam. xvi. 13) and we also read that Cyrus was anointed (Isaiah xiv. 1). Having been anointed the fact is made into a title and the personal is Messiah, i. e. "the anointed." Similarly Elijah is anointed by Elisha (I Kings xxvi. 16). Isaiah feels himself to be "anointed" by the Lord (Isaiah lxi. 1). The priesthood is also anointed (Lev. iv. 5; vii. 36; Exod. xi. 13, 15; Numbers iii. 3). Whether anointing had a long religious history among the Hebrews is an open question. Robertson Smith thinks it was an intermediate stage between the eating of the whole

animal and "the later fire rituals."[1] According to Gressman the religion of the Hebrews, in the early Caananite period, was soaked with Phoenecian and Caananite culture, so that all elements of the "holy" or "sacred" are lacking in the Genesis account.[2] Yahveh appears to men, Abraham and Lot, wrestles with Jacob and no calamities befall them as they did to the carrier of the ark. The problem remains:—Were these stories written *late* under Caananite influence or was the early period in Canaan one either of Caananite rationalism and superculture or practical simplicity? The answer to the question is irrelevant to a degree. We know at any rate that those anointed and consecrated in this early pre-Davidic period were Messiahs. They were special servants of the Lord, of Jehovah. As such the concept of Messiah was vague and nebulous. Moreover, the idea of a personal Messiah who had more than purely local scope was unknown. The Messianic idea was not yet tied up to eschatology.

There exists the problem:—Was the Messianic idea any more than suggested by such passages which refer to the anointing of Saul and David? Was there any real pre-Davidic eschatology? Gressman argues that there was. He insists that the idea of the Messiah was earlier than the prophets. He argues from the prophecy in Isaiah vii. 14, and believes that without the idea of a divine saviour child the prophecy is not understandable and that this idea permeated the ancient world long before David and was known also in Palestine and among the Hebrews generally. To this whole theory held by Gunkel, Gressman and Jeremias it may be said that while such passages as Isaiah vii. 14f may not be clear they do not *demand* the assumption made by these writers. There is no proof of direct borrowing and lastly, it is just as difficult to apply the theory of the strange or mysterious saviour child as it is to get along with a simply naturalistic interpretation. Later prophecy does not give any hint in the way of an elaboration or a name so that any direct foreign origin can be traced. In direct contrast it may be said that the whole tone of the historical accounts and the early prophetic writings suggest the absence of such a mythological concept. Whether Isaiah vii. 14 is "understandable" or not the first *evidence*

[1] Robertson Smith, *Religion of the Semites,* 1894, p. 282f.

[2] Gressman, *Ursprung der Israelitisch Judischen Eschatologie,* p. 129.

of a personal Messiah subsequent to the early idea of a consecrated person is linked up with the name of David.

After the kingdom, which had been solidly welded together by David, who had been "anointed by Judah" (II Sam. ii. 7) and held together by Solomon, was divided after the death of Solomon, the prosperity which the whole land had enjoyed declined and lean years followed. To those who came later, the decline in brilliance and the increase of corruption made the Davidic period stand out by contrast. The interest in the Davidic dynasty was kept alive. Just what the strength of this movement was it is difficult to say. In Amos the backward view is already present (if the last verses of Amos are authentic or from the time of Amos). There is, however, nothing "mythological" or mysterious about Amos (Amos ix. 11). He prophesies that Jahveh will restore the "tabernacle of David" and for purely materialistic reasons, that Edom may be subjugated and the war wasted cities rebuilt. There is no trace of a necessity for a personal Messiah. In Hosea there is the first direct reference to a Davidic successor (Hosea iii. 5) who in the latter days will be sought when the people turn once more to Jehovah. The reference seems, however, to be rather casual, not laden with the sound of formal eschatology.

From the time of Amos to Isaiah two facts became indelibly fixed in the minds of the Jahvehistic prophets, the corrupt conditions of social structure which needed "saving" from complete collapse and the need for a reign by a strong king who would be a popular hero, such as was typified by David, whose memory was still alive and being kept so by the Jahvists. There is nothing to indicate that the Messianic idea had become greatly crystallized from the time of Hosea to Isaiah but the chief elements were already present. The Messiah was to be a saviour, a king and a descendant of Jesse.

In Isaiah the Messianic idea reaches its classical form. It is true that Isaiah was still living in the narrowly bounded world, that his imagination did not picture the glory of Yahveh, the universality of his power and did not anticipate the time when the nearness of Jahveh would turn into a remoteness as the extent of the world dawned upon his worshippers. Nevertheless, the situation gave to Isaiah the essential elements of the idea of the personal

Messiah. The changes henceforth were in the manner in which the Messiah was to function and his endowments.

Whether the three passages referring to a personal Messiah in Isaiah indicate the development of his mind, scholarship has not revealed, for the dates of the three passages are uncertain. In Isaiah vii. 14, there is the bare mention of a child to be born of a young woman and to be called Immanuel. In Isaiah ix. 6, we find either an elaboration or a new idea. The child is called "Wonderful, Counsellor, Everlasting-Father, Mighty God, Prince of Peace." The title "Mighty God" is unique for the Old Testament, and "Everlasting Father" is unusual for the period. Unlike vii. 14, there is definite mention that the child shall occupy the throne of David though the passage does not say precisely that he falls in the Davidic descent. Isaiah seems to have had the idea of a human-divine figure in mind and here the suggestion that there was borrowing, perhaps unconsciously, may be justified. It is to be noted, however, that the passage in itself quite striking, is not directly referred to in the Old Testament, nor in the Apocalypses or in the New Testament. The passage seems not to have exerted any influence on later thought. Far more important, though less striking, is Isaiah ii. 1f. This passage had considerable influence on later Messianic thought. The term branch which Isaiah used became in the course of the succeeding century a technical Messianic term (Jer. xxiii. 5).

The prophecy in Micah v. 2 refers to the birth of a Messianic king but omits mention of all Davidic connections. The prediction that he will be born in Bethlehem Ephrathah gives the prophecy a touch of the "mysterious" and suggests foreign influences or the possibility of its being a later interpolation.

The century after Isaiah saw the defeat of prophetic ideals and the suppression of prophetic activity. Not until Josiah institutes the Deuteronomic reform does light once more flash in the darkness. But the light was only a flash. The destruction of Judah was imminent and came with unfailing certainty. Jeremiah lived through the whole terrible time. Yet if we look for his contribution to Messianic thought we find it almost nil. He has faith that Yahveh will eventually prosper the Davidic dynasty but he does not intensely visualize even in his deepest gloom the coming of a personal Messiah. He speaks of the Branch which is to grow up out of the Davidic line (Jer. xxiii. 5; xxxiii. 15) but he is also anxious

to assert immediately that there will never be a dearth of priests. Jeremiah's whole faith is in Yahveh. He will save Isreal. The Davidic kings will never be absent but these coming kings are never referred to as in Isaiah ix. 6 as extraordinary persons. Yahveh will restore and save Israel; the Davidic kings will rule.

The Exile was begun and after a time the exiles were allowed by Cyrus, "the anointed one" to return home. Ezekiel returned with them. The whole current of thought during the exile was not Messianic. Isaiah spoke about the "suffering servant" (Isaiah 52:53). The editor of Amos (Amos ix. 11-15) saw a new era in the land of Israel and Ezekiel saw not only the restoration but the healing of the old breach between North and South. If the attitude of Ezekiel can be called Messianic it is so only in a wider impersonal sense. The same is true of Isaiah and the editor of Amos. Ezekiel was a priest, and if not expressly, at least inwardly suspicious of the more self assertive nationalism of the older Isaiah. His references to the Davidic dynasty (Ez. xxxiv. 23 and xxxvii. 24) were like Jeremiah's secondary to Yahveh. Yahveh will save. A new heart and a new spirit is what Yahveh will give them, not a saviour.

In Haggai we find not a new situation but for the first time an expressed confidence in an individual by Yahveh. The work of the destruction of the enemies of Israel is not completed, but Yahveh's day will come and then he will choose Zerubabel as ruler in the new age. He is the specially chosen servant of Yahveh, so prophesied Haggai and Zerubabel was a "son" of David. But whether Haggai was an opponent of the priesthood which is unlikely and played up Zerubabel is unlikely. At any rate, the crown fell to Joshua, a priest, while Zerubabel disappears from the narrative entirely. To Joshua is given the technical title of the "branch." Thus in this period the idea of the Messiah was still flexible enough or the pressure of the immediate politico-social situation was sufficiently great, so that a priest could replace a king as Messiah (Haggai ii. 21-23; Zach. vi. 12).

With Malachi, the last of the Old Testament prophets, the idea of messenger or forerunner appears. This forerunner is to precede the coming of Yahveh to the temple. It is an idea that affected all the later history of the Messianic idea, for it is made to carry over and apply to the Messiah instead of Yahveh himself. At this

period the Messiah himself was very probably, as Goodspeed suggests, the messenger.[3]

With "Emmet" we can say that while the eschatological elements of the Old testament were plentiful, an "expectation of the Messiah in a strict sense, occupied a comparatively subordinate place." Before David there is no intimation of a Messiah of a Babylonian or Egyptian complexion. After David and the Golden Age there is a general tendency to look back with longing eyes to the "good old times" but no idea of a personal Messiah appears until the time of Isaiah, but even here it is not exploited. It remains unimportant and negligible. Yahveh himself was thought of as the saviour. The idea of the permanent renewal of Davidic rule persisted, new branches of the line were to grow out of the mutilated stem, but the individual, personal character, the coming of a definite person or messenger from Yahveh had not yet developed. Emmet thinks that the idea of a personal, unusually endowed Messiah was a popular belief.[4] Ezekiel, he thinks, emphasizes Yahveh to counteract the action of the popular idea.

A word about Daniel's reference to the "son of man." In Dan. vii. 13 we have originally no intention of a personal Messiah. At the time of the writing the figure was introduced as familiar. Its meaning in the time of Daniel is uncertain. It became clearer in the post Old Testament period. Daniel pinned his faith not in a Messiah but in the pious, consecrated souls.

II. POST-OLD TESTAMENT PERIOD.

We have seen that there was a general hope for a better future but that there were very few references to a personal Messiah in the literature. How widespread the hope for a Messiah was among the masses is difficult to say. The same disinterestedness on the part of the intellectuals and literary men seems to have continued after the Old Testament was closed. "Baldensperger" and others even go so far as to say that the idea was on the wane.[5] They point to the fact that the Apocrypha hardly mentions a personal Messiah.[6] The idea of a kingdom and another golden age persists, of course, but the idea of a personal Messiah is largely ignored. The Apocry-

[3] Goodspeed, *Israel's Messianic Hope,* Macmillan, 1900.

[4] Emmet, *Messiah.*

[5] *Baldensperger, Wilhelm, Die messianische Hoffnung des Judentums.*

[6] *Schürer: Geschichte des Jüdischen Volkes.*

pha seems to mention a personal Messiah only twice (in Esdras and I Maccabees xiv. 41).

The Messiah is mentioned in the Apocalyptic literature but this, it is to be noticed, is to a large extent popular, and He is also mentioned by the "Hellenistic" writers. The Sadduccees on the other hand, who had no need of a Messiah, and the Pharisees who were more interested in law and the rule of the priesthood show us how unimportant the Messianic hope must have been and by whom it was fostered. A survey of the literature shows us how little concentrated attention was given to the Messianic idea.

In the Sibyllian Oracles III, 49 (168-151 B. C.) and III, 652-994, the references are, however, very short. The Messianic king is a servant of Yahveh's who will engage in war to end war. In a later book, V, the Messiah is a king who destroys Nero (130 A. D.). In "Enoch" little is said. The Messiah appears after the judgment as a white bull. The enemies of Israel and all heathendom worship him. (Enoch 83-90) (166-161 B. C.).

In the "Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs" we find again the priestly character of the Messiah and his Levitic descent. But in the "Testament of Judah" we find him descended from Judah (xxiv. 5f). The Psalms of Solomon were written when Pompey ruled at Rome, 70-40 B. C. The Messiah is Davidic. Here the idea of the "anointed one" comes again to the fore. He conquers the nations, not on horseback but by the power of his word. He is sinless and holy, made powerful by the Holy Ghost. In the Apocalypse of Baruch written in the last decades of the first century A. D. the Messiah appears mysteriously from heaven to judge the nations after the "wars of the last days." The Messiah is the warrior, the slayer and ruler of the Gentiles. In the Fourth book of Ezra the nations rise against the Messiah at his coming but he will stand on the Mount of Zion and crush his foes. The heavenly city will be revealed and the ten tribes of Israel will receive their sacred land. The Messiah will rule 400 years and then die, as will all the people. After seven days the just will be resurrected and a new world be given to them.

The philosopher Philo makes mention of a warrior hero, and Josephus also, but shows no vital interest in him.

III. THE RISE OF RATIONALISM.

At the beginning of the second century we find the non-Jewish author of the Philosophumena writing of the Messiah: "He will belong to the Davidic family but will not be born of a virgin and the Holy Ghost, but of man and woman, as all others are born. He, they believe, will be their king, a war-like and mighty man, who will gather the Jews to battle with all peoples. He will make Jerusalem his capital and restore it to its old condition, and also its inhabitants who will rule and sacrifice there in security for a long time. Then they will be attacked and in the war the Messiah will be killed by the sword. Shortly thereafter the end of the world will come by fire, and the judgment will follow."[7] This, in general, with some variations was the conception of the Messiah after the fall of Jerusalem. As time went on and the Jewish state became a memory the speculations on the time and conditions of his coming, and on the nature of the Messianic age increased. On the whole there was an essential agreement as to his nature. As we see in the passage above the Jews defended their conception against the Christian idea of Christ, against a Virgin birth, and against the idea that the Messiah had any share whatever in the godhead.

There were three phases of the Messianic speculations that stood out quite prominently; first, the restoration of political independence; second, the miraculous ushering in of the Messianic era; and third, the relationship of the Messianic hope to immortality. Political independence became the great hope again even though the political "Messiahs" became fewer. The Messianic age always had its beginning in Jerusalem in the fancies of the Rabbis. Fancy, however, ran wild. Daniel was assiduously studied for the date of its appearance, and the miraculous events preceding the appearance became so much a part of the speculations that when Julian, the Apostate, offered to restore Jerusalem, the Jews were not interested because the restoration was not cataclysmic. These hopes, however fanciful, were nevertheless a means of sustaining the courage of the Jews throughout the Dark Ages. They enabled them to endure persecution, not with resignation, but with pride, and even scorn for his persecutors, for eventually he would be the master.

[7] *Schürer, Ibid,* p. 521-2.

IV. THE INFLUENCE OF ARABIAN RATIONALISM.

The rise of Islam and Arabic culture was accompanied by a revival of activity on the part of Pseudo-messiahs among whom Isaac ben Yahub, Al Rai and Serenas are to be mentioned. But of far greater importance is the revolt against the Rabbis and their literal and materialistic interpretation of the Talmud. The Talmud for a long time fell into a period of disrepute and the revolt against the authority of the Rabbis became widespread. The Renaissance that was taking place had its influence more widely among the Jews than among the Christians. The Sufists and the Mutazalite with their rationalistic interpretation of the Koran taught the Jews to interpret the Talmud in the same way. Fancy ranged free but not any longer on a materialistic basis, for behind even the wildest speculations there was the desire to *explain*, which is so characteristic of periods of super-culture. The speculations deal, however, almost entirely with the Messianic age and not with the person of the Messiah. The "Book of Zerubabel" written by an Italian Jew introduces some fresh material. The Messiah is the "son of Joseph" and called Mehemiah ben Hushiel, and Elijah, the son of Armilas, and the anti-Messiah is the son of Satan and a marble statue. The mother of the Messiah is also introduced, Hephzibah, with the statement "my desire is in her." She will appear five years before the Messiah and slay two kings with the staff of Aaron which is being secretly preserved.

Beginning with the writings of Rabbi Jehudah Halevi (1080-1142) we find a new note, one which was to become of ultimate importance in the history of later Judaism. We find reflections upon the meaning and status of Judaism in God's plan for the world and its salvation. In later centuries this was to result in a disappearance of the Messianic belief.

By far the most important figure in the Middle Ages was Maimonides who was big enough to give a dignified rational account of the Messianic age. There will be no miraculous intervention in the affairs of nature. The Messiah will be a great king in Palestine who will rule the nations as they shall live in peace. Living conditions will be made less hard and men will be able to devote themselves to wisdom instead of war. There will be no immortality.

The Messiah too will die and will be succeeded by his son. The righteous will prosper, the wicked will fall. The Messianic age will be a natural but a god fearing age. Maimonides set the tendency which rationalism largely followed throughout the Middle Ages.

V. DEVELOPMENT IN THE KABBALAH.

The Aristotelianized Judaism of Maimonides and the rationalistic study of Talmud were, however, no food for the people nor even for the intellectuals in periods of bitter persecution. The sustenance they needed was found in mysticism and in the "spiritualistic" speculations of Kabbalists. Among the Kabbalists there was a wide range of differences. Rabbi Moses ben Nahman (1195-1270) was cool and rationalistic, never giving way to the fanciful speculations which sought to understand the advent of the Messianic age by the juxtaposition of numbers. He reiterated the old claim that belief in a messiah was not essential to Judaism though he himself was a believer. Others, however, were more imaginative and active. Abraham Abulafia of Judea (1240-1291) announced himself as Messiah. Moses de Leon (1250-1305) brought out a book called Zohar which became the most widespread hand-book of Messianic speculations and even replaced for the time being in large circles the Talmud as a sacred book. Later came another assertion from Albo (1380-1444) that the belief in the Messiah was not essential, but in a century like the fourteenth when the Jews suffered unspeakably such a view could not become dominant. In the fifteenth century it was severely criticized by Don Isaac ben Judah Abarbanel (1437-1509) who though rationalistic enough in his belief regarding the nature of the Messiah, nevertheless engaged in Kabbalistic speculations as to the date of his coming, which he set at 1530, thereby facilitating the rise of "Laemlein" of Germany, who declared himself to be the forerunner of the Messiah.

The terrible persecution of the Jews was somewhat relieved by the rise of Protestantism and the kindly attitude of Luther. In the seventeenth century, the Jewish speculations on the Messianic age very often were approved by Christian speculations upon the coming of Christ. Such was the case with Menasseh ben Israel (1604-1657) whose speculations had a great influence upon Cromwellian

politics in England. In the East Sabbatai Zebi, also a brilliant Kabbalist, born in Smyrna in 1621, began his colorful career as a pseudo-Messiah. According to the Sabbatians the Messiah possesses a divine personality and is a part of the "original soul" and the first man, also that he is the son of God and the daughter of Zorah, thus establishing a trinity. The last great figure who posed as Messiah was Jankier Frank (1726-1791) who combined Mohammedian, Catholic, and Jewish ideas with the personality of a charlatan. He had no influence, however, on Messianic thought.

VI. THE PERIOD OF REFORM. MODERN JUDAISM.

The Eighteenth Century was the dawn of a new era. The Enlightenment, with its wider point of view, had its influence on Judaism and produced the great figure of Moses Mendelssohn. The spirit of liberalism drawn from the well of the French Encyclopedists began to breathe a new and truly modern life into Judaism so that it was eventually to escape in part some of the pitfalls that Christianity had fallen into. Napoleon assembled the great Jewish Synod and aided the Jews to a new and freer self consciousness. Hopes ran high, many of which were to be dashed to pieces. Two parties arose which took a position with respect to the Messianic hope. One party regarded the new political freedom as a solution for all the problems of the Jews and renounced the Messianic idea. David Friedlander in 1882 wrote urging that all prayers with a Messianic tendency be abolished and that the Jews serve their various adopted countries. The other party found no real relief in equal political rights and still looked forward to the coming of the Messiah, who would grant them not only equal political rights but also their own king in a divinely ordained Jewish kingdom.

Samson Raphael Hirsh (1808-1888) the great orthodox leader of the nineteenth century, suggested the compromise which was the revival of the spirit of Maimonides and Halevi. He urged the Jews to interpret their nationalism in a spiritual sense rather than as a state which is to exist for materialistic benefits. Israel whether distributed among the states of the world or possessing a state of its own is God's means of revealing himself to humanity for the achievement of a universal brotherhood. Zacharias Frankel (1801-1875) thought Hirsch's theory too abstract but though he was a

firm believer in the Messianic hope, he had no definite ideas on the subject and those that he had he changed quite often.

After the establishment of the reform society at Frankfort a. Main in 1843, discussion was continued at the various Rabbinical Conferences. In Pittsburgh in 1885, the Conference decided that the restoration of the Jewish State under the rule of descendants of David was not a part of the Messianic hope, that the destruction of the Second Jewish Commonwealth gave the Jews their real spiritual mission, and that the belief in a bodily resurrection was not essential.

Messianic interpretations of the status of the Jews in their new found freedom continued, however, and it was in a messianic strain of thought that the Zionist movement was introduced. The idea became widespread that the Messianic era will be introduced only after Palestine was reinhabited by the Jews. The Zionist movement, however, was supported by all strands. In any case the Messianic hope today extends beyond the materialistic interest of the Jewish people, and its spiritual interpretation dominates both the orthodox and the liberal parties of Judaism.

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

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A MONTHLY MAGAZINE

Devoted to the Science of Religion, the Religion of Science, and the Extension of the Religious Parliament Idea.

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DOES SCIENCE OFFER SOCIETY ETHICAL GUIDANCE?

BY T. SWANN HARDING

A VERY intelligent, vivacious, neo-Protestant girl fell in love with a Roman Catholic youth. In time religion came up for discussion and she was more than usually bewildered when it came to explaining just what ethical standards her own adumbrant faith provided. In further time a Catholic priest was called upon for adjudication and advice. A very little thereafter the young lady delivered herself of something like this—"I believe I shall join the Roman Catholic Church. I am not especially religious; I do not believe in God so terribly; but I have always felt the need of some definite and precise ethical standard for my conduct and the Roman Catholic church very decidedly and positively offers that. I am all for it."

The young lady's predicament is a common one. That she solved it by antiquated means, for all religious means of ethical solution are today philosophically obsolete—the Roman Catholic perhaps to a less extent than the Protestant, being more efficient—is not especially reprehensible. The church is not to be blamed. If anyone is culpable it is the scientist. For the scientist has deliberately, in some cases, and unconsciously, but necessarily, in others, destroyed the foundation of the older religious ethical sanctions yet has often very haughtily refused to cooperate in the work of replacing this tottering structure. He does not lack material with which to build. He lacks only energy, imagination, disposition and a modicum of bravery.

Where the scientist does come out into the open today he comes, usually, as a Presbyterian seeking to deny the antagonism between science and religion, rather than as a scientist offering a new doctrine and a new inspiration. He comes, instead, with a theological

manifesto signed by prominent citizens certifying to the continuance of an antiquated order, or he affirms propositions which he cannot demonstrate scientifically, instead of coming as the prophet of and instructor in a new order he could so readily outline to humanity.

Indeed the onus is upon him. He has procrastinated and equivocated long enough. For Lincoln Steffens (*Plain Talk*, November, 1928) discovered a real situation when he noted that "Ethics are professional; they differ in different occupations; and an ethical practitioner, formed and fitted in one profession, trade, or business, is apt to be disqualified thereby for another occupation morally as well as technically." This should not be so. Yet it actually is so today.

Some people have a very disconcerting way of asking questions, and no wonder. One has recently asked whether there is even room for ethics in modern science, whether indeed the scientific viewpoint—which offers what is essentially a modern system of practical philosophy if applied somewhat more relentlessly than is customary—has a place for ethics in its operations! The answer is a modified affirmative. Actually science itself must be ethical because it must respect such concepts as fact, truth, reasoning, sincerity, honor and impartiality. In so far as ethics is a system of moral principles and in so far as to be moral is to be guided by the highest sense of what is right and proper, true science must be ethical and must base its operations upon ethical foundations.

But one can easily understand that the lay mind is readily misled by scientific practitioners in their every day habits. There is a very striking dichotomy between the ideals of science and the actual practise of scientists. There is even a very striking difference between the highly ethical attitude of the research investigator in his laboratory, confronting a specific problem, and his attitude towards his own fellows in controversy, much less towards the world at large. What slight contact the laic makes with science is necessarily made via certain men who stand out as scientists in the lay mind, for instance physicians, and via certain other rare investigators whose publicity sense somewhat over-shadows or masks the technique of their purely scientific achievements.

This question is important in a socalled scientific age and it merits examination. At the very start certain propositions seem

basic. It is rather generally agreed that society can only achieve more perfect order in so far as enlightened social consciousness is so aroused in ordinary men that it triumphs over the more selfish types of anarchistic individualism our American political philosophy has so long and so mistakenly emphasized. It is also quite apparent that certain groups of men are able to organize themselves into associations which, while possessing the virtues of organized, unified action, yet preserve individualism rather completely and carefully. Thus we find, for instance, such functioning organizations of, let us say,—thieves, politicians, merchants, lawyers, theologians, physicians and pure scientists. It will be agreed, no doubt, that in this list we have a rising crescendo of excellence. It is also apparent that until scientists have achieved the very highest attainable ethics they cannot hope to have a surplus to pass along to the orders below to help them upward.

With these specific groups selected to simplify the problem and with these general assumptions in mind—recognizing that they are assumptions and do not constitute a proved case—let us examine the orders mentioned in a somewhat cursory way. Thereafter let us see what we can honestly conclude as a result of our examination.

It has often been said that there is honor among thieves. We shall here endeavor to separate thieves from politicians, assuming them to be actual or detected, not potential or undetected, criminals. The differentiation does have certain significance however ill defined. Before detection criminals have very definite codes of honor among themselves. Though anti-social in a large sense they are, within their group, usually honorable and ethical. But this order is maintained by condign and swift punishment and it is involuntary; it therefore has little concern for us here, except as this subgroup affects society and as society affects it.

Curiously enough primitive man appears not to have punished what we call crime. (Sutherland—*Criminology.*) We are told that "even if a person killed his father, which was generally regarded as a horrible offense, he was not punished by the other members or even by the tribe; the members of the family felt that since the family had already been weakened by the loss of one member, it would be foolish to weaken it still further by injuring the offender. They looked upon such acts, however, with great

surprise and disgust." You will observe, however, a lack of vindictiveness or desire to teach a lesson or inculcate restraint in others by repeating the homicide with state sanction.

Wissler, writing of American aborigines, stresses the fact that children were controlled by admonition and ridicule and, as Malinowski also observes, were seldom or never chastised. "In fact the whole control of the local group in aboriginal days seems to have been exercised by admonition and mild ridicule instead of by force and punishment." Yet savage societies were not disrupted by powerful stresses; they were stable and efficient in social control. We appear to have forgotten something as we became "civilized." We have forgotten that stable society and a minimum of crime spring from spontaneous self-discipline which, in turn, arises from a social *esprit de corps* we very largely lack in America today.

In a characteristically delightful essay Albert Jay Nock once insisted (In *The American Mercury*) that an improvement in manners could alone effect the moral reforms we so naively hope to effect by restrictive legislation. This spontaneous, self-regulating mechanism is the one the scientist uses in his laboratory (not necessarily towards his wife) and it can build up our social *esprit de corps* to the point where anti-social acts would be inhibited by the fact that individuals could appreciate the disastrous consequences of such acts without being under duress. In short, when taxicab drivers are heard profanely admonishing their more impetuous colleagues to observe the traffic lights though no policeman is in sight it becomes obvious that almost any human can profit by scientific ethics if he knows what it is.

The scientific attitude will alone produce the social excellencies impotent reformers merely preach. Preaching is useless; punishment is irrational, non-deterrant, profoundly unscientific and manifestly ineffective. The only scientific attitude to apply to criminals is that applied today to the insane and to young but mentally normal delinquents in our more advanced juvenile courts. This consists merely in an impartial, exhaustive study of the social causes for the individual's mal-adjustment to society (which is all that crime is) and an effort to produce conditions under which such mal-adjustment no longer occurs. This procedure is so simple and rational as to be almost startling, yet we habitually follow doctrinal

and emontional procedures which are as anachronistic as they are futile.

Of course there are types which simply cannot adjust to society as it is. Considering our social chaos they may be very sane types indeed. They need segregation for life under intelligent supervision, unless they learn the technique of adjustment with passing years. By that we mean that they must learn so to control what is usually an emotional instability which renders them too anti-social to be abroad in our society as at present constituted. That society is imperfect enough, it is true. Therefore a "crime" is not an absolute evil; indeed science knows no absolute evil save dishonesty. A crime is simply the failure of an individual cell to adjust harmoniously for life as a unit in our present social organism. What was once crime—printing a book, believing in the circulation of the blood, driving with reins, having gold in the house, selling coins to foreigners—is no longer crime and anti-social acts of today—indifference to quarantine, sanitary, factory, traffic or "prohibition" regulations—was not crime in past years. But to live successfully in this society individuals must learn mental and emotional self-discipline. Therefore we maintain young criminals in close association with experts under highly unnatural conditions and consider them lost souls because they do not return to society models of ethical perfection.

A study of *American Prisons and Reformatory Institutions; A Report* by M. Liepmann, Professor of Criminology, University of Hamburg, would illustrate what scientific prison control can do with criminals. The New Castle County Workhouse at Wilmington is a case in point. Here the principle of self-government for prisoners has been realized to a greater extent than anywhere else in the world and as a result the inmate leaves the prison ready for life outside. Three guards, two by day and one at night, control the entire 400-500 prisoners and the maintenance of order is entirely in the control of the inmates. They live peacably in barracks, do the work, are paid for it, indulge in all sorts of social and other activities, do not attempt to escape, collaborate with the officials in their own regeneration and often return to the institution for friendly visits after leaving it. Delaware has only this one penal institution and it has made a citizen factory of it.

We have dealt rather exhaustively with this lowest class of so-

ciety but can handle the intermediate orders more briefly, concentrating again on the scientists, presumed to inhabit the top layer. Making the very slight transition from thieves to politicians there is little new to say. We of course live in a plutocracy. Santayana's ideal "international community with universal free trade, extreme division of labor, and no unproductive consumption" is not yet. As Oppenheimer has it concisely in *The State*—"In principle, there are now, as before, only two classes to be distinguished: one a ruling class, which acquires more of the total product of the labor of the people—the economic means—than it has contributed, and a subject class, which obtains less of the resultant wealth than it has contributed." The research scientist, be it noted, still serves in the subject class today. This is the class of which J. A. Hobson writes—"It is not so much that these people are robbed of their property by their superiors in economic strength, but rather that they are prevented from producing property which they can have no security of holding for their own uses." Brooks Adams goes further and remarks flatly—"In the United States capital has long owned the leading universities by right of purchase, as it has owned the highways, the currency, and the press, and capital has used the universities, in a general way, to develop capitalistic ideas."

When you consider a scientific or functional society it is at once evident that the politician is an anachronism. R. H. Tawney thus defines such a society—"A society which aimed at making the acquisition of wealth contingent upon the discharge of social obligations, which sought to proportion remuneration to service and denied it to those by whom no service was performed, which inquired first not what men possess but what they can make or create or achieve, might be called a Functional Society, because in such a society the main subject of social emphasis would be the performance of social functions."

Since plutocracy depends upon the politician of today so to mitigate the severity of the plutocratic whiplash that the people may think they rule themselves, politicians can have no ethics worth consideration. The financial powers regard a politician as efficient when he is just sufficiently clever to press their advantage as far as is humanly possible without ever reaching what economists call the "incentive limit" at which point a populace loses patience, sees the light and mutters in revolt. In a rich country this job is rela-

tively easy and even a poor politician can become a distinguished senator while a man of brains may sometimes apply his intelligence to the problems of the people quite liberally before he is called to task by his masters. The dubious compromises with the "incentive limit" are interpreted to the masses as fatherly concern for their welfare, and the system easily flourishes in a country richly endowed with natural wealth—so easily that the overseers can afford to be generous in small things and often drop rather large crumbs from their tables. Howe's *Confessions of a Reformer* will portray the politician in this aspect to any who wish to pursue the subject.

It is apparent then, that we can expect from the politicians only the devious ethics of sychophantic buffers and pliable tools and the intelligence of a Bryan (as Pitkin portrays it in *Twilight of the American Mind*) or a Roosevelt, (as his friend, O. K. Davis, so innocently gives it away in *Released for Publication.* That is what we get. We can expect nothing more until society is reorganized on a scientific basis. It remains today antiquated in organization and approaches chaos merely because machine civilization has outrun our intellectual ability to solve social problems by at least a century.

We turn to merchants. Certain commercial organizations have been sufficiently astute to discover the economic value of professional attitudes and higher standards of ethics. But the attitude is still rare in business and industry. Yet, as Laski says (*Grammar of Politics*")—"That element of service is integral to the idea of a profession; it is not yet integral to the idea of business enterprise. We do not hold a boot-manufacturer to the use of such qualities of leather as will make good boots. We do not inquire if a clothier has used shoddy material in the suits he sells." Yet we do exact certain standards of competence in doctors, in lawyers, in dentists, and we even have barber's colleges and schools of automobile mechanics and radio technicians. But business must be brought voluntarily to adopt this professional attitude in the end, for nothing permanent can be accomplished by legislative demands.

Of course certain business houses do sporadically develop high morale. Certain department stores are highly ethical in their dealings but either because they thought it would pay in the beginning or found it did pay in the end. All business and all industry can only be regulated and standardized by professionalism. This is not

an impossible ideal provided the ethics are somewhere being developed right now. Merchants and manufacturers have often shown a surprising disposition to cooperate with rather than to rebel against partially scientific regulatory demands made upon them by the government in such things as pure food laws. Indeed they often come voluntarily to see whether a projected product will conform to regulations, but usually profit and not service naturally calls the pace. This is natural, at the present stage of ethical development.

In a free market relative economic scarcity tends to determine prices, not quality or anything else. It also governs the type and amount of production and goods showing the largest margin between the cost of production and selling price will obviously predominate in such a market. They will be produced regardless of their inherent value and of crying need of less "profitable" goods. This system naturally fails to evolve the most desirable scheme of production because money demand is never synonymous with real need so long as there are rich consumers competing with the poor and demands can be "created" by advertising. For money cost differs altogether from social cost and luxury cars may be built while bread is scarce. Finally market equilibrium breaks down, crises and maladjustments follow, yet these breaks, as Maurice Dobbs says, are due to specific conditions in capitalistic society and not to the character of market exchange *per se*. However, it is apparent, that no high ethics can even be expected from business and industry under such conditions.

We come to lawyers about whom scarcely more needs to be done than to recommend Arthur Train's *On the Trail of the Bad Men* where the situation of this profession in our present society is tellingly portrayed. We have no right to expect high social ethics here. While in police departments, reformatories, penitentiaries, homes for the weak minded and schools for incorrigibles —to which lawyers send the anti-social elements—do at times make successful attempts to develop an ethical morale which is self-disciplinary, the very nature of the lawyer's business prevents him from going very far in this direction professionally.

He also is an anachronism. Not only will lawyers be practically eliminated from a scientific functional society, it is an actual fact by their own admission that they could be cut to one-third in

number if the present legal business of this country were transacted in a sensible, reasonable, logical manner. But the source of their income leads them to protest such rationalization. They have gone so far that they will disbar a colleague convicted of crime, though they still constantly refuse to disbar one known to be just as guilty so long as he has escaped conviction. This is what we should expect.

In the lawyer we have really come upon another incarnation of the politician because he is the equivocal servant of an antiquated society which seeks to perpetuate its obsolete self for the benefit of itself. It never questions its own value to itself. What or who would? The lawyer does not serve scientifically. He serves empirically and often, at the behest of more powerful forces, he acts to belabor or to impede scientific research and the advance of knowledge itself. An examination of government reports will constantly make it apparent how the lawyer-politician type continually interferes with legitimate scientific achievement. He defers reforestation by opposing national forests; he impedes the construction of public bridges and holds out for high-priced, high-tolled private structures on public highways; he finds a thousand and one things more advantageous than a soil survey which is intrinsically more valuable than two-thirds of the things a lawyer suggests; he lays a restraining hand upon the publication of the results of laboratory investigation wherein they might injure business and advertising though they would enlighten the people who paid for the work enormously. So long as this is true legal societies can be no more than relatively ethical and it is vain to expect more of them or to reprehend them for being what they must be.

When we come to the theologians we again face the same problem of an antiquated profession resolutely facing the past in a society which moves inevitably towards more fundamental scientific organization. So true is this that when Pitkins (*Twilight of the American Mind*) declares there is no work today for a single first-class intellect in this entire profession, and liberally quotes a minister's confession of his normal day's work from *Harpers* in 1928 to support his contention, we are almost compelled to believe him. Theologians are already anachronistic. This is no particular discredit to them. There is no cause for recrimination. Many estimable and sincere men in all ages have conscientiously faced the

past and refused to embrace the present or peer into the future. Blinded men, no matter how intelligent or sincere, walk in circles.

But theology represents a mental attitude which sought to solve practical problems by inspirational methods. This is the confusion of values which might induce rural farmers to pray to God for deliverance from an insect scourge rather than to appeal to the State Department or the U. S. Bureau of Entomology. Such confusion of values is basically unethical. The practical problems of society are amenable to scientific solution only, yet Detroit ministers and believers prayed in their churches for the unemployed in 1927! Inspirational methods are out of date. We know better if we can but bring ourselves to apply our knowledge. Religion, in so far as it has *raisond'etre,* has it as pure mysticism—personal absorption into the Absolute Ego. It has no documentary or socially functional value. Attempts to make it work for its living must end abortively. Hence associations of clergymen can only be expected to argue about inconsequential doctrinal quibbles or to act like bad politicians—for they lack cleverness and political intuition in dealing with social problems. Hence we can expect little ethical enlightenment in this sector.

Experience in the scientific professions, however,—which are obligated to the very highest ethical standards—also indicates that we are far from daring to place a general reliance upon *esprit de corps* as an efficient social self-discipline. Not only are individuals in these professions often devious personally but in association with each other they are too frequently so corrupted by the low values of an acquisitive society that they forget scientific standards in their collective deportment.

The attitude of the medical profession may easily be summed up. Dealing as it does with science it has dawned upon individual physicians that ethical standards are imperative, that certain things must be prohibited or discountenanced even though such practices may be legal. So it is that some physicians exact from themselves almost as high a standard as the oath of Hippocrates framed thousands of years ago. Thus fee splitting is no more reprehensible in the eye of the law than is taking a commission on a bond deal or an insurance policy or a profit on a funeral. When a man takes his friend to a broker or real estate dealer and a sale results, he expects and will gladly take from the broker a split or commission

which his friend really paid. He feels no depravity. But physicians have observed that it makes for poor or unnecessary surgery when a practitioner can exact a split of the surgeon's fee on every operation he persuades his patients to have. Fee splitting occurs widely—as the brave editor of the *Medical Journal and Record* displayed in an open forum for doctors he conducted in his pages in 1928, but the medical association officially ignores this and has little to say about fees.

Why? Because in such an organization—which is actually and of necessity rather a trade guild than a scientific society—ethical easily becomes synonymous with expedient or "in a prescribed manner." This is so in medical advertising which is not based, even in the society's own pet journal, upon the quality of the product, but upon the fact that it is restricting its advertising exclusively to physicians. Actually many of the therapeutic agents advertised are perfectly impotent and valueless. While the association leads the physician to believe that all advertising in his journal represents therapeutic agents of established scientific merit, this is not so at all, to the great detriment of healing. And of course the medical association cannot possibly gain anything financially from the advertisement and sale to laymen of a remedy, no matter how good and specific that remedy is! Such procedure may be "ethical" in a certain trade sense, but it is not ethical in the dictionary sense of the word.

Again you will find that the medical association will list as a fellow any physician who pays his dues, and will star those who say they are specialists. Yet intimate conversation with any physician friend will disclose that they, if competent themselves, are rushed to death by reason of the mistakes and incompetence of other specialists or fellows of the association. But can they openly advise people who are and who are not really good physicians? They cannot. That is grossly unethical and would result in their censure. Indeed the association itself rigidly refuses as a matter of policy to point out good physicians when appealed to to do so because that would be "unethical."

The fact that second, third and fourth rate men must be admitted to the profession as competent, all around physicians, as it is at present organized explains such breaches of ethics and the professional antipathy towards science. Of course, if scientifically

organized, a few first rate minds would direct the medical service of each community and would have organized under them tonsil mechanics and tongue lookers who could do a specific task well but are lost when it comes to general diagnosis. At present, however, when ex-presidents of the American Medical Association and the present Editor of its Journal proclaim that medicine is an art, and not a science and seek to make us believe that every fifth rate practitioner is a noble intellect, antipathy to science is natural.

For science weeds out incompetence and strengthens ethics in so far. Quite naturally Harry H. Moore's well documented and wise study of medical disorganization in this country—*American Medicine and the People's Health*—was damned by the ordained society reviewer with very faint praise and its appendix—*Is Medicine Usually Practised Scientifically?* was denounced as "an unbalanced, irrational assault on modern medical practice that should never have been published anywhere. Its inclusion in the book is perhaps another indictment of Mr. Moore's judgment." The article was by a physiological chemist (the present writer) and begged for more science in medicine. Yet, of Mr. Moore's masses of incontrovertible facts and statistics the medical journal said "Even the selection of these items has been apparently planned with a view to casting great discredit on the practice of medicine as it exists today!"

Discredit needs to be cast and can be, but Mr. Moore was eminently fair and scientific in his procedure. But when you mean by "ethical" what is scientifically good, true and useful, you naturally come into violent conflict with a professional society in so far as it resembles a trade guild. The article by M. L. Harris, M. D., in the Nov. 26, 1927, *Journal of the American Medical Association* and entitled "Medical Economics" will prove to those who wish to investigate that trade guild here predominates over science. Medicine as at present organized does not dare go over to science, which would demand complete reorganization on a scientific basis and a total revision of ethics. Such reorganization, however, will almost necessarily demand the control of an aroused and alert social consciousness for reasons given by this paragraph from Graham Wallas' *Art of Thought.*

"But the whole history of professional organization since the 'guild' system of the late Middle Ages shows that if a monopoly of service is given to the persons on the register of any profession, and the right to admit to and remove from that register is given to a body consisting of representatives elected by the profession, the right of registration will be primarily used to secure the interests of the existing members of the profession, as producers, against the rest of the community, then living or still to be born, as consumers. In drawing up, for instance, conditions of admission, the desire to raise salaries by restricting members will always prove more influential with the voting majority than the desire, which will be constantly proclaimed and often sincerely felt, to increase professional efficiency. And the discipline enforced by the right to remove names from the register will, as years go on, aim mainly at the protection of members of the profession from such a competition among themselves or from outsiders as shall increase the severity of the effort needed to secure a livelihood in the profession. The terms 'professional ethics' and 'professional reasons' have, indeed, acquired in the legally self-regulating professions, and in the voluntary organizations which in fact control many legally unregulated professions, a peculiar and unmistakable."

A careful and thoughtful perusal of this paragraph will explain whatever else we need to know about the present ethics of the medical association, its attitude towards science and towards quack interlopers as well as towards those who would reorganize it to function scientifically in an alertly self-conscious society. We may pass on then to the rarified realm of scientists themselves.

For we must take the case to this court of last resort before we complete our study. The experimental scientist is dedicated to truth, to facts and to high standards of honor; it is his duty to be unemotional, impersonal, impartial and just, in so far as this is humanly possible, and he normally is in his attitude toward his own experimental results. But it is just as true that, in a majority of cases, he is as unbalanced, as prejudiced, as emotional and as unfair as the next man in his attitude towards the work of his rivals, in his dealings with other scientists and in his attitude towards life outside the laboratory.

Twenty years personal experience in the inner recesses of this profession leads the writer to say that more anecdotal evidences of scientific jealousies, cliques, devious ethical procedures and de-

liberate over or under emphasis could be recorded here than he cares or intends to relate. There is this for guidance—the attitude of the intelligent and sincere investigator towards observations and experiments he performs to formulate a hypothesis. Then he is at his best. His hypothesis formed he tends almost inevitably to make it a doctrine and, in spite of himself, to view inimical facts with a jaundiced eye. But, what is far worse, he too frequently lends himself to petty emotional attitudes and predominantly doffs his scientific attitude with his laboratory coat when he goes out into the world. He has, in the scientific method, the thing with which to rebuild the world. He needs first to refashion himself in accordance with its specifications and then to take the viewpoint boldly out into the world of men.

"Scientific method," writes Karl Pearson (*Grammar of Science*) "consists in the careful and often laborious classification of facts, in the comparison of their relationships and sequences, and finally in the discovery by aid of the disciplined imagination of a brief statement or formula, which in a few words resumes a wide range of facts." This requires tolerance, objectification, suspended judgment, *sui compose,* and rigid impartiality, besides honor and humor. It in short demands the very highest ethical standard and one which should be applied first to scientific societies and then given to mankind at large for guidance.

What is done? Consider this bit of advertising which appeared in the "News Edition" of *Industrial and Engineering Chemistry,* organ of the American Chemical Society, Dec. 10, 1927. Employers were first informed that all good modern chemists were members of the society, which is of course untrue, because all chemists who were interested in their profession and were what they ought to be, joined—which is also untrue. The employer was then asked this: "Are your chemists among the number? We shall be glad to inform you. Membership keeps them in touch with the profession and its development. This insures their value to you."

This is patently the sort of advertisement we should reasonably expect from some trade union in the lower intellectual ranks. A more grossly unethical and unscientific exhibit could scarcely be produced. As a matter of fact membership in the American Chemical Society merely indicates that a man has some sort of connection with chemistry in some tenuous or real way and that he is

disposed to pay his dues. It argues nothing whatever as to his competence. Yet the employer, who may believe this, is subtly led to infer that all good chemists belong to the society and that those who do not are incompetent,—which is devious, unethical and indecent in implication. Finally he is offered gratuitous private sleuthing to determine the status of his men in this matter. Truly the organization is after members by hook or crook and is willing to insult scientific ethical standards to secure them.

Consider also the following announcement made by the same presumably "scientific" body before the spring meeting of the American Chemist's Union in 1928. Remembering that a truly scientific body is dedicated to the pursuit of truth and to its widest possible dissemination to all who will hear and learn, consider this announcement to prospective guests of the body at its trade conclave:

> "The council has voted that the policy of the Society regarding attendance and participation in its general, divisional, and regional meetings shall be as follows:
>
> (a) Attendance at meetings is limited to registered individuals.
>
> (b) All individuals in registering shall state whether or not they are members of the Society, and if not, whether they are chemists.
>
> (c) American chemists non-members of the Society shall assist in the support of the facilities which they enjoy by paying a higher registration fee than members and being furnished with a special non-member badge to differentiate them from members of the Society and from foreign and non-chemist guests.
>
> (d) Papers by American chemists not members of the Society shall not appear on its programs unless they are joint papers with Society members."

This is gross. It is in part due to our present social and economic system that a scientific body so far forgets itself as to brand non-member guests and forbid them to present papers, no matter how excellent. But devotion to the ideals and ethics of science should enable a body of men even to overcome the incubus of an acquisitive society. It can and does do so. While you cannot expect high ethics in the American Chemical Society as evidenced by the facts given you do find them in other societies.

"The Society for Experimental Biology and Medicine" is ready and willing to hear papers from non-members. The writer attests this from personal experience. The "American Society of Biological Chemists" welcomes visitors and is totally uncommercialized; the same holds for the "American Physiological Society" and for other bodies which could readily be named did space permit. It is still possible for a group of scientists to organize in pursuit of truth, to require only intellectual worth as prerequisite to membership and to avoid cliques, emotions and commercial methods. They can and do then make a serious, totally disinterested effort to achieve high ethical standards, and their professional standing is likewise high and marked by an *esprit de corps* which evokes irreproachable conduct spontaneously. That is what can be and is done.

Or again, take the action of twenty-three men eminent in the field of public health when they thought the Mayor of Chicago had dismissed a competent and excellent Health Commissioner, Dr. Herman N. Bundesen, in order to appoint his untrained, personal physician to the important office. They published a statement flaying this "sacrifice of the lives of the citizens of Chicago to political exploitation and personal whims" and said "The action of the Mayor of Chicago strikes a blow at the most fundamental principles of good government. It should meet with prompt and vigorous rebuke from all people of Chicago who care for the reputation of their city and it should stimulate citizens everywhere to see that city charters are amended so as to make such interference with good health administration impossible in their own communities." This shows how the impact of true scientific standards may be brought to bear upon social problems.

Disparagement of societies *qua* societies is not intended in this presentation. Let that be insisted. All societies have their *raison d'etre*. Trade unions are useful, respectable, above criticism—but just so long as they claim to be trade unions and do not seek to disguise themselves as scientific organizations. Higher ethical standards do now prevail in those societies which are most scientific and least commercialized. Thus trade union groups and the chemical society will freely permit conduct which would revolt better professional groups; commercialized professional groups, in turn,

permit conduct revolting to organizations made up of pure scientists and conducted scientifically.

Objection will certainly be made that so many evils exist in the ordinary spheres of life that we should refrain from all adverse criticism of such comparatively excellent groups as chemists and physicians. The objection is not valid. People in general cannot be expected to improve in morale, attain social consciousness and self-disciplined conduct unless and until the most intelligent and advanced sub-groups earnestly seek to improve their own status as much as possible. It is freely granted that we have far to go before we can professionalize commerce, industry and business and criticism comes easy there. But the fact remains that those who engage in these lines of activity are not, on the average, as highly intelligent as those who engage in medicine and science. Therefore, while they can be expected to improve themselves at their own status, the obligation rests just as heavily upon the upper orders to improve themselves at theirs.

That is really the only way to conquer the crime wave, which is such an annoyance just now. Sutherland in *Criminology* remarks that "Public opinion in pre-literate society made it practically impossible to commit crime. . . (but) . . . public opinion in present society not only puts no such impassable barriers around the individual, but gives him glorified examples, makes him believe that crime is customary, breaks down the legal influences. It is probable that the principle reason for the differences in frequencies of crime in the United States and Canada or England is this public opinion." The ethics of science percolating through our entire society would produce and formulate a public opinion which would make crime as impossible as deliberate falsification in the presentation of scientific results to a scientific body is today in the United States.

Besides, the girl we mentioned in the first paragraph has a right to guidance. She has a right to expect science to formulate a system of practical ethics, for science has the method and the knowledge and is gaining power daily. But so far it lacks the courage and the disposition to undertake this work or even thoroughly to clean its own house. What can we expect of the masses so long as science itself holds back? Profound students of social conditions now see clearly that better morals can only evolve by

the evocation in individuals of such voluntary standards of conduct that satisfactory group life becomes possible. This cannot be accomplished by compulsion, punishment or retributive "justice." It can only be accomplished by the same sort of definitely standardized and impelling public opinion which sees to it that we do not eat with our knives or fight duels or befoul the public streets and this can only occur in so far as ethical standards seep downward from higher up.

Then there must be high ethics up above. Higher sub-groups must be non-commercialized, must place service and social duty first, must formulate ethical doctrines for general use. There, at the apex of society, there must be a conscious, deliberate and very sincere effort to attain the highest possible standards of group conduct, both with reference to the sub-group (or profession) and society as a whole. If low standards rule above, society as a whole has little to hope for. Our case therefore rests upon the willingness of our best groups to accept adverse criticism intelligently, to profit thereby, to live on a high ethical plane and to formulate ethical doctrines for mass application.

THE FUNDAMENTALS OF BUDDHISTIC PHILOSOPHY

BY REV. TAI-HSU

I. The Conception of Body and Life of the Universe

THE Buddhistic teachings propagated in many countries and ramified in different schools agree in general and essential principles relating to the conception of Body and Life.

The Body is the manifold organization of different accomplishments of the inner and outer causes (Karma). The Life is a unified "Continuation" (*Kontinuum*), which now ceases and then comes into existence. This unified Continuation of Life is so created that it exhausts itself. However, as soon as it exhausts itself, it arises again; thus the old and the new change. The Varied organization is able to disintegrate, but as soon as one decomposes, another unites; therefore the many different transformations appear.

The totality of all isolated objects composes the universe. The universe taken in detail composes the objects. World and objects compose together all single forms of Body and Life; therefore, they are within the organization which, now disintegrating and then uniting, exists in many formed transformations, and likewise within the now exhausted, then newly recreated, power of the permanent change from old and new. Now this will be established in detail.

From the system of fixed stars to the starry sea, and from the atom to the electron, there are no really independent bodies. All simply go to compose the varied organization effected by the inner and outer Causes. Likewise, there is no form which is stable in itself. All is the unified "Continuation" which now ceases and then comes into being. In this "Continuation" is also to be found the appearance of the disintegration and the decomposition of the organization and of the Exhaustion and rise of the power. Thus we know that the eternal substance is nothing other than Body and Life. This can be proved according to physical principles. Not only

we humans, closely bound together, but also the saurians lying far back, the extremely small bacteria and the old well rooted giant trees are all formed by the organizations of accomplishments of inner and outer causes, and are realized through the unified Continuation which ceases and then comes again into existence. One is able to glimpse the power of recreation and reproduction in the change of old and new. One can consider the disintegration and the new formation of the organization in the manifold transformations. Therefore, it is clear and lucid that the single living being is nothing other than the single Body and the single Life. That is proven according to biological teachings.

The germ is the inner Cause (Causality) and the ostensible qualities and the excitement of the senses are the outer Causes (Affinity). When the germ ceases, the Being comes into existence. If the germ grows, the Being expires. This apparent becoming and ceasing always continue through many moments. This manifold organization and the unified power has been known to us for a long time through the isolated perceptions of each of our five senses. Thus each impression presents itself to our consciousness as a "Body and Life." This is the view from a psychological standpoint.

A family, a sect, a trades union, a scientific association, a political party, a state, a nation and a world are nothing more than the manifold organization and the unified historical Continuation. The variation originates by means of division and transformation. The old and the new arise through cessation and reproduction. Therefore, each group of society which exists in the world is a "Body and Life." This is shown by sociological teachings.

All proceedings can be easily explained according to these four theories (physical, biological, psychological and sociological). Accordingly, all things of the world are "Body and Life." It is not the single Body and the single Life but the manifold "Body and Lives" which are in a mutual relationship. Even though we already know this, nevertheless it is not yet clear to us whether the identical "Body and Lives" possess different standards of value and where the original power of the change from old to new is located.

The "Body and Lives" of all different beings have originated through our conception of man and animal as one biological division. The "Body and Life" in physics and in psychology is likewise one division of the entire "Body and Life." Plants themselves do not

yet possess consciousness. The animal alone is the first to have these elements in itself, but its faculty is not fully developed. Therefore, among all living beings on the earth, man is the only one whom we can term a perfect being of "Body and Life" and in the whole universe "Buddha" is the only one. Man is the beginning of the perfect "Body and Life" and Buddha is the completion of the same. There lies a wide gap and many different steps between man and Buddha. That is the diverse standard of "Body and Life." Each animal has within itself complete elements of "Body and Life." Every "Body and Life" has a complete faculty which contains in the occult a power to live, namely the Alaya. It has controlling power because of its eternal efficacy. A higher development is attained by means of its consciousness, which is able to inspire. From the organisms of animals as well as of all plants and minerals, to the inconceivably great universe, all possess this creative Alaya and the concept of the senses which is capable of development. They act reciprocally and are the original power of the dying and reviving transformations. A system of fixed stars experiences a transition from existence to decline, to non-existence and then to revival. These are the general fecundations of the original power of the innumerable Alayas. The single living being has a transformation from life to death to concealment and to rebirth. This is the single impregnation of the original power of the single Alaya. Through this we are able to recognize wherein lies the original power of transformation of the total "Body and Lives."

II. Dead and Living "Body-Life"

As already mentioned above, all beings are "Single-Body-Life." Is there beside the positive "Body-Life" which is comprehensible to us, a negative "Body-Life" (Not "Body-Life") from which arises the positive "Body-Life"? If we give a negative answer to this question, then there is no longer a beginning for the now perceptible "Body-Life." Where there is no beginning, there is no ending. Thus it is always in a living and continuously moving condition of transformation. Therefore, each "Body-Life" is an eternal and living "Body-Life."

If, however, we say that there is besides the positive "Body-Life," a negative "Body-Life" and that this is the origin of the former, then it is decidedly different from the phenomenon which is

made through experience. There is another dead matter which is of neither the organization of different inner and outer Causes, nor of the Continuation which ceases and then comes into being. This dead matter remains ever an immovable dead matter whether it is characterized as a simple or a manifold matter, as a God, as an Ego, or as the consciousness of all things. How a life of the "Body-Life" with changing transformations can arise from such a negative "Body-Life," that is from dead matter, is inexplicable by logic. If, perhaps, it were possible according to the teachings of monotheism and atomism, that the entire living "Body-Lives" could be created or formed from such dead matter, then this perceptible living "Body-Life" must have an ending because it has a beginning. Before the beginning and after the ending, it is solely dead matter. If the beginning came from death and if the end goes to death, then the living "Body-Life" which is existent in a short space of time remains equal to death. Even in this short space of time of the living "Body-Life," the real-body is composed of dead matter, and the living "Body-Life" is only appearance. Then it itself must, during its lifetime, be only dead matter. In view of this, therefore, every "Body-Life" must be an eternally dead "Body-Life."

Buddhistic philosophy, that is to say, Mahayanistic teaching, (whether of the Sing or Siang school) maintains that every "Body-Life" is an eternally living "Body-Life" without either beginning or end. It condemns all beliefs arising from spiritualism, egoism, materialism and idealism which posit all "Body-Lives" as having their beginning and end in dead matter, and the material body of the dead "Body-Life" as being composed of dead matter.

In contrast to this, Hinayanistic teaching opposes only the real Ego among animals. It supports the contention that every object possesses a real body. This is denied by Mahayanism. According to Mahayanistic teaching, there is neither a real Ego nor a real body; the only living form is the living "Body-Lives" which materialize in appearance.

III. The Fundamental Principles of the Living "Body-Life"

The difference between the now dying off, now newly becoming transformations and the latent capacities is that they are without beginning. They are again hidden in a continually circulating Alaya,

and are constantly by the thoughts and objects of the external world. Through these, they either add to themselves or detract from themselves, grow or die off, stand out in relief or remain latent, develop strongly and well or weakly and badly. Through these also, originate the countless organized and unceasing "Body-Lives." They are constantly moving, as water flows, and as an old one dies off, a new one matures. Thus a manifold transformation comes into existence. This is the Mahayanistic philosophy of the Asamga school.

All moving "Body-Lives" are molded through external causes (Karma), but there is no invariable cessation and origination. They are all empty and have no unalterable real body. The life of things, the life of a thought, human life, and social life are all only manifestations of the organization of accomplishments of the inner and outer causes and of the continuation, which now dies off and then arises. In order to understand and comprehend them, we have given a name to each of these manifestations. This pseudo-name is empty and has no real body; it arose out of emptiness. Emptiness and appearance act upon each other reciprocally; they are also reciprocally equivalent. Out of this, neither empty nor apparent, but still empty and apparent condition one must consider the whole, true, materialized, living life. Beyond this there is no reality. This is the Mahayanistic philosophy of the Nagarjuna school.

Mahayanistic philosophy according to the above two schools is of value as the fundamental principle of the living "Body-Life."

IV. The Reality of the Living "Body-Life"

All "Body-Lives" are solely manifestations of the perpetual life which never dies, but in all "Body-Lives" of this world there are nevertheless two kinds of death.

a. The detached partial death which arises from simple distinct representations and material forms, occurs when these two have lost their "Continuation." This kind of death corresponds to the death of animals and the decay of plants and minerals. Even though their psychic and material existence continues further, it is impossible for man to perceive or observe it. Therefore, it is accepted, on the one hand that the "Body-Life" of a living being after its death, as well as objects after their decay vanish utterly and forever. This contention is the so-called "Dyan-djian" (Partial-Idea). On the other

hand, it is accepted that every living being possesses an immortal and unchangeable real Ego which reigns between life and death, and that the world is eternally indestructible. Were this not so there, would be an imperishable and inexhaustible God who would continually reign between extinction and creation. This is the so-called "Tschang-djian" (Eternal-Idea). Many disturbances and imbroglios within different "Body-Lives" have arisen through these two ideas.

b. Permanent transformation death which arose from the invisible but clear representations and material forms. This type of death corresponds to biological and mineralogical development and also to the development from simple man to sage. In the struggle for existence the victor lives and the defeated must die, and thus arises a strong and good relationship, and a weak and bad one. These two relationships repulse each other so that a harmonious development is prevented.

Through the partial death there is no freedom and through the transformation, death, there is no uniformity. The unfree death and the ununiform.are both, however, no real result of whole living "Body-Lives." Because this real result was not fully comprehended it was erroneously believed that the single "Body-Life," or a part of the same, was a distinct "Real-Body." On this belief was built the conception of "Real-Body" (Fa-Dschao), from which arose the unequal transformation death. This latter forms for the attainment of truth a fixed boundary which is designated as the retardation in the conception (Schou Dsi Dschang). Furthermore, it was falsely believed that there was a real Ego in every "Body-Life" of animals or in a part of them. From this developed the conception of "Real-Ego" (Wuo Dscha) out of which the unfree partial death originated. Through this latter were brought into being many inner disturbances and imbroglios which were designated as the "Unrest-Retardation" (Fan Nao Dschang).

In order to realize the true life form of all "Body-Lives" and to prove that there is only a living, and never a dead "Body-Life," the intelligence must be so purely and clearly developed through good deeds and peaceful meditation, that it is able to observe precisely and to scrutinize thoroughly. Only through this exact consideration and deep scrutiny is one able to gain a true proof for the real life form of all "Body-Lives." Then only will one be able to realize

that the life form is developed from inner and outer causes, and that there is no invariable cessation or origination. The characteristic of the real "Body-Life" hovers between emptiness and appearance. Its form is only an idea for sense perception. Through this knowledge, the two erroneous ideas concerning the "Real-Ego" and the "Real-Body" must vanish without leaving a trace. Without the two ideas, the two obstructions can no longer exist and they too have to vanish. But without the obstructions the two types of death can never subsist. This victory or extinction is the so-called "Nirvana." Since, through this wisdom, the two ideas, the two obstructions and the two types of death have all been done away with, the true and real life form which is wholly free and equal makes its appearance. Then one gains the so-called "Bodhi."

Whoever reaches Nirvana and Bodhi and whoever can picture the wholly empty universe as the whole "Body-Life" and whoever has conquered the false kinds of death and gained entrance to the true life, that man is "Buddha." Buddha is therefore the reality of the living "Body-Life." This reality of the "Body-Life" is called "Fa Schen Hui Min" (the life of the Dharmakaya).

Hinayanistic Nirvana annihilates only the "Real-Ego" and the "Unrest-Retardations," and through these the partial death. It is only a partial annihilation, and therefore not a basic one. Furthermore the other teachings and religions cannot sever themselves from the two ideas, obstructions and forms of death, and consequently they may never gain the true reality of the "Body-Life."

THE NUMBER AND NAMES OF THE DEVILS

BY MAXIMILIAN RUDWIN

THOUGH we usually speak of the Devil in the singular, it must not be forgotten that there are many devils. As a matter of fact, there are as many varieties of fiends as there are of ferns. The Devil, it has been said, is hydra-headed; he wears a thousand crowns, wields a thousand sceptres and is known by a thousand names. "I go by a thousand names," says the devil to Tom Walker in Washington Irving's well known story (1824). In all European countries, men swear by a "thousand devils." Milton, Chateaubriand, Balzac and other writers speak of demons in thousands. This number also occurs in several German expressions, such as *Sauf in tausend Teufel Namen* and *Steh in tausend Teufel Namen auf*.[1] But this sum should not be taken literally. As a matter of fact, the number of the evil spirits runs into millions.

The Old Testament knows only Satan, although, as a matter of fact, this "accuser" was in no way a devil to the ancient Hebrews. In the New Testament, the Devil already has "his angels" (Matt. xxv, 41; Rev. xii, 9), who sided with Satan in the war of the heavens and who were cast out with him into utter darkness. The Gospel writers speak even of a legion of demons. We are at least led to infer this number from the reply of the Gerasenian madman, who fancied that he was possessed by a legion (an army) of demons (Mark v, 9; Luk. viii, 30).[2] The apocryphal Gospel of Nicodemus, as early as the third century, mentions already several "legions of devils," who are under Satan's sway in hell.[3]

[1] A German writer, A. Saager, seems to be on familiar terms with three hundred thousand devils, about whom he tells anecdotes in his recently published book *Dreimal hundert tausend Teufel*. The medieval French epics, the *Chansons de geste*, speak of five hundred thousand demons.

[2] A legion is the Roman regiment of approximately 6,000 soldiers.

[3] Josephus, in his *Wars of the Jews* (VII. vi. 3) speaks also of legions of demons, but he has in mind the spirits of wicked men.

The number of the angels who participated in this movement of rebellion has never been fully ascertained. The belief current among the Catholic Schoolmen, based upon an interpretation of a biblical phrase (Rev. xii, 4), is that a third of the angels ranged themselves under Satan's standard.[4] The rebel leader's armed force seems to have comprised nearly two thousand four hundred legions (about fourteen million four hundred thousand demons), of which each demon of rank commanded a certain number. Furcas commanded twenty, Leraie thirty, Agares thirty-one, Morax thirty-six and Sabnac fifty legions in the celestial civil war. Alfred de Vigny thinks that a thousand million followed Satan in his fall (*Cinq-Mars,* 1826).

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In an attempt at a reconciliation of the two contradictory passages relating to the punishment of the revolting angels (Rev. xii, 9 and xx, 3), a few Church fathers thought that not all the followers of Satan were thrown with their rebel chief into hell and cast into chains. A number of them were left on earth in order to tempt man.[5] It has been suggested that the angels who were not hurled into the bottom of hell but banished to our earth had maintained a neutral position in the rivalry between the Lord and Lucifer. It is not so generally known that during the war in heaven the angels were not wholly divided into two opposing camps. There were many spirits who, untouched by partisan passions, remained aloof from the conflict and refused to don the uniform. They demanded their right of keeping out of a war which they did not bring about and in which they had no interest whatever. When the Lord defeated his enemy and cast him and his legionaries into the abyss, He did not hurl also the neutral angels into hell, but, in order to give them another opportunity to choose between Him and His rival, cast them down to the earth, to which the scene of the battle

[4] Cf. Johannes Oswald: *Angelologie* (Paderborn, 1883), p. 95.

[5] Michael Psellus, one of the most famous Byzantine writers of the 11th century and author of *Dialogus de energia, seu operatione dæmonium,* distinguishes six kinds of demons, according to their different habitations. He names demons of fire, of the air, of the earth, of the water, of the underworld, and lastly, demons of the night, "who shun the daylight." Coleridge, in his gloss on *The Ancient Mariner* (1798), refers his reader to Psellus on demons in illustration of the poem. The treatise by Psellus seems also to have given suggestions for *Christabel* (1816).

had been transferred. From these angels, who married mortal maidens, there has developed a race which has always shown a striking contrast to the human family. It has furnished humanity with its prophets and poets, with its reformers and revolutionaries. All great men at all times and in all places have belonged to this mysterious race which does not proceed from father to son, like other races, but appears here and there, at recurring intervals, in the families of mankind. The descendants of this union between the sons of God and the daughters of men have always stood in the first ranks of those who seek peace and abhor murder. They have proved valiant warriors in the eternal conflict between the Good and the Evil for the mastery of the world. They have long ago redeemed themselves, but they will not return to heaven until they have also redeemed all men.[6]

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In addition to the angels who were hurled from heaven for their participation in the celestial civil war, other sons of God were expelled for their lust after the daughters of men (Gen. vi, 1-4).[7] Jewish tradition teaches that two hundred angels, attracted by the beauty of the daughters of Eve, descended to the summit of Mount Hermon and defiled themselves with them. No sooner had the angels left heaven and descended to earth, so say the rabbis, than they lost their transcendental qualities and were invested with sublunary bodies so that a union with the daughters of men became possible.[8]

The celestial mutineers belonged to all nine orders of angels, which Diogenes has named as follows: cherubim, seraphim, thrones, dominions, principalities, powers, virtues, angels, and archangels.

[6] This theory was advanced by the present writer in his essay "Dante's Devil," which appeared in the *Open Court,* vol. XXXV (1921), pp. 513-28.

[7] Higher criticism will not admit that this passage refers to a union between angels and humans. It maintains that the expression *benê-elohim,* rendered "sons of God" by the Revised Version, means in reality "spirit-folk," and that the corresponding term *nephilîm* rendered "giants" means "fallen ones," i. e. descended from star-land. They are super-men, who descended from the stars to intermarry with mortals. The belief prevailed among the primitive races in many lands that their ancestors had come from the stars, and that they themselves, after a few generations, would return there. This idea is still prevalent among certain Indian tribes in our own country. The moral implication is a later exegetical addition, which is first found in the Book of Enoch.

[8] *Cf.* Louis Ginzburg: *The Legends of the Jews* (Philadelphia, 1909-1925), I, 151.

Satan was a cherub, according to certain authorities. Astaroth, Lucifer and Samael were seraphs. Among the members of the order of thrones were Acaos, Asmodeus, Beleth, Cedron, Celsus, Easa, Focalos, Gresil, Murmur, Phœnix, and Purson. Achas, Alex, Cham, and Zabulon belonged to the order of principalities. Aman and Goap were part of the powers. The order of virtues counted among its members Agares and Barbatos. Murmur belonged to the order of angels as well as to that of thrones. Satan was, according to other authorities, an archangel. He shared this honor with Belphegor.

In the seventh play of the York mysteries we are informed that of each of the nine orders the tenth part fell in Satan's revolt. Others hold that Satan, as an archangel, led only his own order to war on Jehovah. Gregory the Great conveys the idea that the order of Satan which fell was, from the very first, distinct from the other orders, which remained loyal. The rebel angels, according to this theory, belonged wholly to the order of *ophanim,* living and flaming wheels all covered with eyes.

Among the angels who forsook the celestial choir-stalls in exchange for the charms of mortal maidens, Jewish tradition mentions Asa and Asael—who later founded a great college of sorcery and astrology in the dark mountains of Egypt—Azazel, Beelzebub, Cedor, Samiasa, Shamdan and Shemhazai. The union of these sons of God and daughters of men resulted in a race of giants known for their wickedness as much as for their strength. The ghosts of these malicious giants begotten of the angels by the mortal maidens turned into demons (Book of Enoch, ch. xvi).[9] Justin Martyr expresses the belief that all demons are the offspring of the angels who yielded to the embraces of earthly women. Other Church fathers, among them Athenagoras, Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian and Cyprian, even taught that the sin of the angels which had brought about their fall consisted not in their revolt against the Lord but in their carnal relations with the daughters of men. St. Paul demands for this reason that women should veil their heads in church "because of the angels" (1 Cor. xi, 10), who might be attracted by their beautiful tresses and thus be led to sin (*cf.* also Tertullian's *De virginibus velandis*).

Byron's poem *Heaven and Earth* (1822) goes back to the days

[9] A critical edition of the Book of Enoch will be found in R. H. Charles, *The Apocrypha and Pseudo-epigrapha of the Old Testament.* 2 vols. London and New York, 1913.

when human passions "drew angels down to earth" and deals with the biblical legend of the union of the sons of heaven and the daughters of earth.

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Then again all heathen gods, when driven off the earth by Christianity, went under the earth to swell the ranks of Satan. The numberless dethroned, outlawed, and fallen deities of the subjugated races and discredited religions changed, for the Christians, into demons. The ancient Hebrews already considered the gods of the nations with which they were at war as devils. What meant deity to the heathens signified devil to the Hebrews. It is wholly natural that the god of one religion or one nation should become the devil of another religion or nation, especially if these groups are enemies. Thus Baalzebub, the god of Ekron (2 Kings i, 1), was to the New Testament writers the chief of the devils (Matt. xii, 24).

In the wake of the conquering hosts of Christian mythology, the original mythical denizens of the earth were banished to hell. This was especially true in the case of the divinities which, in pagan beliefs, were already associated with the shadowy world. From St. Paul to Savonarola, the pagan gods were considered as fallen angels. The great apostle identified all ancient gods with devils (1 Cor. x, 20). The Church regarded the gods of mythology as fallen spirits who beguiled men into worshipping them in the form of idols.[10]

[10] "But the fundamental cause (*consummativa*) [of idolatry] must be sought in the devils, who cause men to adore them under the form of idols, therein working certain things which excited their wonder and admiration" (St. Thomas Aquinas: *Summa theologica,* II ii. 94).

Professor A. H. Godbey maintains that St. Paul does not mean the "devils" of medieval Christian fancy. In his opinion, the apostle protests against the current ancestor worship and has in mind "human spirits" speaking through a "medium (*cf.* Rev. xxii, 8-9; Acts x, 25; xvi, 8-18; xxviii, 3-6). Similarly, Professor Godbey insists that the Church fathers did not mean our horned and hoofed demons, but the spirits of the dead. Their *dæmones,* meaning "knowing spirits," refer to the patrons, friends and guardians of men. It is but necessary, he says, to read Origen's controversy with Celsus, who insisted that the worship of beneficent *dæmones* should not be abolished. This fact is also evident from the writings of Clement, Tertullian, and Arnobius. Be that as it may, it will be perfectly clear to the reader that our presentation of the subject is from the viewpoint of medieval orthodox Christianity, which denounced as evil all spirit-personalities not included in its small theological hierarchy and applied the borrowed terms "demon" and "devil" even to those powers which were not evil in the ancient world. In fact, some of the most beneficient of the ancient gods were most devilish in the eyes of the medieval Christian.

The pagan deities were in reality, Catholic tradition maintains, supernatural beings who exercised their powers for sinister aims and who caused themselves to be adored under different names in different countries. The Church fathers were very explicit on this point. Tertullian states unequivocally that all the old gods were disguised demons (*De spectaculis,* xix). Mohammed likewise reduced all ancient pagan deities to devils.

When the Christian religion spread over the Western Empire, the Greek and Roman gods were looked upon as allies of the Devil. The diabolization of the Greek gods is well depicted in Mrs. Browning's poem *The Dead Pan* (1844). Milton, in his *Paradise Lost* (1667-1674), also places the "Ionian Gods" in his Pandemonium (i. 508). The Puritan poet follows this tradition throughout his poem of the fall of Lucifer.

When the Teutonic nations accepted Christianity, the Devil entered upon a particularly rich inheritance. To his portion fell all the dark and gloomy powers of the original beliefs of these peoples. All the rich wealth of ideas which the primitive Germans associated with their ancient good and evil spirits, they ultimately distributed over the Christian Pantheon. Germanic mythology went primarily to enrich Christian demonology, although it also contributed a good deal to Catholic hagiography. The countless legions of earth-sprites and the army of giants that inhabited the countries of the North came under Satan's sway. Spirits such as elves, kobolds, fairies, hairy hobgoblins of the forest, waternymphs of the brookside, and dwarfs of the mountains were transformed by medieval Christianity into devils, or into hellish imps, a sort of assistant or apprentice devils. Mephistopheles in Goethe's *Faust* had this diabolization of Greek and Germanic divinities in mind when he said: "From Hartz to Hellas always cousins" (ii. 7743).

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The number of the demons keeps on increasing from day to day as a result of Death, which the Devil brought to the children of Adam. The belief was prevalent already in classical days and was expressed by Hesiod that the ghosts of the dead turn into demons. It is believed even nowadays that after death good men become angels in heaven, bad men devils in hell. As the latter outnumber on earth the former, hell must necessarily have a larger population

than heaven. It cannot be gainsaid that mankind, though created to fill the places in heaven that had been occupied by the fallen angels, only replenished the cave of Tartarus. Men have, as a matter of fact, always headed downwards, and not upwards, as had been originally planned. In all probability, hell is by now filled to the point of overflowing. A French philosopher, as far back as the eighteenth century, found consolation in the thought that he would no longer find room in the infernal regions. *"Il y a longtemps,"* said he, *"que l'enfer est rempli; on n'y entre plus!"* ("Hell has been full for a long time; one can no longer enter!")

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Furthermore, the demons, who are composed of members of both sexes, replenish hell in the same manner that we employ in replenishing the earth. The ancient Jews supposed that the devils were propagated like mankind; that they ate and drank, and were married and divorced.

The demons also multiply with synonyms and dialectical differences in their names.

The Middle Ages, thanks to the Inquisition, fairly pullulated with the demons of hell. Their number increased still further in all Protestant countries after the Reformation. Far from decreasing the power of the Devil in the world, the Reformation brought him strong re-inforcements. Martin Luther firmly believed in the Devil and affirmed that he had seen him with his own eyes and that he had frequently carried on a conversation with him. The German reformer lived in a constant consciousness of contact with and opposition to the Devil. He saw the Fiend grinning at him while he translated the Bible and threw the inkstand at his Satanic Majesty. The stain is to be seen to this very day on the wall of his cell in the Wartburg.[11] Luther saw in the Devil a real, living power, who is incessantly working in human affairs. In his eyes, Satan was the good Lord's hangman, and the instrument of his anger and punishment. The English reformer, John Wycliffe, likewise exaggerated the Devil's power on this planet. He went so far as to affirm, in his book, *De dominio divino,* that here on earth God must obey the Devil.[12]

[11] Luther's dispute with the Devil is very cleverly described by Népomucène Lemercier in his *Panhypocrisiade* (1819).

[12] On the conditions that tended to vivify the belief in the Devil during the Elizabethan era, see Thomas A. Spalding's *Elizabethan Demonology*. London, 1880.

Luther has, as he himself says in one of his hymns, "seen and defied innumerable devils." In his writings, the Evil Power divided and subdivided itself into as many manifestations as there are vices in the world. Protestantism showed the rationalistic tendency of discovering the Devil in the vices of men. It reduced the Principle of Evil from a personified phantom with which no man could cope to those impersonal but all the more real moral abstractions with which every man can cope. The German reformer and his disciples thus filled Germany with devils by diabolizing all vices. The disciples, as is generally the case, outdid their master. Luther threw an inkstand at the head of the Devil, and his followers poured oceans of ink on him. The Protestant preachers of Germany began, toward the middle of the sixteenth century, to wage a bitter war with their pens against the hosts of hell. The most curious work of Protestant demonology is the *Theatrum diabolorum* (16th cent.) by Sigmund Feyerabend, a volumnious collection of the orthodox views of Luther's followers concerning the existence, power, nature and demeanor of the devils. We find in this book all sorts of devils, such as the devil of blasphemy, the dance-devil, the servant's devil, the hunting devil, the drink devil, the wedlock devil, the devil of unchastity, the miser's devil, the devil of tyranny, the laziness-devil, the pride-devil, the pantaloon devil, the gambling devil, the courtier's devil, and so forth, and so on.

The idea of special devils, however, is not original with Luther. We find them already in medieval mystery and morality plays. We can even follow this idea further back into the history of human thought. Already in ancient times different devils presided over different moral and physical evils. The Kabbala already knows of special demons and demonesses for each sin. Among the Jews, probably as far back as the time of Christ, demons were designated according to the diseases they induced. There were demons of asthma, croup, hydrophobia, insanity and indigestion.[13] Knut Leonard Tallquist says that among Assyrians, demons were named after the diseases attributed to them. He further tells us that the connection was so close that names of demons and corresponding diseases came to be identical.[14]

[13] See authorities quoted by Alfred Edersheim in his *Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah* (8th ed., London, 1899), II 759.

[14] Quoted by Thomas Witton Davies: *Magic, Divination, and Demonology among the Hebrews and their Neighbors; including an Examination of Biblical References and of Biblical Terms* (London, 1878), p. 104.

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There have, as a matter of fact, been as many devils conceived in the human mind as there have been ideas of evil. The trooping legions of evil thoughts naturally suggested legions of devils. "Everywhere in the great world men are building little worlds of their own," observes the thoughtful Mephistopheles (*Faust* i. 4044-45); "and everywhere they are creating little devils of their own to inhabit them," is Miss Agnes Repplier's comment on the words of the Devil.[15]

Johannes Wierus, a pupil of the famous Cornelius Agrippa and author of the learned treatise, *De præstigiis dæmonium* (1563), went to the considerable trouble of counting the devils and found that their number was seven and odd millions. According to this German demonologist, the hierarch of hell commands an army of 1,111 legions, each composed of 6,666 devils, which brings the total of evil spirits to 7,405,926, "without any possibility of error in calculation." A professor of theology in Basle, Martinus Barrhaus, is, as far as is known, the last man to take the census of the population of hell. According to this infernal statistician, the devils number exactly 2,665,866,746,664.

If we are to believe Ricalmus, a French abbot of the end of the thirteenth century, the number of the devils exceeds all calculation, being equal to the grains of the sands of the sea. Three friars, so runs the legend which confirms the view of this monk, hid themselves one night near a Witches' Sabbath, which happened to be held in a valley in the Alps, in order that they might count the devils present at the affair. But the master of ceremonies, upon discovering the friars and divining their intention, said to them: "Reverend brothers, our army is so great that if all the Alps, their rocks and glaciers, were equally divided among us, none would have a pound's weight."

The fecund imagination of our ancestors peopled the air, the earth, and the flood with devils. Paracelsus tells us in the 16th century that the air is not so full of flies in the summer as it is at all times of invisible devils; while another philosopher maintains that the air is so full of devils that there is "not so much as an hair's breadth empty in earth or in waters above or under the earth."

Indeed, any attempt to find the sum of the evil specters that have

[15] Agnes Repplier: "In Man's Image and Likeness." *Putnam's Monthly*. Vol. III (1908), pp. 549-54.

haunted mankind would be like trying to count the shadows cast upon the earth by the rising sun.

The generic term "devil" (*diable* in French and *Teufel* in German) for the evil spirit is a derivation of the Latin *diabolus* (Greek διάβολος) which means an "accuser," an "assailant" and which consequently is the exact Septuagint translation of the Hebrew word *satan*.[16]

The word "demon" (from Latin *dæmonium*, dæmon, Greek δαίμων), meaning a "knowing spirit," originally had a complimentary connotation. It signified in pagan Greece a benevolent deity, but came to mean in Christian lands a malevolent being.[17] The demon of Socrates of whom Plato speaks was his good spirit.[18] The word "demon" was also generally used by the neo-Platonists of Alexandria with the meaning of a good spirit. Coleridge in his *Rime of the Ancient Mariner* (1798) and Emerson in his essay on *Demonology* (1877) likewise use the word "dæmon" as a term for genius.

In addition to the generic and general terms "devil" and "demon," the biblical books contain several proper names for the evil spirits, such as Satan, Lucifer, Beelzebub and Belial (*alias* Beliar), although neither of the four, to speak from the historical viewpoint, originally designated a devil. It has already been shown how Satan, Lucifer and Beelzebub were raised to the honors of demonhood by rabbinic and patristic writers. As far as the word "Belial" is concerned, if it is not a variant of Bêl or Baal, this word may have been personified by the Septuagint through a mistaken rendering of the Hebrew text (2 Cor. iv. 15), which is a term for ungodliness.

But what a catalogue of demons may not be found in the rabbinic and patristic writings! The rabbins and Church fathers as well as the writers of medieval and later times have shown great ingenuity in devising names for the demons. The medieval German mysteries

[16] In Louis Ménard's story "le Diable au café" (1876), the Devil calls Hebrew a dead language, and, as a modern, prefers to be called by the French equivalent of his original Hebrew name. It is interesting to note that the word "devel' is the gypsy term for God. On the other hand, the Latin word *deus* became in English "deuce," an appelation for the Devil. The change in sense from good to bad and from bad to good is a frequent occurrence.

[17] The belief in evil demons, however, is equally to be traced in Greek literature from the earliest period. As early as the fourth century B. C., Xenocrates and Chrysiphus, Empedocles and Theophrastus taught that there were evil demons as well as good ones.

[18] See R. Nares: *An Essay on the Demon of Socrates.* London, n. d.

call sixty-two devils by name,[19] and Reginald Scot, writing in the sixteenth century, knows already the names of seventy-nine devils.[20] But this number is far from exhausting the list of the diabolical appellatives.

Many of the denominations invented for the devils bear witness to their former high estate either in the Empyrean, on the Olympus or in Asgardh. Other designations for the demons have been derived from their character, appearance, occupation, or habitation. Thus, for example, the Devil is called Old Horny or Old Hairy or the Black Bogey on account of his cornuted, capillary, or complexional characteristics. Among his many appelations denoting occupation may be mentioned "the baker," for the reason that the Devil puts the damned into the oven, or *Brendly* (meaning in German: "the stoker") for tending to the furnaces and keeping the fires of hell burning.

The infernal spirits have also been baptized after human characters. They have inherited the names of historical personages who achieved notoriety through their evil deeds, such as Nero and Napoleon. In addition, Christian devils often go by the names of Jews and Mohammedans, such as Mendes and Mohammed. They even adopt many Christian household names, such as Nicolas, Richard, Robert, Roger, Will(iam), and among women's names, Mary.[21]

What a number of names and titles have been devised for his infernal Majesty! Satan is frequently called "the god of this world" (2 Cor. iv. 4), "the prince of this world" (John xii. 31, xiv. 30; xvi. 11), "the prince of the powers of the air" (Eph. ii. 2), "the prince of the devils" (Matt. ix. 34; xii. 24; Mark iii. 12), the prince of hell, the prince of darkness, "the ruler of the darkness" (Eph. xi. 12), "the angel of the bottomless pit" (Rev. ix. 11), the dark

[19] *Cf.* M. J. Rudwin: *Der Teufel in den deutschen geistlichen Spielen des Mittelalters und der Reformationszeit* (Göttingen, 1915), pp. 96-98.

[20] Reginald Scot: *Discoverie of Witchcraft.* London 1584. 2nd ed., 1651. A critical edition with Explanatory Notes, Glossary and Introduction by B. Nicholson appeared, in 1886, in London.

[21] On the other hand, men have given the names of devils to animals, especially cats and dogs. Gautier gives the name Belzebuth to a cat (*le Capitaine Fracasse,* 1863), and Balzac names the toad used by the witch Fontaine in her divinations Astaroth. Karr gives the wasps, *in les Guêpes* (1839), names of devils, such as Mammone, Moloch, Astarte, Belial, etc. These wasps are so many winged messengers, who fly about Paris, enter into every council, penetrate into every chamber, buzz by every hearth, and overhear all sorts of secret gossip and scandal.

son of the night, "the lost archangel (*Par. Lost* i. 243, "the archangel ruined" (*ibid.*, i. 593), the Black Archangel, *the spiritus infernali*, the grim gentleman below, the genius of evil, the spirit of evil, the evil spirit, the malignant spirit, the unclean spirit, the lost spirit, the evil one, the wicked one, the Bad Man, the spirit that denies, the deceiver of mankind, the liar, the lying spirit, the father of lies, the father of iniquity, the tempter, the tormentor, the murderer, the arch-fiend, (*Par. Lost* i. 156), the foul fiend, the enemy of mankind, "the accuser of the brethren" (Rev. xii. 10), "the spirit that worketh in the children of disobedience" (Eph. ii. 2), the beast, "the (great) worm," (Isa. lxvi. 24), "the serpent" (2 Cor. ii. 3), "the old serpent" (Rev. xii. 9; xx. 2), "the infernal serpent" (*Par. Lost* i. 34), the crooked serpent, the piercing serpent, "the dragon" (Rev. xii. 7), "the great (red) dragon" (Rev. xii. 3, 9), "the roaring lion" (1 Peter v. 8), "the dog" (Phil. iii, 2; Rev. xxii, 15), the ape, the Adversary of the Almighty, the infernal rival of God, and the Other. On the other hand, the Devil is also given such flattering names as the Good Man, the Good Fellow and Gentleman Jack.

The French expression *le bon diable* points to the Devil's simplicity of mind rather than to his generosity of spirit. It generally expresses the half-contemptuous pity with which the giants, those huge beings with weak minds, were regarded in Northern mythology.

The Devil is commonly honored with the venerable prefix "old." Numerous names given him begin with this epithet. Mr. Charles P. G. Scott, in his very interesting paper "The Devil and his Imps,"[22] lists forty-one names for the Devil with the adjective "old": Old All-ill-thing, Old Belzebub (not Old Beelzebub), Old Bendy, Old Bogie, Old Boots, Old Boy, Old Chap, Old Clootie, Old Cloots, Old Deluder, Old Devil, Old Enemy, Old Fellow, Old Fiend, Old Gentleman, Old Gooseberry, Old Hangie, Old Harry, Old Horny, Old Lad, Old Lucifer, Old Mahoun, Old Man, Old Mischanter, Old Mischief, Old Mischy, Old Nick, Old Nickie-ben, Old Nicol, Old Nicolas, Old One, Old Poker, Old Roger, Old Sam, Old Scrat, Old Scratch, Old Serpent, Old Schock, Old Shuck, Old Soss, and Old Thief. We may add the following vernerable names: Old Booty, Old Cooney, Old Dragon, Old Hairy, Old Hick, Old Iniquity Old Night, and simply Old One.

[22] Charles P. G. Scott: "The Devil and his Imps, an Etymological Inquisition." *Transactions of the American Philological Association.* Vol XXVI (1895), pp. 79-146.

JESUS, THE PROPHET AND MESSIAH

BY WM. WEBER

THE Israelites had prophets ever since they became a nation. But they lost them after the third war with the Romans. That happened in the year 135 A. D. From that time on, the Pharisees became the religious guides of the Jews.

The Jewish followers of Jesus remained Jews. They had their synagogues, observed the Sabbath and all the Jewish feasts, obeyed the law of Moses, but did not accept the rules of the Pharisees.

Unfortunately, they stood, thanks to Paul, between the pharisaic Jews and the Gentile Christians and were bound to be crushed sooner or later by the Gentiles and the Pharisees. The last synagogue of the faithful followers of Jesus was destroyed in the seventh century. Gentile Christians annihilated them. That was the final fulfillment of the warning of Jesus:

> Give not that which is holy unto the dogs.
> Neither cast pearls before the swine.
> Lest haply they trample them under their feet
> and turn and rend you. Matth. vi. 6 and 10, 5-7 a. s. f.

If any one dares to learn the truth about Jesus, he has to study the Four Gospels. For they contain what has come down to us and can explain why Jesus was and ought to be still the Prophet and Messiah of his nation as well as all others who understand him and believe in him.

It is generally supposed that Jesus was born in Palestine, grew up there, became a disciple of John the Baptist, started on his own mission after he had been baptized by his teacher and had heard with all that were present the voice of God that proclaimed from heaven: "This is my beloved Son in whom I am well pleased." (Matth. iii. 17; Mark i. 11; Luke iii. 21 f. and John i. 32.

According to certain statements, Jesus was about 30 years old when he became a prophet and the Messiah. He died within a year after his baptism. That is at least the report of the Synoptic Gospels.

The age of 30 years can hardly be accepted. For while the gift of prophecy is based indeed upon an inborn, clear understanding and judgment, it can be developed properly alone by long and manifold experience. Therefore all great prophets have been old men. Even John Milton refers to that fact in his Il Penseroso. There were read:

> And may at last my weary age
> Find out the peaceful hermitage,
> The hairy gown and mossy cell,
> Where I may sit and rightly spell
> Of every star that heaven doth shew,
> And every herb that sips the dew,
> Till old experience do attain
> To something like prophetic strain.

That Jesus is supposed to have been only 30 years old when he ended his career on earth, has come from the Gentile Christians. They believed Jesus was the natural Son of God, and they had always been convinced that most of the Olympian Sons of Zeus appeared to be about 30 years old when they mingled with men and women on earth.

The Jews were not afflicted with such a superstition. For they had been taught by all their prophets that God and His Angels regarded sexual intercourse with daughters of men as the greatest and never forgiven sin of heavenly beings.

There was however one Angel, or according to other reports a number of Angels, whose duty was to watch the people on earth. Therefore he was called the Watcher. His name is Azâzêl. He fell in love with beautiful daughters of men and descended from heaven to live on earth with such women. It was their offspring that brought all sin and wickedness into the world and caused the Deluge.

There are quite a number of additions to this story in the *Book of Enoch.* The oldest part tells us that the faithful Angels reported Azâzêl to God. The latter had all the women and their wicked descendants drowned in the Flood. Azâzêl however was placed in Dudâêl and covered with darkness. But on the great day of Judgment he shall be cast into the fire.

The Book of Enoch was very popular during the age of Jesus. He himself has quoted the following words from it: "In the resurrection they neither marry, nor are given in marriage, but are as Angels in heaven." (Matth. xxii, 30; Mark xii, 25; Luke xx, 35 f.) See Book of Enoch, Sect. II, 51, 4.

The editor of this Book, published by the Clarendon Press at Oxford, tells us in the General Introduction, page I: "All the writers of the New Testament were familiar with the Book of Enoch . . . With the earlier Fathers and Apologists it had all the weight of a canonical book, but towards the beginning of the fourth century, it began to be discredited, and finally fell under the ban of that Church."

There is no room at all for doubting that the Jews at the time of Jesus could not believe in any natural son of God. That was and remained exclusively a Gentile idea and that a most repulsive one.

But also that Jesus was baptized by John the Baptist and that the voice of God was heard by all who were present, is more than doubtful. The Jews believed indeed in the voice of God that spoke sometimes from heaven to one or more of His worshipers.

D. August Wünsche, Beiträge zur Erläuterung der Evangelien aus Talmud and Midrasch, Göttingen 1878, has thrown light upon the voice from heaven in which the Jews believed. The Pharisees called it *Bath kol*, as the doctor explains page 22 f.

But those words from heaven were heard only at important occasions. Peter tells us of only a single voice from heaven, that was addressed to Jesus shortly before his pilgrimage to Jerusalem. He writes in his Epistle I, 6-8: "We were eyewitnesses of his majesty. For he received from God the Father honor and glory, when there was borne such a voice to him by the Majestic Glory: This is my beloved son, in whom I am well pleased. And the voice we heard out of the heaven, when we were with him in the holy mount."

That was the only voice from heaven of which Peter, James and his brother John knew. It is confirmed by Matth. xvii, 1-8 as well as by the other two synoptic Gospels. It happened just as Jesus was to start on his journey to the Temple, perhaps two weeks before his death on the cross. This act of God had a double purpose. It was to encourage Jesus and, at the same time, to convince his three companions, who would have to continue his work on earth,

that their master was the promised Messiah. There is certainly no room in the public life of Jesus for two such appearances of God.

Matth. xi. 2-6 presents a question of John the Baptist and the answer of Jesus. Both indicate that Jesus and the Baptist had never met each other. Besides, the two were of about the same age. That is implied in the words: "When John heard in prison the works of Jesus, he sent by his disciples and said unto him: Art thou he that cometh, or look we for another?"

This question proves that the two were not acquainted with each other. That means: John has not baptized Jesus nor heard the voice out of the heavens which told all that were present that Jesus was the Messiah. The very question of the Baptist indicates that he has never met Jesus.

That is also confirmed by the reply of Jesus. He told the messengers: Go and tell John the things which ye hear and see.

The blind receive their sight and the lame walk.

The lepers are cleansed and the deaf hear.

The dead are raised up and the poor have good tidings preached to them. And blessed is he, whosoever shall find no occasion of stumbling in me.

Not a single word of Jesus could be understood as a reproach of the prisoner. No allusion is made to any former acquaintance. The Baptist evidently had heard of Jesus the first time only lately.

The terms blind, lame, lepers a. s. f. do not refer to sicknesses of the body, but are used in a figurative sense. The blind are people who do not see the truth. The lame cannot follow the strait way. The lepers are men whose very faces betrayed their character. The deaf do not care to listen to religious instruction. The dead has lost all interest in the religion of their fathers. The poor, on the other hand, were people who trusted in their Father in heaven and served Him faithfully, but had to suffer from their less pious neighbors.

The men who had all kinds of religious diseases were the retinue and servants of the tetrarchs. They included the soldiers and the officers of the armies of the three sons of Herod as well as the publicans who collected the taxes. All those persons were Jews by birth. Compare Luke iii, 14.

The closing line of Matth. 11, 2-6 has been written for the benefit of John the Baptist and his disciples. They seem to have been

somewhat inclined to criticise the method of Jesus which may have differed from that of John.

Jesus was apparently about as old as John. That is indicated by the people who later imagined Jesus was John who had been sent back to the earth. Others believed Jesus was one of the great prophets of the olden times as either Elizah, or Jeremiah, or somebody else. (Matth. xvi, 14; Mark viii, 27 f; Luke ix, 19.) All those prophets were thought to have been old men when they died.

The fact that the two, Jesus and John, had never met each other, suggests and proves that they never lived together in Palestine, except for a short time. When Jesus returned to his native land, the Baptist was imprisoned. If both had lived in the Holy Land longer than one year, they would have become acquainted with each other at the great feasts in the Temple which every Jew had to attend with his family or friends.

There is another important passage which confirms the just arrived at conclusion. It is found Matth. xiii, 54-57 and reads:

> "Coming into his own country, he taught them in their synagogue, insomuch that they were astonished and said: Whence hath this man this wisdom and these mighty works? Is not this the carpenter's son? Is not his mother called Mary? And his brethren James and Joseph and Simon and Judas? And his sisters, are they not all with us? Whence then hath this man all these things?
>
> And they were offended in him.
>
> But Jesus said unto them: A prophet is not without honor, save in his own country, and in his own house."

That can only have happened when Jesus after many years of absence returned to his own country and visited first of all his birthplace where the members of his family still lived with the exception apparently of his father. That also is confirmed by the first five words of our text: *Coming into his own country.* These imply that Jesus had been for a long time outside of Palestine.

His intention was to begin in Nazareth his final and greatest work as prophet and Messiah. If he had preached for any length of time in Palestine before he had visited his family and his old friends, his fame would have reached them before they ever met him. They would have been proud of his successes and received him as one of the greatest prophets when at last he visited Nazareth.

The lack of a proper arrangement of the different parts of the Gospels indicates that the editor had no experience in writing a book. He seems to have added them just as they came into his possession. For instance, Matth. xiii. 54-58 brings us back to the day when Jesus had just returned from foreign countries and visited first of all his family and his old friends. That was the beginning of his mission in Palestine.

Matth. xi. 2-6 leads us a little farther. Jesus has become known as prophet and John the Baptist has sent to him from prison some of his disciples. He wishes to learn whether Jesus is the Messiah or not.

Matth. x. 5b-42, or at least the greater part of it, contains the final instructions which Jesus has given his disciples. That brings us to the beginning of his momentous journey to Jerusalem and the Temple.

The editor seems to have added new parts to his Gospel, one after the other, just as they came into his possession. A proper arrangement would have placed Matth. xiii. 54-58 where we find now x. 5b ff. and x. 5b ff. might take the place of xiii. 54-58. Matth. xi. 2-6 could remain where it is. That does not of course remove all the difficulties of our Gospels.

Jesus, according to the Synoptic Gospels, began and ended his prophetic mission in his native country in less than one year. He must have reached his home shortly after the day of Pentecost in the year 28 and was crucified on the day before the paschal lamb was eaten in the year 29. It has however to be remembered that the Jewish day begins at 6 in the evening. That Jesus was crucified on the day before the paschal, is stated John xviii. 28: *His accusers entered not the praetorium, that they might not be defiled, but might eat the passover.* That agrees also with Matth. xxvi. 5: Not during the feast, lest a tumult arise among the people.

The Fourth Gospel sends Jesus more than once to Jerusalem (see John v. 1.) But the original and genuine part of that Gospel consists of John ii, 13-17, the cleansing of the Temple; x, 1-18, the Good Shepherd; xi. 47-50, the Plot to put Jesus to Death; xii. 12-16, the Triumphal Entry; xiii. 1 and 3-20, Jesus Washes the Disciples' Feet; xviii. 12-40 and xix. 1-32 (with many exceptions) the Seizure, Questioning, Condemnation and Crucifixion of Jesus.

All the later additions have been furnished by a man of Jewish descent who had become the deacon of Polycarp, the bishop of

Smyrna. The Church of Smyrna belonged of course to Gentile Christians. The Jewish believers in Jesus had no Churches, but synagogues. Quite a number of Jewish Christians however followed the example of Paul and joined sooner or later Gentile Churches.

As soon as Polycarp had read the new Gospel, he hastened to Rome in order to present the newly discovered book of John to Anicetus, at that time the bishop of Rome. The bishop of Smyrna was especially interested in calling Anicetus' attention to the day on which Jesus had died on the cross. He seems to have been a young man. For otherwise, he would hardly have started the Quartodeciman movement which is based upon John xviii. 28. The present Gospel has been published between the year 159 and 169, possibly near the year 169.

The deacon of Polycarp must have found the original booklet of John in the home of his parents. He translated it into Greek and made out of it a book by adding all kinds of stories. He gave the book to his bishop who was delighted.

Judas Iscariot has possibly made his first appearance in the Fourth Gospel. He is an invention of the second century. That may be learned from 1. Corninthians xv. 5-8. That chapter has not been written by Paul, but by a later writer. It has been added to 1. Corinth. and may belong to the Second Century. The words that concern us here are:

> He appeared to Cephas, then to the twelve; then he appeared to above five hundred brethren at once, of whom the greater part remain until now, but some are fallen asleep; then he appeared to James, then to all the apostles; and last of all he appeared to me a miscarriage.

There is no allusion whatever to a traitor. Moreover people familiar with the Jewish customs as long as the Temple existed, cannot believe that the High Priest would have thought of hiring a stranger whom nobody needed.

Besides, Jesus has had only three companions, Peter, James and John. The twelve Apostles are those whom Paul has appointed for the Gentiles. That may be learned from *The Didache of the Twelve Apostles,* called also *The Didache of the Twelve Apostles of the Gentiles.* Bryennios has discovered that important little book and has it published in Constantinople in the year 1883.

Some officers of the High Priest had only to watch Jesus during

the day in the Temple and follow him in the evening to his quarter where he intended to eat the pascha lamb. That was done of course on the same day on which Jesus has cleansed the Temple. The second night after the cleaning of the Temple, Jesus was arrested.

Jesus, according to the Synoptic Gospels, began and ended his prophetic mission in Palestine within less than one year. He returned to his native land shortly after the day of Pentecost 28 and was crucified on the day before the paschal lamb was eaten in the year 29.

After this necessary deviation, we may try to learn if possible where and why Jesus has been so long away from home Luke has preserved a true story about Jesus when he was twelve years old. His parents went every year to Jerusalem for the feast of the passover. At that occasion the son forgot father and mother and remained in the Temple with the Pharisees. His parents found him at length there while he was with the Rabbis, listening to them and asking questions. All that heard him were amazed at his understanding. That revealed his inborn desire of learning all about God. But he did not join the Pharisees. For he had made up his mind, possibly then and there, to become a prophet.

Some of the prophets have written books which have been preserved in the Old Testament. That has induced many to believe that, with a few exceptions, the prophets have died out not long after the destruction of Jerusalem and the Temple by Nebuchadnezzar. But that is a mistake. There have been prophets always among the Jews of Palestine till the year 135 A. D. After that time, they have been suppressed also in the Diaspora but mostly by the Gentile Christians.

After Pompey had taken possession of Palestine for Rome 63 B. C., there was a change. Herod and later his sons ruled the province for the Roman Empire. During their supremacy, it became very dangerous for prophets to be found by officers of the king and later of the tetrarchs. Thus John the Baptist lost his life in the year 28 A. D. Jesus himself had to hide for some time in a desert because Herod the tetrarch wanted to arrest him also. Herod Agrippa I. killed James, the brother of John, with his sword. Such happenings must have driven most prophets out of Palestine into the Diaspora. For in all other Roman provinces, the Jewish religion had been declared by the Emperor a Religio Licita.

Under such conditions, Jesus like many other young students

left the home of his parents soon after his return from the Temple. His father and mother had become convinced that he was eager to study the art of the prophets in the Diaspora. In any case, he was old enough to take care of himself somewhere in the Roman world. One might compare him with the young scholars of the Middle-Ages. Many of them had to leave also very early their homes and support themselves while they studied. Jesus was the oldest son of a large family and the income of a carpenter in Nazareth less than small. Also the case of Samuel may be referred to. His mother devoted him as a baby to the temple and he became a prophet.

From 63 B. C., the Jews of Palestine grew more and more excited. They believed rightly their God was the only true God. Therefore they were convinced, as long as the Jews were faithful to Him, He would protect His sons against all foreign suppressers. Herod the Great kept them under strict control. That was rather easy for him, because he was related to the High Priest. But after his death in the year 4 B. C., Augustus ordered a census of Herod's kingdom which was to be divided among the sons. The Emperor had therefore to ascertain how much of the tribute had to be paid by each division.

That led to the first revolt of the Jews against the Roman government. The leader was Judas of Gaulanitis who claimed to be the Messiah, Sabinus, not QUIRINIUS, as he is named by mistake Luke ii. 2, was sent by the Emperor to suppress the rebels. Judas and his followers had in the meantime taken possession of the Temple. That famous building was destroyed together with the Jewish defenders after a long siege.

That event must have aroused Jesus and caused him to study more carefully and earnestly than ever before his own conception of God, as well as his God-inspired duty to his people. He more than likely decided to visit for that purpose all the cities of the Roman Empire where Jews were living. That meant, all the cities in which Greeks had their homes in larger numbers. For the Jews always followed the Greeks who were the merchants of the Empire and whom the Jews supplied with the goods. Every great city, no matter where, including Rome itself, was filled with Jews. They were not only prosperous but also protected by the Roman government in their religious life. They had their synagogues and their ancient religion had been declared by the Emperor Religio Licita.

No Gentile was permitted to disturb the Jews and their religious meetings.

The Jews had to pay indeed a regular tribute to the government. But every other citizen without exception had to do that also. For that was the only way in which the Empire could defend all subjects against enemies, wicked men and robbers. Besides, cities, streets and roads had to be built and extended in all directions from one end of the Roman country to the other. All these roads had to be kept in perfect condition.

Jesus learned all that in due time and could not fail to recognize the blessing, justice and necessity of what the government of the Gentiles achieved. He also could not help to become acquainted with the Roman armies, the greatest and best the world has ever seen. Jesus was bound to become convinced that his country, Palestine, had no cause whatever to make war against the Romans, and that any attempt to do so would end in the destruction of the Jews at home and the Temple. Jesus himself has foretold the end of the Temple and declared in public that the Roman tribute ought to be paid by the Jews.

Thus Jesus had come to the conclusion that his God was not a God of war but of peace. He had forbidden his disciples to fight for him. The kingdom he was offering to his nation was not a kingdom of this world, but the invisible kingdom that exists in the hearts of his believers.

In closing, we turn to Matth. x, 5b-42. The five parts of it are related to each other. They belong to the last warnings Jesus gave his disciples. He foretold what was to happen to them after his death. For he had not come to send peace on the earth but a sword.

That of course did not mean, his followers should take up swords to fight for their new religion. Jesus had to call their attention to the fact that they had to face the same fate as he. Thus he told them:

> He that findeth his life shall lose it; and he that loseth
> it for my sake shall find it.

Jesus had to warn his disciples of what the future had in store for them. For their countrymen believed, it was their divine duty to fight for their independence. God Himself would guide them to an everlasting victory and establish on earth forever His kingdom under his Messiah.

Jesus had learned among the Romans that the kingdom of God was and would be for ever invisible just as God Himself. He told the people:

> The kingdom of God does not come while you wait and watch the sky. Nor shall they say: Look here or there. For behold, the kingdom of God is within you.

That was the new message Jesus had to bring his nation. He was convinced that the Jews of the Diaspora were ripe to accept the new revelation. Therefor he sent Peter alone to them. His two other disciples, he assigned to Palestine. For as long as the Jews of the native land did not share the belief of Jesus, the Jews of the Empire would remain doubtful. Of course after the destruction of Jerusalem and the Temple, all the surviving Jews would have believed in the revelation of Jesus.

But in the meantime, Paul had begun to convert Gentiles in defiance of the clear warning and prohibition of the wise Master. What he has foretold, was true. But his work and sacrifice was destroyed. Our Jews believe in the Pharisees. Our Christians have remained Gentiles.

MUSIC AND PHILOSOPHY

BY FREDERICK N. SARD

MUSIC, as form, yields only music as logic yields only propositions. Yet the space of acoustics is likewise the space of mind and musical form is a part of the life of concepts and of imagery. In the domain of thought music is privileged to stand with other types of discourse. The last quartettes of Beethoven, for example, begin as sound but end at the farthest reach of thought.

Between the exact descriptions of science and the merging of distinctions by mystics we have not to choose. Nor do we require the buttress of Croce's theory that esthetic experience is a form of knowledge. We do not ask of Beethoven's music that it give us knowledge. What province is claimed for it beyond the limits of sound?

The major works of Beethoven sharpen the sensibility to the transcendental questions raised in the Old Testament and in the Upanishads (and by derivation in the Gospels); in western literature from the Greeks to Shakespeare, Goethe, Kant. Such questions as the place of mind in nature, the meaning of suffering, the nature of time or death, Beethoven knew and was concerned with. These questions are not futile when approached from the attitude of searching rather than solving. The reach of mind grows with aspiration, even if, like an asymptotic curve, it can never reach infinity.

This essay aims to present the philosophy or philosophical urge underlying Beethoven's music at the point of maturity, sometimes called "the third period" or "the third style." The attempt is predicated on the theory that music has a context derived from the ruling or central ideology of a given time. This is not the place to present the thesis that western music is a commentary on Christianity—its root-themes an expansion of the great leit-motifs of the

Gospels: the dignity of humanity and the conquest of death. But it may be noted here that the individual genius of the composer, up to the twentieth century, has worked within these leit-motifs, modified by cross-currents such as the French Revolution, the romantic movement in literature and the philosophies of idealism. The present disintegrated state of the art of music is a reflex of disintegration in other fields; and is evidence that the humanistic ideologies are no longer operative; that no new ideology has taken their place.

Often a musician builds a work to a poetic text; we beg to reverse the process by using musical works as a path to the content of the musician's mind. In choosing the meditation-form we wish to indicate that no claim is made for a one-to-one correspondence between Beethoven's music and the context proposed.

Beethoven's Inner Life

And there appeared to Beethoven the desire to take an inventory of his life; but his meditation merged with musical images, thematic fragments of works abandoned—like the Macbeth and the Faust. Memories rose to the surface and were carried away in the movement of revery. He was not at peace; questionings intruded, unsolved in his favorite books—Job, Plutarch, The Tempest—which may be compared to regions of clarity surrounded by dark spaces.

He compared his development to that of a tree, foliage potential in the roots and growing inwardly, silently, incorporating influences of light and atmosphere and the whole realm of nature, of which it is unaware. The feeling of novelty, of having added something not prepared for, vanished in a calm survey of his works. There, in the very beginnings, were the roots of his later modes of expression.

As musician, he had not coveted other domains. This centralization gave to his music a completeness new in the art. When he speculated on problems of destiny it was from the same feeling "for play" which animated his music. As his deafness increased he withdrew deeper into himself, pursuing ideas as he did musical images, into weighty digressions and hidden relationships. If, as musician, he was restless in a given key, as thinker he had even wider range for exploration.

The problem of his place in the scheme of things fascinated him. Convenient solutions were at hand, sanctified solutions, but he was intellectually honest and wished to break marble from his own

quarries. From his earliest works, this determination to think for himself was given free rein in the long sustained adagios.

In reaching out for some sign from nature, he never succumbed to mysticism. The tree-simile pleased him as adequate for musical form, but where has mind its roots? Nature presented to him a possible synthesis provided that mind was not left outside it. At one time, he leaned towards pantheism but now he realized that the addition of minds does not make a universe. If the world be intelligent at the core, it was necessary to tunnel through to reach it. Pantheism was too easy.

It was at the period of his Fifth Symphony (1805-1807) that his reverence for nature, as a spectacle, left unsatisfied his metaphysical hunger, sharpened by reading and a distaste for organized religion. The mood was assertive rather than analytical and reached the Greek-Christian antithesis in the opening theme of the C minor symphony, alleged to indicate "Fate knocking on the door," when, it seems to us, it was Beethoven who issued the summons. In the last movement of that symphony, the vitality of the artist sweeps the problem into an ocean of rhythm. The conflict, however, was not ended; only an armistice had been declared.

There followed a mood of Pascalian resignation before the immensity of the problem. What might have happened had the Upanishads come into his hands is an intriguing speculation, but the deeper resignation of oriental genius would not have been without profound influence on his mind. (Years later he copied out in his note-books many passages from the Upanishads). He was not as susceptible as Wagner to exotic philosophies but the eagle imagination of Beethoven would have felt at home on Himalayan heights.

In the seventh symphony (1812) he found a form in which the creator, by a tour-de-force, might conquer fate; a veritable "will-to-power" which earned for this symphony the title "Dionysian." It required, however, a crescendo of health beyond his powers to carry forward this thrust. The reaction was inevitable. The eighth symphony was a respite; he returned to the attack in 1817, the beginning of his "third period" during which he produced the greatest of his works: The Ninth Symphony, The Missa Solemnis, and the last quartettes.

In the challenge of the seventh symphony, Beethoven left the

clue to a music of the future. In the bold lines of an Angelo cartoon, he sketched the music of yea-saying, bringing within human compass those gods of fate, of closed-in-omniscience who are credited with condemning mankind to inescapable suffering—the god of Sophocles and the god of Job. Now they are made to dance to transcendental irony. Beethoven announces man's capacity for joy; with mockery he serenades the images of stone, then, suddenly, hurls the whole orchestra at them. In the first and second movements of this symphony he contemplates and addresses these gods with measured dignity. In the allegretto he had even placed wreaths around them; but in the last movement (with what cunning had he prepared this!) he tears off the mask of humility and crushes them with sledge-hammer force; you hear the thud of the fall of the leaden verities. With mind enfranchised, he asserts that suffering is not the core of eristence; that a deaf, ill and harried man could say "Yea"; and in that assertion the emotional scope of music advanced centuries.

Again, in the last movement of the ninth symphony, he renewed the struggle, but this time with the support of the humanitarian Schiller, ending with a lyrical-religious setting supplied by "The Ode to Joy." In this music he succeeded in depicting joy but he was not so successful in depicting brotherhood. Occasionally, as in the piano sonata opus 111 and in the last quartettes, he was to recapture the militancy, but in these works as a whole, it is renunciation that is ennobled and deepened.

For these last works he must develop inner walls, proof against clamorings, bickerings, intruders great and small. He will select the ripest fruits of his melos; reach a greater internal coherency; wrest a new inwardness from contemplation, so that his discourse will satisfy the mind first before taking secondary substance through instruments. And this depth will give forth its own light. Wondrous, it seemed to him, that his deafness has opened hidden doors for his music; that an art which requires so many intermediaries—notation, instrument, performer—had in him reached the point remotest from outer things; and his whole being rejoiced in that memory and imagination had become peculiarly his instruments, giving him ideal conditions for concentration, for canceling the irrelevant, for control over the form of music.

To hold, without strain, the many phases of his life in an internal

frame; to contain, as in a gigantic bracket, the human and the transcendental, was now the essence of his creative activity. In the retreat of the ensemble-form, he sought to forge his own ideology, fusing eastern and western thought, to reach an outlook wider than the ethos of Christianity. So these last quartettes became his spiritual testament; the summit of his musical pilgrimage. From them we venture to draw the affirmations implicit in these works.

Beethoven's Affirmations

Not by annexing dominion in time and space is mind realized; nor by prayer and ritual. No ethic, religion or philosophy can change the center of thought, transfer it to nature or give it a power beyond its power.

By diverse routes, in changing keys and rhythms, Mind ever returns on itself, enriched without concessions, ever enlarging its capacity, knower of Brahm, Absolute, of the genius-line across which nature walks with greater majesty.

So are creeds like the well-meaning friends of Job who, in conciliation and casuistry, simulate the spirit. The thunder of the whirl-wind must be answered by the thunder of Mind creative, else we be as Lears babbling in the storm.

Seek not to compel the elements to answer your questions; but take joy in the very motions of thought.

The silence of stars is not an impeachment of mind. One day Mind will address the universe in a language to which it can respond.

I sought essence only to find form; I explored form only to discover meta-forms.

Whether and how parts are related to a whole or if the whole inheres in every part—are themes of the one universal dialectic of spirit, of which the great minds of east and west are forms.

Order is the ground of higher orders; their transforms are a perpetual music of spirit.

Spirit, the Melos; the ground of reality; the voices of time, space, minds; here names end as sounds must end.

* * * * *

How satisfying are the ways of contemplation! It knows no hierarchy of matter-mind or mind-matter; requires no mediators; where prophets speak truth, they are its servants; dogmas cause

it to discover new hiding places; illusions cannot deceive it. It is not Reason, but it opposes all that is contrary to reason. It is not imagination, but imagination is its messenger. It is not wisdom, but wisdom is nourished by it. It is not coerced by discipline of logic but order is at its core, and all tangents of disorder, when carried too far, fall back into it. It requires neither number nor space but from it spring number and space. It is not form but is the matrix of forms.

The matrix of life, of light, of energy, works in manifold paths; where two paths join, there is mind; where three paths converge there is spirit. The one path of light and the one path of body, these make mind. The three enter the field of transforms where high aspiring meditation yields to music its precious fruits.

In the heart of this music dwells the secret of transformation—the white perfect of God.

Spirit of Spirits, through whom space is infinite and time is endless, who art raised high above all limits of upward struggling thought, Thou art mind's summit; form of forms; transform of forms. Our creations are but as the shadows of thy wings; our highest thoughts seek but cannot embody thee. Thy light is the source of suns as it is the source of mind. Thou art so that the heavens might be and all the systems that roll below and above us. Thy essence is certain and that which comes into being sings praises to thee. As thou art free of desire, no external force moved thee to create. Spirit of Spirits, to whom the human mind lifts its desire, in thee to be purified of desire.

THE ETHICS AND TECHNIQUE OF RETIRING

BY VICTOR S. YARROS

WE Americans are, proverbially, a strenuous, hard-working people. Few of us retire from business unless compelled to do so by the rules and regulations of banks, corporations, universities and governmental services. Most of us die in harness, and, in the words of the late Col. Theodore Roosevelt, prefer to wear out instead of rusting out. The federal treasury's income tax data show, among other interesting things, that even the men of great wealth remain in industry or trade, or in the professions, and derive a considerable part of their annual incomes from business activities.

Is this, on the whole, a sound policy either from the individual or the social point of view? Should men retire at a certain age, conscious of having done their duty to the community and to humanity and spend a few years, or even several years, far from the madding crowd—traveling, seeing the picturesque and fascinating world, listening to music, going to the theater and cinema, attending scientific and sociological conferences,—in short, enjoying themselves rationally and loafing with their souls as companions?

Lately, in American and British periodicals the question has been raised whether useful persons have a moral right to retire and amuse themselves. It has been affirmed that the ethical aspect of the retirement problem has been wholly neglected in the past, and that it must now be faced frankly and fairly.

Mr. H. G. Wells, in his sprawling social novel, *The World of William Clissold,* has drawn up a sweeping indictment of the thousands of retired and all-but-retired men of affairs who fill the hotels and villas of Southern France and the Riviera, who have nothing to do and kill time by playing golf and tennis, dancing, flirting, giving and patronizing tea parties and dinners. Mr. Wells groans over the ability, energy, intellectual power and ripe wisdom wasted by

these idle hosts, who, after all, cannot escape boredom and ennui. He demands service of them—disinterested, tolerant, wise counsel, at least, if not active management of important public affairs.

This idea is not startling or revolutionary. Some men have retired and do retire from business in order to be free to devote their time and gifts to various altruistic activities. The example of Mr. Edward Bok scarcely needs to be recalled here. Retired men of large affairs are found on charity and hospital boards, foundations, and the like. But the number of such men is admittedly small in America, and is growing smaller in Europe with the irresistible advance of democratic ideas and of the conception of service as the only real title income or wealth. The acceptance of the principle of service, however, obviously complicates the retirement problem. Will men and women increasingly feel that they must work as long as health and strength permit, or will society concede the right as well as the wisdom of giving up one's regular job voluntarily in advance of disability and of playing the part of an interested spectator of the drama of life and doing what one pleases during the years of earned leisure?

Let it be said at once that if society were to establish the institution of "elder guides" and really demand appropriate and dignified service of such persons, few would be so mean, callous and malicious as to decline that duty and opportunity. But the West has no such institution and is not considering the creation of one. To remain in business or in the professions to the end of the span of life is to remain in the struggle, the scramble, the pursuit of money and power. Is it not better to retire and make way for younger and naturally ambitious men and women?

So far as the sense of moral obligation is concerned, it is certain that even the most sensitive conscience will not trouble him or her who has devoted thirty-five or forty years of adult life to the serious competitive business of getting a living in a legitimate and honorable occupation. The collective social conscience is not likely to demur to the spontaneous conclusion of the developed and alert individual conscience in the premises.

Moreover, retired business or professional men need not be *entirely* useless to their families, groups and communities. There are amusements and amusements. To attend scientific and philosophical lectures; to patronize good music and the artistic and literary drama; to travel and write accounts of one's wanderings;

to read or re-read books of value and merit, and to discuss them; to form groups for study and debates—to do such things as these is *not* to waste time and deprive society of possible intellectual and spiritual benefits. And, after all, cultivated men and women retire not to dance and play cards, but to enjoy the finer pleasures of life. These pleasures are not selfish; they can be shared with others and made to contribute to social progress.

The *expediency* of retiring is a more difficult question. He who lacks resources in himself, who has not formed habits of reading, study, contemplation, creative listening to music and the spoken drama; he who is not really interested in intellectual, social, æsthetic and ethical problems; he to whom travel means no more than drifting and changes of the external scene and who is restless and discontented everywhere, cannot be advised to retire. He would "go to pieces"; he would be cutting his life short; he would make others miserable. But he who has the art of making good use of leisure, with profit to himself and to his companions and friends, should certainly be encouraged to retire while still in possession of his faculties, while still avid and appreciative of the fine things of life, while physically and mentally capable of educational delights and elevated and noble pleasures.

Long ago the late Herbert Spencer told Americans that they did not know how to rest and relax, how to enjoy beauty and other spiritual luxuries. The same reproach is brought against them today, and with the same force and truth. But they are not to be blamed for their aversion to idleness; the fact is, *they have not been prepared for leisure.* We are just beginning to learn that leisure is not an unmixed blessing; that it hath its perils and snares, and that men and women must be trained for leisure as well as for work and concentrated, fruitful study. The notion that only the wage workers need preparation for leisure is shallow and unfounded; the average man of affairs is quite as unprepared for emancipation from routine and the daily grind.

It is, indeed this unpreparedness for leisure that leads so many Americans to assert that work is the greatest fun in life, and that if you love your profession, or job, or business, it would be the height of folly to abandon it for any other pursuit or interest in the world. Of course, we should love our work, find it creative, absorbing, fascinating. Work should be joy—and it is to be hoped that some day that consummation will be effected. But work should

not be the *only* fun desired and enjoyed. Even the savant, the specialist, the philosopher, the inventor should not renounce other kinds and forms of fun. There is a distinguished physicist and mathematician in Chicago who devotes hours every week to the reading and re-reading of Italian and Spanish plays and novels in the original language. No man on earth loves his work and laboratory more than this great scientist, whom the world has repeatedly and signally honored for enduring contributions to his branches of research. But he repudiates the idea that it is unworthy of a scholar to enjoy dramas, comedies, novels, poetry, even nonsense of the Lear-Carroll varities. He used to play tennis and golf, and to attend concerts and recitals.

Life and work are by no means synonymous terms. We have many faculties and aptitudes to develop, and he who has neglected any of these has not come into his full inheritance, has not lived abundantly, has not made the most of human life. Darwin lost his taste for poetry as the result of years of hard work and experimentation in a laboratory, but that was an unnecessary loss. Science and poetry are not mutually incompatible, and there is time for all things desirable and lovely to him who has learned how to husband his resources.

What we need in this country is organization for leisure. The individual may fear idleness even if he be highly cultivated, versatile and resourceful. He is not sure that he will find congenial associates, and he knows how busy people—or people who affect to be very busy—receive visitors who drop in for a chat. He feels that the atmosphere of the country is chilly and unfriendly to retired persons; he has, perhaps, himself snubbed and cold-shouldered such persons and felt pity and contempt for them. But the situation would be changed if groups and societies were organized everywhere for the declared purpose of improving leisure and enjoying it worthily. Groups might be organized for study and discussion, for the reading and interpretation of epoch-making or classical books, for courses of lectures on abstract and other sciences, for the performance and enjoyment of chamber music, for excursions, "hikes," explorations, tours, and the like.

Such organizations would advertise the availability of competent, experienced, broad minded men and women for all kinds of social, philanthropic and charitable activities. There are many art institutes, symphony orchestra associations, natural history museums,

chamber music organizations, and the like that need and would greatly benefit by the sober minded, sensible advice of cultivated and traveled laymen. No individual can offer himself for membership in any such organization, even if his or her qualifications for the part be conspicuous. A strong group of retired persons willing and able to give gratuitous service to the community—to art, science, education, benevolence—would not hesitate to make it known that its members were ready to respond to calls for aid and advice.

The writer of these lines has friends who, like himself, feel that they have earned leisure and the privilege of retiring from regular, gainful work. They are not weary of their jobs; on the contrary, they find those jobs as stimulating and interesting as when they first tackled them thirty or thirty-five years ago. But they long for freedom and for certain pleasures that are barred by "jobs." Travel, of course, is one of these pleasures, but by no means the only one.

Who will start the first club or organization of retired or retiring business and professional men? New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Boston, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and some other American cities are clearly the indicated leaders of the coming movement for the intelligent utilization of leisure by individuals, groups and clubs. Perhaps the first step to be taken on the eve of that movement is the publication of a small monthly periodical for and by men and women interested in the retiring problem and desirous of ideas and suggestions concerning the several aspects of that far from easy problem.

THE RELIGIOUS SPECULATIONS OF JAKOB BOEHME

BY BIRGER R. HEADSTROM

IN his treatment of the religious problem, which had been initiated by the intellectual movement of the Renaissance, Boehme met with two seemingly insuperable difficulties: the remoteness of God, who dwells according to the learned, in the far away heavens and the insignificant place man occupies in Nature, and the struggle of good with evil, both in the world of men and in Nature; in other words, the question: How is the existence of evil compatible with the existence of God?

To him, however, God is not far, and Heaven is not in the sky but rather within oneself; we live in God and God in us, and if we are pure and holy, then we are God, for within us there stir the same powers as in God, and in the whole of Nature. The underlying thought of this is that God's power and essence move in all things, in us equally as well as in the outer masses, that God is not sundered from Nature but is as related to it as the soul is to the body. Fire, air, water, earth,—all is God, otherwise we cannot be God's image, for we cannot be of other matter than God Himself. Whenever we regard the earth, the stars, or the great depths we see God, and in this same God we are and live. That is, it is the force from which they derive their life that dwells in us; and furthermore, the inner motions in Man are the same as those which take place in God. Only in the spirit of Man is He recognized; in all the processes of Nature, He is concealed. Man can therefore understand nothing of God if his soul is separated from Him.

Boehme was aware, however, of the criticism which could be addressed to this line of thought for he wrote: "Hear and see, and note the difference. My writing is not heathen but philosophical. Moreover, I am no heathen, but have a deep and true knowledge of the one great God who is all!" This view had made the world alive

for him, and furthermore had shown him that the spirit within it is the one which moves at the heart of all things. Such a thought he had tried to put aside, but fear and anxiety had led him to its further consideration, until he gradually became convinced of its possibility as a solution to the tormenting problem which for a time had almost driven him to despair.[1] For in this idea, the religious longing after inner union with God agreed with the philosophical need of an interconnection between all things, both finding support in the naturo-philosophical doctrine of Paracelsus that man consists of the same elements as the universe.

It was largely due to the influence of Paracelsus that Boehme was able to proceed to the next step in his problem. He had already asked himself in what manner the outer world of sense had arisen, and why all things do not exist in such an inner and harmonious interconnection that anxieties, such as had tormented him, could not arise? Guided by the view of the alchemist that the differentiation of the elements had taken place through a process of separation, he gradually arrived at the question of the origin of evil, intensified for him as he desired to know nothing of God apart from the world and souls, conceiving, instead, the life of these to be part of God's own life. For the cobbler, evil is precisely due to the fact that we seek to separate ourselves from the whole complex to be a totality, though we are merely a part-thereby giving rise to disunion, dissension, and consequently the pain of the world. That he was at all able to discuss this question and solve its implications is attributable, as he explained, to that same spirit which not only moves in the world, and has done so since eternity, but which also moves within himself. That is, he employed his own inner experiences and struggles to explain Nature and its history, and to understand, as well, the innermost moving force of all things. And though he depicted a series of processes and catastrophes, a whole world-drama as it were, he did not imply that such actually happened at any definite time or place, nor that it developed historically and successively. He described rather what constantly is in progress everywhere, the eternal fundamental relations of the world-powers, the struggle which continues unceasingly. "My meaning is not that there is in heaven any particular place or a particular body where the fire of the divine life breaks forth . . . but I speak in this bodily fashion for the sake of my readers' lack of understanding; for thou canst name

[1] *Morgenröte im Aufgang,* chaps. xix. xxv.

no place—neither in heaven nor in this world—where the divine ought not to be and is not." "And although I have written here how everything happened, and how everything became formed and shaped, and how the Deity burst forth—yet thou durst not therefore think that there is ever any rest or extinction and afterwards a fresh bursting forth. Oh no, but I must write bit by bit for the sake of 'my readers' lack of understanding." "The birth of Nature takes place to-day, just as it did in the beginning." "With the divine happenings there is no beginning, middle or end." "Thou must know that I do not write this as a history, which has been related to me by some one else, but that I myself must always stand in the midst of this same battle, in which I, like other men, am often tripped up."

Convinced that nothing can be explained out of an absolute unity, Boehme was thoroughly opposed to the theory of creation out of nothing. For him, there lies in the essence of God a plurality of moments, an inner, original antithesis that finds expression, so to speak, as a source of all life.[2] God is not only the positive moment Yes, but also No, for otherwise there would be nothing that could be decidedly prominent. Neither would there be a will, for pure unity possesses nothing in itself that it could will. This original element of opposition he called, in his mythological language, the wrath of God and the fundament of hell. In other words, wrath is as original with God as love; he is the fundament of hell as well as blessedness. For, he asked, where should anger come from, if it did not have its root in God? However, this wrath is only a moment which serves as a means to enable love to arrive consciously into prominence. The fundamental significance of Life requires such an opposition for otherwise in Nature there would be no motion, growth, and impulse in everything. Everything was resolved by him into active forces and tendencies; and without a plurality of qualities, i. e. difference of qualities,[3] no motion, no life, in fact, no consciousness would be possible.

The acceptance of this original unity of opposites still leaves, however, the question of how can such a unity be reconciled with our experience of the hardness and bitterness in the world, and particularly of the struggle between good and evil, both in the inner

[2] *Vide Theosophischen Fragen.*

[3] Boehme explained the word "quality" as expressing an inspired thought; "Quality is the mobility or impulse of a thing."

and outer world, for obviously plurality can no more be deduced from absolute unity than discord from absolute harmony. In the drama in which the members of the Trinity (the primitive qualities) and the host of archangels all take part, the main point is that one of the elements in the original nature of the Deity, wrath, or the No, becomes desirous of ruling the whole, in other words, not satisfied with being a moment it aspires to be a totality. Essentially it is this: that Lucifer triumphs over the entire Deity and aims to a prouder and more splendid *Qualificierung*[4] than God Himself. The opposites, being dislodged from their original harmonious union, give rise to the pain and strife of the world and accordingly define the world as we now know it. For Boehme, then, evil existed before men, its germ is in Nature itself. Equally as well, the story of creation, as told in the first book of Moses, had little significance, for, according to him, "it runs contrary to philosophy and reason." Nor could he believe that "that worthy man Moses was its author." For the most part, he followed his own thoughts, having little use for the ways of the philosophers and theologians "since I have learnt nothing from them; but have another schoolmaster which is the whole of Nature."

The view, which many held, that God designedly chooses some men for blessedness, while ordaining others to condemnation, seemed to Boehme absurd, and he would not have believed it even had Paul or Peter written so, for to him God does not will evil, nor did He foreknow what had happened. Yet, evil must have its root in God, for He is the author of all things; but it is the negative moment, the "fundament of Hell" which is merely a divine element separated from the original harmony; it is "God against God," as he expressly wrote.[5] It is for this reason that the struggle in the world is so stern and violent; divine power is fighting on both sides! And so arises the fear and pain from the struggle with self, and from which Boehme saved himself by taking refuge in the thought of the heart of God, unceasingly combating the hardness and bitterness of the world.

That the involuntary precedes the voluntary, Boehme was quite aware, for he found the origin of evil to lie in the involuntary ground of Nature, and not in God's free will. Yet he failed to grasp the significance of the gap from difference to strife, from contrast

[4] *Qualificierung* is the same as motion (*Bewegung*).

[5] *Morgenröte*, chap. xiv ¶72.

to separation; nor could he explain how Lucifer's pride arose. But in spite of this, he had embarked on a course of thought from which he could not deviate, and though he did not know whither it was leading he at least felt the new powers which his thoughts had initiated.

A faithful believer in positive Lutheranism, he saw, however, that if divine light and life serve as a balance to the hardness and bitterness which pervade the whole of Nature, admission to that light cannot be limited, that is, every man may work or grow through the "anger" to the "love." "He who has love in his heart and leads a merciful and gentle life, striving against evil and pressing through the anger of God into the light,—he lives with God and is one in spirit with Him, for God requires no other service." Though these words may seem "curious and without foundation" they have a secure place in Boehme's fundamental notions, and express as well that universalistic tendency that characterized the philosophy of the Renaissance, and which is closely linked up with the idea that Man once more believed in his natural powers and dared to use his own thoughts. At any rate, Boehme treated his problems with an intellectual force and freedom that carried him far beyond the limits of dogmatism, and lastly, his religious speculations only become really comprehensible when considered in connection with the new cosmology, especially with the ideas of Paracelsus and Copernicus.

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THE FORM OF THE FIEND

BY MAXIMILIAN RUDWIN

THE Devil has assumed many forms and worn many costumes. Hundreds of books, pictures and prints depict his Infernal Majesty in almost as many different disguises as there are stars in the sky. Satan is a polymorphous individual. He is the equal of Jupiter in the art of physical tergiversation, having a capacity for almost endless variations and transmutations, which he uses to the great perplexity of mortals. As successor to Hermes, he has also inherited the Greek god's ability to contract and expand at pleasure. Indeed, if we credit all the accounts of the forms in which the Fiend has shown himself on earth, he is a quick-change artist of first-rate ability.

The Devil as a fallen angel is, naturally enough, "a spirit in form and substance,"—but he has been granted the power of manifesting himself to the eyes of man in a material form as far back as the first century of the Christian era. As the adversary of corporeal saints, he necessarily and unmistakably became more material than he had been as the shadowy opponent of the spiritual angels. Although in reality incorporeal, he can, of his own inherent power, call into existence any manner of body that it pleases his fancy to inhabit, or that will be most conducive to the success of any contemplated evil.

It has been said that the Devil can manifest himself to the eyes of man in any form which exists "in the heavens above, in the earth beneath, and in the waters under the earth." He can, first of all, still manifest himself in his former rôle as an angel. St. Paul warns us that Satan can transform himself into an angel of light (2 Cor. xi. 14), and St. Thomas, commenting on the words of the great

Apostle, teaches that the higher natural qualities of the angels have not wholly been withdrawn from the fallen spirits.[1]

But this is not all. In order to mislead mankind, the Devil can even appear, according to Thomas Cranmer, author of *A Confutation of Unwritten Verities* (16th cent.), in the likeness of Christ. It is known that the Devil manifested himself to the Deacon Secundullus first as an angel and later as Christ himself.[2]

As a general thing, however, the Devil seeks his models among men. He has at his command, as Timon of Athens has said, "all shapes that man goes up and down in." He can appear in the form of either sex. The Fiend figured in human form when he approached the hermits of the Thebaid. The earliest known representation of the Devil in human form is found on an ivory diptych of the time of Charles the Bald (9th Cent.). In Thomas Middleton's *Witch* (p. 1778), Hecate speaks of a custom that witches have of causing their familiar spirits to assume the shape of any man for whom they have a passion.[3]

But incarnation in a human body is not sufficient for Satan. The forms of the whole of the animal kingdom seem also to be at his disposal. He can adopt, in fact, the form of any animal he wishes—from a worm to an eagle. Indeed, one of the most significant elements of demonology is the persistance of the animal character in which the Devil appears. But not content with known animal forms, he even seeks further to assume incredible and impossible shapes. Popular fancy assembled, in fact, the repugnant parts of all known living beings and fashioned the Devil out of them. In order to frighten the good Christians, the Fiend had to possess a form which was particularly suited to instil terror into their hearts.

The Devil, whom our medieval ancestors detected so unerringly and feared so mortally, was a compound of all the contortions and distortions known to exist among living things on this earth. Our pious forefathers imagined him who "one day wore a crown under the eyes of God" in as horrid and hideous a form as fancy could

[1] Consult the authorities quoted on this matter by Anatole France in his novel *la Révolte des anges* (1914). A contemporary Polish novelist, Kornel Makuszynski, says in his recent story "Another Paradise Lost and Regained" (1926): "It is one of the most ancient and common of hellish tricks for a devil to take the shape of an angel."

[2] Cf. Wilhelm Fischer: *Aberglauben aller Zeiten* (Stuttgart, 1906-7), I, 55.

[3] Norman Douglas in his novel *They Went* (1921) offers an interesting variant in the person of Theophilus, the Greek merchant.

WITCHES CELEBRATING WALPURGIS NIGHT
(By Franz Simm)

render it. Like the Greek Gorgon, the Christian Satan was meant to represent, as Anatole France has said, the sympathetic alliance between physical ugliness and moral evil. The grotesque paintings of the Devil in the medieval cathedrals were enough to scare even the Devil himself.[4] Daniel Defoe has well remarked that the Devil does not think that the people would be terrified half so much if they were to converse with him face to face. "Really," this biographer of Satan goes on to say, "it were enough to fright the Devil himself to meet himself in the dark, dressed up in the several figures which imagination has formed for him in the minds of men."

If you wish to see the Devil in his genuine form, we are told in Gogol's story "St. John's Eve" (1830), stand near a mustard seed on St. John's Eve at midnight, the only evening in the year when Satan reveals himself in his proper form to the eyes of man. Sir John Fraser suggests, in his *Golden Bough* (1911-1914), that this prince from a warmer climate may be attracted by the warmth of the mustard in the chilly air of the upper world.

The Devil, in fact, is very sensitive in regard to the unflattering portrayal of himself by the good Christians. On a number of occasions, he has expressed his bitter resentment at the ugly form given him in Christian iconography. A medieval French legend relates the discomfiture of a monk, who was forced by the indignant Devil to paint him in a less ugly fashion. Lucifer also appeared once in a dream to the Florentine painter Spinello Spinelli to ask him in what place he had beheld him under so brutish a form as he had painted him. This story is told in Giorgio Vasari's *Vite de' piu eccellenti pittori, scultori et architetti* (1550) and retold by Anatole France in his story "Lucifer" (1895).[5]

It makes us, indeed, wonder why the Devil was always represented in so repugnant a form. Rationally conceived, the Devil should be by right the most fascinating object in creation. One of his essential functions, namely temptation, is destroyed by his hideousness. To be effective in the work of temptation, a demon

[4] On the Devil in medieval art, consult Emil Mâle's three volumes: *l'Art religieux du XIIe siècle en France; l'Art religieux du XIIIe siècle en France; l'Art religieux de la fin du moyen âge en France,* and Maurice Gossart: *la Peinture des diableries à la fin du moyen-âge; Jérôme Bosch, "le faizeur de dyables," de Bois-le-Duc* (1907).

[5] In his story "les Blattes," Anatole France also expresses the fear of an Italian painter that he may have incurred the Devil's displeasure by the manner in which he presented him on the cathedral doors and church windows.

might be expected to approach his intended victim in the most fascinating form he could command.[6]

The fact is that the form given the Devil in Christian iconography has an historical foundation. It has been derived from the fabled gods of antiquity. The medieval monster is an amalgamation of all the heathen divinities, from whom he derived, especially of those gods or demons which, already in pagan days, were inimical to the benevolently ruling deities.

Indeed, a great number of sacred animal representations will be found in most of the religions of antiquity. The gods of India, Egypt, Assyria, Babylonia, Greece and Rome were worshipped under the form of the animals which were supposed to possess the qualities for which they were reverenced. At a later period in the history of religion, the divinity was partly humanized; and a human deity was conceived with certain animal parts to represent the form under which he had originally been worshipped. Later on, all vestiges of the ancient animal forms were discarded, and the deity emerged in full human form. This evolution accounts for the fact that the Devil has appeared to our ancestors in full animal form, in a form half animal and half human, and finally wholly human.

As a matter of fact, every animal form that was assumed by the gods in antiquity has had its body occupied by the Devil.[7] Furthermore, the Devil's representation in the form of certain animals is the result of a literal interpretation of a figurative scriptural expression. The medieval writers had a tendency to convert symbols and metaphors into facts. If the Devil is called in the New Testament a roaring lion, a dragon, a serpent, a wolf, a dog, it was instantly supposed that he was in the habit of actually assuming the forms of these animals.

The elephant, which was sacred to the eyes of the Buddhist, had its body inhabited by the Devil. The bull was diabolized for the

[6] The Devil, it should be added in all truthfulness, appears on certain occasions also in an agreeabe form. Anatole France tells us that "the Devil... clothes himself in divers forms, sometimes pleasing, when he succeeds in disguising his natural ugliness, at other times, hideous, when he lets his true nature be seen" (*la Rôtisserie de la Reine Pédauque,* 1893). William Shakespeare has also remarked that "the Devil hath power to assume a pleasing shape" (*Hamlet,* II, ii, 628-9).

[7] The animals which were diabolized by the early Christians on account of their associations with mythological personages or ideas should not be confused, however, with those animals which, owing to the fact that they possess qualities inimical to man, were already feared as demons in the animistic religions.

reason that he was venerated by the Egyptians. As successor to the Egyptian Seth, Satan also appeared in the form of a pig. The fox, which was sacred to certain ancient divinities, was likewise considered as the Devil's incarnation. The bear was for similar reasons one of the Devil's medieval metamorphoses.

The representation of the Devil in the shape of a goat goes back to far antiquity. Goat-formed deities and spirits of the woods existed in the religions of India, Egypt, Assyria, and Greece.[8] The Assyrian god was often associated with the goat, which was supposed to possess the qualities for which he was worshipped. This animal was also connected with the worship of Priapus, the Greek god of vegetal and animal fertility. The goat was similarly sacred to the Northern god Donar or Thor, whom, as Jacob Grimm says, the modern notions of the Devil often have in the background. Thor's chariot was drawn by goats. As the familiar of the witch, the Devil appeared in the form of a goat as well as in that of a dog. Esmeralda's goat, in Victor Hugo's novel *Notre-Dame de Paris* (1831), was believed to be her familiar demon. French witches were often thought to slip into the skin of a goat to identify themselves with their goatish god. Satan presided at the Witches' Sabbath in the form of a black buck. The goat, in the grand scene of the Last Judgment, is also the symbol of the slaves of sin.[9]

The dog has always been one of the Devil's favorite metamorphoses, especially as the familiar of the witch or wizard. The Devil had already been represented as a dog in the Bible (Phil. iii. 2; Rev. xxii. 15). He is, therefore, called hell-hound in the medieval mysteries. Mephistopheles appears to Faust in the form of an ugly dog, "a fit emblem," as Conway says, "of the scholar's relapse into the canine temper which flies at the world as at a bone he means to gnaw."[10] Cornelius Agrippa, the sceptic philosopher, who was considered a magician in the Middle Ages, was also attended by a devil in the shape of a black dog.

The Devil as guardian of hell was also equated to Cerberus and inherited the latter's triple head. Many mythologies, in fact, show

[8] On the relation of satyrs to goats see Sir John Frazer's *Golden Bough*, vol. VIII, pp. lsqq.

[9] The creation of the goat has aso been ascribed to the Devil. Hans Sachs has written a farce entitled "The Devil Created Goats" (September 24, 1556). Engl. Transl. in Wm. Leighton's *Merry Tales of Hans Sachs* (London, 1920), pp. 129-131.

[10] Moncure Daniel Conway: *Demonology and Devil-Lore*. 2 vols., 3rd ed., New York, 1889.

tricephalic gods of the underworld. The Devil's trinitarian head recalls Typhon of the Egyptians, Hecate of classical mythology, Hrim-Grimmir of the Edda and Triglaf of the Slavs.[11] The Dantean Dis has three faces: one in front, and one on each side. The middle face is red, that on the right side whitish-yellow, that on the left side black.[12] The trinity idea of the Devil was in-

THE TRINITY
From a painted window of the sixteenth century in the church of Notra Dame at Chalons, France.



THE TRINITY OF EVIL
From a French MS. of the fifteenth century, preserved in the Bibliothèque Royale at Paris.

terpreted by the Church fathers as Satan's parody of the trinitarian God-head. The Devil is described as a three headed monster in the Gospel of Nicodemus (3rd cent.) and in the Good Friday Sermon of Eusebius of Alexandria, who addresses him as the "Three-headed Beelzebub."

The Devil inherited the form of a crow or black raven from

[11] Cf. Paul Carus: *History of the Devil and the Idea of Evil* (Chicago, 1900), p. 249.
[12] *Ibid.*

Odin, who, in Scandinavian mythology, had two ravens perched on his shoulders. Mephistopheles, in Goethe's *Faust*, is accompanied by two crows (i. 2491).

The dove, which was a sacred animal in the pagan period, was, in Christian days, gradually invested with something of the evil character of the Tempter of Job and came very nearly to represent the old fatal serpent power. This creature was sacred to all Semites, who revered it as the reincarnation of their beloved dead, and who, for this reason, avoided eating or even touching it. The Romans also held the dove in veneration and offered it as a sacrifice to Venus.

The bat, on account of its ugly form, was especially fit to offer its body for habitation by the Devil. In Anatole France's story "le Grand St. Nicolas" (1909), six devils appear in the form of bats.

The rat or mouse was also among the Devil's metamorphoses. It will be remembered that Mephistopheles calls himself in Gœthe's Faust "the lord of rats and mice." (i. 1516). An imp of hell jumps out of the mouth of the witch, with whom Faust dances in the Walpurgis-Night, in the form of a little red mouse (*ibid.*, i. 2179). In the Middle Ages, the soul was often represented as leaving the body in the form of a mouse. The soul of a good man comes out of his mouth as a white mouse, while at the death of a sinner the soul escapes as a black mouse, which the Devil catches and carries to hell. The Piper of Hamelin, in the legend well known to the English world through Robert Browning's poem "Pied Piper of Hamelin" (1843) and Miss Josephine Peabody's play *The Piper* (1909), who carried off one hundred and fifty children when the inhabitants of Hammel in Saxony refused to pay him for ridding them of the rats which had infected their town, was, according to Johannes Wierus and Robert Burton, none other than the Devil in person; and the rats which he charmed with his music into following him were human souls. Death, the Devil's first cousin, if not his *alter ego*, similarly has the souls, in the Dance of Death, march off to hell to a merry tune on his violin.[13]

The form of the fly for the Fiend was suggested by Ahriman, the Persian evil spirit, who is the ancestor of our Devil and who entered the world as a fly. The word *beelzebub* means in Hebrew "the fly-god." In Spencer's *The Fairie Queen* (1590-96), Archimago summons spirits from hell in the shape of flies.

[13] On the Devil in the form of a mouse, see M. Barth's article "Dämonen in Mäusegestalt" in the *Kölnische Volkszeitung* of February 7, 1917.

The cat, which was considered in Egypt as a guardian genius, a friend of the family, and a slayer of evil things, has been a representation of the Devil in all Christian lands. Bast, an Egyptian goddess, was figured with the head of a cat. Inasmuch as this animal was sacred to the ancient Egyptians, it naturally enough became a devil to medieval Christians. The cat, which drew the wagon of Freya, became the Devil's pet animal, after the Scandinavian goddess had turned as Frau Holle into the Devil's grandmother. The witch was believed to transform herself into a cat.

The belief in the diabolical character of the cat has persisted to this day and has even been shared by a great number of modern poets. Gœthe, the German poet and sage, openly said that he believed black cats were of the Evil One. The French diabolists Baudelaire and Huysmans adored this animal. Verlaine, in his poem "Femme et chatte" (1866), represents the cat as the impersonation of the Devil, and woman as very much akin to the two. "The cat," Théophile Gautier has said in his essay on Baudelaire (1868), "has the appearance of knowing the latest sabbatical chronicle, and he will willingly rub himself against the lame leg of Mephistopheles."[14]

The dragon is a frequent diabolical figure in medieval literature. The basis of the conception of the Devil as a dragon is in the Book of Revelations (xii. 3, 7, 9). The Devil appear as a dragon in Michelet's story "Madeleine Bavent." In Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress* (1678), the devil Apollyon is a winged dragon covered with scales, and belching fire and smoke. The Devil appears in the form of a dragon in the pictorial representations of the combat between St. Michael and the leader of the rebel angels by Raphael in the Louvre, by Luca Giordano in the Belvedere of Vienna, by Schongauer in the Cathedral of Ulm, by Jacobello del Fiore in Berlin and by Mabuse in Munich. In the Faust-book, Faust flies in a dragon-drawn chariot through the air. In Calderon's play *el Magico prodigioso* (c. 1635), Satan appears in the end as a dragon.[15]

The basis of the conception of the Devil as a worm is in the

[14] On the cat, cf. Anne Marks: *The Cat in History, Legend and Art*, London, 1909; Champfleury (pseud. of J. H. Fleury): *The Cat Past and Present*, translated from the French by Mrs. Hoey, London, 1885; A. M. Michelet (Mme Jules Michelet): *les Chats*, Paris, 1909. Mr. Carl Van Doren has recently published in New York two anthologies of cat stories.

[15] On the dragon, consult the following two recent books: G. Eliot Smith's *The Evolution of the Dragon* (1919) and Ernest Ingersoll's *Dragons and Dragon Lore* (1928).

passage "their worm shall not die" (Is. lxvi. 24; cf. Mark ix. 44, 46, 48), which has been applied to the chief of the evil spirits.

The representation of the Devil in the form of a wolf is the result of a literal interpretation of the biblical phrase "grievous wolves enter in among you" (Acts xx. 29).

Notwithstanding the biblical comparison of the Devil to the most courageous and ferocious of all wild beasts (1 Peter v. 8), representations of the Devil in the form of a lion were not popular out of respect for "the lion out of the tribe of Judah" (Rev. v. 5). The substitution of the dragon or the serpent for the lion as a general representation of the Devil was, furthermore, made necessary in certain countries by national respect as well as by Christian tradition. In the play *Pyramus and Thisbe* written by Rederijker Goosen ten Berch of Amsterdam, a lioness, appearing in a silent rôle, is however, interpreted as the Devil.

The Devil's simian aspect is of patristic origin. It comes from the fact that the Church fathers called Lucifer an ape on account of his efforts to mimic the Lord. When they noticed the similarities between the observances of Christians and pagans, they explained them as diabolical counterfeits. They believed that the Devil, whose business it always is to pervert the truth, imitated the sacraments of the church in the mysteries of the idols. The patristic appellation for the Devil as *simia Dei* was taken literally by later writers, and the Devil was represented by them under the form of a monkey.

Of all representations of Evil, that of the serpent is common to all countries, all peoples, all times and all religions. The serpent as an autumnal constellation figured among all races as an enemy of the sun-god or light-god. Moreover, the serpent, of old the "seer," was, in its Semitic adaptation, the tempter to forbidden knowledge. Satan played this part to our ancestors in the Garden of Eden. He appears in the traditional shape of the serpent in Dante's *Purgatorio* (viii. 98f.) Milton similarly mentions the infernal serpent (*Par. Lost* i. 34). A legend of the Devil in the form of a serpent will also be found in the *Dialogues* of St. Gregory the Great (593-94). Paphnutius, in Anatole France's novel *Thais* (1890), sees Lucifer as "the serpent with golden wings which twisted round the tree of knowledge its azure coils formed of light and love." In Gœthe's *Faust,* Mephistopheles calls the serpent his aunt (i. 2049).

The Devil may owe his office as guardian of treasures to his

identification with the serpent or dragon. In Hindu mythology, homage is paid the serpent as guardian of treasures. The idea that demons are guardians of treasures is especially prevalent in the Orient. Furthermore, the Devil, who dwells in the bowels of the

THE GOOD LORD AND THE DEVIL
(In Goethe's Faust, by Franz Simm.)

earth, was soon regarded as the guardian of all subterrenean treasures and as the possessor of unlimited wealth. It is believed in many European countries that treasures can be found on St. John's Eve by means of the fern seed. Treasures also bloom or burn in the earth and reveal their presence by a bluish flame on Midsummer Eve.

The idea of the Devil, in the representation of the temptation of Eve, as a serpent with the head of a woman is not earlier than the Middle Ages. According to the Venerable Bede, Lucifer chose to

tempt Eve through a serpent which had a female head because "like is attracted to like." Vincent de Beauvais accepts Bede's view on the female head of the serpent in the Garden of Eden. Pierre Comestor, in his *Historia scholastica* (c. 1176), concludes from this fact that, while the serpent was yet erect, it had a virgin's head. In the temptation scene of the medieval mystery plays, Satan usually appears as a serpent with a woman's head. Raphael, in his representation of the combat between St. Michael and the Devil, likewise represents the latter as a serpent with a woman's head. Ruskin shows an unfamiliarity with medieval literature and art when he states that the serpent in Paradise was for many centuries represented with the head of a man. In Grandchamp's painting of the Temptation, however, the serpent has the head of a handsome young man.

When the Devil was later figured in human form, he was given the head of an elephant, a camel, a pig, or a bird covered with thick locks resembling serpents, the ears of an ass, the mouth and teeth of a lion, the beard of a goat, the horns of a goat, a bull, or a stag,[16] the wings of a bat, the long tail of a dragon, the claws of a tiger, and the foot of a bull, a horse, a goat, or a cock. The Ethiopic devil's right foot is a claw, and his left foot a hoof.

The Devil inherited his bull-horns and bull-foot from Dionysus, his horse-foot from Loki and his goat-foot from Pan. He borrowed his snaky *coiffure* from the Erinyes and his batwings from the Lemures, and shares his elephant-head with Ganesa, the Hindu god of wisdom, and his dragon-tail with the Chimera.

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The Devil appears in many colors, principally, however, in black. The black color presumably is intended to suggest his place of abode. Racial hatred had, however, much to do with the dark description of the Devil. There is no warrant in biblical tradition for a black devil. Satan, however, appeared as an Ethiopian or Moor as far back as the days of the Church fathers. Descriptions of the Devil as black in color will be found in the Acts of the

[16] The Devil's horns are first mentioned in the *Vita S. Antonii* by St. Athanasius (4th cent.). Mr. R. Lowe Thompson, in his recent *History of the Devil* (1929), traces the Devil's horns to the dawn of history. He sees in the medieval demon the successor to Cernunnos, the ancient Gallic god of the dead. Adam Hamilton published anonymously a very clever essay entitled *Where Are my Horns,* in which Lucifer himself addresses the readers.

Martyrs, the Acts of St. Bartholomew, and in the writings of Augustine and Gregory the Great. A black face was a permanent feature of the medieval representations of the Devil. "Of all human forms," Reginald Scot tells us in his *Discoverie of Witchcraft* (1584), "that of a Negro or a Moor is considered a favorite one with the demons." Satan figures as king of the Africans in John Bunyan's *Holy War* (1682). In modern literature, the Devil appears as a Black Bogey, among others, in Washington Irving's "The Devil and Tom Walker" (1824), in Robert Louis Stevenson's "Thrawn Janet" (1881) and in Anatole France's *le Livre de mon ami* (1884). It is a common belief still to-day in Scotland that the Devil is a black man. The term "Printer's Devil" is usually accounted for by the fact that Aldus Manutius, the great Venetian printer, employed in his printing shop toward the end of the fifteenth century a black slave, who was popularly thought to be an imp from hell. We now recall the popular saying that the Devil is not so black as he is painted. Even the devout George Herbert wrote:—

"We paint the Devil black, yet he
Hath some good in him all agree."

It should, however, be added in all truthfulness that whereas the Devil shows himself as a Negro among white men, he appears as a white man among the negroes. Many tribes of Western Africa, as a matter of fact, represent the Devil as white.

The Devil also appears to us in flaming red colors, whether he wears tights or not. Satan is portrayed in popular imagination as a sort of eternal salamander. He was described already in the New Testament as a fiery fiend. Red was considered among all Oriental nations as a diabolical color. Agni, one of the chief gods mentioned in the Indo-Aryan sacred books, is described as red in color. Brahma of the Hindus was also represented as of a red color. Hapi, god of the Nile, is also figured red in color.

The Devil also appears in yellow and blue colors. Yellow was considered, from antiquity, the color of infamy.[17] The blue devil is a sulphurously constitutioned individual. When the Englishman suffers from melancholy, he believes himself to be possessed by the "blues," *i. e.* the blue devils.[18]

[17] In Lenau's drama *Faust* (1835), the Devil is a gypsy for reasons other perhaps than the color of his skin.

[18] Luther remarked that the Devil was a mournful character and could in no way endure light, cheerful music.

As a matter of fact, the Devil appears in any color that has an unpleasant look or suggestion. "As white as the Devil," say the Orientals, for whom white is the color of death and mourning. "As green as the Devil," says the Spaniard inasmuch as green was a sacred color to the Moors. "As yellow as the Devil," say the Italians, who do not like this color. The French swear-word *sacré bleu,* however, has no diabolical connotation. It is a euphomism for *sacré Dieu.* The French expression *le diable vert* also has no reference to the Devil's color. Gérard de Nerval has written a clever story "le Diable vert" (1849) in explanation of this expression.[19]

The Devil usually has saucer eyes all black without any white (Mérimée, *Lettres à une inconnue,* xxv). In Charles Nodier's story "le Combe de l'homme mort" (1832), he has little red eyes, more sparkling than red-hot coals. In Russian iconography, the all-seeing spirit of evil is represented as covered with eyes. Edgar Allan Poe, in his story "Bon-Bon" (1835) and Charles Baudelaire in his prose poem "les Tentations, ou Eros, Plutus et la Gloire" (1863), on the other hand, represent the Devil as an eyeless monster.

The Devil is usually figured in a lean form. His hands are long and lean. His face is generally as pale and yellow as the wax of an old candle and furrowed by wrinkled lines. The cadaverous aspect of the Devil is of old antiquity. With but one exception (the Egyptian Typhon), demons are always represented as lean. "A devil," said Cæsarius of Heisterbach of the thirteenth century," is usually so thin as to cast no shadow (*Dialogus miraculorum,* iii). This characteristic of the Devil is a heritage of the ancient hunger-demon, who could not be felt, because his back was hollow, and, though himself a shadow, cast no shadow. The Devil was reputed, however, to cast his own shadow in Toledo, the immortal home of magic. In the course of the centuries, though, the Fiend has gained flesh.

Hairiness is a pretty generally ascribed characteristic of the Devil. He has probably inherited his hairy skin from the fauns and satyrs. Esau was also believed to have been a hairy demon.

The Devil was often represented with a long beard, but long bearded devils are more common in the representations of the Eastern church. Diabolus was formed in the image and likeness of the Greek ecclesiastic, whose crook he often carries in his hand on

[19] For the correct explanation of this expression consult Littré's dictionary.

cathedral doors or church paintings. Satan is known to affect ecclesiastical appearance, as will be seen further in our discussion.



THE THREE-HEADED SERAPIS

AZIEL, THE GUARDIAN OF HIDDEN TREASURES.

Moreover, as the counterpart of the monarch of heaven, the monarch of hell must needs also have a long beard. Pluto has a long beard descending over his chest in Tasso's poem *Gerusalemme liberata* (iv. 53).

The Devil's beard as well as his hair is usually of a flaming red color. Satan and Judas were both represented on the medieval stage with red beards. The Devil has flaming red hair in Nodier's story already mentioned. In Egypt, red hair and red animals of all kinds were considered infernal. Typhon, the evil spirit in Egyptian mythology, has red hair. Thor or Donar, in Scandinavian mythology, also has a red beard, although this, of course, represents the

lightning.[20] Red hair is down to the present day a mark of a suspicious character.

The Devil is often represented with a hump. This deformity was caused, according to the account given by Victor Hugo in his book *le Rhin* (1842), by the fact that, in escaping out of the sack in which the Devil carried them on his back to hell, the human souls left behind "their foul sins and heinous crimes, a hideous heap, which, by the force of attraction natural to the fiend, incrusted itself between his shoulders like a monstrous wen, and remained for ever fixed." A book entitled *le Diable bossu* appeared at Nancy, in 1708, as a pendant to LeSage's novel *le Diable boiteux* published the preceding year.

The Devil often wears a suit of green cloth, as may be seen in Walter Scott's well-known ballad.[21] Shakespeare is of the opinion that the Devil wears black garments (*Hamlet* III, ii, 1223). In Poe's story "Bon-Bon" already mentioned, the Devil wears a suit of black cloth. The color of his garments has, however, also been red, bistre and golden. In Gœthe's *Faust*, Mephistopheles appears in a scarlet waist-coat and tights (i. 1536 and 2485). In Nodier's story already mentioned, the Devil is dressed in a doublet and breeches of scarlet red and wears on top of his head a woolen cap of the came color.

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In our own days, the Devil has turned human, all too human for most of us. He no longer appears in the gala attire of tail, horns and cloven foot, with which he used to grace the revels on the Blocksberg. "You fancied I was different, did you not, Johannes?" Satan asks the little Dutch boy in Frederik van Eeden's novel *De kleine Johannes* (1887). "That I had horns and a tail? That idea is out of date. No one believes it now." The Devil now moves among men in their own likeness, but "the kernel of the brute is in him still." His diabolical traits appear no longer in his body, but in his face; you can see them there, although he does not mean you should.

But although the Devil can now discard his animal parts, he

[20] On red hair as a diabolical characteristic, see E. L. Buchholz: *Deutscher Glaube und Brauch im Spiegel der heidnischen Vorzeit* (Berlin, 1867), II, 218-25.

[21] The story of this ballad is given towards the end of this article.

cannot rid himself of his limp, which is the result of his cloven hoof or broken leg. He still limps slightly, like Byron, no more and no less.[22] But notwithstanding his defect in walking, he steps firmly on this earth. The traditional explanation for the Devil's broken leg is his fall from heaven. This idea was suggested by the scriptural saying: "I beheld Satan as lightning fall from heaven" (Luke x. 18). One of the most striking indications of the fall of the demons from heaven is the wide-spread belief that they are lame. This idea has probably been derived from the crooked lightnings. Thoth, Hephaistos (=Vulcan) Loki, Wieland, each had a broken or crooked leg. Asmodeus, in LeSage's novel *le Diable boiteux* (1707), appears as a limping gentleman, who uses two sticks as crutches.[23] He ascribes, in this book, his broken leg to a fight with a brother-devil and his subsequent fall. According to rabbinical tradition, this demon broke his leg when he hurried to meet King Solomon. Victor Hugo, in *le Rhin,* offers another explanation for the lameness of Asmodeus. According to this writer, a stone crushed the demon's leg. In Maupassant's story, "la Légende du Mont St. Michel" (1882), Satan had his leg broken when, in his flight from St. Michael, he jumped off the roof of the castle, into which he had been lured by the archangel.

The Devil is now clad in the costume of the period. He has on clothes which any gentleman might wear. The Devil is very proud of this epithet given him by Sir John Suckling ("The prince of darkness is a gentleman" in *The Goblins*) and by William Shakespeare ("The Prince of demons is a gentleman" in *King Lear*); and from that time on, it has been his greatest ambition to be a gentleman, in outer appearance at least; and to his credit it must be said that he has so well succeeded in his efforts to resemble a gentleman that it is now very difficult to tell the two apart. Satan wears with equal ease an evening suit, a hunting coat, a scholar's gown, a professor's robe (as in the paintings of Giotto's school), or a parson's soutane.

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[22] Heine in his poem "Ich rief den Teufel und er kam" (1824), is of the opinion, however, that the Devil has finally succeeded in correcting his defect in walking. Mephistopheles retains, however, his limping leg in Goethe's *Faust* (i. 2498).

[23] The mother of the Devil is named, in the Alsfeld Passion Play of the end of the 15th century, Hellekrugk (Höllenkrücke) for the reason that she walks on crutches.

The Devil loves to slip into priestly robes, although it cannot really be said that he is "one of those who take to the ministry mostly." In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Satan is frequently shown under the garb of a monk. The Devil disguised as a monk has assumed a national character in Spain. The most characteristic treatment of the Devil in Spain is the play *el Diablo predicator* attributed to Belmote of Cello, in which Lucifer is forced to turn Franciscan monk. The conception of the Devil as a monk in the Germanic countries after the Reformation was principally the result of the Protestant anti-clerical sentiment. Luther declared, in fact, that the true Satanic livery was a monk's cowl. Satan is disguised as a monk in John Bale's biblical drama *The Temptation of Jesus* (1538). Mephistopheles, in the Faust-book, appears first to Faust in the guise of a monk. In Marlowe's *Dr. Faustus* (c. 1589), Mephistopheles takes the form of a Franciscan monk. In the "Temptation of Jesus" by Lucas van Leyden, the Devil is habited as a monk with a pointed cowl. In Anatole France's stories, the Fiend often borrows the appearance of a monk.[24]

Satan is known to have occupied pulpits in many parts of Christendom. The Fiend is even famed as a pulpit orator. His speech to St. Guthlac, the Irish St. Anthony, is not, as has been somewhere stated, the only extant instance of a diabolical sermon. Among others, the Devil is said to have preached a sermon in the Church of North Berwick. Lord Morley recently related the French story of the monk, who was a particular friend of the Devil and who had him occupy his pulpit.[25]

The Devil has now added to the charm of his exterior, already conferred upon him by Milton, a corresponding dignity of bearing

[24] On the Devil as a monk, read the interesting essay by Georg Ellinger: "Ueber den Teufel als Mönch." *Zeitschrift für vergleichende Literatur-Geschichte.* N. F. I (1887-8) S. 174-81.

[25] The story as quoted by John O'London (pseud. of Wilfred Whitton) in a recent number of the New York *Times Book Review* runs as follows: A certain French monk, who was a particular friend of the Devil, was one Sunday morning too ill to preach, and as Diabolus chanced to appear that morning in the sacristy, he asked that obliging personality to occupy his pulpit for the special edification of his congregation. The Devil preached a most masterly sermon, covering himself with shame and confusion. "How now?" said the monk when the Devil came down, "you have pretty nearly ruined yourself with that sermon." "Oh! dear no," answered the Devil, "no harm done, no harm done; there was no unction in it." Richard Taylor's book entitled *The Devil's Pulpit* is a work on religious origins, which caused a great stir in England upon its publication in 1830. The Reverend Mr. W. S. Harris published in Philadelphia, in 1903, a book of *Sermons by the Devil* illustrated by Paul Krafft and others.

and nobility of sentiment. Marie Corelli, in her novel *The Sorrows of Satan* (1895), describes the Devil as of extraordinary physical beauty, fascination of manner, perfect health, and splendid intellectuality. In fact, he is represented by her as "a perfect impersonation of perfect manhood." The modern French writers also have a rather flattering opinion of the Devil. Georges Ohnet, in his novel *Volonté* (1889), describes his villain, Clément de Thauziat, as "resplendent in Satanic beauty." Anatole France represents the fallen angel as "black and beautiful as a young Egyptian ("l'Humaine tragédie," 1895).

The Devil manifests himself to us now as a well-bred, cultivated man of the world. In appearing among us, he generally borrows a tall handsome figure, surmounted by delicate features, dresses well, is fastidious about his rings and linen, travels post and stops at the best hotels. As he can boast of abundant means and a handsome wardrobe, it is no wonder that he should everywhere be politely received. In fact, as Voltaire has already said, he gets into very agreeable society. His brilliant powers of conversation, his adroit flattery, courteous gallantry, and elegant, though wayward, flights of imagination, soon render him the delight of the company in every *salon*. In Heine's poem already mentioned, the Devil, by grace of the prelates of the Church, is at present the most admired personage in every court and fashionable drawing-room in Christiandom.

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When the Devil wishes to tempt a man in the flesh, he approaches him in the form of a beautiful girl. The belief prevailed in the Middle Ages that the Devil is often manifest on earth clothed in all the natural perfections of woman, inciting men to sin until their souls are by this means snatched from their bodies and carried off to hell. The French theologians call the Devil incorporated in a woman "the beautiful Devil." It was in this form that St. Anthony met the Tempter in the Thebaid. This may be seen in the paintings by Bosch, Altdorfer and Teniers. Temptation in the form of a woman is very common in literature as in life. There is an instance of it in Dryden's *King Arthur* (1691) and in a ballad by Walter Scott, the story of which runs as follows: Two hunters meet two beautiful ladies in green. One of the hunters goes off with one of the green ladies. The other gentleman is more prudent.

After a time, he goes in quest of his companion and discovers that he has been torn to pieces by the Devil, who had assumed so fascinating a form. Beelzebub transforms himself into a beautiful girl in order to bedevil a young man in Jacques Cazotte's romance *le Diable amoureux* (1772). Théophile Gautier, in his poem *Albertus* (1830), tells how the Devil disguised himself as a woman to tempt a painter of high ideals and finally twists his neck.

The Devil has evidently in modern times changed sex as well as custom and costume. Owen Meredith has said:

"The Devil, my friend, is a woman just now.
'Tis a woman that reigns in Hell."

Victor Hugo similarly believed that the Devil is now incarnated in woman, as may be seen from the following line:

"Dieu s'est fait homme; soit. Le Diable s'est fait femme"
(*Ruy Blas*, 1838).

The belief in woman as the incarnation of the Devil was current until recent times in all Catholic countries. Prosper Mérimée speaks fully in the spirit of the Church fathers when he says: "Woman is the surest instrument of damnation which the Evil One can employ." St. Cyprian said: "Woman is the instrument which the Devil employs to possess our souls," and St. Tertullian addressed the beautiful sex with the following words: "Woman, thou art the gate to hell." "The eternal Venus," says Baudelaire, "is one of the most seductive forms of the Devil." The proverb says that the heart of a beautiful woman is the most beloved hiding place of at least seven demons.[26]

Modern artists frequently represent the Devil as a woman. Felicien Rops, Max Klinger, and Franz Stuck may be cited as illustrations.

[26] A recent volume of tales in verse by Mrs. Alice Mary Kimball bears the title *The Devil is a Woman* (Alfred A. Knopf).

SUGGESTIONS OF OCCIDENTAL THOUGHT IN ANCIENT CHINESE PHILOSOPHY

BY J. K. SHRYOCK.

PART I.

SOME of my friends who are interested in the history of thought think that there is little of value to the student in the philosophy of the east. This is natural enough as regards China, because the difficulty of the classical language deters all but a few from its study, and also because those who have devoted themselves to things Chinese have had little training except in linguistics. It requires a training in philosophy to understand the philosophic literature of any race, as well as a knowledge of the language, and this professional point of view is lacking in most of the translations of the Chinese classics which have appeared in western tongues. The result has been that we have thought of the Chinese as a practical people who were interested only in ethics, and have given little effort to speculative thought. That the rich mine of Chinese philosophy has recently been opened for us is due partly to European scholars like Professor Forke, of Berlin, and partly to modern-trained Chinese, like Dr. Hu Shih, whose history of ancient Chinese thought, which has not been translated, has begun a new era in Chinese writing. Only the surface of this mine has been worked, and there is a depressingly large field which awaits careful investigation by properly equipped men. With the exception of Dr. Henke and Dr. H. H. Dubs, Americans have had very little to do with the results until now, but it is to be hoped that we will develop scholars who may cope with the problems which wait solution. Already it is known that the Chinese have furnished a long line of thinkers who can challenge comparison with the best of any nation, and without a knowledge of whom no account of the search for truth is adequate.

The best known and the most interesting period of Chinese philosophy is that of the Chou dynasty, which lasted roughly from 1100 to 230 B. C. During the last three centuries of this dynasty the real power lay in the hands of feudal princes, whose quarrels kept the country in continual war and reduced the common people to starvation and brigandage, while the courts, cities and armies multiplied and flourished. In spite of the disorder, civilization advanced at the same time that morals declined, and the constant communication between the feudal capitals aided in the spread of ideas.

There was in China a class of men who were peculiarly fitted to advance the development of thought. These were the peripatetic scholars whose business was the science of government, and who wandered from court to court seeking employment from the feudal lords. These men were advisors and not fighters, owing their positions to their knowledge and mental ability. Nearly all the thinkers of the period came from their ranks, and most of them had practical experience in official positions, yet it is to their credit that a surprising number preferred their self-respect to honor and fame, resigning their posts when the ruler indulged in unethical conduct against their advice. The Chinese have always recognized the close connection between ethics and politics.

In their struggle to solve the problems of their own time they attacked questions which have arisen whenever men have reasoned about the universe and human existence. The main positions in metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics and even logic were taken and debated, while man after man elaborated and intrenched the teaching of his school in the light of criticism and argument. During the latter part of the period the city of Liang in the central state of Wei, where the dukes were patrons of literature, attracted a group of brilliant men whose solutions of the problems of philosophy often anticipated the best results of occidental thought. When their writings are put into the technical language of western scholarship, it becomes apparent that the human mind reasons in the same way when faced by certain difficulties, whether in China or in Europe, and that eastern Asia can lay claim to a line of thinkers who may be placed in comparison even with their contemporaries in ancient Greece.

The Absolute.

Chinese classic literature is not old, compared with that of Egypt and Mesopotamia. The three works generally accepted as the earliest are the *Book of History*, the *Book of Changes*, and the *Book of Poetry*. While there is considerable dispute concerning certain passages, the first of these may possibly contain material of the 18th Century B. C. but took its present form after the year 1000 B. C., and the second is attributed to the last quarter of the 12th Cenutry, B. C.

The *Book of History* is an interpretation of the chief events in the ancient history of the Chinese in terms of a practical monotheism. Although lesser spirits, connected with mountains, forests and bodies of water are recognized and sacrifices to them recorded, throughout the book nothing occurs except by the will or command of Heaven. Another phrase is also used, which sinologues generally agree is equated to Heaven, Shang Ti, or the Emperor on High. The first term is impersonal in the sense of our Providence, while the second is usually translated by God, and they are used interchangeably. The ruler owes his position to the Decree of Heaven, the virtues and the social order have their origin in Heaven, dynasties change and calamities occur by the will of Shang Ti, and his decisions are shown by the course of history, through divination, by the words of great men who represent him, and by the desire of the nation as a whole. In the book no war, either civil or foreign, is declared to be a struggle between divinities. On the contrary, Heaven rules over all impartially, barbarians as well as Chinese, and the ruler of a new dynasty sacrifices to Shang Ti in the same way as the man he superseded. While this God cannot be called an impersonal absolute, there are almost no traces of anthropomorphism. His attributes imply personality, and he is supreme in the universe. This concept of God was embodied in the later Confucian tradition and is still of great influence in China.

The Book of Changes, however, gives a somewhat different picture. The work seems to be an attempt to solve the problem of the one and the many, based upon ancient geometrical figures, or trigrams, which had long been used for divination. The trigrams are formed of broken and unbroken straight lines. These lines, the eight trigrams, and further combinations of sixty-four hexagrams, represent natural objects and forces, as well as ethical qualities, and

by using them as a text, the authors have constructed a description of the universe which gives a large amount of moral instruction and a good account of the civilization of the period. The book contains the following sentence.

"Therefore Change has the Great Ultimate, which gives birth to the two Principles. The two Principles give birth to the four Images (or Forms). The four Images give birth to the eight Trigrams."[1]

The Great Ultimate is represented by an unbroken line, the Principles by two lines, one broken and the other unbroken, the four Images or Forms are combinations of two lines each, and it can be seen how the Trigrams, which stand for the sun, clouds, fire and so on, can be combined into a short-hand account of the universe, all developed from a single source.

There is nothing in the text which justifies equating the Great Ultimate to Heaven, and it appears to be an impersonal absolute. The passage is brief, and does not seem to have had much influence in the period which immediately followed, but it was seized upon by the scholars of the Sung dynasty in the 11th Century of our era and made the keystone of their system of thought. As 2000 years lay between the Sung thinkers and the authors of the Book of Changes, it is very uncertain whether their interpretation of the text existed in the minds of those who wrote it.

An attempt to construct an absolute which was more immediately effective was made by Lao Tzu in the 6th Century B. C. Lao Tzu's effort has been studied by European scholars more as mysticism than as philosophy, but it is a very respectable intellectual achievement. His problem is the old one, which he probably inherited from the Book of Changes, how to account for change by that which does not change, and for the particular by the universal. That the first serious attack upon this question should be a little vague is not surprising.

Lao Tzu's method is the use of antinomies. He couples opposite and mutually exclusive statements, asserting both to apply to his absolute, which he calls Tao. Tao has a name, and yet is nameless. Nameless, it originated Heaven and Earth; named, it is the mother of all things, and yet named and nameless, it is the same. It is existence and non-existence, which give birth to each other. Six

[1] *Sacred Books of the East,* Vol. 16. Chapter I "Chi Tsi Chuan."

pairs of opposites are given, such as length and shortness, which are opposed and yet unified because one requires the other. Good and evil, beauty and ugliness are relative, and the existence of one term implies the existence of the other. The statement that all things change is itself an unchanging rule. Tao is a flow and pervades all things. It is undefined and complete, existing before Heaven and Earth, weak and yet strong. It can be found and practised, yet no one is able to find or practice it. It is not knowledge, but rather a forgetting of wisdom, and yet it may be known. It does nothing, and so there is nothing which it does not do.

Tao, the word which Lao Tzu uses for the absolute, probably meant road or way originally, but by the 6th Century it had already acquired a philosophic meaning, and there are reasons for supposing that he was not unique in his application of the term. It is not the equivalent of Heaven, for it is distinctly said to have existed prior to Heaven, and it is not ethical, but superior to the distinctions of ethics. Benevolence and justice did not come into being until men had lost Tao, and this opposition to the virtues is characteristic of the later Taoist writers. Lao Tzu seems to have caught his inspiration from nature, which appears to produce the growth of plants and animals as well as the course of the seasons and the celestial phenomena without effort or disturbance.

Confucius was a younger contemporary of Lao Tzu. He adhered closely to the teaching of the *Book of History*, and the expression Heaven was constantly on his lips. As he added nothing to the Chinese conception of the absolute, no more need be said about his views except that opinions differ as to whether he was a complete agnostic, or believed in a personal God. Some of his followers incline to one side and some to the other, depending upon whether they regard Heaven as personal or impersonal. Their dispute with the disciples of Lao Tzu was ethical and epistemological rather than metaphysical. Both schools use the word Tao, but with the Confucianists the term stands for the moral order of the universe, which is quite different from the content given the word by Lao Tzu.

In the 5th and 4th Centuries B. C. Lieh Tzu and Chuang Tzu developed the teachings of their master, Lao Tzu, but without changing his position materially. Both seem to have been genuine mystics in the sense that they passed through an abnormal psycho-

logical experience in which distinctions were gradually obliterated until at last even that between subject and object disappeared, and they were united with the universe. Though there is no trace of such an experience in Lao Tzu himself, his doctrine lends itself easily to mysticism. However, ancient Taoist thought can hardly be said to be religious, since Tao cannot be called a god in any sense, and Taoism does not appear to have resulted in any religious behaviour nor cults before the 3rd Century B. C.

An interesting attempt to rationalize the belief in Heaven was made by Meh Ti in the 5th Century B. C. He is said to have been the first Chinese thinker to have used the syllogism and to have attempted proofs. His argument for the existence of God is doubtless the first appearance of the ontological proof.

"How do we know that there is a universal being. We know because Heaven eats universally. How do we know that Heaven eats universally ? It is said, 'Within the four seas, all people who eat grain never fail to feed sheep and cattle, and to prepare wine and rice for making sacrifices to Shang Ti and the spirits."[2]

This may be expressed a little crudely, but the argument is clear. All men prepare sacrifices to Shang Ti, therefore all men have the idea of Shang Ti in their minds, and this universal conception is of the nature of proof. Meh Ti goes on to point out that unless Heaven and the spirits exist, the religious ideals of the people would be overthrown, and it would be "as though the sacrifices were poured into a dirty gully."

Meh Ti also uses the argument from design.

"For it is Heaven that created the sun, moon, stars and constellations, making them shine and duly follow their courses. By arranging the four seasons it regulates the lives of the people. By means of thunder, snow, frost, rain and dew, it quickens the growth of the five cereals and thread-giving flax. It planned the formation of mountains, rivers and valleys, producing wealth in manifold forms. It created rulers, princes and lords in order to supervise the morals of the people, rewarding the good and punishing the wicked."[3]

These arguments for the existence of God have had a varied history in the west and in China they were criticized by Wang Ch'ung

[2] *The Open Court,* May, 1928, "Meh Ti," by Quentin K. Y. Huang, p. 278.

[3] *Ibid.* April, 1928, p. 234.

about the beginning of the Christian era. Meh Ti himself mentions those who doubted the existence of spirits, who appear to have been some of the followers of Confucius, but the reference is indefinite.

The influence of Meh Ti was indirect and he was neglected even by the Chinese until recently, when interest in his work has revived. The mystical teaching of Taoism could be understood by only a few, and in the Ch'in and Han periods it was perverted into a polytheistic religion which borrowed extensively from Buddhism and the popular shamanistic cults, Lao Tzu himself becoming a deity, but there continued to be real seekers after Tao, and the Tao Teh Ching is still a force in Chinese thought.

The Theory of Ideas

The brief passage from the *Book of Changes* already quoted states that the two Principles give birth to the Images of Forms, and these in turn to objects. The word translated as Form is said in the same chapter to mean copy. Dr. Hu Shih interprets the text as showing that change and progress are due to ideas,[4] and the *Book of Changes* seems to imply that ideas or forms come before objects.

In Lao Tzu there is an important sentence bearing on this point. "Tao is that which is vague and eluding. It is vague and eluding, yet there is the Form in it. It is vague and eluding, yet has an object in it."[5] A later commentator remarks that Lao Tzu was careless here, since the object obviously exists before the idea of it, but probably Lao Tzu knew what he was doing, which was in accordance with the Book of Changes. But it is not until Confucius that there is a clear doctrine of Ideas, which suggests Plato. Where Lao Tzu speaks vaguely of knowing beauty as beauty and goodness as goodness,[6] Confucius is quite definite. When asked what should be done first in administering the government, he said,

"What is necessary is to rectify names."

"Indeed," remarked Tzu Lu, "you are wide of the mark. Why must there be such rectification?"

The Master said, "How uncultivated you are, Yu. The superior man shows a cautious reserve in regard to what he does not know. If names be not correct, language is not in accordance with the

[4] *Hu Shih, History of Chinese Philosophy.* Section on the I Ching. The book has not been translated.

[5] *Sacred Books of the East,* Vol. 39. "The Tao Teh Ching," Chap. 21.

[6] *Ibid.* Chap. 2.

truth. If language be not in accordance with the truth, affairs cannot be successful."[7]

Again, the Duke of Ch'i asked about government, and Confucius replied, "When the prince is prince, and the minister is minister; when the father is father, and the son is son."[8]

In another passage he exclaims, "A cornered vessel without corners! What a vessel!"[9]

These quotations show that Confucius considered the reality of sacrificial vessels, princes, ministers, fathers and sons to depend upon the degree to which they conformed to ideal patterns of these things which existed independently of their material copies. What a real ruler is does not depend upon any man conforming to that standard, but good government lies in an approximation to the ideal, or as Confucius puts it, in the rectification of names.

Mencius carried this principle to its logical conclusion. When asked whether it was right for Wu Wang to have killed Tsou, the last of the Yin rulers, he replied,

"He who outrages benevolence we call a thief; he who outrages righteousness we call a ruffian. I have heard of the cutting off of the thief and ruffian Tsou, but I have not heard of putting a soverign to death."[10] In other words, although Tsou possessed the rank and title by inheritance, he was not really emperor because he did not possess the qualities Heaven had decreed for the position.

In ancient China, long before the period of the Chou philosophers, it had been the custom for princes to carry with them on military expeditions the tablets of their ancestors and of the Gods of the Land and Grain. Rewards were distributed before the former, and punishments inflicted before the latter, so that in time they came to symbolize the abstract virtues of benevolence and righteousness or justice, which are emphasized in the Analects. The peculiarly Chinese virtue which is rather lamely translated as propriety seems to have developed from the sacrificial ritual. Loyalty was a necessary accompaniment of the feudal system. These and other virtues appear as abstractions or universals from the time of Lao Tzu and Confucius onward, and more and more ethical dis-

[7] *Analects,* 13, 3. There are many translations of the *Four Books,* so these references are to the chapter and verse of the Chinese text.

[8] *Ibid.* 12, 11.

[9] *Ibid.* 6, 23.

[10] *Mencius,* 1, 2, 8.

cussion centered about them. They were the backbone of the Confucian system, and were bitterly attacked by the Taoists.

The chief foe of virtue was the brilliant Chuang Tzu, who flourished about 300 B. C. Mencius had ascribed the virtues to Heaven, which had implanted them in the human heart as innate ideas or intuitions. A contemporary and friend of Chuang Tzu, named Hui, had discussed abstract nouns like hardness and whiteness, and what can be affirmed about them. Chuang Tzu attacks both on the ground that universals are only names, and that discussion of them is useless. There is no such thing as propriety in the abstract, for the old ways of Chou cannot be used in modern Lu.[11] All knowledge is relative. Suppose an eel and a man both slept in a damp place. The eel would draw the conclusion that dampness is an excellent thing, while the man would get rheumatism and claim the reverse.[12]

Unfortunately little of Hui Tzu has survived, so we have only the word of Chuang Tzu for their discussion. Mencius was dead. But Hsun Tzu, the last of the great Confucian thinkers of the ancient or Chou period, seems to have been so impressed with the attack of the Taoists that he abandoned the position of Mencius entirely and instead of making the virtues intuitions of heavenly law common to all men, he declares them to be nothing but artificial standards erected by society for its own purposes. Subsequent Chinese thought has generally held with Mencius and against Chuang Tzu and Hsun Tzu on the question of the virtues, and Hsun Tzu, although a Confucian, has not been honored with a place in the Confucian temples. But Chinese common sense has supported Chuang Tzu in his attack on universals other than the virtues, and today little is known except that the question was discussed. The orthodox Confucian position is that the virtues have their origin in Heaven, which has placed them in the human heart. How Hui Tzu and others thought of a stone as connected with the idea of hardness we do not know.

[11] *Sacred Books of the East.* Vol. 39, p. 353.

[12] *Ibid.* p. 191.

Part II.

The Nature

The Chinese character translated as Nature occurs in both the Book of History and the Book of Poetry.

"Men have no regard for their heavenly nature," complained the founder of the Chou dynasty.[13]

"Heaven gave birth . . . . but the nature it confers is not to be depended on. All are good at first, but few prove themselves to be so at the last."

"Heaven, in giving birth to the multitudes of the people, to every faculty and relationship annexed its law. The people possess this normal nature, and they love its normal virtue."[14]

The Chinese point of view, whose antiquity is witnessed by these texts, is that all things were created with a certain nature or form or purpose appropriate to each, and that this nature is conferred by Heaven. In the case of men, this nature has generally been regarded as ethical.

Lao Tzu, however, taught that the purpose of man was to achieve or reach Tao. Tao was a respectable word already in general use, so that not even the conservative Confucius was shocked by it, but the way in which Lao Tzu employs the term is vague, to say the least. The opening sentence of the Doctrine of the Mean, which is attributed to the grandson of Confucius, appears to be an attempt to explain Tao by uniting it with the older conception.

"What Heaven has conferred is called the Nature. Tao is accordance with this Nature." In other words, man is made as he is by Heaven with a view to a certain end or purpose, and Tao is achieved when a man lives according to his nature and conforming to that purpose. This statement leaves the term nature undefined beyond saying that it is given by Heaven, and about the beginning of the 4th Century B. C. the Chinese were shocked—and they have not recovered from it yet—by a definition of the Nature in terms of a complete egoistic hedonism.

"Sorrow and grief," said Yang Chu, "are contrary to human nature; ease and pleasure are in accord with it."[15]

[13] *Sacred Books of the East.* Vol. 3, p. 120.

[14] *Ibid.* p. 410.

[15] *Wisdom of the East Series.* A. Forke, "Yang Chu's Garden of Pleasure," p. 64.

"Allow the ear to hear what it likes, the eye to see what it likes, the mouth to say what it likes, the body to enjoy what comforts it likes to have, and the mind to do what it likes."[16]

Yang Chu is nothing if not consistent. The most extreme case in such an argument would be a man who takes pleasure in cruelty. Yang openly defends the two worst men in Chinese history, represented as monsters of lust and brutality, by saying that if it were their nature to behave in that way, and it gave them pleasure, they were right to do it. It is only fair to add that Yang himself appears to have been a very mild man who found his own pleasure in cultivating his garden. Yet such a theory demands an answer, and the right man was found in Mencius.

The attack of Mencius was both negative and positive. His destructive criticism, in which he mentions Yang Chu by name, is that Yang is hopelessly selfish, that his doctrine would destroy society and would result in a relapse into savagery.[17] Positively Mencius stated the famous doctrine which is the key to an understanding of Confucian ethics, that the nature of man is good. Just as water always seeks the lowest level, so men have a craving for virtue that is an ineradicable part of humanity.[18] Even the most depraved man cannot see a child about to fall into a well without feelings of sympathy and alarm.[19] Heaven has given to man a nature which is its own image, but which man himself corrupts. Mencius has a list of four virtues—the generally accepted number at present is five—which do not correspond exactly with any English words and are misleading when translated, so that they need not be enumerated. The important point is that Mencius holds that a man is benevolent and just, or at least recognizes these qualities as admirable, because he was made that way by Heaven. It is not the nature of man to desire sense pleasures as the chief good, but rather virtue.

Mencius was followed by the Taoist Chuang Tzu, who attacked the reality of universals, and pointed out that the virtues are only relative. A robber may be said to have all the virtues.

"That he knows there are valuables in an apartment shows his wisdom; that he is the first to enter it shows his courage; that he

[16] *Ibid.* p. 43.
[17] *Mencius*, 3, 2, 9, 9, f.
[18] *Ibid.* 6, 1, 2, 2.
[19] *Ibid.* 2, 1, 6, 3.

is the last to quit it shows his righteousness; and that he makes an equal division of the plunder shows his benevolence. Without these qualities no one has ever become a great robber."[20]

Hsun Tzu, who flourished during the 3rd Century B. C., closes the great creative period of Chinese thought. He abandoned the position that the Nature is good, taking the contrary view that it is evil. If men are naturally good, why is education necessary? What we actually observe, argues Hsun Tzu, is that children are naturally selfish, and have to be taught altruism, fair play and conformance with the rules of society. Education thus becomes largely corrective. Men are superior to beasts because they combine, specialize in their activities, and work for the common good. In order to do this they are obliged to subordinate their selfish interests in a way which is not natural, but must be taught. The virtues therefore become standards set up by society, or by the ruler as the head of society, and virtue itself entirely external and utilitarian.

There are two other views of the Nature possible. One was taken by a contemporary opponent of Mencius, named Kao, that it is neither good nor evil. The other was held by a Han thinker named Yang Hsiung about the beginning of the Christian era, that the heart of man contains the seeds of both good and evil, and that it lies with him how they are developed. The overwhelming weight of Chinese opinion has sided with Mencius, and his doctrine of the essential goodness of man's nature, which is also the nature of Heaven, is memorized by every Chinese schoolboy.

The Theory of Knowledge

In the second chapter of the Tao Teh Ching, Lao Tzu speaks of knowing beauty as beauty and goodness as goodness. This seems to imply that both these concepts have a separate existence which we recognize. As to how we acquire such knowledge, Lao Tzu and the Taoists generally agree that it is by intuition. Without going outside his door or looking through his window, a man may see Tao and understand all things. Knowledge is to be gained neither by observation, nor by rational processes, for it is a forgetting of wisdom. This conclusion is natural to a mystic, because his approach to reality is through his peculiar experience, and that experience discards both observation and the labor of thought. An-

[20] *Sacred Books of the East.* Vol. 1, p. 283.

other metaphysical conclusion which is apt to result from a mystical experience is that the distinctions between things are not real. The Chinese do not go as far in this direction as the Hindus, but Chuang Tzu dreams that he is a butterfly, and on awaking wonders whether he is a man dreaming he is a butterfly, or a butterfly dreaming he is a man. The Taoists all teach that there is no absolute knowledge except the mystical knowledge of Tao.

Confucius was not a mystic but a man of affairs who cared little for metaphysics. He has no clear position as to how knowledge is gained and what it is, although his theory of ideas makes it evident that both objects and universals have an existence outside ourselves, and that the reality of the former is due to the latter. He emphasizes experience and study, and in teaching he lifted one corner of a subject, requiring his pupils to lift the other three; in other words he made his students do a good deal of thinking for themselves. He also taught that real knowledge includes practice.

His followers are divided on the theory of knowledge. In the Great Learning, a small treatise attributed to his disciple Tseng Tzu, there occurs the expression, "The investigation of things," and while the development of Confucian epistemology from this phrase did not take place until the 11th Century of our era, the lines along which it followed may be indicated. The first of the Sung philosophers, Chou Teng I, had as pupils two brothers named Ch'eng. From Ch'eng Hao developed Chu Hsi and his followers, who taught that knowledge was gained from the investigation of things in the sense of what we would call a scientific or inductive observation of the universe. The Sung thinkers have not been thoroughly studied by European scholars, and it is not certain whether Chu Hsi thought of our knowledge of external objects as immediate, or as a correspondence, but it does seem clear that he regarded such knowledge as real and not as appearance. On the other hand, from Ch'eng I there was a line of development through Lu Hsiang Shan and Wang Yang Ming which taught that knowledge was to be gained by introspection and tested by experience, which has led some to call Wang Yang Ming a pragmatist. While the interpretation of Chu Hsi is regarded as authoritative, all these men are considered orthodox Confucians, and their names are placed in the Confucian temple.

To return to the ancient period. Meh Ti, in the century follow-

ing Confucius, was a thorough empiricist and his three standards for the testing of any principle are all based on experience.

"There is the standard of precedent; there is the standard of observation; and there is the standard of function."[21] The meaning may be phrased in this way. Is a principle true or valid? First, it may be checked by the recorded experience of the nation; second, it may be tested by the ears and eyes of the common people; and third, it may be tried out and if it works well, adopted. Meh Ti says nothing about intuition, nor about the rectification of names. Sense perception seems the only way he recognizes that truth can reach us, and his argument for the existence of ghosts and spirits is a naive application of his method. We have the records of the appearances of spirits in the past, and we know many people alive today who say that they have seen them, therefore they must exist.

The Taoists are not so sure of this argument. Lieh Tzu makes a distinction between perception and the thing perceived. Sound is not the same as that which causes sound, and which is not itself audible. Sight is different from the object seen, and so on.[22]

In two remarkable stories, Lieh Tzu shows the part played by the mind in making truth. The first tells of a man who had lost an axe, and was convinced by the behaviour of a boy that he had stolen it. Shortly after he found the axe, and on again meeting the boy observed none of the suspicious signs.

The second describes how a certain man's mind was so set on obtaining gold that he walked into a shop and helped himself. When the judge asked why he had committed the theft in broad daylight, he answered that he had seen and been conscious of nothing except the gold. The moral is that we see what we look for.[23]

The story of the deer[24] is too intricate to retell but is well worth reading. A simple occurence soon becomes so involved with dreams, discrepancies of testimony and fiction that after the most thorough investigation the authorities despair of coming at the real facts, and order a decision to be made on grounds of convenience. In other words, there is no such thing as absolute truth, or if there is, we cannot know it, and are forced to exercise choice in deciding what

[21] *The Open Court*, April, 1928, p. 231.
[22] *Wisdom of the East Series*. L. Giles, "Taoist Teachings," p. 21.
[23] *Ibid.* p. 120.
[24] *Ibid.* p. 66 f.

is to be considered true. Naturally faith plays a great part in Lieh Tzu's teaching, and he makes much use of fable and the miraculous.

Dr. Hu Shih has pointed out that a number of minor philosophers who seem to have been influenced by Meh Ti and are sometimes called Neo-Micians, of whom Kung-sen Lung is the best known, made valuable contributions to the development of the theory of knowledge. Meh Ti had made knowledge empirical and Lieh Tzu had emphasized the part played by the mind in making truth. These later men distinguish three elements in knowledge. First, there must be the ability to know; second, knowledge implies reception, that is sensation due to stimulii; third, knowledge is meaning.[25] This amounts to a synthesis of Meh Ti and Lieh Tzu, for there must be both sensation and an orderly grouping of sensations by the mind. The Neo-Micians seem to have held that this grouping or correlation of sensations was accomplished by what we would call time and space coordinates, but the Chinese text is extremely cryptic and Dr. Hu's interpretation has been questioned.

The difficult form in which these teachings were expressed, and Kung-sen Lung's use of paradoxes which resemble Zeno's, rather discredited the school. It is criticized by both Chuang Tzu and Hsun Tzu, though from different points of view. How is one to know whether the image in the mind corresponds to the real object? Chuang Tzu follows Lieh Tzu, holding that there is no way of telling, and that all truth is relative. Hsun Tzu revives the Confucian doctrine of the rectification of names, implying that there is a real connection between terms and objects, though what it is he does not define. He also holds that the meaning of such terms is fixed by social agreement. In the main, he accepts the Neo-Mician analysis of knowledge with common sense reservations, and so closed the discussion of the problem in the Chou period.[26]

The Decree

The character translated as the Decree, or as Fate, is at least as old as the Book of History, and presumably much older. Very often it occurs in the phrase, the Decree of Heaven. It may be given two interpretations, depending upon whether the interpreter is a determinist, or a believer in free-will. The determinist uses the

[25] H. H. Dubs, *Hsüntze. Probsthain's Oriental Series.* p. 213 f.

[26] *Ibid.* p. 227 f.

word in the sense of fate, or unavoidable destiny, while the other uses it as the command of Heaven, which may be disobeyed even though disobedience brings with it inevitable consequences.

While the *Book of History* unequivocably declares against fatalism, it also shows that by the beginning of Chinese history the term was already used as fate. Chieh and Tsou, the last rulers of the two dynasties preceding the Chou, are condemned because they relied upon the Decree, or as we would put it, upon divine right. Against this view the Book of History points out that the continuation of the decree appointing a man to office depends upon his good behaviour, and that disobedience to the commands of Heaven will result in the changing of its appointment.

"Shang Ti has changed his Decree regarding Yin, though many of its former kings were in heaven."[27]

"Heaven had no purpose to do away with Hsia or Yin, but the last rulers reckoning on the Decree, abandoned themselves to excess, so Heaven sent down ruin."[28]

Meh Ti also refers to these bad rulers as having taught fatalism.

"I have heard from the men of Hsia that he, (Chieh), feigned the orders of Heaven and taught fatalism to those below."

"Tsou did not worship Shang Ti nor the spirits above, and troubled his ancestors by neglecting sacrifices. He even said, 'My people have their fate; there is no use in punishing their disgrace in which Heaven also indulges.' "[29]

It may be that fate is the original meaning of the word, but it is certainly true that one of the purposes of the Book of History as we have it, is clearly to combat determinism. Heaven does send disaster, but only as a test or a punihment, and men may rise superior to it. Only the consequences of their own acts are inescapable.

When so much discussion of the term had already taken place, it is surprising to find that the two great leaders of the line of Chou philosophers say little or nothing about it. Lao Tzu uses the word only once, merely saying that the honor and reverence paid to Tao and its complement Teh are not due to the Decree, but are part of the natural order of things.[30] Confucius seldom spoke of the

[27] *Sacred Books of the East,* Vol. 3, p. 184.
[28] *Ibid.* p. 216.
[29] *The Open Court,* July, 1928, p. 434.
[30] *Tao Teh Ching,* Chapter 51.

Decree,[31] but placed himself squarely against determinism by saying that "the will of even a common man cannot be taken from him."[32]

Although the founders of the two chief schools of thought were reticent on the subject, their followers were not, and in general it may be said that the Confucianists, who stressed ethics and the virtues, declared for freedom, while the Taoists, who decried the virtues and sought inspiration in the course of nature, were on the side of determinism, both parties using the same word.

Mencius limited the working of the Decree to "that which happens without man's causing it to happen,"[33] excepting man's will from the law of mechanism, though not excluding the consequences of his actions. The book of Mencius contains very little of a religious nature and begins with a statement that he discussed nothing but benevolence and righteousness. This accent upon the virtues and the place he gave them in the Nature of man necessitated the acceptance of freedom and a corresponding definition of the Decree.

"He who has the true idea of the Decree will not stand beneath a wall about to fall."[34]

On the other hand, the Taoist Chuang Tzu is a clear fatalist. Life and death are ordained,[35] and the only correct attitude is that of submission to fate.[36] He damns Confucius with faint praise by calling him a good man who was condemned by Heaven to an undue interest in ephemeral matters.[37] "Acquiesce in what has been arranged"[38] is his teaching. "The sages contemplated Heaven but did not assist it."[39] Birth and death are like the procession of the seasons,[40] as usual he caps his argument with a story, in this case about a tortoise which was wise in divination but could not prevent its own capture and death.[41]

Hsun Tzu does not seem to have differed from Mencius on this point, defining the Decree as what one meets at the moment,[42] but

[31] *Analects,* 9, 1.
[32] *Ibid.* 9, 25.
[33] *Mencius,* 5, 1, 6, 2.
[34] *Ibid.* 7, 1, 2, 2.
[35] *Sacred Books of the East,* Vol. 39, p. 241.
[36] *Ibid.* p. 248.
[37] *Ibid.* p. 252.
[38] *Ibid.* p. 255.
[39] *Ibid.* p. 305.
[40] *Sacred Books of the East,* Vol. 40, p. 4.
[41] *Ibid.* p. 137.
[42] H. H. Dubs, *Hsüntze,* p. 71.

he was probably less religious than Mencius and Confucius. His translator, Dr. Dubs, says that he considered Heaven as impersonal law, borrowing the Taoist conception,[43] but rather inconsistently he allowed man a measure of freedom.

The great opponent of fatalism in ancient China was Meh Ti, who devoted an essay to the subject, though in its present form it is probably the work of his pupils. He lays the blame for the disorders in the China of his day to the apathy caused by the current belief that there is no use in struggling against fate.

"The fatalist says: 'Being rich by fate, a man is rich; while being poor by fate, he is poor. Whether a nation increases or decreases is determined by fate. When order is fated, there will be peace; when disorder is fated, there will be trouble. . . . What is the use of working against fate?' Thus, they preach to the rulers, dukes and great men above, and prevent the people below from doing their business. Therefore the fatalists are charged with being unbenevolent. We cannot fail to understand what the fatalists say. But how do we discriminate these sayings? Meh Ti says, 'We must have a standard.' If there be no standard . . . . the distinction of right and wrong, of benefit and harm, can never be known."[44]

Meh Ti goes on to point out the disintegrating influence of such a doctrine upon society, enumerating the evils which ensue when men consider themselves helpless. "These are the results of believing in fate. They have their birth in evil words. Therefore Meh Ti says, 'Now the scholars and superior men . . . . cannot fail to know that the words of the fatalists are wrong. It is the greatest evil in the world."[45]

In this brief paper I have endeavored to indicate some of the problems which the thinkers of ancient China attacked, the solutions they offered, and the play of mind on mind among the different schools. The enormity of the attempt would be equalled by trying to describe the development of Greek thought from Thales to Aristotle in a similar space. Yet the effort is worth while if it indicates the width and depth of the golden period of Chinese philosophy, and stimulates western scholars out of their apathy towards the East, which is not creditable either to our learning or our sympathies.

One of the most striking features which one notices in the study

[43] *Ibid.* p. 63.
[44] *The Open Court,* July, 1928, p. 430.
[45] *Ibid.* p. 434.

of Chinese thinkers is the number of solutions and arguments which suggest or run parallel to the results of European thought. I have refrained from making comparisons because I had to be brief, but they will readily occur to everyone. And I have taken the liberty, which I feel is quite justifiable historically, of treating the development of an idea as a continuous process, each man adding something to what had gone before. The fact that there is known to have been frequent communication between the feudal states, that ideas travelled easily, that most of these men are known to have lived in the same city for portions of their lives, and that in nearly all, the effects of previous thought can readily be traced, make the assumption admissible even when the influence is not admitted directly. Some of these men refer to their predecessors, Chuang Tzu, for instance, mentioning by name nearly every Chinese thinker before and contemporaneous with him, while others write without any direct reference as to where they received their stimulus to thought.

The notes refer to English translations, which are always unsatisfactory, and which usually fail to indicate that the Chinese text employs technical terms which cannot be loosely rendered into a foreign language. The quotations have been checked with the Chinese by Mr. Huang K'uei Yuan.

AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRE-HISTORY OF CHINESE THOUGHT

BY H. G. CREEL, A. M.

THE task which it is proposed to carry out in this and succeeding articles is an investigation of the origins and development of Chinese thought, from the earliest period about which we can reasonably speculate down through the period of the classical philosophical systems. It will immediately be objected that such an undertaking is quite incongruous with a "series of articles," but is rather a labor for a lifetime of investigation deposited in a shelf of volumes. This would be true, if this study presumed to treat exhaustively of each separate period and each individual thinker as such. It does not. The modern emphasis on specialization for efficiency in scientific research carries with it, however, the necessity of correlation in order that perspectives may be preserved and enlarged. It is to this latter task that this study is directed.

We shall have occasion, to be sure, to go in some detail into the features of some of the most important developments in Chinese philosophy and religion, but always the emphasis will be rather on placing particular thinkers and ideas in their setting with relation to the main stream of Chinese thought than on any detailed description of these phenomena themselves. Indeed, we must go back still further, and ask if there *is* any such thing as a "stream" of Chinese thought, or if it is rather, as a few sinologists have seemed to feel, a kind of trough into which various individuals have from time to time poured ideas originated almost *in vacuo,* following which has ensued a period of degeneration. It may be confessed here that the general thesis of this study (arrived at, not *a priori,* but as the fruit of research) is that there does exist a definite and peculiarly Chinese world-view, the history of whose development

may be traced at least in outline. Further, each of the more important thinkers and ideas within our period has originated, not outside of nor in opposition to this background, but rather as an expression of it and a development within it.

At the outset may one be pardoned for recalling a platitude of modern historical method which, like other things taken for granted, may easily be neglected in practice? When we study any particular culture our most fruitful approach is to look at it, in so far as we possibly can, from the inside. In approaching things Chinese we must attempt, first of all, to appropriate to ourselves the Chinese point of view, so that we regard any particular thing not as a Westerner would, nor even as a Hindu, but as a Chinese.[1] This need is well illustrated by the Chinese word *hsing* 行, often translated "element." The five *hsing* are wood, fire, metal, water, and earth. Immediately the Western reader is likely to equate these with the Greek elements. But those were relatively inert; the *hsing* on the other hand are very active. Other meanings of the same character include: "road, conduct, behavior, actions, walk, move, perform, do." One is tempted, again, to make a hasty conclusion and to equate these "elements" with the very active electron-composed substances of modern physics. But again he would be mistaken, for *hsing* is a Chinese idea, equivalent to no Western idea, and must be thoroughly studied and understood in its own setting before it may intelligently be used as a concept.

Especial caution, that we may keep from reading in our own interpretations, is necessary in dealing with the Chinese thought-world. Ancient China enjoyed an unique physical isolation from the rest of the world. "Desert, mountain, and sea had conspired together and presented an almost insurmountable barrier to human intercourse."[2] This geographical separation has had its very definite intellectual counterpart. If one wished to make an extreme statement, he might even contend that ancient India, the Mesopotamian world, the Mediterranean world, and Europe shared (within the widest limits of variation) one system of human thought, while ancient China presents us with another. Here lies one of the greatest values of the study of Chinese history; many ideas which

[1] This does not mean, of course, that I carry the insistence on cultural atomism to the point to which Oswald Spengler does, holding that borrowing between cultures is absolutely impossible. This is to press a good principle entirely too far.

[2] James B. Pratt, *"The Pilgrimage of Buddhism."* p. 272.

have been thought "universal," and have been referred to the "psychological unity of mankind," must abdicate this position when the Chinese touchstone is applied.

The fact remains that many of the earlier studies of Chinese religion in particular were made by men who recognized but little the existence of a peculiar Chinese mode of thought, if indeed they did not deny the very possibility. Three reasons for this may be mentioned. The first is the inaccessibility of the country. The second is the difficulty of the language.[3] Third, since these conditions prevented the early entry of unbiased scholars, in any number, into the Chinese field, the initial task of interpretation of Chinese history, philosophy, and religion was left almost entirely to Christian missionaries, men who by their very calling were usually unqualified for the labor of objective and critical scholarship. As a result, the Chinese Classics are still known to the West largely through the translations of such men as James Legge. One can have only admiration for the conscientious industry which Legge gave to his pioneering tasks, but that does not prevent the wish that they might have been performed by some one less determined to harmonize Chinese history with the book of *Genesis*.[4] Ancient Chinese is a language which can not be translated literally into another tongue. The translator must be to some extent an interpreter. Such a situation is paradise for the man with a theory.

The unfortunate sequel has been that when more competent investigators, free from such bias, entered the field, they took over, to some extent, this distortion of Chinese ideas. Thus, for instance, M. Granet translates *shen* as "dieu," but since this does not fit in other places (it does not fit precisely, anywhere) he must translate the same word differently. The same is true of *shê* which he translates sometimes as "dieu du sol," sometimes otherwise, although the meaning in Chinese is the same. All this is most confusing. It is hoped that the reader will bear with the alternative which has been adopted for this study, of first defining such genuinely untranslatable terms and thereafter using the phonetic transliteration to denote them.

[3] This is partially due to the fact that the teaching of Chinese has not yet been developed to anything like the efficiency which prevails in the teaching of European tongues. It may be hoped that in the near future, as a result of labors now going forward, learning Chinese will be considered by no means an insurmountable task.

[4] Cf. Legge, *Shu King* (in *Chinese Classics*) (referred to hereafter as *Shu*) p. 189.

In order to understand any Chinese idea or any Chinese thinker, we must have some comprehension of the Chinese thought-world as a whole, and of its history. Manifestly, this requires that we shall start with the very earliest data which we can find, and work from that point. We are faced with the difficult task of evaluating those of the Chinese records which pretend to tell us of remote antiquity.

Western scholars are very cautious in making any statement of fact for China prior to, say, the time of Confucius. Chinese scholars in general are, of late, hesitant about affirming anything concerning their early history. Almost any hypothesis may be proved or disproved on what may seem fairly good authority. Almost all documents are suspect. Granet throws overboard nearly the whole of early Chinese literature, in so far as it is supposed to record historical events.[5]

A hopeless situation? For accurate political history, perhaps. Certainly a discouraging situation, from any point of view. Yet, it is the obstacles to be overcome which give zest to any game, from chess to research. In any case, we are certainly faced with a situation calling for a peculiar method of approach. For myself, I am unable to place much faith in specific dates and events prior to the time of Confucius, and almost none in those anterior to the founding of the Chow dynasty (1122 ? B. C.). Yet this does not make the writing of cultural, intellectual, and religious history by any means impossible. For instance: If we find in the book called *The Tribute of Yu* that a certain tribe sent earth of five colors as a tribute, it may make little difference whether Yu or the tribe ever existed; the important point for us is that if we can establish an approximate date for the document, we shall know that the five colors as a concept existed at that time (barring later interpolation, of course). And at any rate this provides us with one more evidence of the existence, at whatever date, of an important element of the Chinese natural philosophy.

It is the first task of this study to set forth the complex of natural and religious philosophy as it existed in China a little before the time of Confucius. To do that, we shall have to go into remote origins, and there we shall be on doubtful ground. But this will not seriously endanger the final result, for, while the historical chronology of a people may be falsified and garbled past recognition in

[5] *Cf.* Marcel Granet, *Danses et Legendes de la Chine Ancienne* (noted hereafter as *Danses*) p. 1.

a literature, *it is literally impossible that a literature of the scope and variety of the Chinese could be pervaded by a single type of philosophy if that philosophy had not been, as a matter of fact, a dominating factor in the life of the people.*

No argument is required to show that the question of the original home of the Chinese people is of importance for our problem. If as Legge believes they are descendants of Noah who moved eastward after the incident at Babel, if they came from Egypt, or if they were immigrants from ancient Babylon, these facts will give us a key to the interpretation of their early philosophy. But even the question of when they entered the territory we know as China is one to which, as Henri Cordier wrote in 1915, we may never know the answer. It is comforting to reflect that we do have at least one specific date; according to Schlegel, the oldest astronomical observation in the world was made and recorded in China, that of the eclipse of the sun on May 7, 2165 B. C. This implies, of course, that the people making the observation had reached a very considerable degree of advancement.

A detailed summary of the more important reasearch on the question of Chinese origins will be found in the *T'oung Pao* for 1915, pp. 577-603. Two general theories seem to have taken the field, one being that the Chinese have been in their present situation from highest antiquity, the other that they migrated to China from a previous westward home. With the latter theory is usually, but not always, combined the contention that they were herders during and prior to the migration.

These two theories are sometimes associated, and used to account for the undoubtedly composite origin of the Chinese. It is held, then, that a portion of the people came in as warlike, pastoral nomads, conquered the people they found in the land, and settled among them as a ruling caste. If we could accept this explanation it would certainly solve several of our knottiest problems, as we shall have occasion to see. But a theory is not correct *merely* because it is convenient.

The arguments for a pastoral "stage" in Chinese history are not convincing.[6] It used to be believed that, just as people passed first from marital promiscuity through the matriarchate, then

[6] In support of the pastoral theory see Kwen Ih Tai, *An Inquiry into the Origin and Early Development of T'ien and Shang-ti* (Ph.D. Thesis, Chicago), pp. 138-160. For the primitive agricultural theory, see H. F. Rudd, *Chinese Social Origins*, p. 55.

through a patriarchal stage, so they went from hunting to herding and thence to agriculture. Both are exploded theories, in so far as they were thought to be universally applicable. In aboriginal North and Middle America, herding never reached any development worthy of mention, while the agricultural achievements of the Indian are probably his chief contribution to civilization.

In regard to the whole question of the place of origin of the early Chinese and the mode of their early life, we must be willing to maintain suspended judgment. While this is written, researches are going forward which may, at any time, put our knowledge on firmer ground; when this happens we may expect that several other mysteries, of the greatest importance for the history of the whole human race, will be cleared up at the same time. But lack of dogmatic certainty on this point need not prevent us from building an interpretation of ancient Chinese thought which, we may be reasonably confident, will not be invalidated no matter what may be the results of future research in the field of origins. Good scientific theories should be constructed, when possible, on the plan of Japanese dwellings—flexible enough so that they can stand an earthquake or two in the substructure without being shaken completely to pieces.

After all, what precise difference would it have made in the world-view of the people, at the earliest time at which we know them, if they had been nomadic cattle-raisers in some remote antiquity? Even Dr. Tai, an enthusiastic proponent of the pastoral theory, tells us that the composition of the *Book of Odes* (which must have been well before the time of Confucius) "was after the Chinese people had occupied China and had adapted themselves to the geographical environment for several thousand years. We need not be surprised to find that *the agricultural civilization had by this time thoroughly permeated the thought and expression of everyday life.*"[7] (Italics mine).

We know well enough what happens to the religion and the philosophy of a pastoral people which settles down to an agricultural mode of life. Some elements of their old religion are re-interpreted to fit the new situation; those which do not adapt themselves are dropped. Such a transitional situation runs through almost the whole of the *Old Testament*. But we have an even more concrete example just south of China, in India. The religion of the *Vedas*

[7] Tai, op. cit., p. 141.

is that of a group of pastoral nomads. They moved into India, and took over an agricultural and settled economy. Certain of the old gods, as Varuna, which had been very important to them as nomads, no longer contributed to their new way of living, and were practically forgotten. But Indra, who was unimportant when they were herders, brought rain; his importance to farmers is obvious, and he was, in fact, raised to a place of the first rank. On the basis of such facts, and with the independent knowledge of the Chinese situation which we possess, we are justified in laying this question of pastoral origin to one side for the present, and in proceeding to make our interpretation on the basis of an agricultural economy.

We have plenty of material, if we are willing to accept it all, to make a picture of Chinese life as it was at the beginning of the Chow dynasty. If we can accept the *Great Plan,* as it stands in the present text of the *Shu King,*[8] as actually dating from 1024 B. C. (a point which is far from being definitely established) we can even say that the whole foundation and a good deal of the superstructure of later Chinese philosophy and religion existed at that time. It is highly probable that this is the case. To penetrate beyond this date is difficult. We have many, too many, pieces of the puzzle; some we must reject as obviously incongruous. What shall we do with the remainder? We are in the realm of hypothesis, and must use deduction for lack of a better method.

Of the apparently genuine materials before us, which *seem* most likely to have appeared first? The five household *shên*[9] 神 and the Sacred Place (Granet's "Lieu Saint") appear to meet the specifications. The five *shen* are the outer door, the inner door, the well, the hearth, and the atrium.[10] These are the focal points of interest about the home, and most of them, at least, very soon take on

[8] *Shu King* means, literally, "Document Classic." This book is the collection of records which makes up the orthodox history of the Confucian school. Like most other ancient Chinese books, it has had a checkered history. Much of it, at least, is of doubtful age.

[9] *Shen* is a word of wide occurrence. It is sometimes translated "god" which is thoroughly misleading. "Spirit" is better, but still inaccurate in many contexts. It is sometimes used as an adjective, meaning "unusual" or "weird," though not "supernatural" in the Western sense.

In the present application the word means little more than the objects themselves, capable of acting to help or harm the household.

[10] It is impossible strictly to translate the Chinese phrase into English. This "atrium" is the space under the middle of the roof of the principal room, at which point was located an opening which served both as chimney and as window.

"super-usual" significance among any settled people. We find sacrifices, the beginning of which is unknown, made to them at specified times.[11] The Sacred Place (as representing Earth) is closely linked to the five *shên* both by Chavannes and by Wang Ch'ung[12] (I,510). This is to class the five *shên* as *yin,* since earth is the very essence of *yin.* In both cases, however, the classification is based on a considerable development of the *yin-yang* philosophy,[13] a fairly sophisticated set of ideas which, since we seek origins, we can hardly assume as an original datum. This association may more plausibly be explained on the assumption that both the five *shên* and the Sacred Place were, at an early period, part of a naïve agricultural cult closely bound to the earth. The elements of this cult would then have been loosely grouped with the Earth side of the later Heaven-Earth duality. In this later system, it must be remembered, Earth as *yin* is female, yet Wang associates the hearth (seat of fire, which is the essence of *yang,* the male principle) with it. Furthermore, the sacred mound, *shê* 社 which is the very focalization of the agricultural powers of earth, often figures as *masculine.*[14] Obviously, we have here certain tell-tale incongruencies which indicate very strongly that the more recent system was built on the basis of an earlier cult.

This mound, the *shê* just mentioned, appears to have been the center of the life of the tiny agricultural village, which comprised, the records tell us, twenty-five "families" (this family included a kinship group of considerable size, of course, as is the case in China today). There is reason to believe that the cult centering about the *shê* is very ancient indeed, that it is, in fact, the central element of the hypothetical agricultural cult of which we have already spoken,[15] which preceded the philosophical "Heaven-Earth, *yin-yang*" complex. The reasons for this are several. For one, the mound seems to have included a tree, or perhaps even a sacred

[11] Edouard Chavannes, *Le T'ai Chan,* p. 492.

[12] Wang Ch'ung, born 27 A. D., is one of the most interesting figures in the history of Chinese literature. In dealing with the popular religion we shall have occasion to consider him in detail. References in parenthesis refer to volume and page number of his *Lun Hêng* (in the English translation by Alfred Forke), one of our most valuable sources for the popular religion.

[13] This dual system of classification will be discussed in detail in the succeeding chapter.

[14] Chavannes, *op. cit.,* pp. 520-21.

[15] Chavannes, op. cit., p. 437, p. 524. Granet, *La Religion des Chinois* (cited hereafter as Religion), p. 63.

grove.[16] But wood is that one of the five *hsing* which corresponds to the east, which is a *yang* region, which contradicts the *yin* status of the mound.

Furthermore, the place of the Earth in the later religion is decidedly subservient and secondary. But the *shê* of the ancient villages seem quite self-sufficient. They are gone to by the people for almost all of the things which they would have needed in a simple agricultural situation, such as crops, protection from drouth, and protection from floods. Further, the techniques used to gain these ends are easier to understand by themselves than to fit into the later philosophical scheme. Instances are the practice of putting five frogs on the mound to draw rain, and of moistening the mound from the irrigation ditch for the same purpose.[17] Water, like the *shê*, is classed as *yin*. When we find that recourse is had to the mound in case of high water, we may feel that here is a proof for the philosophical theory. But when we find that the *shê* was also appealed to in case of drouth, we begin to suspect that the mound was far more important than the later scheme would represent it to have been.

Indeed, Wang Ch'ung seems rightly to have described the situation, in so far as the people are concerned, when he said, "It is customary to sacrifice to the *shê*, which produce all things." (II, 337). Anciently, the common people looked, for the things they wanted, to Earth, not generically but in the form of the *shê*. In the documents, Heaven is respected, sometimes feared, but Earth is loved and venerated (I, 535; II, 337, 339, 376-7). From the very first appearance of Heaven in the literature, it is remote, just, ethical, almost a philosophical concept rather than an element of a simple religion. Heaven seems almost to be a transcendentalization of the governmental and regulatory function. Earth, on the other hand, is close, intimate, bountiful—the old concept of the *shê*, in fact, will not fit into the later cosmological scheme without that alteration which, as we shall see, it underwent.

But one of the chief reasons why it seems impossible that the *shê* originated simply as a personification of the *yin* comes from the fact that it is very easy to account for its origin in a manner which does not require that we throw the sophisticated philosophy of a later day back into a setting where it looks like a top-hat on a

[16] Chavannes, *op. cit.*, p. 466-70, p. 485. Granet, *Religion*, p. 68.

[17] Chavannes, *op. cit.* p. 495.

coolie.[18] On the other hand, the *yin-yang* philosophy itself appears, without forcing, as a natural development out of the early village life and agricultural cult on the one hand, and the later political developments on the other.

The village life is very important, for it appears to be the archetype from which the entire Chinese conception of the world and even the cosmos grew. The village was, as has been said, small. It was based on agriculture. It was apparently a community of a peaceful regularity and a social solidarity beyond anything which we of the present day can imagine.[19] Rudd has summarized the climatic situation admirably.

> The Chinese civilization appeared in a region of extensive plains and low hills, located in the temperate zone between the parallels of 30° and 40° north latitude. The earth offers but few such favorable situations for the development of great peoples. No other ancient civilization had such freedom for extensive and intensive development. The cold winters and hot summers offered stimulus and reward for personal effort. Industry was necessary in order to secure food and comfort. The soil was naturally productive. The rainfall was not abundant, but it came at the seasons when it was most needed for agriculture, and stimulated the effort to utilize it when it came.[20]

To this day, the sense of solidarity among the members of a Chinese "large family" has few parallels in the West. In these ancient agricultural villages there was "une sorte de gregarisme, une vie en groupes, en communautés où individus et familles doivent se perdre et ne comptent pas."[21] Again, "Une village enferme une vaste famille tres unie et très homogène.[22] This solidarity took on not alone a social but even a territorial aspect. Indeed, Granet

[18] That I be not thought wilfully to ignore the fact, let me acknowledge that the practice of putting a red cord about the *shê* in case of drought does appear to be an example of the *yin-yang* philosophy. But it can not be proved that this was early. To be sure, Chavannes (*op. cit.* p. 485) says that the string was at first put about the tree rather than the mound, which seems to refer the practice to antiquity. But Chavannes' source for this dates from 500 A. D.

[19] I do not mention the nine-field scheme (cf. Maspero, *La Chine Antique*, p. 108-10) for three reasons. (1) Considerable doubt of its authenticity has been raised of late, especially in China. (2) It can not have been in existence at any time prior to the existence of fairly well-recognized government. (3) It is of no very great importance for this study.

[20] Rudd, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

[21] Maspero, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

[22] Granet, *Religion*, p. 4.

holds that the relations of the family group with the soil were originally so close that the corpse was deposited on the family ground, near the dwelling, during decomposition, and each new member of the family was considered a literal reincarnation of the substance of the ancestors.[23] He finds, also, an association of the fertility of the grain, which was stored near the conjugal couch, with that of the women.[24]

But the most striking fact about the life of the village-dweller was the division of his year into two seasons, according to which almost every phase of his existence was drastically altered.[25] In summer, the whole family went to the fields, and lived in little huts at the scene of the agricultural labors. The work in the fields was done by the men, the women and children preparing their meals and bringing them to the field. This condition continued all through the summer. After the harvest was gathered, the mode of life was changed altogether, the whole group going back to the home to spend the cold winter. Here it was the women, apparently, who did the large share of the work, making clothing, etc.[26]

The turn of the season, in spring and fall, would quite evidently be a time of great importance. It was the time, in each case, when the season of the labors of one sex had finished, and when that of another was to begin. In the spring there was all of the anxiety over the crops of the coming year, and the rejoicing at the return of vegetation; in the autumn there was gladness because of the harvest. Beyond doubt we have here the origin of the two great festivals of the ancient Chinese, which came approximately at the equinoxes. It is worthy of note that, at the spring festival, there were ceremonies celebrated at the Sacred Place (which was perhaps the early form of the *shê*)[27] in which, apparently, young men and young women danced opposite each other (dramatizing the opposition of the sexes), singing ceremonial songs. They finally paired off, the climax being sexual intercourse. This was followed by marriage if a child resulted.[28]

The opposition of the sexes in this ancient agricultural life is striking. It is so sharp, Granet opines, that it may be said to have

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 27-28.
[24] *Ibid.* p. 26.
[25] Maspero, *op. cit.*, p. 114.
[26] Ibid., p. 116. Granet, *Religion*, p. 3-4.
[27] Granet, *Danses*, p. 447-50.
[28] Granet, *Religion*, pp. 8-16. Maspero, *op. cit.* pp. 118-19.

dominated the whole of the social life. We find what is perhaps an echo of it in the separation of the sexes among the aristocracy.[29]

Granet was the first, to my knowledge, to point out the very great probability that the *yin* and the *yang* conceptions were originally merely the classification of objects in general under these two categories (male and female) which were most ready to the hand of the ancient farmer.[30] It must be borne in mind that it is not contended that the developed *yin-yang* cosmology existed among the early agricultural Chinese—rather the contrary—but only that this division on sex lines is probably the source of the later philosophical concepts. Granet believes that *yin* at first referred to the position taken by the female dancers in the spring festival, while *yang* referred to the proper place of the male dancers.

Other aspects of the village life which had an overwhelming importance for the later Chinese religion and philosophy were the social solidarity, already mentioned, and the intense provincialism which characterized it. This is not alone peculiar to agricultural communities located in China. Wherever such a group exists, it tends very quickly to achieve a code of ethics which is not subject to criticism, even the minutest violations of which are considered to be great offences. The origin of reflective, as opposed to hereditary, morality, lies in wide contacts, bringing criticism and comparison. The Chinese village lacked this. China as a whole has lacked and deliberately excluded it, from very ancient times down almost to the present. The result, reflected in the literature beyond all possibility of doubt, was the placing of the highest premium on conformity to custom down to the smallest detail.

The process went a step further. It is nothing unique for a people to believe that its religious rites cause the processes of the universe to follow their accustomed round. Nor is it unusual for people to believe that conformity or non-conformity with a particular ethical code has spectacular cosmic consequences. Most of us have heard some good person say, after a tremendous earthquake or fire, "What a wicked city that must have been!" The tendency to think in such terms increases as we approach conditions of village provincialism like that in ancient China. The Chinese developed this idea, in combination with certain other conceptions,

[29] Granet, *Danses,* p. 569.

[30] Granet, *Religion,* pp. 20-21. The etymology of the characters *yin* 陰 and *yang* 陽 is interestingly discussed by Granet.

into a religion, and a social and political and even a natural philosophy. As a result of this, almost every calamity which could happen was referred to the failure of some person or persons to live up to the established code.

The positive conceptions of the ideal state in this regard were *li* 禮 "propriety" and *h'u* 和 "harmony, union, concord, agreement." The former refers to the body of *mores* according to which it was necessary to live in order to win social approval and prosperity, and to avoid disturbing the order of the cosmos (conceived as including men on very intimate terms). The second term is very often used to denote that harmonious state of nature which was the normal and beneficial thing. In the beginning, these ideas were very simple. Men must follow the customs of the group in order to maintain both social and cosmic harmony. If they do not, they will bring upon the group (in a very naturalistically conceived way) such disasters as follow upon the disturbance of the harmonious rotation of the seasons, *i. e.*, drought, floods, crop failures, plagues of insects, etc.

This early Chinese thought-world was (if we do not push the word too far) dynamically conceived. The *hsing,* "elements,"[31] if they existed in the Chinese world at that time, were not so much types of substance, apparently, as *localizations of modes of action.* The Chinese never seem to deal with the epistemological problem; they are naïve realists, with a decidedly pragmatic tinge. In the same way they conceive "good" not as a type of substance but as a state of harmony. That which Westerners have called "supernatural" appears to differ from the "natural" not in substance but only in its way of action. Evil is not a substance nor a class of things, but a kind of behavior which is the opposite of harmonious, that is, *kuo* 過, "excess," "going beyond."

It may seem that the above paragraph attributes to the ancient Chinese a number of sophisticated philosophical ideas which would be, in a setting so naïve, surprising. But careful consideration will show that it rather denies to them certain ideas which the Westerner tends unconsciously to assume that the Chinese must have had, merely because they are implicit in his own occidental background.

We have traced the origin of the most important early ideas in the Chinese philosophical and religious world—on the one hand *yin* and *yang,* on the other the solidarity of the social with the cosmic

[31] The date of their origin will be considered later.

order. But almost nothing has yet been said of *T'ien*, which is, according to some scholars, perhaps the most important ingredient of early Chinese religion. The neglect was not inadvertence. *T'ien* has been mentioned so little because it is believed that its importance, at this period, was very slight and secondary.

The importance of *T'ien* in early Chinese religion has probably been greatly overemphasized, for two reasons. In the first place, by the time the Chinese were writing down their history in any sort of systematic manner, and were re-editing all of the old texts, the political system which depended on the *T'ien* concept (as completely as the Holy Roman Empire depended on *Jahweh*) was in full swing, and it was the officials of this system who wrote and edited the histories. Add to this the Chinese reverence for and imitation of antique custom, and it becomes plain that the officers would beyond all question have written a flourishing *T'ien-cult* into the ancient period, whatever the facts might have been.

In the second place, Western scholars, led in the first place by Christian missionaries, have often been eager to demonstrate the early importance of *T'ien*, usually in order to prove that monotheism was the original religion of China. Christianity then appears, of course, as the preservation of this original and pure cult through the ages. In any case they equate *T'ien and Shang Ti*[32] to Jahweh, and try to find them to have been as important as possible.

No one, Western scholar or Chinese, pretends to find any sort of popular cult of *T'ien* 天[33] within the historical period. But there was, undeniably, an early and flourishing cult of the *shê*, the five household *shên*, etc. Here was an embarrassing position for the historians. *T'ien* was considered the loftiest power in the universe and was associated with the Emperor himself, and therefore should, of course, have been the object of the most wide-spread and the most ancient veneration. Yet where was the proof of this? As is usual in such cases, a neat explanation was found.

This explanation, upon which some have based the antiquity of the cult of *T'ien*, is founded upon a passage of the *Shu King*, dated about one thousand years after the event, referring to an incident in the reign of Yao, the first Emperor mentioned in the

[32] *Shang Ti*, "Upper Ruler," is probably another form of *T'ien*. This point will be discussed later.

[33] This character seems to have developed from a picture of a man with a line (representing the sky) above his head. It is generally accepted to have originally meant merely the sky.

Shu King. The passage, taken from the document *Leu-hing* of the *Shu*,[34] reads:

> Then he commissioned Ch'ung and Le to make an end of the communications between earth and heaven, and the descents (*of spirits,* Legge interpolates) ceased. From the princes down to the inferior officers, all helped with clear intelligence *the spread of* the regular principles of duty. . .

Wieger, who of course shares the general Roman Catholic thesis of universal primitive monotheism, tells us that the situation lying behind this text was as follows: The primitive Chinese religion, the pure cult of *T'ien,* had become contaminated through the contact of the people with certain non-Chinese tribes, the Li and the Miao. Shun was charged by the Emperor to punish them, with the result that, the *Shu* tells us, he exterminated them.[35] Further action was necessary, however. The people, not leaving the offering of sacrifices to the official channels, had begun to have personal relations with the superior powers, which threw the entire religious system into confusion. For this reason it was necessary "to make an end of the communications between earth and heaven." This caused the old order to be re-established, Wieger tells us, and it continued until about 770 B. C.

But, upon such close examination, this incident does not at all show that a popular cult of *T'ien* existed at an early date. Wieger says that Shun revived the laws of the ancient cult; had it, therefore, been previously the custom for the people not to sacrifice to *T'ien,* but to leave this to the Emperor? If so, that would agree perfectly with my own hypothesis, that *T'ien* was never properly a deity of the people. On the other hand, it seems difficult to see how the prohibition of popular sacrifices to *T'ien* could have done away with the abuses which were supposed to have occurred. It would seem that the Emperor and his agents would rather have tried to stimulate the *T'ien*-cult, and to make it take the place of the supposedly heretical practices. Furthermore, Legge reports an extended dialogue concerning this passage, dating from the time of Confucius, in which there is not the slightest hint that it has any reference to popular worship of *T'ien* at all.[36]

[34] *Shu* p. 593.

[35] L. Wieger, S. J., *Histoire des Croyances Religieuses et des Opinions Philosophiques en Chine depuis l'Origine, jusqu'à Nos Jours* (cited hereafter as *Histoire des Croyances*), pp. 14-15.

[36] *Shu,* pp. 593-94, notes.

Another difficulty is worthy of note. How is it that this popular *T'ien*-cult, supposedly so strong up to this time, was extirpated in the full spotlight of history (as its proponents would have us believe) yet has left no echo of its existence in the rest of Chinese literature, not even in the *Shi King*, the *Book of Poetry*, which is our best source for popular sentiment? The point is not one on which to be stubbornly dogmatic, but until further evidence is produced I shall remain persuaded that *T'ien* was always a governmental figure, never a popular one. It is the aristocracy, not the people, who sacrifice to it. The fact is that all of this literature which concerns the early rulers of China is very doubtful. Some of its incidents can only be mythical, much is probably allegory. As collateral evidence it is often very good; as independent proof it is in most cases worthless. In this case the independent evidence nearly all points away from a popular cult of *T'ien*.

But suppose we concede that a *T'ien*-cult might have existed, deeply rooted in the popular imagination, from the earliest times. Could the Emperor have ended it with such ease, or even at all? He could not. Chinese emperors who try to introduce great innovations in religion have always lost their heads and their thrones to some ambitious vassal who has been watching for just such an opportunity to raise a pious rebellion.

But if *T'ien* was not always the great deity of the Chinese, we must account for its origin is some manner.[37] One may not ignore the very frequent association of nomadic peoples with sky-gods. From this fact comes, perhaps, the strongest argument for a pastoral nomadic period in the history of the Chinese.

> The earlier Heaven-cult did not include the earth as the counterpart of Heaven, and can not well be said to be a product of the peasant community. The agricultural feature was apparently added to the original ritual as the farming interest had been gradually developed to displace that of pastoral economy.[38]

One may not deny the possibility of a pastoral nomadic period, nor dogmatically assert that this might not be the origin of *T'ien*. It might. But the tendency of nomadic deities to atrophy in an agricultural situation is, as has been pointed out, great, and is

[37] T'ai refers to "the undivided supremacy which *T'ien* had commanded over the people from time immemorial." *Op. cit.*, p. 233.

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 141a.

irresistible unless the old deities are able to take on new functions which fit into the new habitat and mode of life of their people. In China, *T'ien* did, in the course of time, assume functions of a governmental character, but one can hardly believe that this group of nomads (according to the hypothesis we are pursuing) can have moved into China and immediately set up a thoroughly organized government. Therefore, even if the origin of *T'ien* were nomadic, it seems probable that the concept would in any case have undergone an intermediate period of extreme feebleness.[39]

But if we eliminate the pastoral stage, we may still find an explanation for *T'ien*. The sky is important for the agricultor, as well as for the herdsman. It is from the sky that the rain comes, it is in the sky that the sun, all-important, is located. The sky becomes a symbol of the orderly rotation of the seasons, which is associated with that remarkably strong sense of Harmony and Order, social and cosmic, which, as we have seen, the Chinese developed.

The sky sees everything. Among many peoples it has become linked with justice and with government. It is often the seat of the Great Ruler, who is of course closely associated with the human king or emperor. So it was in China. This development, which can only be mentioned here, will be treated at length when we come to deal with Confucianism and its background.

The sky is active, sending driving rain and hot sunlight. The earth is passive, motionless, putting forth the fruit of the seed it receives. Quite simply, the male *yang* came to have its seat in heaven, while the female *yin* was naturally linked with earth.[40]

* * *

The foregoing picture is not presented as anything like a complete account of early Chinese religion or philosophy, nor even as a thorough canvass of all of the reliable material which is available on the subject. Many elements have been omitted, some because they are peripheral, others because they are included implicitly in what has been described. The chief purpose of this sketch has been to provide a background for, and an introduction to, the ensuing study of later Chinese thought.

[39] The only alternative would be the persistence among the settled people of a governing caste, or the penetration among them of a group of nomads who set up an aristocracy. See Granet's refutation of these possibilities, *Danses*, p. 9-24.

[40] The sun is sometimes called "the great *yang*."

NATURE AND EPISTEMOLOGY

BY M. WHITCOMB HESS

"IF the undergraduate," says a modern college president[1] "can only get it through his head that Christian morals and natural morals are two quite different things . . . that they differ in aim and in purpose a vast confusion may be resolved." But the vast confusion observed in the lives of the present generation so far from being resolved by a consideration of nature as alien to the Christian life is partially the result of that attitude. For the distinction Mr. Bell would make between natural morals and Christian morals is the result of an ambiguous hybrid of epistemology and ethics, the identification of nature with half-knowledge, which, in the background of theological and philosophical speculation for some centuries, threatens to darken the landscape.

No one will deny that a real relation exists between ethics and epistemology. The two are at one concerning the nature of good and of evil. Each concedes the synonym of the abstract terms, truth and good, error and evil. But though they meet on this one ground, ethics is as far removed from epistemology as the concrete is from the abstract. Ethics deals with the relating of experience; epistemology, with the reverberation of reality. There is no separation between life and knowledge, but there is a difference of degree between the theory of life which is truth, or knowledge, and the theory of the theory, which is epistemology. Because of this difference, the meeting-ground of ethics and epistemology is also the dividing line between them. It has been this indeterminate relation which has brought about that opposition between nature and spirit which sets the one as the principle of reason over against the other as the unreasoned principle, or blind force. And for such concep-

[1] *The Atlantic Monthly*, April, 1928. *The Church and the Undergraduate*, p. 505, by Bernard Iddings Bell, President of St. Stephens College.

tion, ethics has borrowed the knowledge-levels discovered by epistemology which belong to the theory of knowledge as such, and which applied to the self merely make for a confused notion of what the earth-life is all about.

II

In individual experience the body is at once a place and a possession though in its intimacy of relation to the thinking self it exceeds that of any other place or possession to an almost unimaginable extent. However, since the dawn of speculation the body has been identified more or less with the devilish principle. This identification has been strengthened by the ancient human desire to repudiate disease and death but it has its roots in nature's alignment with half-truth by the epistemologists.

Experience has always shown that first judgments are subject to change. The necessity for hard and patient thinking was manifest from the earliest adventurings in philosophy. The pre-Socratics already had put reflection beyond naive experience in value for attaining truth. Illusory appearance was attributed to the deceit of the senses before the sophist Protagoras identified thought with sense-perception as one process. Believing, like earlier thinkers, that perception is conditioned by organic changes in both percipient and perceived object at the moment of contact, Protagoras' very definition of perception, or thought, made it unstable. So the great advance Protagoras made was lost even in the making; and perception to this day has hardly recovered from the equivocal position given it when Plato and Aristotle completed the giant task of proving against the sophists a universal validity for knowledge which Socrates, with his inductive doctrine, began.

In human experience knowledge progresses from a low state, which has been held identical with sense-perception since it is coincident with primary presentations, to a high state held as pure thought. For this reason the phenomenal world was considered by early thinkers as separated from a higher world of thought, by a difference of degree, if not of kind.[2] Plato taught then that the incorporeal world forms the object of science; but the mistaken

[2] Democritus expressed the difference between perception and thought in quantitative terms: Obscure insight or perception, and genuine insight or thought, result respectively from the atomic motions of coarse and fine images of things.

notion drawn from his teaching was that the phenomena of the natural world of the senses are manifestations of immaterial realities, the Ideas, which exist side by side with them just as partial insight (Protagorean perception) exists side by side with true insight. Nevertheless the most careful studies of Plato reveal his conception of the Idea as purely epistemological: The first great epistemologist meant by the Idea what modern epistemologists mean by value; he meant by phenomenon what they mean by fact. In other words, Plato taught that knowledge about things and events is progressively intelligible; and he used the terms "intellectual" and "sensuous" as convenient names for knowledge-divisions, and was at times confused in his own statments by the nomenclature.

Aristotle, more scientist than philosopher, mapped out a system of development from the lowest expression of reality in truth which he called matter, to the highest, or pure form. The relation of matter as mere possibility to form as complete actuality removed for Aristotle the difficulties of separation which he thought he found in Plato's doctrine. But while there is present an epistemological monism in form and matter taken as two sides of one and the same reality, still the Aristotelian system stresses a marked dualism of the resistant passivity of matter, and, opposing it, the purposive activity of form. And as Plato also had done Aristotle applied these limits to bodily and psychical activities, an application anticipating St. Paul and St. Augustine. An anthropological dualism thus grew out of the inevitable application of epistemology to human-conduct—inevitable because of the very nature of truth which makes difficult the limiting of the theory of knowledge to its particular field.

III

Philo Judaeus who lived during the first century A. D. fell into the pitfall laid by epistemology. In his reinterpretation of Judaism in the light of Greek philosophy there is found dominant the note of contrast between spirit and flesh. Spirit, man's true nature, Philo believed, must engage in continuous strife with man's false nature, flesh, which actually imprisons and retards the spirit in its development. It is interesting to note that Philo remaining in the fold of Judaism insisted on the spirit-flesh antagonism which his contemporary, Saul of Tarsus, emphasized after his conversion.

With Philo the reason was admittedly the result of having ingrafted Greek thought into the Hebrew faith; and Paul, of philosophical training, was the first among the Christians to take the cross as a symbol of spirit's literal triumph over the flesh.

Two centuries later than Philo and St. Paul, Plotinus made a forthright identification of the corporeal world with partial-truth. The famous metaphor of the founder of Neo-Platonism, drawn from its prototype in the Republic, though mystically and poetically suggestive, is a penetrative analysis of the learning process. From truth's exhaustless source light emanates first as spirit, then as soul and finally at its farthest reach forms a twilight with matter. Matter is dark space, sheer ignorance, or sheer evil. Plotinus shows in this extraordinary figure that truth is unchanging and unchangeable as Parmenides had claimed for it before Plato. He gives the nature of truth in its least manifestation. In the process of knowledge the more light and fuller needed is obtained not by the absorption of anything external to the thinker but by the mind's return to itself. There is the further illumination of truth's nature: The effect of higher determinism if abstracted from this cause appears as blind behavior. *Unreasoned power is the express rebellion against truth.* What is usually overlooked in Plotinus' remarkable snapshot of the thinker at the moment of complete knowledge is that the picture has no content, but is of mere knowledge-theory.

IV

Whatever may be the ultimate meaning of nature, it is not found in setting it over against spirit as its lower stage. And to identify nature and spirit with knowledge-states, diametrically opposed because taken from their continuum in knowledge-process, ends by making epistemology absurd and experience futile.

INTELLECTUAL INTEGRITY AND THE ART OF THINKING

BY VICTOR S. YARROS

CROCE, the distinguished Italian philosopher, maintains in one of his books that there is no such thing as an intellectual error. The average man has talked for ages of mistakes of the head and mistakes of the heart, but Croce asserts that all mistakes are essentially moral.

This, at first sight, appears to be a wild paradox. Is it not notorious that the most careful, conscientious and truthful men make mistakes? Are not men misled by apperances, by evidence which seems to them sufficient but turns out eventually to have been insufficient? Are not hypotheses and theories revised and re-revised in the light of new facts, and is it not legitimate to form tentative theories? Now, then can Croce take the position he does as to the origin and nature of error?

The answer is that Croce believes, with Prof. Graham Wallas and others, that there is an art of thinking, and that it is one's duty to undergo training and discipline in that art, and to master it, *thus avoiding errors.*

For example, a man of science observes phenomena and tries to explain them. This means that he has formed a theory. But if he is truly scientific, he will realize and insist that his theory is provisional, tentative, subject to modification or even rejection after further observation and experiment. In that case there is no error. Likewise, when a person is aware of his limitations, his ignorance, he will qualify his statements and remain open-minded. He will say, "I am inclined to believe," not "I believe." He will not claim convictions when he has only notions or opinions based on slender data.

Croce, if I understand him, contends that the avoidance of errors and mistakes is a matter of literary style, and that the true scientist

can have no difficulty in expressing himself with precision and caution. Rashness, dogmatism, looseness of statement, vanity, pretence and the like are, of course, moral, not mental, qualities. Hence Croce's conclusion—so odd when not analyzed and correctly interpreted—that error is moral, not intellectual.

This question is raised again by Abbe Ernest Dimnet, the French critic and teacher, in his little book on *The Art of Thinking*. His conclusions are not different from those of Graham Wallas, but he is less direct, less exact, less didactic. He is interested, he says, in producing thought, not in guiding it. Wallas was interested in improving the quality of much current thought. Both agree that the obstacles to real thinking are many, and the wonder is that we manage to think as well as we do. But who would dispute the proposition that, if it be possible to produce better thought and more thought of the right kind, it is our duty to employ whatever means are available for the promotion of that end?

For, as M. Dimnet says, the question is at bottom a moral one—namely, the making of the fullest and worthiest use of all our faculties. The question is individual, primarily, but it is also social. Waste of power and faculty is reprehensible, and the victims of such waste are often the victims of social maladjustment, bad educational methods, group blunders and false standards. If schools and colleges do not teach the art of thinking, they neglect their primary and most important purpose. Facts are only the raw material of thought, and obviously to interpret them aright, to arrive at hypotheses and theories, or at laws, thinking is necessary.

How, then, can we teach thinking? Wallas divided the process of thought into four distinct stages, and stressed the importance of adequate preparation, of time for incubation and the proper utilization of illumination. M. Dimnet passes over this suggestive division and deals more generally with the problem.

He first points out the obstacles to thought—Wallas would say to correct and sound thinking. What are they? Dimnet gives quite a list of obstacles—passion, to begin with, naturally, which is another name for bias or prejudice, and then imitation, gregariousness, indolence, wrong ideas of education, lack of leisure or of time for reflection and the cultivation of the pleasures of the intellect.

Can these obstacles be avoided? Not entirely, perhaps, but most of those who are endowed with the capacity for thought—with brains, in short—and with a certain amount of intellectual integrity

and seriousness can avoid most of the obstacles under ordinary circumstances by observing certain conditions and eliminating other conditions.

What must we do to enable our minds to think correctly? I confess I am not entirely satisfied with the way in which M. Dimnet answers the question. He omits vital elements and is rather vague in his answer, though all that he says is true and helpful.

Those who would teach men to think and to avoid error should lay particular stress on the duty of fitting one's-self to form an opinion on a given subject. What value is there in an opinion based on no facts, no knowledge? And how can there be much value in an opinion based on very little and ill-assimilated knowledge? The trouble with most men, especially in the realm of the inexact sciences, is that they form and express opinions without half the knowledge that would give them the *right* to opinions, and that they refuse to modify their notions even if the evidence against them is overwhelming. Further, the trouble with most men is that they are too vain and proud to be intellectually honest. He who would reason scientifically must be humble, ready to change his mind, or to suspend judgment, or to consider with sympathy the arguments of opponents.

But to return to M. Dimnet. What are his conditions of thought? He names and discusses several. He emphasizes the trustworthiness of intuitions, of flashes, of inspirations, agreeing in this with Bergson. He advises leisurely contemplation. He insists on the reading of the best books and on living with the great and their noble and elevated ideas. He urges cultivation of one's own vein, after determining what that vein is. He deprecates the tendency to rush into print. He believes, as does Wallas in incubation and illumination after due preparation, and also in verification.

Since the little book is distinctly literary, rhetorical and conversational, it has the defects of its good qualities—it is occasionally superficial and paradoxical. But these faults may be passed over. It is bound to stimulate thought and direct attention to the sources of error, the vices of intolerant and dogmatic writers, the bad habits of the generality of men who regard themselves as civilized and superior, and the road to truth and high-minded thinking.

The Wallas and Dimnet books should be studied in every high school, college, university and institute of the world. They are more valuable than text-books on logic, or, rather, they are excellent text-books on logic among other things.

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Discredited, what feature of the tale
  Again o'ertold had thus offended them,
The self-posed censors, of divine travail
  That raised an Avatar in Bethlehem?

The miracle in measure looms as great
  As in the favored gospel's poesy—
And witness waxes large, as numbers prate
  In unison of things of mystery.

A story told, of repetition's voice,
  Unlike in naught essential to the theme,
Sage authorship in handwork should rejoice
  Accredited in revelation's scheme.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

Edited by

WILLIAM A. HAMMOND AND FRANK THILLY

Of the Sage School of Philosophy, Cornell University

September, 1928

Clarke's Ethical Philosophy (II).....Ernest Albee

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CHRISTIANITY IN ITS CONFLICT WITH FREUDIANISM

BY GEORGE YEISLEY RUSK, PH.D.

DURING the past decade Freudianism, directly and indirectly, has been gaining a dominating sway over the thought of our age. During the past year its very success has aroused the militant opposition of orthodox Christianity—as revealed especially by the recent conviction of Mrs. M. W. Dennett for sending thru the mails her booklet, *The Sex Side of Life*. The success of Freudianism, as well as the opposition which it has aroused, renders it imperative that its attitude to Christianity be given wide publicity and be subjected to a careful examination. Professor Freud in his book, *The Future of an Illusion,* maintains—to quote him freely—that religion is the universal neurosis; that it has never succeeded in making men even happy; that it is responsible for the relative degeneration of the adult over the normal child; that the legitimate demands of culture can be enforced upon all individuals—except the hopelessly insane—by the same rational methods as those by which they are now enforced upon the neurotic, so that religion is no longer necessary for that purpose. And he believes that in view of the results so far achieved by psycho-analysis, when its appeal to the reason to observe laws evidently necessary for our social good, is generally substituted for the authoritative commands of religion to observe a medley of laws—many of which are contrary to social advantage—mankind will enter upon an experience of social order and individual peace such as it has never known in the past.

Is Professor Freud justified in his condemnation of religion? In considering this question we should notice three admissions that he makes in the course of his discussion: (1) That in the past religion has aided man to control the world by personalizing it. (2) That dogmas are "fulfillments of the oldest, strongest and most in-

sistent wishes of mankind." (3) That we can "know reality by our senses because our senses are the product of reality and we are not interested in other worlds." But, in the first place, since it is the task of mankind to control the world (inanimate, personal and social), and since the ability of psycho-analysis to do so is the reason why Freud claims that *it* gives us a real knowledge of truth, religion also must be said to do so, since it has aided us in the same project. And, in the second place, it used to be said by agnostics that the dogmas of religion are not true because they do not appeal to what the agnostics considered the only fundamental power in the human constitution, that is, pure reason. They regarded their own beliefs as valid because, they claimed, their beliefs *were* in accord with an ineradicable faculty of the human soul. But now when with a broader knowledge of the constitution of the soul, it is discovered that the dogmas of religion do appeal to one of its constituents, namely the desires, the fact of such appeal is no longer held to be important, as decisive for the affirmation of their truth. The fact that the natural history of a belief can be traced should cast no aspersions upon its truth. But the fact that a belief rests upon a fundamental power of the soul provides it with a foundation which no human being can ever escape far enough from consistently to deny. Various desires may pass away or after many days be satisfied. But desire for some form of redemption and vindication —the only necessary constituents of religion—cannot pass away as long as the human soul survives. And, in the third place, if we "know reality by our senses because our senses are the product of reality," then we know reality by our desires because they, too, are the product of reality.

We must conclude, therefore, that some religious faith is possible in spite of the findings of psycho-analysis. But what shall be its form? What specific dogmas may we entertain? What doctrines will aid us to achieve personal unification, and integration into society—the necessary aim of every living creature,—an integration which implies a corresponding reform of society to permit the integration? In the present paper we cannot hope to formulate a creed, but we can determine the general nature of a creed to which men acquainted with psycho-analysis may subscribe and so resolve the conflict between it and Christianity. In order to do so let us study that article of faith most likely to appear in every creed: that God is at once infinite in His justice and mercy and inscrutable

in His ordering of human lives. (See, for instance, *A Brief Statement of the Reformed Faith,* adopted by the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in 1902.) The conclusions at which we shall arrive from our study of the one article, a study of any other article would but confirm.

The first response to the article of faith which we have chosen for study must be the conviction that it is self-contradictory. A person whose actions cannot be understood cannot be declared to be morally perfect. It would therefore seem that we must reject our typical article of faith in toto altho it is fundamental to every other article of faith which could be devised. And yet, if we think about the nature of experience, with which all creeds must accord, we must acknowledge that it contains a contradiction precisely analagous to that which we find in the creed. To act at all in experience we must presuppose that it has meaning, and so that every part is justified as a constituent part of the whole, that is, that life is just and even good,—although at every step there are evils which blind us to the final purpose and cannot be justified piecemeal. But this is essentially what the credal article affirms, and is quite as self-contradictory as the article. Since the article is self-contradictory but is true to essential experience, and so cannot be completely discarded, we must conclude that its helpfulness to a person in achieving personal and social integration would depend upon his state of mind at the time of his employment of it, and so upon the aspect of the article which he would select to apply to his own life. If at the time of employment, he were overwhelmed by the inherent injustice of life—caused, for instance, by unfortunate love affairs or inability to earn an honest living in a world of which John Jay Chapman declares: "The attention of everyone in the United States is on someone else's opinion, not on truth,"—then belief in God's justice and love might cause him to refurbish his infantile father-image, which would prevent his reacting practically to the real world,—till, with greater misfortunes and more extreme dependence upon the father-image for protection, he might lose all sense of reality, thus being insane.

Or he might turn his libido in upon itself to determine wherein he has so deeply sinned as to deserve the evils he has experienced,—all greatly intensified because of their moral implications in his thought, and develop a highly overwrought conscience, which cannot judge relative values, but hour after hour torments itself over trifling misdeeds of the past.

Or again, his mind might become centered upon the problem of how ineluctable evil can lead to an experience of peace and vindication for himself and all men—which infinite love should guarantee as the guerdon for "the end of days," and at length in despair turn away from the real world to one of delusion.

Or the article of faith which we are studying might cause the bewildered man to consider that in it he finds confirmation for his despair of finding any meaning, purpose or value in life; and so, again, force him to turn in upon himself till he reaches his primitive self, which was not sensitive to hopes and fears but lived only in the sensuous present. To such a person God is just and God is love, but He wields an inscrutable justice and He wooes us to Himself with an insane love.

Or the believer might be caught between the various fates which I have described; and in order to avoid them, momentarily tend to lose faith in his creed, and so merely become one of that vast army which Professor Freud has thus described from his knowledge of the souls of multitudes of men laid bare: "Countless people have been tortured by the same doubts, which they would fain have suppressed because they held themselves in duty bound to believe, and since then many brilliant intellects have been wrecked upon this conflict [between doubt and belief] and many characters have come to grief through the compromises by which they sought a way out."

But if the would-be believer comes to his creed with smug self-satisfaction; if success has made distress seem only a far-off possibility, then belief in a holy but inscrutable God might cause him to receive his success as the badge of distinguished merit from his God. Gradually he might separate himself altogether from the ranks of humanity and conceive himself an incarnate God with all power given to him in heaven and in earth. Indeed, this often happens. The inscrutability of God's providence would protect him from ever having to stop and ask himself why God had chosen him for supreme honor and glory. As a devout and consistent believer he could give himself up without reserve to what is known among psychiatrists as "the delusion of grandeur."

Or, what is much more common than any of the reactions to the fundamental article of faith described above, a man might feel that God had commissioned him to make known God's justice and love; had called him to endure the utmost of sacrifice for its wide

proclamation and successful application; had demanded that he incarnate the divine nature in his own life as the only effective means of its revelation to men. And when the people do not respond, being concerned in making practical adjustments to life and not in following abstractions, the prophet again might be thrown back upon himself, conclude that he is much abused and develop a marked persecution complex. He may not realize that his essential message is absurd: that men are naturally wicked and so need to turn to his God for salvation; for if they were, then they could not turn; and if God must be depended upon for the initial revolution, then it would be impious for the sinner to do anything about it himself. All of the emotional appeals which the prophet addresses to his audience, having small effect there and having no foundation in a reasoned view of the world, must react upon himself, mightily stirring up the foundations of his nature (ancestral and primitive as well as personal) till there is left nothing assured in his whole being. At length, if utterly sincere, he must become sadly baffled at the world, secretly wonder about the validity of his message (a question which he dare not frankly face), give himself up to mystic visions, and increasingly separate himself from the calm confidence of normal human living.

While I have been writing the past paragraphs, I have been seeing the kettle bubble—the kettle of my readers' impatience. I suppose that they all are eager to exclaim as with one voice: "But the psychological effects of a belief in God may be very different from those which you have so far described." And to this objection I wish to yield immediate assent. Thus the person overwhelmed with a sense of the injustice of life, its constant thwarting of purpose, might find in God a refuge and a fulfillment—perfect and complete, which the world cannot give. The inscrutability of God's providence would relieve him from all sense of sinfulness in the event of misfortune, and God's justice and mercy ever find new fulfillment in the repeated sanctification of sorrow which comes from personal communion with Him. Fortified by such a faith a man might pass through life with no smell of fire upon his garments, and through the waters of death without fear. But we must insist that to achieve this end such a person would have at every point to make arbitrary selections, carried out to just the right degree, of the intellectual possibilities contained in his faith in God.

And, in like manner, the person whose cup had been filled with success might find in the doctrine of the divine inscrutability a rebuke to all his pride, and in God's justice and love an urgent command to social service—in ways immediately practical and successful. Such deductions are possible but not necessary. The primal doctrine of religious faith may lead the believer to increasing integration or to destruction. One deduction is as logical as another. Acceptance of a doctrine does not guarantee any predictable result in life. Hence the strife of tongues about religious doctrines and their fruitage in practice.

Even when the extremely unfortunate results from a bad choice of inferences from a theistic faith, such as I have described, do not follow, yet many twists, strains and dogmatisms of character do result. Often with vast effort from other parts of one's creed or from a common sense reaction to life, they are pressed far down into consciousness or disguised. But even when they are so dealt with, though no longer recognized for what they are, they profoundly interfere with practical efficiency and with one's essential peace as a loving child of the living God and a simple friend and brother to all the sons of men.

All of this, naturally enough, religious people have repeatedly acknowledged. They have realized that their doctrines do not work ex opere operato. At times, in various phrases, they have insisted that the letter is dead, that the spirit alone gives life. Jesus declared that in order to behold his kingdom one must be born again. In other words, the acceptance of no doctrine is in itself sufficient for salvation. Paul declared "we are fools (*i.e.* reject logical reasoning from a single aspect of doctrine) for Christ's sake." And yet, when the attempt is made to bring to a troubled human soul the integrating power of religion, necessarily it finds expression in credal articles such as the one which we have discussed,—articles which may have diametrically opposite effects upon different people. We must therefore conclude that no general statement can be made with regard to the practical effect in life of any specific article of religious faith.

What should we conclude in the face of the facts at which we have so far arrived, namely:—(1) that psycho-analysis cannot disprove the truth of religion but must leave it embedded in the very constitution of our natures, and (2) that no estimate can be made of the value for life of belief in any specific religious doctrine? We

must conclude, in the first place, that whenever a person makes a deduction from his creed which is harming his life, he should be analyzed by a psychiatrist to find the reason for his deduction and then be reeducated to see the other possibilities implied in his creed. And, in the second place, the hydra-headed nature of religious doctrines should be freely admitted by the devout at all times. They should insist that true doctrine must be complex because life is complex. That it may not be purely rational because life is not thus rational.

Life is not a rigid following of any abstract truth however august. Life is a problem in adjustment. And by adjustment I do not mean an oily conformity. I mean something too complex to permit of consistent definition. I mean an unwillingness to misstate facts, yet a willingness to live pleasantly with those who deny the facts. I mean a willingness to sacrifice much for the public good, yet not more than it can profit by and than one can offer without growing bitter at its ingratitude. I mean conformity when no essential issue is involved, while reformation is gathering from the four winds of heaven. I mean purposive endeavor, but also appreciation of the plans of others. If the good life is as complex as this, then so must true doctrine be. And we should be intolerant only of such doctrines as shut out at the final Kingdom of the Spirit any who have gained peace and triumph through a different ordering than our own of the tiles of the fair mosaics of their lives.

The only use to which an article of religion may rightly be put is the employment of its various aspects in correct proportion to right the floundering boat of a human life and bring it to its desired haven—in company with a vast flotilla, which no man can number. Any attempt to render any doctrine absolute, that is, as always pertinent in everyone of its aspects to every life, would cause religion to be of inestimable harm in the lives of those who chance upon an aspect toward which they already lean to heavily. They would be confirmed in error to their final destruction. Man was not made to be offered up as a victim upon the altar fires of an abstract religion; but religion was made for man, for his redemption, both now and unto all the ages.

So conceived, religion is in no conflict with the findings of psycho-analysis. On the contrary, psycho-analysis, by forcing the thought of the Christian church to the question of the effect of doctrines

upon the secret springs of human conduct, has forced religion to turn from a weary round of abstract debates, necessarily unending, to face what is evidently its essential problem,—but a problem which it has not before dared to face for lo! these many centuries. Having now at length faced its problem, religion will solve it. It will offer each human life what it most desperately needs. It will be as personal as was Jesus in its dealing with men —and as tender. It will reinforce with its divine sanctions every undeveloped possibility of the human soul, and it will hold within bounds every urgent desire. Religion, liberated at length from its primitive dread of its own credentials, will in the ages which are upon us accomplish all that it has striven—but not according to knowledge—to do in ages past. First philosophy, then natural science, then historical criticism, and now in these latter days, psychoanalysis, have harrowed the soil of religion. Ever planted with the new life of the rising generations, it will bring forth harvests which will appear of supernal beauty to the contemplative mind.

CHINESE NATURAL PHILOSOPHY*

BY H. G. CREEL

THIS chapter completes the first section of our study, which consists of a sketch of the background against which any intelligible picture of the development of the Chinese world-view must be thrown. We have reviewed, in the briefest way, what seem to have been the very early religious and philosophical ideas of the Chinese. We must now consider the broad conceptual outlines of Chinese thought, as it existed down to the end of our period, *i.e.*, to the first century A. D.

In presenting the varied materials with which we are dealing it is quite impossible to maintain a thoroughly logical order. It has seemed wisest to relinquish chronological sequence in favor of an arrangement which, it is hoped, causes that which precedes to help in the understanding of that which follows.

In undertaking to deal with Chinese natural philosophy we must bear well in mind the cautions of Chapter I. We must look at these Chinese ideas, not through Western eyes, but, in so far as it is at all possible, through Chinese eyes. We must try, then, first of all, to understand what this natural philosophy was to its Chinese authors.

We will not be dismayed by the fact that many Occidental philosophers, particularly certain of the German thinkers, would immediately rule this thinking out of court as no philosophy at all. For they refuse to recognize as philosophers any who do not use a great deal of their intellectual energy in grappling with the epistemological problem. But, as Prof. T. V. Smith has pointed out, the rise of idea-isms and of idealisms is usually associated with the desire to negate the world as it apparently is, in order to escape to a world

* This is one of a series of articles which will be incorporated in a forthcoming book, entitled *Sinism: A Study of the Evolution of the Chinese World-view.*

more flexible to human wishes—that it is, in other words, closely associated with a despair of attaining the good life here and now. But the ancient Chinese were peculiarly fortunately situated, and held steadfastly to the belief that it was possible to make this life, in this world, worth-while. Only the philosophic Taoists abandoned this position even to a degree, and it is precisely their philosophy which most reminds us of Western Idealism. It is surely no accident that in China, most favorable of lands for human life in ancient times, and in the United States, most prosperous of modern nations, similar types of pragmatic philosophy have been developed,[41] and that the latter have effected similarities even in such an element of culture as art.

The Chinese mind is primarily social. The true Chinese cosmos is, monotheistic propaganda of Christian missionaries to the contrary notwithstanding, anthropocentric, never theocentric. The corollary of this is that practical orientation of the Chinese mind which observers have so universally remarked. When the Chinese speculates, he is usually speculating for a purpose, and if he is not, his speculation will be disapproved by Chinese society.

To those of us who deplore the great apparent waste involved in the vast amount of often seemingly foolish speculation in which Western philosophers engage, this may seem a very desirable situation, yet it had its unfortunate results. Without this *narrow* practicality, this short-sighted and imperfect pragmatism, nothing could have prevented the rise of the scientific method in China by the beginning of the Christian era at the latest. Chinese thinkers were penetrating analysts, and they reasoned, in many cases, scientifically. Even experimentation was begun, among certain of the Taoist alchemists, with minerals, vegetables, and even animals, but this was forbidden by their brethren and even by the government, because they were wasting their time![42]

This should not be mistaken to mean that the Chinese were wholly ignorant of all but immediately practical matters. Curiosity is, seemingly, a universal characteristic of humanity, and Chinese literature shocks us periodically with bits of surprisingly accurate physical information which the Chinese possessed. For instance, Wang tells us that "Some people have measured the light of the

[41] The fact that Chinese thought is so congenial to our own leads to the reasonable hope that American sinologists may surpass the European in this department of research.

[42] Leon Wieger, *Taoisme*, Vol. I, p. 14.

sun and calculated his size. They found the diameter to be 1000 *li* (the *li* is about one-third of a mile) long." Far as this figure is from the one which we accept, it is still further removed from the appearance of the sun's size to the naked eye. These ancient Chinese were not inept at getting information they wanted, but on the whole they did lack scientific curiosity. On a point so easy to verify as the manner of the birth of the young of the hare, Wang Ch'ung tells us that they issue from the mouth of the mother! (I, 319).

The crux of the matter is that the ancient Chinese were on the whole neither systematic nor orderly thinkers. When a piece of information suggested itself as true, the only tests which seem to have been applied to it were (1) whether it *appeared* to have practical value, and (2) whether it obviously and flagrantly denied some particularly sacrosanct tenet already accepted as true. If the candidate for inclusion in truth could answer the first question affirmatively and the second question negatively, it became part of the body of things accepted as true. That great lacunae, and numerous mutual contradictions, must have grown up by the use of such methods, appears at once. They did, but because the Chinese did not try very thoroughly to systematize their information, they were unnoticed. The fact that we find Chinese philosophical information done up in neat bundles of five and seven and six factors, etc., does not modify the statement that the ancient Chinese were unsystematic. They were indefatigable cataloguers; they were not systematisers.

Coupled with this practical emphasis, as a leading principle of Chinese natural philosophy, is the fact that the Chinese physical world is a world of action as opposed both to a static world and to a world of substance. On the one hand, the Chinese world appears to be always in flux, to do little resting on any "eternal verities." On the other hand, we find, in the Chinese world, only one sort of substance, if indeed that be a substance at all. (This is a broad generalization, and such statements may usually be shown to have exceptions. There may well be individual variations from this position, although the writer knows of none.) Things are differentiated, not by the stuff of which they are composed, but by the way in which they act. Stuffs pass from a state of having one sort of properties to a state of having another; in the latter state they have a different name, but the only difference is one of activity. One wonders, indeed, whether (although an ancient Chinese would

never have thought of, let alone expressed this) the phenomenon is not, in ancient Chinese thought, identical with the noumenon. To say the same thing otherwise, the Chinese seem to have lacked a conception of substance, matter, as such,[43] since this can only exist as over against that which is not material. To the ancient Chinese thinker, the differences between things consist in degree of density (itself a kind of activity) and nature of activity.

So much for the approach of the Chinese thinker to his task. He is practical, unsystematic, looking in the main for ways to better human social life. He is not wedded to a dualistic view of reality [44] but is, on the whole, a naive realist. But a philosophy, as everyone knows, grows out of another ingredient in addition to methodology, *i.e.*, assumption, the back-ground of axiomatic "truth" which the thinker brings, consciously or unconsciously, to every problem. This background seems very evidently to come from precisely that ancient agricultural-village-life complex which was described in Chapter I.

It will be recalled that the chief characteristics of this life were found to be regularity and order, both in social life and in the natural processes of agriculture and the weather. The hypothesis was further ventured that these two sorts of regularity were ama'gamated into a cosmology in which the idea of harmony became the ideal. Granet[45] calls the Chinese "des gens dont la pensée profonde était que rien de ce qui est humain ne peut être sans retentissment dans la nature entirère." In theory, at least this formula works also in the reverse direction. Further, "Le sentiment que le monde naturel et la société humaine sont étroitement solidaires a été l'élément de fond de toutes les croyances chinoises."[46] The statement is an extreme one, but in the large, true. Surely no one can read the *Chinese Classics,* not to mention other literature, without being impressed with the emphasis which is laid on the dogma that there *is* a right and proper way to do everything, and that no act is of so little importance that the manner of its doing is a matter of indiffer-

[43] Is not modern physical science moving in much the same direction?

[44] Many, perhaps most, of the writers on Chinese philosophy have called the *yang-yin* idea a dualism. But if it is so, it is a very different sort of dualism from that of the West, since the *yang* and the *yin* are constantly passing over into each other, and both derive from what Wang Ch'ung calls "one primal fluid" 一元氣

[45] *Religion*, p. 31.

[46] Granet, *Religion*, p. 17.

ence. This would obviously be true in a universe so constituted that every portion of it were in the most intimate and immediate relations of cause and effect with every other portion of it.

To be sure, the actions of a king or a feudal lord or a sorcerer are of more importance than the same actions on the part of a husbandman, because the former are placed nearer the center of things. The principle is the same as that by which the deflection of the barrel of a rifle, for a fraction of an inch, is much more important near the breach than at the muzzle. The king is at the center (geographically as well as governmentally) of the world, and it is through him that the social world receives its most beneficial integration with the rest of the cosmos. Therefore, if anything goes wrong at the center of things, if the king is not virtuous, the world of men and of animals is disturbed, and various disorders occur in the natural world and in the heavens. This idea is central to Chinese thought, and is perhaps older than any of our literature. It appears in the *Great Plan*,[47] which is supposed to go back to high antiquity, and to have been written down at the beginning of the Chow dynasty (1024? B. C.).

> Fifth, of the royal perfection.—The sovereign having established his highest point of excellence, he concentrates in himself the five happinesses, and then diffuses them so as to give them to his people:— then on their part the multitudes of the people, resting on your perfection, will give you the preservation of it. That the multitudes of the people have no lawless confederacies, and that men *in office* have no selfish combinations, will be an effect of the sovereign's establishing his highest point of excellence.

As will be shown in Chapter III, one inevitable result of this idea was the very rigorous regulation exercised (always in theory and often in practise) over even the most seemingly unimportant acts, performed by persons of significance.

A taste of the intricate symbolism, by which the conceived linkage of the various elements of the universe was represented, is given by the following:

> Le Ciel exerce son action bienfaisant à l'aide des douze mois et des cinq Éléments; la musique excite la joie, l'allégrésse et produit la concorde au moyen des douze tubes sonores et des cinq notes fondamentales. Chaque tube ex-

[47] Legge, *Chinese Classics*, Vol. III, p. 328.

> prime la Nature d'un mois, chaque note a la Vertu d'un saison.[48]

The connection of the idea of harmony with music[49] was not overlooked by the Chinese, and we find many references to music as being peculiarly potent, sometimes for evil as well as for good.[50]

We have said that the ideal is harmony. But what is harmony? Here is one of the crucial questions for ancient Chinese philosophy, and one on which various schools differ, as we shall see. But, in general, harmony is the ordinary, the usual, the "golden mean," the temperate, even the common-place.

> Generous wine (a good thing in moderation) is a poison; one can not drink much of it. The secretion of bees becomes honey; one can not eat much of it. A hero conquers an entire State, but it is better to keep aloof from him. Pretty women delight the eyes, but it is dangerous to keep them. Sophists are interesting, but they can by no means be trusted. Nice tastes spoil the stomach, and pretty looks beguile the heart. Heroes cause disasters, and controversialists do great harm. These four classes are the poison of society. (I, 303.)

Is this not a beautiful example of the philosophy of the typical western rustic? These things look very nicely, but, better let them alone! Yet Wang Ch'ung, who wrote this, was one of the most sophisticated philosophers China has ever produced. When China became an empire, the Chinese village concept was distended to cover hundreds of thousands of square miles.

The concept of harmony is hypostasized as *h'u ch'i* 和氣, "the harmonious fluid," to which Wang refers often. Unusual phenomena which are considered especially good, as, for instance, the birth of sages (I, 316) are referred to the action of this harmonious fluid.[51]

It should be noted that this *h'u ch'i* is not a different *kind* of fluid, but simply a portion of the universally present fluid which has taken on, for the time being, an unusual mode of action. This ephemeral nature of the superusual quality is graphically shown by the fact that if, for instance, the seed from an unusual sort of

[48] Granet, *Religion,* p. 120.

[49] This does not mean that there was "harmony" in the technical musical sense in ancient Chinese music. But even music which consists of single notes must have a certain harmony between those which succeed each other.

[50] *Cf. Lun Hêng,* II, 180; Granet, *Religion* p. 119-121.

[51] *Cf.* also I, 471.

grain (the spontaneous growth of which is a good omen) be sown, the crop will be only ordinary grain, the harmonious fluid which produced the original grain having dissipated (I, 356-7). Wang denies even that there is a species of the fabled unicorn, holding that it is probably born in the deer species under unusual conditions. (I. 357). Specifically: "All ominous 瑞 things originate from a harmonious fluid. "Born in an ordinary species, they have their peculiar character, and therefore become omens." (I, 356.)

It is difficult, however, to distinguish this harmonious fluid[52] from the *chao* (or *yao*) 妖 fluid. The latter adjective has the force of "weird" or "supernatural."

> The *chao* fluid engenders beauty, but the beautiful are often vicious and depraved. The mother of Shu Hu was a beauty. Shu Hsiang's mother knew her, and would not allow her to go to the chamber of her husband. Shu Hsiang remonstrated. "In the depths of the mountains and in vast marshes dragons and snakes really grow," said his mother. "She is beautiful, but I am afraid, lest she give birth to a dragon or a snake, which would bring mishap upon you." (I, 302.)

That is, unusual beings, since they are formed of the same stuff (*i.e.*, the original universal stuff *plus* superusual action-patterns) may and often do change from one into another form of such beings with the greatest ease.

But what is the difference between these two classes of unusual stuff, the harmonious and the weird? Two distinctions may be inferred from Wang's treatment. With respect to origin, the harmonious fluid seems to be generated by an especially harmonious condition, social or cosmic, such as prevails in time of peace or at the equinoxes; the origin of the *chao* fluid is more special and accidental. With respect to result, the harmonious fluid is in general beneficent, while the weird fluid may produce either good or bad effects. These distinctions are not rigorous, however, as we shou'd not expect them to be. In general, the ideal is that of symmetry, a specialization of the harmonious principle which holds that like must be grouped with like. It is therefore the case that the same stuff may be beneficial to one man, who has the constitution to consort with it, and deadly to another.

[52] As here used the word *fluid* is not easy to distinguish in meaning from mere *substance.*

> When the Hsia emperor K'ung Chia was hunting on Mount Shou it began to rain, the sky turned dark, and he entered the house of a citizen, where the mistress was just nursing a baby. Some said the child to which an emperor came must needs rise to high honors, but others were of the opinion that a child unfit for such an honor would become ill-fated. (II, 314.)
>
> The child turned out unlucky.[53]

Again, if two individuals of different constitution, one fated, perhaps, for the nobility, the other for common life, are so unlucky as to marry, the match is very unfortunate, for one of them must die.

It becomes apparent that this matter of harmony and disharmony was not an academic philosophical question, but one of the greatest practical importance. In such a world, if one is to live satisfactorily, he must know, in the first place, what constitutes harmony. How may it be preserved, or, if lost, how may it be regained? These questions of technique and of the fundamental standard of harmony are at the base of the more important philosophical and religious systems developed in China. They must be dealt with in the chapters which remain. Before that, however, there is still something to be sketched of the fundamental background of the whole intellectual drift.

It is evident that in any case "harmony" denotes a relationship between two or more objects. A "harmonious" universe must be a universe in which parts are distinguishable, in order that those parts may stand against each other in that *relation* which alone can give meaning to the term "harmonious." Furthermore, any attempt to produce or to conserve a condition of harmony must have as its end the control of these parts. It is, then, one would suppose, perfectly evident that the investigation of the divisions of Existence (*i.e.*, the universe), of the characteristics of these parts, and of their mutual relationships and tendencies to act, is not only of philosophical and speculative interest, but is (on the premises) a *prerequisite* to practical action, and therefore to be considered as the most practical sort of activity.[54]

[53] This idea differs from the Polynesian idea of the hurt done a commoner by the chief's *mana*, because the conception of kingship is different, as will be shown in the next chapter.

[54] I do not mean to intimate that the physical theories which will be described were all reached as the result of such a process of reasoning as is here given. I do mean, however, to protest against the custom of some writers in the field, to consider Chinese physical theory as utterly impractical and puerile speculation. It has already been shown that Chinese thought was, on the whole, too practical to be so fruitful as it might otherwise well have been.

The Chinese thinkers did not, of course, elaborate the constitution of the universe *de novo,* but rather reworked the old conceptual furniture into useable forms. The first, and perhaps in all Chinese thought the most important divisions which were made, seem to have been the old categories of *yang* and *yin.* The early history of these ideas has been traced. They quickly expanded, in importance, far beyond their vague beginnings.

As well as an historical beginning (which, of course, the Chinese philosopher did not recognize), it was thought in the philosophical era that the *yang* and the *yin* must have had a material origin, and this was almost universally referred to some single original stuff out of which the two were differentiated.

Wang says specifically that "One Heaven (which is *yang*) and one Earth (which is *yin*) conjointly produce all things. When they are created they all receive the same fluid." (I, 471.) But why is there evil in some, why are there such creatures as vipers, etc.?

> Fire is a phenomenon of the sun. All created beings of the world are filled with the solar fluid (or, the fluid of too much *yang*),[55] and after their creation contain some poison. [*i.e.,* poison is excessive *yang, cf.* I, 298]. Reptiles and insects possessing this poison in abundance become vipers and adders, bees and scorpions, plants become croton seeds and wild dolichos, fishes become porpoises and *to-shu* fish. Consequently men eating a porpoise liver die, and the bite of a *to-shu* is venomous. . . . .
>
> Among mankind bad characters take the place of these creatures. Their mouths do mischief.[56] The bad men of the world are imbued with poison fluid. The poison of the wicked living in the land of *yang*[57] is still more virulent, hence the curses and the swearing of the people of southern Yüeh have such wonderful results.

Here we see that the *yang* and the *yin* have become, not mere principles of classification, but also principles of origination of all things, and principles, also, of their difference.

[55] *T'ai yang* 太陽 may mean either "the Great Yang" (*i.e.,* the sun) or it may mean "too much (*i.e.,* excessive) *yang.*" Forke translates it always in the former sense, which, while technically correct, does not always present the best sense of the passage to the reader. As a matter of fact, the ideas are *identical* in Wang's thinking, for he says specifically "The sun *is* fire" (I, 301) and fire is the very essence of *yang.*

[56] The mouth and tongue, as well as speech, are *yang.* (I, 246, 301).

[57] The south (I, 298).

It is pertinent to ask, at this point, when these all-pervasive concepts first appear in Chinese literature. Wieger places the earliest possible occurrence of the terms in recorded literature at the time of Confucius.[58] The *Yi King* has been supposed to contain them in other language and in veiled references. Forke says, rightly, that to find them there requires very liberal interpretation. On the other hand, it seems likely that the ideas did exist in some form at a time much earlier than that of Confucius. Let us consult a thoroughly unbiased source for the meaning of the terms. The following definitions are from Mr. O. Z. Tsang's *Complete Chinese-English Dictionary.*

> *Yang.* (*n.*) The male or positive principle in nature. The sun. The south of a hill. The north of a river. Penis. (*adj.*) Male; masculine. Sunny; light; brilliant.
> *Yin.* (*n.*) A shadow; shade. The south side of a river. The female or negative principle in nature. The privates; privities; the genitals. (*adj.*) Shady; dark; cloudy; gloomy. Cold. Mysterious; secret. Female; feminine.

Why do we find in these definitions this irrelevant "south of a hill," "south of a river," etc.? These do not appear to be the deliberate constructions of philosophic terminologists. Granet holds that these refer to the relative positions taken by the young men and the girls in the spring festivals previously referred to, which, he thinks, did much to give content to the *yin* and *yang* idea.[59] The hypothesis seems probable.

There is a difficulty, however, in the apparent non-occurrence of the words, if not of the ideas, in the early literature. The characters occur frequently in the *Shu* and the *Shi,* but are used in senses other than the philosophical. In the *Shu* there seems to be only one certain reference to the *yin* and the *yang* as philosophical concepts.[60]

The particular document in which the passage occurs is said to date from about 1000 B.C. It is possible, also, that the very beginning of *The Great Plan* employs the *yin-yang* idea, in this case substituting *T'ien* for *yang.* No published translation which I have examined gives this meaning to the passage, however.

As a final statement, it may be said that the origin of the *yang* and *yin* ideas is not possible at present to determine positively. They

[58] *Histoire des Croyances,* p. 136.
[59] *Religion,* p. 21.
[60] *Shu,* p. 527.

do not appear, however, to be mere constructions of sophisticated philosophers, and there is reason to believe that they go back to early roots in Chinese folk religion.

It is obviously a simple and inevitable step to identify that regularity and harmony, cosmic and social, of which we have spoken, with the harmony of the *yin* and the *yang*.

> The people being at ease, the *yin* and the *yang* are in harmony, and when they harmonize, all things grow and develop; such being the case, strange omens come forth. (II, 192.)
>
> When the *yin* and the *yang* are at variance, calamitous changes supervene. (II, 16.)

The connection between *yin* and winter, *yang* and summer, was mentioned in Chapter I. This later received a philosophical interpretation. "The *yang* having reached its climax turns into *yin*, and the *yin* having gone to extremes becomes *yang*." (II, 344.) Again there should be noted the tendency of all things to preserve harmony, or at least to tend to and return to it. Animals are classified, in general, as *yang* and *yin*, showing themselves in summer or in winter (II, 357). The bear is, of course, a *yang* animal.[61]

Here we have the beginning of that elaborate classification of objects and phenomena as belonging to the *yin* or to the *yang* which pervades so much of ancient Chinese literature. The brightness and obscurity of the two fluids explains the difference in the length of days in summer and in winter (I, 258). An eclipse is the temporary vanquishment of the *yang* by the *yin* (I, 269), or of the sun by the moon (which is *yin*) (I, 270). The sun is proved to be fire by the fact that a burning-glass held toward the sun will cause flame (II, 350-51, 412); similarly, mirrors left out at night accumulate dew, which is water drawn from the moon (water is the *yin* "element," and the moon is *yin*) (II, 351). Ghosts are made of concentrated *yang*, and therefore are, of course, the *yang* color, red.[62] They are able to hurt people because *yang* is poison (I, 299).[63]

[61] Granet, *Danses*, p. 567.

[62] Wang does not believe that ghosts are dead men, but those who do, in China, sometimes hold that since man is made up of *yang* and of *yin*, and decomposes when he dies, the lighter stuff, *i.e.*, the *yang*, is naturally what will go about hurting people. Ghosts made of *yin* are not unknown, however.

[63] The idea of *yang* as poison would appear not only to be connected with the fact that it is essential activity, and is unharmonious without the mixture of *yin*, but also with the prevalence of disease and fever in summer and in hot regions.

> In Kiang-pei the land is dry; consequently bees and scorpions abound there.[64] . . . Those creatures growing in high and dry places are like the *yang* (the male principle). The *yang* (penis) hangs down, therefore bees and scorpions sting with their tails (I, 302).

The *yin* occupies a less prominent place in this process of classification, as is fitting. "The creatures living in low and wet places resemble the female principle. The female organ is soft and extensible, therefore snakes bite with their mouths" (I, 302). The dragon, an animal associated with clouds and rain, belongs to the *yin*.

A proverb says "Many mouths melt metal."[65]

> The mouth is fire. Fire is the second of the five elements, and speech the second of the five actions. There is an exact correspondence between speech and fire, therefore in speaking of the melting of metal one says that the mouth and tongue melt it.

This brings us to the classification by fives, which is an important and complicated subject. The use of the number five may be traced, perhaps, to counting on the fingers. In any case, any reader of the *Chinese Classics* alone can not fail to note the predominance of the classification into fives.

In the *Great Plan,* of the *Shu King,* the antiquity of which has already been discussed, there are several sets of fives, conspicuously more than of any other number. The five we may accept as old. But which five is oldest, and started the system? Provisionally, in the present lack of evidence, there is good reason to believe that the five directions, north, south, east, west, and center, may well have come first. There is nothing inherently sophisticated in the idea, the Zuni Indians of North America having had as many as seven directions. It is an idea which might easily occur from the east-west passage of the sun, to which a perpendicular is easily erected. The idea of the center, tied to the idea of the village and of the mound (*shê*), seems a natural addition.[66]

Chinese geography represented the world as very much like an apple pie, cut into quarters, with a slice for each cardinal direction. This means that the lines of division ran northeast-southwest and

[64] Denoting *yang,* since water is *yin.*

[65] This may have arisen from the process of blowing the flame of the blast furnace.

[66] Does the fact that there was not an *up* direction, but that there was a *center* associated with the *shê* argue that the *shê* is older than *T'ien?*

northwest-southeast. Heaven was a similar pie, according to one idea, situated a great distance above the earth. The center of heaven was the pole star, while the center of the earth was the imperial *shê*. Whether there were other worlds was debated. (I, 89).[67]

> Le trait fondamental de la pensée chinoise est une classification des êtres par Régions, sous la domination d'un Vent ou d'un Orient.[68]

That the five directions was the first system of the hierarchy of fives to be developed, seems altogether probable, if not provable. But what came next? Probably the five colors and the five *hsing*, but which of these preceded would be difficult to say.

The five colors are not difficult to account for. For north and south we have simply the colors of the *yin* and the *yang*, black and red. Red is the color of the sun and of flame. Black is the color of night, and of darkness and shade in general.

The color of east is green. The sun rises in the east, which governs Spring (I, 520) and the new life. The color most prominent in Spring is, of course, green. The color of the center, always associated with earth, is yellow, which is perfectly understandable if we remember the color of the loess which makes up the soil of much of China.

Only the color of the west, white, is difficult to account for. It may well have come, however, as an attempt to complete the list of colors. It is the only color conspicuously missing from the list previously given.[69]

Concerning the antiquity of the five colors, it is worthy of note that they are mentioned in *The Tribute of Yu*, which Legge suggests may have been written during the Hsia time, and feels rather certain was in existence before 1077 B.C.[70]

Given the five directions and the five colors, the evolution of the so-called Five Elements, the *wu hsing* already referred to, would seem to present no great difficulty. *A priori*, there does not seem to be any great necessity of postulating a foreign origin, as some scholars have done.

[67] It must not be supposed that sophisticated Chinese thought, even in *Wang's* time, held such a simple idea of the heavens. Complicated theories which accounted very ingeniously for the movements of the heavenly bodies had been developed. (Cf. I, 260-61).

[68] Granet, *Danses*, p. 390.

[69] Green is a very usual substitute for blue in the making of color series.

[70] *Shu King* in *S. B. E.*, p. 19 (*cf.* p. 67).

The five *hsing* are, in the order of their "production," wood, fire, earth, metal, water.[71] This is the order in which, starting in the east with wood, they would occur, clockwise, as one passed around a map, omitting earth which is the center. It is also the order in which occur, beginning again with wood (corresponding to Spring), the seasons with which these elements are associated, again omitting the earth. They are said to "produce" each other in this order. Wood produces (is capable of supporting) fire; fire produces earth (ashes); earth produces metal; metal produces water (dew deposited on a metal mirror); water produces (makes possible the growth of) wood. Thus the circle is completed.[72]

Another order in which the *hsing* figure prominently in Chinese thought is that in which they "overcome" each other. This order is water, fire, metal, wood, earth, and may be seen to be based on the north-south, west-east opposition. Water extinguishes fire, fire melts metal, metal cuts wood, wood penetrates earth (by the roots of trees, or, perhaps by the wooden plow), earth soaks up or dams the course of water.[73]

As opposed to such attempts at explaining these sequences on a naïve and quasi-naturalistic basis, Granet[74] holds that they are:

> Simplement une transposition dans l'ordre intellectuel de divers modes de la technique divinatoire. . . .

This is possible, and in the existence of good evidence might even be probable, but he admits that

> Nous ne savons pas de quelle façon les techniques divinatoires, astrologiques, et astronomiques ont commandé le developpement de ces théories.

An hypothesis so feebly supported remains an hypothesis. Naturalistic origin appears most probable.

When and where did the five elements originate? Chavannes has held that they were introduced to the Chinese, from a "barbarian" people, about 300 B.C.[75] If true, this would necessitate great revision in the writing of Chinese history. It has, however, been refuted thoroughly both by De Saussure and by Forke.[76] As De

[71] It will be remembered that these are "forces," not inert "elements," and they must not be confused with those "materialistic" concepts which are opposed, in the West, to "spiritual things."

[72] *Cf.* Forke, *Lun Hêng*, Vol. II, p. 469-70.

[73] *Cf. ibid.* Vol. II, p. 470-71.

[74] *Religion*, p. 117-118.

[75] *T'oung Pao*, 1906, p. 96-97.

[76] *T'oung Pao*, 1910, p. 265 f. *Lun Hêng*, Vol. II, p. 240.

Saussure has said, all of the ancient literature of China "est partout (let us be cautious and qualify with "almost") imprégnée de la théorie des cinq éléments."

The five *hsing* are given in the *Great Plan.*

> First, of the five elements.—The first is named water; the second, fire; the third, wood; the fourth, metal; the fifth, earth. *The nature of* water is to soak and descend; of wood, to be crooked and straight; of metal, to obey and to change; while the virtue of earth is seen in seed-sowing and ingathering. That which soaks and descends becomes salt; that which blazes and ascends becomes bitter; that which is crooked and straight becomes sour; that which obeys and changes becomes acrid; and from seed-sowing and ingathering comes sweetness.[77]

Here we have an example of that building of fives, to correspond with the five *hsing,* directions, seasons, etc., which ancient Chinese writers were wont to indulge in. Even in the above quotation, it will be seen that the principle of, at least, easily available analogy, was abandoned. Beyond doubt, there was a reason for each of these lists, and its order, but many of these reasons must have been historical rather than analogical. That we shall ever be able to explain the origin of all of them seems both doubtful and of little import. A table of these fives is given on the next page. It must be remembered that this table is suggestive rather than exhaustive. There are, for instance, within the brief space of the *Great Plan,* tables of fives which it does not include. Further, there is more than one set of animals which is placed in relation to the five *hsing* (cf. I, 105).

It is true, as was said in the beginning of this chapter, that these various lists of phenomena were not systematised, in the sense of a rigid revision to remove discrepancies.

There was, however, a distinct but perhaps almost an unconscious process of reducing ancient, and perhaps intruded, elements of thought to the terms of the *yang-yin,* five *hsing* interpretation of the universe. We have seen, for instance, that the *shê,* the village mound, apparently gave three elements to this complex which were not a part of the old cult of the *shê* at all, that is, the idea of *yin* as localized particularly in earth, the idea of the center direction, and the idea of earth as one of the *hsing* and associated with the *yin* and the center. Again, Wang mentions the Four Sacred Mountains

[77] *Shu,* (in *Chinese Classics*) p. 326-27.

Table of the Five "Elements" 五行 and Their Correlates.*

Five "Elements"	wood	fire	earth	metal	water
Five Directions	east	south	center	west	north
Five Colors	green	red	yellow	white	black
Four Seasons	spring	summer		autumn	winter
Five Flavors	sour	bitter	sweet	acrid	salt
Five Odors	goatish	burning	fragrant	rank	rotten
Five Grains	wheat	beans	panicled millet	hemp	millet
Five Sacrifices	inner door	hearth	inner court (atrium)	outer door	well
Five Animals	sheep	fowl	ox	dog	pig
Five Classes of Creatures	scaly	feathered	naked	hairy	shell-covered
Five Organs	spleen	lungs	heart	liver	kidneys
Five Numbers	8	7	5	9	6
Five Musical Notes	*chio*	*chih*	*kung*	*shang*	*yü*

(* This table, based chiefly on the *Li Ki*, is suggestive rather than exhaustive. Many variations from the above lists occur, and many sets of "fives" not mentioned here are to be found in Chinese literature.)

(II, 244). There can be no doubt that the mountain was one of the important objects of early Chinese religion, and it may well have served as the gathering place for feudal lords which it is represented. We find, however, that the sacred mountains become five, each one corresponding to one of the directions.[78] In another place Wang himself speaks of the Five Mountains (I, 251).

It is not to be supposed that the categories which have been mentioned are the only ones which figure in Chinese thought. Various less important categories, such as that of the "Six Honored Ones" (I, 517),[79] are met with, but these seem not to have won any great use, perhaps because they did not fit well with the categories which had already developed into a flourishing complex.

It is altogether possible that the number eight, and the four, are older in Chinese thought than is the five. Certainly eight is an important number throughout the ancient period, but in the literature it is by no means so prominent as the five.

> Les Vents sont huit comme les sons. Les danseurs s'affrontent par bandes de huit (on vient de voir qu'il (sic) se groupaient aussi par trois). Les inventeurs des chants et de la danse sont les Huit fils d'un Souverain . . . qui était le mari de Hi-Ho (le Soleil) et de Tch'ang-hi (la Lune). Le soleil parcourt dans sa journée *seize* stations (parmi les noms qui correspond à la première se retrouve les noms d'un luth et celui d'une danse). Pour presider a la nuit, il y a Deux bandes de Huit divinités.[80]

That the four directions and their media gave origin to the number eight seems *a priori* probable. There is some evidence for this.

> Les huit sons . . . sont, d'après le *Po hou t'ong* chap. 1, *Houai-nan tseu* et le *Po ya*: le Tambour (peau)= N.; la flute de Pan (calebasse à 19 tuyauax)= N-E.; la flûte (bambou)= E.; la caisse de *bois*= S-E.; l'instrument à cordes de soies= S.; le sifflet d'*argile*= S. W.; la cloche (métal)= W.; la pierre sonore= N-W.[81]

Such was the general character of the various ways in which the parts of the world of existence were described in ancient China.

To summarize, we have found the most general conception of

[78] Henry Doré, *Researches into Chinese Superstitions* (tr. by M. Kennelly), Vol. VIII, p. xxiv.

[79] According to Forke, these have been said to be "water, fire, wind, thunder, hills, lakes" or, "sun, moon, stars, rivers, seas, and mountains."

[80] Granet, *Danses*, p. 264.

[81] Ibid., p. 264, n. 1.

early Chinese philosophy to be that of harmony and order, in which social and cosmic regularity are combined in a single complex. But this simple whole had to be analyzed, both under the pressure of curiosity, and of necessity to control the environment of man. This analysis, probably never made consciously, followed old lines of thinking, and gave rise to the idea that all things originated from the interaction of the *yang* and the *yin*. These, combined with the simple ideas of direction, and working perhaps under the influence of the decimal numbering system, developed into the complex series of fives. Other methods of analyzing reality arose in profusion, but were never able to reach the surpremacy of those already mentioned.

Man occupies an interesting place in this universe. He is, as we have seen, a natural and an inseparable part of it, his acts affecting all the universe, and all the universe affecting him, in a manner much more intimate than the Western world is accustomed to suppose. Yet he is also felt to be unique. Wang says "Man alone is not metamorphosed, being the recipient of the real Heavenly fluid" (I, 327). As is not unusual, Wang contradicts himself on this later; however, he is giving expression to a very deep-seated conviction of the value of man, which is typically Chinese. The *Li Ki* says:

> Man is the heart and mind of Heaven and Earth, and the visible embodiment of the five elements. He lives in the enjoyment of all flavors, the discriminating of all notes (of harmony)) and the enrobing of all colors.[82]

Here is suggested the idea, voiced many times, that man is a microcosm, reflecting the universe. He is certainly in close relation to it.

A great man agrees with Heaven and Earth in virtue (II, 27).

> Heaven, in giving birth to the multitudes of the people, to every faculty and relationship annexed its law. The people possess this normal nature. And they (consequently) love its normal virtue.[83]

But man, an integral part of a supposedly harmonious universe, found that all things were not as they should be, and that famine, war, and injustice made life something far different from that ideal peaceful existence which is so beautifully described in the *Classics*. How was this possible? More important, how could humanity find the way back to order, peace, happiness?

To the various answers which were given to these questions, the remainder of this study will be largely devoted.

[82] *Li Ki* (in *Chinese Classics*) p. 382.
[83] *Shi King* (in *Chinese Classics*) p. 541.

THE IDEA OF PURPOSE

BY CURTIS W. REESE

I

PHILOSOPHY properly understood is perhaps the most important of all studies. It is not, however, to be thought of as a system of a priori hypotheses, but rather the art of thinking in an orderly way and on the basis of factual experience about one's total situation. In recent times the idea has taken hold of many minds that philosophy must give way to the sciences. I regard the growth of the sciences as one of the most encouraging of modern developments; but the basic terms and concepts of the sciences need constant critical scrutiny and the results of scientific inquiry inevitably lead thoughtful persons to wonder what it is all about. The examination of terms and concepts is the critical function of philosophy and the attempt to form opinions about the totality of experience is its speculative function. Without this critical and speculative service of philosophy, the sciences would suffer and life adjustments in a world sometimes all too chaotic become even more difficult than they are at present.

The focussing of attention upon the sciences, and especially of late upon technology has naturally taken attention away from the more far-reaching problems of man's place in the cosmic arrangement. Nevertheless, the "how" of things, which is the particular interest of science, cannot thrive unless someone attends to the "why" of things, which is the particular interest of philosophy. Nor can the "why" be fruitful unless someone attends to the problem of "how" things come about.

So, after all the marvelous progress of modern science, we still find ourselves puzzled more and more over the old philosophical problem of the nature of being, and still wondering whether

in point of fact there is an increasing purpose running through the ages and if so, what it is.

It is no surprise to find this state of uncertainty about things cosmic when one considers the causes that lead to it. First of all there is the appalling state of the human race. Poverty and ignorance and disease and war and the like menace the human family. Ages pass and conditions are changed but little, and then not always for the better. Second, there is the old naturalism which spreads terror. One could fairly hear the screak of the cosmic wheels as they rolled relentlessly through the years, and feel the cold blast of surely enveloping winter as it chilled the soul. And, third, we were taught that the universe itself was running down at a terrific speed. The classic expression illustrative of man's desperate situation is found in Bertrand Russell's *The Free Man's Worship.* Here is another characteristic statement from his pen, as quoted by Hoernle in *Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics*: "The universe as astronomy reveals it is very vast. How much there may be beyond what our telescopes show, we cannot tell; but what we can know is of unimaginable immensity. In the visible world the Milky Way is a tiny fragment; within this fragment, the solar system is an infinitesimal speck, and of this speck our planet is a microscopic dot. On this dot, tiny lumps of impure carbon and water, of complicated structure, with somewhat unusual physical and chemical properties, crawl about for a few years, until they are compounded. They divide their time between labour designed to postpone the moment of dissolution for themselves and frantic struggles to hasten it for others of their kind. Natural convu'sions periodically destroy some thousands or millions of them, and disease prematurely sweeps away many more. These events are considered to be misfortunes; but when men succeed in inflicting similar destruction by their own efforts, they rejoice, and give thanks to God. In the life of the solar system, the period during which the existence of man will have been physically possible is a minute portion of the whole; but there is some reason to hope that even before this period is ended man will have set a term to his own existence by his efforts at mutual annihilation. Such is man's life viewed from the outside."

Another classic utterance in similar vein, but with a different purpose in view, is from Balfour's *Foundations of Belief.* He

says, "Man—past, present and future—lays claim to our devotion. What, then, can we say of him? Man, so far as natural science by itself is able to teach us, is no longer the final cause of the universe, the Heaven-descended heir of all the ages. His very existence is an accident, his story a brief and transitory episode in the life of one of the meanest of the planets. Of the combination of causes which first converted a dead organic compound into the living progenitors of humanity, science, indeed, as yet knows nothing. It is enough that from such beginnings famine, disease, and mutual slaughter, fit nurses of the future lords of creation, have gradually evolved, after infinite travail, a race with conscience enough to feel that it is vile, and intelligence enough to know that it is insignificant. We survey the past, and see that its history is of blood and tears, of helpless blundering, of wild revolt, of stupid acquiescence, of empty aspirations. We sound the future, and learn that after a period, long compared with the individual life, but short indeed compared with the divisions of time open to our investigation, the energies of our system will decay, the glory of the sun will be dimmed, and the earth, tideless and inert, will no longer tolerate the race which has for a moment disturbed its solitude. Man will go down into the pit, and all his thoughts will perish. The uneasy consciousness, which in this obscure corner has for a brief space broken the contented silence of the universe, will be at rest. Matter will know itself no longer. Imperishable monuments and immortal deeds, death itself, and love stronger than death, will be as though they had never been. Nor will anything that *is* be better or be worse for all that the labour, genius, devotion, and suffering of man have striven through countless generations to effect."

It is not yet possible to feel altogether comfortable about the environing situation, but our fears are a bit assuaged by the increasing testimony of competent thinkers to the effect that while our knowledge of the universe does not allow us to affirm dogmatically that we are the favorites of the cosmos; neither does it allow us to pronounce dogmatically the final doom of all things good and fair. Professor Perry of Harvard, in his *Present Philosophical Tendencies,* says, "To pretend to speak for the universe in terms of the narrow and abstract predictions of astronomy, is to betray a bias of mind that is little less provincial and unimaginative than the most naive anthropomorphism. What that residual cosmos which

looms beyond the border of knowledge shall in time bring forth, no man that has yet been born can say. That it may overbalance and remake the little world of things known, and falsify every present prophecy, no man can doubt. It is as consistent with rigorous thought to greet it as a promise of salvation, as to dread it as a portent of doom. And if it be granted that in either case it is a question of over-belief, of the hazard of faith, no devout soul can hesitate."

Professor Lewis of the University of California, in a recent work on *The Anatomy of Science,* testifies that he finds no evidence that the universe is running down; and Professor Millikan believes that he has found positive evidence that the creative process still functions on a cosmic scale. While such testimony is encouraging, especially since the feeling of dependence that most of us have to an alarming degree predisposes us in favor of facts or even theories that increase our confidence in cosmic support, it is nevertheless a long leap from such fragmentary bits of hope to the affirmation of a purposeful universe which concerns itself with human affairs. And I myself am not yet prepared to make it, save as the idea may apply to orderly movement and to the partial achievements of parts.

The idea of purpose carries us beyond peace meal issues to considerations of the whole, so it is fundamentally a religious problem; and for this reason, among others, the warfare of conflicting ideas of purpose has been intense, sometimes bitter. There is a feeling, which I believe to be well grounded, that what one thinks about the problem of purpose really makes a difference in human conduct. The idea of purpose, therefore, should be studied not merely in the light of personal experience, which is ofttimes crude and chaotic, but in the light of highly organized systems of thought as worked out by mature minds. The effect in personal development and social action of theories held on such a subject, in my judgment justifies careful scrutiny of the problem as thought out by various schools.

Moreover, purpose must be interpreted broadly. It is not tied up essentially with any single manner of origin, or mode of realization. Orderly movement is the essential criterion. A machine-like universe moving toward a fixed goal would surely indicate purpose, even though we should never find out what the purpose is. An absolute that eternally reorganized its inner parts would be pur-

posive. And by the same token, a universe with no total goal wou'd be purposive as regards its parts that come to fruition. Shou'd the cosmos end in utter oblivion, it would still be true that the mind of a Plato or of a Francis Bacon resulted from purposive process of whatever origin and however operative. And especially would the result of human wills, or of human wills linked in a common cause fall within the scope of purposive processes. From such broad view as this, and not from a narrow personalistic view, must we approach the subject.

The quest for purpose in the universe has resulted in many theories, some of which we shall now briefly sketch.

1. In the early days of human life it was thought that spiritual beings, both good and bad, inhabited things and influenced or controlled their doings. This animistic, or as it is called in its earlier form animatistic, view held sway for along into comparatively modern times, and in a modified way still commands the allegiance of many people. Indeed vitalism is animism's sophisticated city cousin. Animism concerns itself not so much with ultimate and far-flung purposes as with immediate ends. There are floating sou's, or souls in general, that enter into relations with things and persons, sometimes briefly, sometimes taking possession for extended periods. All sorts of curious, unusual, or dramatic happenings are accounted for in animism by the purposive operation of spirits that infest the earth. The effort to get rid of evil spirits or to induce good ones to become operative has resulted in the creation of all sorts of ceremonies, many of which continue long after the spirits that they were designed to placate have faded into myths. Other sou's inhere in rivers and seas and mountains, the winds and the heavens above. Sometimes these spirits rise to the position of presiding Gods, thus passing from an animative status to that of a directive spirit. Fauns and the like constitute the souls of plants and trees. The souls of animals are manlike in ideas and mental processes. Man himself in his basic nature is soul, his bodily form being a more or less unnecessary impediment. The whole world is full of purposes and the means for their realization, but the idea of one inclusive or increasing purpose has not yet dawned to trouble the mind of primitive man.

2. Animism, which by reading a part into the whole, levels nature up to man, may be contrasted with materialism, or as it was

known in its lower stages, atomism, which levels man downward and constantly looks with suspicion upon all that is not explainable by the locomotion of materials. This is an ancient notion of the way things operate dating back no doubt far beyond Democritus in whose hands the theory took more or less reputable form. But the atomic theory faired poorly due no doubt to the long alliance of Aristotelian Philosophy with Theology, till in the 17th century it merged into a more general materialism. Regarding the elements not as properties but as bodies, was an effort to find constant qualitative elements, and was a fruitful scientific method. But it was not quite so fruitful in philosophical results. And, unfortunately for materialism, the atom was found to be made up of lesser units of uncertain nature, which behaved in ways not altogether characteristic of material units. So the effort to eliminate purpose from nature, or to reduce it to clocklike motions has resulted in more uncertainty as to what things are composed of and how they operate than ever before in human history. If it be conceded that all is matter, then comes the query, what is matter? And any effort to answer this question requires the use of terms that are suggestive of anything else but a block universe. So the materialistic hypothesis proved to be no more philosophically fit than was animism. Both views are mirrors in which the face of reality is distorted.

3. Perhaps the most ambitious attempts to find a satisfactory explanation of things, and to give man a feeling of cosmic support, fall under the general head of theocracy. True the idea of God or gods did not arise from this or any single motive, the origin of God idea is most complex and is still shadowed in mystery. But perhaps from earliest times, the shorthand explanation of mysterious, or even commonplace occurrences was to credit them to the operation of God or gods. Man sorrowfully faced sure defeat when the gods were against him. He joyfully faced sure victory if they were allied with him. Always, however, there were sophisticated intellects who had their doubts about the adequacy of theocracy. But only the most courageous gave vent to their doubts. What happened was that the gods were gradually reduced in number and their functions quietly reduced in scope. Aristotle's prime mover is a case in point. Another is the whole movement which in its later and more developed form is known as deism. For some purpose as

yet unknown, God started the world going, established laws for its movements and then retired, leaving the vast machine to itself. I think the chief motive in deism is not so much to find what the end is, as to find what the beginning was. Getting things started was the big job, so God was regarded as the great first cause, or the Divine Technician. At best this idea of God was satisfactory only to those persons whose chief interest was speculative. It never warmed the heart to the point of discipleship. It left the world in cold isolation from the hearthstone of the old homestead, in sharp contrast with the brooding will of theism. Little wonder that theologians, with more or less consistency, balanced transcendence with imminance. In this effort to harmonize transcendence and imminance is found the doctrine of theism properly so called.

4. Theism is the hypothesis that the ultimate ground of the universe is intelligent will fulfilling a moral purpose in the course of which he either consciously and specifically influences human fortunes or so orders the cosmic situation as to make possible the realization of moral ends by human beings. This is a very satisfactory view for one who can bring himself to the point of holding it with deep conviction, but it seems to many persons to be inadequate. Romantically viewed, theism has the edge on all other forms of theocracy. But realistically viewed by one who wants to know the truth even though the truth fail to set him free, the theistic hypothesis presents insuperable difficulties. To apply such terms as "moral," "intelligent will," and the like to the ultimate ground of the universe, or to the universe itself, is to take terms that belong to the human realm out of their human setting and apply them to a totality which is non-human though including the human. Moreover, it is noteworthy that only the good qualities of men are read into the ultimate. By the same process that one uses in arriving at a personal God, one might arrive at the idea of a personal devil. Nor are the doings of the cosmos such as to indicate that the term moral has cosmic significance in the sense that it has human significance. The universe seems to be either above or below good and evil. Cosmic forces seem to be irreconcilable with theism. Theoretically, also, the theistic view is unsatisfactory, for the mere purpose of working out a pre-destined end a mechanistic arrangement would seem to be preferable. Such an arrangement would make unnecessary the conscious and specific influence of human

affairs, or even attention to cosmic happenings. It might be said in rebuttal that if the end in view were the production of free human personality, a mechanistic arrangement would not suffice. But in view of the moral waste on every hand, and the present conception of the vastness of the universe with its millions of suns, such concern for human welfare seems highly improbable. Furthermore, the evidence, as evidence is ordinarily understood, for the theistic type of influence of human fortunes is lacking. By the common consent of the competent, the experience of God in the very act of influencing human fortunes is the only valid evidence. Such mystical experiences are exceedingly rare, and such as exist are capable of explanation on grounds other than the theistic, and in any event they could have no primary validity for persons having no such experience. Evidence, to be scientifically valid, must be capable of verification.

For these reasons, the theistic hypothesis seems to me to be an unsatisfactory way of finding purpose in the universe. That theistic theologians are aware of the inadequacy of theism as historically held is evidenced by the fact that many of them are developing variations of the theory that leave the old view very much the worse for wear. Thus Beckwith's theory of a Finite God; Wieman's theory of God as a Phase of the Behavior of the Universe, and G. B. Smith's theory of God as that Quality in Environment that Sustains Human Values.

5. Closely related to theology, but essentially philosophical, is the theory of the absolute. The absolute whether basically psychic or otherwise, puts the end in the beginning. All things work together for good. The outcome is sure. There is no ultimate hazard. The eternal rearrangement of parts constitutes the activity of the whole. Novelty is out of the question. The universe is sewed up from everlasting to everlasting. In its more extravagant moods, this theory is not satisfied with fixing the part irrevocably within the whole; it also puts the whole within every part. The idea of the absolute, however, is facing more and more opposition till one may perhaps safely predict the abolition of the absolute. The good, the true and the beautiful are being transformed into the idea of good things, true occurrences, and beautiful situations. The theory of the relativity of things seems to be making great headway in all fields of thought. Not even the speed of light

may be said to be absolute. At best, the accepted rate of the speed of light is only approximate. Light is not constant when passing through water or through a gravitational center. The "am—was—evermore—shall—be" arrangement, whether applied to parts only, or to the whole increasingly seems an unlikely situation. But, no doubt, in due course, someone will claim that the principle of relativity is itself absolute and then the old warfare will be fought over again. But for spiritual purposes, the absolute is losing its significance.

6. In contrast with theocracy is the old naturalism. Where theocracy is dualistic, even with the doctrine of immanence taken into consideration, naturalism is monistic. It keeps all within one being. Supernatural becomes a term of reproach. But unfortunately the old naturalism is defective in that it oversimplifies the nature of things. It reduces the higher to nothing but the lower. The evolutionary idea had not gained great headway even in naturalistic circles when the old naturalism was at its height. So no place is provided for genuine novelty. Mind, itself, is not taken seriously even as a variant of matter. The old naturalism is imprisoned within the facts and ideas and categories of the exact sciences. The biology and the psychology of the 19th century were far from being the valid sciences that they are today. So the tendency of the old naturalism is to bring mind down to brain as kinetically conceived, instead of bring brain up to mind as empirically known as is the present tendency with evolutionary naturalists. But in contrast with the old theocracy, the old naturalism is to be commended for attempting to explain the order of the universe on the basis of efficient causes without calling into service the doctrine of final ends as consciously held in the purposes of God.

7. But after all the battle is between vitalism and mechanism both of which are more significant as representing large points of view than they are as representing careful analysis. Vitalism has an effective protest against the cocksureness of mechanism, or at least of some mechanists. It is a thorn in the flesh of scientists who are tempted to wander along the road of vague generalization. It is a fighting philosophy. It searches diligently for holes in the armour of its opponents and upon finding them fires with sure aim. Had vitalism stopped with this negative aspect it would still be worth special note. Its purpose, however, is not merely that of one

who loves argument. It really believes in dualism. It challenges the self sufficiency of the so-called physical realm. It posits a non-physical agency, an elan vital, to explain the processes which it believes cannot be explained mechanistically. Prof. Roy Wood Sellers, the leader of the American Critical Realists, says that "it is a mistaken philosophy that makes the vitalists dualists." "As the physical world was ordinarily conceived by scientists they had a right to be dualists. They were simply more courageous and more specu'atively inclined than the ordinary experimentalist. But I do not think that they were very original, or they would have attacked the adequacy of traditional mechanism and the exclusion of mind and consciousness from the organic level of the physical world. They have, it seems to me, not been courageous enough. Why did they accept the traditional limitations assigned to the physical? The suspicion will not down that they were idealists at heart. Driesch and Bergson assuredly are and, from his interest in psychical research, I infer that McDougall is likewise. It is this too ready acceptance of the stereotyped view of the physical which betrays them."

8. The mechanists, on the other hand, encourage detail experimentation. They hunt down correlations. They search for differences that really make a difference. They try to find out how in point of face organisms really work. And it is hardly fair to identify present day mechanism with mechanism of the old materialism. The ever ready machine theory is not to be identified with mechanism. Chemical and biological processes do not act as do the parts of a machine. In other words, mechanism is expanding to fit the observed unitary facts of nature. Organism is mechanistic, but not in the kinetic sense; and it is vitalistic, but not in the dualistic sense. It seems to me that controversy is reaching a stage where vitalism and mechanism are merging into an organic, unitary view of being.

9. It may be that we shall find even the term "organism" too small for philosophical purposes, but at present it seems to be a suitable term. Organic suggests the dominance of the telelogical. That is to say, an organism seems to function to some purpose, form and process being subordinate to ends. Furthermore, the organic idea suggests evolutionary processes, purposive capacities, creative levels, plastic diversity, uniqueness, mutual support and the

like. In the organic idea we may find a harmony of nature embodying all that is really essential in the old ideas of purpose. In an organism the past lives effectively in the present and projects itself into the future. Each organic level is what it is,—physically, chemically, psychologically, but the whole is a greater than the sum of its parts; and even the parts are different when in the total setting from what they are in isolation. In the organic there is an empirical teleology not found in the inorganic realm. There is a cumulative creative synthesis. The organic rises to mental levels. The idea of the future is purposive in the present. The organic realm seems to move toward increasing harmony.

THE NATURE OF GOD

BY ANITA MARIS BOGGS

WHAT *is* God? The most learned metaphysician and the most ignorant savage alike reply "He is unknowable." Only the mystic philosopher knows that God *IS*. He knows, for he contacted God. He has experienced Him in an experience that exceeds ecstacy, as ecstacy exceeds the normal mode of thought. The ecstacy of St. Theresa, of St. Anthony of Padua, of St. John of the Cross, of Swedenborg, of Jacob Boehme, of Dionysius the Areopagite, of Iamblichus, of the Buddhists in Nirvana, of the Sufien, is the ineffable union of the soul with a conscious being of a nature apparently indescribable, so far does it exceed human thought or terms. It is beyond thought, for the mind enters the union as a secondary factor. Both mind and soul are receptive, negative to the force that comes swirling into them. This force interpenetrates every part of the soul and then the mind until the soul feels itself identified with, yet in some incomprehensible fashion, still a distinct entity from this all pervasive power.

This identification is the supreme moment of the Sufien, the mystic sect of Mohammedanism, the one religion that is strictly unitarian, that countenances no subsidiary gods. To this end, the Zirk is held weekly. Certain ritualistic motions, dances and intoning are begun until, all in unison of bodies, minds and voices give a prolong high pitched cry "WHO-OO" as it sounds to a western ear. With this mystic arabic name of God, they fall on their hands and knees in adoration of the glorious influx of spirit that they all await eagerly, but, except to the chosen few, almost in vain. For this power chooses to whom it will flow consciously. The tantrik and yogi training of the Far East, seek the same, the annihilation of all thought in Samadhi or Union.

The bliss of this union is sufficient to the mystic. Blessed is the soul that has contacted once the pervasive force of Love. Who, in a lifetime contacts it twice, is a saint. Who lives in continual consciousness, is a being beyond the ken of man.

Through the years, the memory lingers for one who has once contacted this bliss and the taste remains. "Sweeter also than the honey and the honey comb" sings the psalmist. Life and its experiences assume a new meaning in the light of the inner vision, a light that may at times be clouded like the sun, but is never extinguished. Who experiences only the Light, experiences the glare. Who stands twice in the presence of God is a saint. Love radiates from him, like a light from an encasing alabaster bowl. By their very presence the saints inspire. Conscious of the exquisiteness of God, they desire only to taste again of His Being. They seek not to serve the world but to enjoy Him. Hear how the Persian mystic one of the greatest of the Sufien, Jalau'uddin Al Rumi, sings of the soul and the almightiness of God in his Mathnawi—

" Do me right, O glory of the Righteous, O Thou who art the dias and I, the threshold of Thy door.

" Where are the threshold and the dias in reality? In the quarter where our Beloved is; where are 'we' and 'I'?

" O Thou whose soul is free from 'we' and 'I,' O Thou who art the subtle essence of the spirit in man and woman,

" When man and woman become one, Thou art that One; when the units are wiped out, lo, Thou art that Unity.

" Thou didst contrive this 'I' and 'we' that Thou mightest play the game of worship with Thyself,

" That all 'I's' and 'thou's' should become one soul and at last should be submerged into the Beloved.

" All this is, and do Thou come, O Thou who givest the command BE, O Thou who transcendest 'Come' and all speech.

" The body can see Thee only in the fashion of the body: it fancies Thy sadness and laughter.

" Do not say that the heart that is bound (by such bodily attributes) is worthy of seeing Thee.

" Who is bound by sadness and laughter is living by means of these two borrowed attributes.

" In the verdant garden of Love, which is without end, there are many fruits besides sorrow and joy.

" Love is higher than these two states of feeling, without spring and without autumn it is ever green and fresh." (Lines 1783-1794.)

" Our emotion is not caused by grief, our consciousness is not related to fancy and imagination.

" There is another state of consciousness that is rare: do thou not disbelieve for God is very mighty.

" Do not judge from the normal state of man, do not abide in wrong or well doing.

" Wrong and well doing, grief and joy are things that come into existence; those that come into existence die: God is their heir. (*Lines* 1804-1806.)

THE ALMIGHTINESS OF GOD

" We have spoken all these words but in preparing ourselves we are naught, naught without the favours of God.

" Without the favours of God and God's elect, angel tho he be, his page is dark.

" O God, O Thou whose bounty fulfils every need, it is not allowable to mention anyone beside Thee.

" This amount of guidance, hast Thou bestowed upon us; till this time Thou hast covered up many a fault of ours.

" Cause the drop of knowledge which Thou gaves to us heretofore, to become united with Thy seas.

" In my soul there is a drop of knowledge: deliver it from sensuality and from the body's clay.

" Before these clays drink it up, before these winds sweep it away. Although when they sweep it away, Thou art able to take it back from them and redeem it.

" The drop that vanished in the air or was spilled on the earth, when did it flee from the storehouse of Thy omnipotence?

" If entered into non-existence or a hundred non-existences, it will make a foot of its head (will return in headlong haste) when Thou callest it.

" Hundreds of thousands of opposites are killing their opposites: Thy decree is calling them forth again into existence.

" There is caravan on caravan, O God, speeding from non-existence into existence.

" In particular, every night all thoughts and understandings become

naught, plunged into the deep Sea.

" Again at dawn those Divine ones lift up their heads like fishes, from the Sea.

" In the autumn the myriads of boughs and leaves go into rout into the Sea of Death.

" In the garden, the crow clothed in black like a mourner makes lament over the greenery.

" Again from the Lord of the land comes the edict to Non-existence 'Give back what thou hast devoured.'

" O, brother, collect thy wits for an instant: from moment to moment, incessantly there is autumn and spring within thee.

" Behold the garden of the heart, green and moist and fresh, full of rosebuds, and cypress and jasamine;

" Boughs hidden by multitudes of leaves, vast plain and high palace hidden by the multitude of flowers.

" These words which are from the Universal Reason, are the scent of those flowers and hyacinths and cypresses.

" Didst thou ever smell the rose where no rose is? The scent is thy guide and conducts thee on thy way.

" The scent is a remedy for the eye: it is light making. (*Jalalu'uddin Al Rumi,* translated by R. A. Nicholson, Cambridge University Press, 1926.)

To the mystic God is Love to be experienced through the complete merging of all the senses in the supreme act of union. Exultantly sings Jalalu'uddin "I am the Beloved."

Not all human nature is capable of enjoying God, or if such enjoyment has been had, of resting content without explanation of the essential nature of Love and the Beloved. Mind acting without its master love rarely rises to the heights attained by the emotional soul. Its methods are those of ordinary life and so are more understandable by the man of the world. Mind searching the inherent nature of God uses the same methods it would employ in learning to drive a car. First the trial and error method with more errors than success, then concentrated study of the general aspect of the thing as a whole ending with a general hazy knowledge of the aspect or outer appearance or manifestation but no real knowledge, scientific or otherwise, of real motive force inherent in the gasoline, the electric starting spark, or the physical laws governing the motor, generating the power.

Plato, the great Greek philosopher, speculated on the nature of

God. When he formulated the doctrine of the Archetypes, he sought to penetrate the mystery through mind. Positing the highest abstract ideas of which man is capable, he placed these in-forming ideas in invisibility, in unchanging existence: "Does the being, which in our dialectic we define as meaning absolute existence, remain always in the same state, or does it change? Do absolute equality, absolute beauty, and every absolute existence admit any change at all, or does the absolute existence in each case, being essentially uniform, remain the same and unchanging and never in any case admit of any sort or kind of change whatsoever?" "It must remain the same and unchanging, Socrates," said Cebes.

"And what of the many beautiful things such as men and horses and garments and the like and all of which bear the name of ideas, whether equal, beautiful or anything else? Do they remain the same or is it exactly the opposite with them? In short, do they never remain the same at all, either in themselves or in their relations?"

"These things," said Cebes, "never remain the same."

"You can touch them and see them and perceive them with the other senses while you can grasp the unchanging only with the reasoning of the intellect. These latter are invisible and unseen," said Socrates. (*Phaedo*, XXV.)

THE SOUL AND ITS RELATION TO GOD

Socrates continued, "Our souls exist apart from our bodies and possessed intelligence before they came into man's shape. I shall try to explain to you the kind of Cause at which I have worked and I begin with the assumption that there exists an absolute beauty, an absolute good, an absolute greatness and so on. It appears to me that if anything besides absolute beauty is beautiful, it is so simply because it partakes of the absolute beauty, and I say the same of all phenomena—Ideas exist and Phenomena take the name of ideas as they participate in them. A concrete thing is generated from its opposite."

" What is that which must be in the body to make it alive? A soul.
" Then the soul always brings life to whatever contains her, and the
" soul does not admit of death? Then the soul must be immortal.
" If the immortal is imperishable, then the soul cannot perish when
" death comes upon her. She will never admit death or be in a
" state of death. And all men must admit," said Socrates, "that

" God and the essential form of life and all else that is immortal " never perishes." (*Phaedo,* XL et foll.)

In his Republic, Plato defines God as: "One and true in word and deed: He neither changes Himself nor deceives others" (379 et foll). "God alone is wise and knows all things," he states in his Apology, 30D.

If God is "the wise," emotion naturally is not the medium through which the soul knows God. Speaking through the mouth of Socrates in the *Apology* (30D), Plato gives the method by which he has realized that God is. "God has commanded me to spend my life in searching for wisdom—I have a certain divine sign from God, it is a voice." A voice presupposes a mental capacity to hear, understand, comprehend, to follow and to act according to its dictates. It is the relation of the master to the servant, of the executive to his assistant. There is no thought of enjoyment. The hearer is not an onlooker watching a procession of "caravans on caravans speeding from non-existence into existence." He is one of the caravan and as such can know only the immediate caravan in which he is. He may know or think he knows the general nature and aspect of others. He may have theoretical knowledge that in other caravans the camels of life proceed differently and to different goals. His immediate knowledge, however, is limited to the one at hand. He is concerned with the ultimate destination of that particular caravan, with obeying the orders of the master camel driver, of cooperating with the other travellers in protecting all their goods from the common enemy that roams the desert of existence, whose camels "pad, pad" swiftly over the golden sands of time. Darting like a shooting star, the enemy attacks the little camp when the watchman's fires burn low. He seizes the travellers. When morning comes, only the camel tracks lead to the horizon. Silent tracks in silent sands to show that once a caravan passed this way. With the sun rises the wind, the sands dance in the heat, revolve in eddies, the camel tracks vanish.

The caravan that has vanished? The master camel driver and his men, the travellers and the camels, all know only that they go not where they had planned. They are carried by a force superior to their own to some unknown destination whose path they know not nor the perils, nor joy, that may await them. Their minds are sand grains swirling with the wind, now alighting here, now

alighting there, drifting into the whirlwinds of indecision, fear and confusion.

Who knows all the caravan routes of God? Who has pitched his black tent of woven camel's hair at all the oases of experience? Who has explored all the modes and moods of the winds of life? The master of the caravan knows his course across the trackless desert, he knows his camels and he knows the cool oases ahead. His road is but one of the infinity of roads. God opens the way and His winds obliterate the tracks.

Can the mind of man in a myriad of lives, travel the path of each star in its course? Can a single mouth drink all the drops in the Sea of Wisdom? Passing through the daily experiences of life, man's mind, like the bee sips now of the jasamine, now of the rose, and often of the bitter aloes. It sips and distills the honey of life in the dark cell of the comb. Of the nature and purpose of the rose, it neither knows nor desires to know. It is content to gather one drop from the infinity of beauty.

Mind is an attribute. It fashions God according to its experiences and the physical environment in which it manifests itself through the body. The highest abstract conception of the bushman of Australia scarcely equals in nobility the lowest material concept of civilized man. Plato posits God as Absolute Idea. The soul, being intelligent, may grasp some conception of God's inherent nature. The God of Plato is a concatenation of attributes and categories, mutually exclusive and therefore infinite. He posits absolute Time, absolute Space, absolute Equality, absolute Beauty, absolute Goodness, absolute Wisdom. How can more than one infinite exist in time or space concurrently? If time and space are eliminated as categories or mental concepts, then all the attributes, the Wise, the Beautiful, the Good must equally be eliminated and the God of abstract mind disappears into complete annihilation.

Reason and judgment are not content to let God disappear in the mists of abstractions. God *is*. God *creates*, God is *omniscient*. What God is, how He creates and why He creates is beyond all possible knowing. The mystic may enjoy God but the mind of man may never attain to the essence of God nor the purpose and method of creation. Dionysius the Areopagite, a christian father and neoplatonist writing probably in the fourth or fifth century after Christ, expresses the position of those to whom God is unknowable:

" Once more ascending yet higher, we maintain that it (God) " is not soul, nor mind, one endowed with the faculty of imagina- " tion, conjecture, reason nor understanding; nor is It any act " of reason nor understanding, nor can It be described, by reason " nor perceived by the understanding, since It has not number, " nor order, nor greatness or littleness, nor equality nor in- " equality, and since It is not immovable, nor in motion nor at " rest and has no power and is not power nor light and does not " live and is not life; nor is It personal essence or eternity, nor " can it be grasped by the understanding since It is not knowl- " edge nor truth; nor is It kingship nor wisdom; nor is It One, " nor is It unity; nor is It Godhead nor goodness, nor is It a " Spirit as we understand spirit, nor is It the Sonship nor the " Fatherhood, nor is It any other such thing as we or any other " being can have knowledge of, nor does it belong to the category " of non existence or to that of existence: nor do existent things " know It as It actually is; nor does It know them as they actually " are; nor can reason attain to It: to name It: nor to know it: " nor is It darkness nor is It light; nor is It error nor truth; " nor can any affirmation nor negation apply to It; for while " applying affirmations or negations to those orders of beings " that come next to It, we apply not unto It either affirmation nor " negations inasmuch as It transcends all affirmation by being the " perfect and unique Cause of all things and transcends all negation " by the preeminence of Its simple and absolute nature—free from " all limitation and beyond them all" (*The Mystical Theology*, " Ch. V)."

Denying all attributes to God, Dionysius by his very negation posits a God more noble more lofty than the highest abstraction of that great master mind of Plato could conceive. The God of Dionysius is beyond the reach of the mystic soul that would lose itself in the enjoyment of beatitude; It is beyond the mind that would infer Its existence through reasoning from the visible to the invisible from the concrete to the abstract. It is a God beyond absoluteness for It is the Cause. It is unique.

God is unique, unknowable, beyond the reach of the soul of man or of his mind, yet Dionysius can describe fully what God is not and by the nullification of categories and abstractions of existence can present a viril God that is real, that *is*. When he ascribes affirma-

tions and negations to those orders of beings that come next to it," he refers to the Archetypes of Plato, to the archangels of Jalalu'uddin and the hierarchies of the occult schools. Would Dionysius perhaps retort to the cry of Jalalu'uddin "I am the Beloved": "True, the Beloved of the hierarchy of Love, an order of beings that shadow forth but an aspect of God but who are not God." To Plato, "You have contacted the formative Ideas but God you know not." Perhaps Plato would reply "What O Dionysius is your God?" The Areopagite could but reply "My God is the inscrutable Cause. *What It is* I do not know."

The mystics conceived God through their emotions, They describe positively or negatively, by attributes, "love," "beauty," holiness," goodness," "beyond all goodness, all life, all essence, all unity" or negatively "He is not essence, nor life etc." Plato, Aristotle and the followers of "reason," throughout the centuries find God through logic, reason, understanding and wisdom. For Aristotle, "God is the formal Cause, the efficient Cause and the End." Man is in the same relation to God as the object to the subject with "be" balancing them. Since man is a thinking being, he may know God as God is Thought in its essence. The nature of God to him is the quintessence of his own desirable qualities to the superlative.

Is either the soul or reason satisfied with "God is good," "God is love," God is beyond unity," God is beyond all comprehension, "He is joy," "He is beauty," "He is ineffable?" Is this abstract God more appealing than the anthropomorphic jealous God of the ancient Hebrews or the amorous gods of the Greeks or the modern God of battles who is always on the side of the prayer makers of that moment, or the whimsical God who is swayed by the selfish aims of man to change the weather to suit his wishes or to set aside laws of human making that the prayer may escape some well merited punishment, about to be inflicted by his fellow beings. Anthropomorphic or abstract, what *is* God?

God is. In the simplicity of the statement is the great mystery clear. To Be, means of itself, Immortality, Infinitude, the Formal, the Efficient Cause, the End, the Lover and the Beloved, the Thought and the Thinker, the Created and the Creator.

To exist presupposes something or cause from and by which existence is made manifest. To be is Life: God is Life. What

Life is, is indeed unknowable and the mystic is right when he cries "It is beyond all knowing." Life is both imminent and transcendant; It is both sentient and conscious and purposeful. Things do not have life: Life creates forms. "Mother Nature" is not distinct from Life: It is Life. Plato asked:" What is it that makes the soul live?" "Life," answered his pupil. "There is caravan on caravan speeding from non-existence into existence," sing Jalalu'uddin. From invisibility Life is coagulating into visibility and dissolving again into seeming invisibility. Life is a river. It flows, It forms bubbles of existence. Wind, earth, water, fire, ether are forms of motion. Life is the power that generates motion and It is the motion. "Beyond life" or "non-existence" are two mists of the mind. There is nothing but Life. Even non existence, nothingness must have Life to *be*. Without Life there is no "Goodness," "Pity," "Equality," "Number." Nor is there category nor attribute, for without Life no thought exists, thought is the product of Life.

Were Life definable it would not be unique. Its action may be described and felt but its essence as such is incomprehensible. Everything that exists is Life, man is Life but who knows what Life Is?

Flowing is the essential characteristic of Life. It has five proper motions, with many sub-motions and interblendings. These motions are centrifugal, centripetal, forward, descending and ascending. Centripetal, descending flowing is Life taking on form. It coagulates within Itself into nuclei, like the start nebulae of the various universes that in turn precipitate denser and denser matter until the seeming density of solid rock is visible. Yet it is all Life. When Life flows forward on a given plane, It is experiencing equilibrium. Such equilibrium constitute the "Night of Existence" or *"pralaya"* of eastern religions. Centrifugal, ascending force is the breaking up of form.

Life is a circular cell, of self imposed limitations. It forms within Itself at Its pleasure and for Its pleasure, a universe or a canary. It alone limits Itself. It contracts Itself into any form It desires, ever without disruption. It contains all and is contained of all. It has all attributes and is all attributes. It is Thought and the Thinker: It is Love and the Beloved. It is purpose: It is Will: It IS.

Life acts upon Itself-Life. The more subtle, the more refined,

the light, penetrates the heavier part of Itself called substance or Nature. Yet both are Life. The gentle friction of two degrees of Life, drawing towards each other is love; hate is the heat engendered friction of a higher or subtler life penetrating, boring through heavier, gross substance. All Life is conscious. Its degree of consciousness is according to and in direct ratio with the subtlety of Its form. The gross heavy substance is lethargically aware It will be destroyed by the penetrating beams. It gathers Itself into greater density darkness and more compact cohesion to resist destruction. This concentration for resistance is what man calls "evil." It has no reality except under the mental concept of time and space for in essence the resister is identical with the resisted. Eventually they neutralize each other. Life creating in Itself is the father side of God: Life created in Itself in the mother side of God—both are one.

If Life is God and consciousness is an inalienable attribute of all that is, since all is Life and that consciousness is active according to the subtlety of the form in which It is manifesting, what is the soul, and what is its purpose? The soul is simply a more subtle form of Life that interpenetrates the grosser coagulation known as body. Mind is another form of subtle Life, but not so subtle as soul. Mind, by exercise and conscious use may be developed, the exercise and constant use being but the coagulating of the form of Life manifesting as mind, the concentrating of it along definite lines whence it flows, following the five proper motions of its nature, Life. As mind may be so developed, so may the soul force be coagulated and concentrated until it assumes definite form and as such is able to act as a receiving substance for a high, still more subtle flowing of Life even as the body has received it. In the union with the higher, subtler Life, is experienced the ecstasy, the ineffable moment of contact with the Beloved. The higher Life interpenetrates every cell of the soul, to use finite terms, as a river in flood, overflows its banks and seems to obliterate all boundaries. As the river fertilizes the ground of itself, so is the soul fertilized by the essence of the higher Life. Life makes time, space and form: into Life dissolve time, space and form. When the essence of man consciously concentrates Itself, his soul becomes self conscious, It knows that It *is* a drop of the Sea of Being. Only those who have experienced the ineffable union can comprehend even

faintly the indescribable joy. The mystic is content to enjoy, to sing: "I am the Beloved."

Is enjoyment all that God expects of his creatures, a mutual enjoyment of each other? If so then the attributes of mind, will purpose and power are superfluous. Does God perhaps desire Its creatures to imitate It and, proceeding along lines of creation conceived by It, create in a lesser fashion on a lower substratum, that the creatures of the creatures shall seek their creator and through the infinity of creators raise themselves to the ultimate—Life Itself, found but never comprehended? To create mind calls into being its attributes will purpose and power. Mind functioning through such attributes is but blind, functioning on one plane only unless it is interpenetrated consciously by the subtler Life of the soul. Man may learn the laws of creation and become a cocreator with God to the degree limited only by the rarity of the Life force within him. Man is God as a drop of water is the ocean only so far however as Life is, and Life is identical in all form and in the absence of form.

The Life that man treats so casually and pretends to despise is his very divinity. With his modicum of brain he may use his Life for constructive or destructive ends. He may continue to flow on one plane through his entire manifestation as a human entity or he may concentrate both his mind and soul forces, marry them as it were in a marriage with the Life of higher existence and so become conscious and capable of manifesting on other planes of existences. If he does this, he elevates his entire environment.

Jesus said "I am the way, the truth and the life. If ye had known me ye would have known my Father also. I am in the Father and the Father in me."

BEHAVIORISM UNMASKED

BY D. E. PHILLIPS

FOR the last twenty or thirty years we have been gradually drifting towards some form of determinism in human conduct. I say some *form of determinism* because there is a wide difference, yes, a gulf between *mind determinism* such as held by Adler and others that all human thinking and behavior is fundamentally purposive and directed by some underlying force to a goal, and that chance mechanistic and atomistic determinism into which many modern thinkers are drifting. We have, it is true, been forced to recognize that every variation in structure and chemical composition of the body modifies our thoughts and feelings. However, no one has as yet pointed out the exact causes of all these minute changes. We also see the curve of mental life rise and decline with the growth, development, and decay of the body. We also note that certain brain processes seem to be the condition of consciousness.

Heredity gives us certain dominant instinctive tendencies which map out the chief line of human action, feeling, and thinking. Such conduct is soon converted into habits most of which operate without the interference of consciousness. These habits drift most of us to our eternal destiny. Again, many forms of human behavior seem to be under the guidance of some unconscious mental force.

Either line of facts naturally leads to the question as to how far the individual and society can consciously direct their destiny. Out of these perplexing problems the bastard child Behaviorism has been born, and now seems to be dominated by the idea that nothing but *mechanism shall remain in the universe.*

Why do I say "dominated by the idea?" According to the behavioristic doctrine neither purpose nor consciousness is ever a

cause. It is only an accompanying phenomenon. I should have said that certain neurones in the brains of these behaviorists were set in motion by the adequate stimulus and formed a *neural pattern*. But how did this original *adequate stimulus* happen to set up a motion in the neurones of these behaviorists that has been going on for years? And how have these neurones compelled *them* to a definite line of activity all this time? What is the state of these neurones and synoptic connections that forced them to perform delicate experiments? If any behaviorist will explain his own *behavior* in writing a book, in hunting persistently for things to support his doctrine, in trying to explain wit and humor as having their origin in the sensitive zones of the body—I say if he will explain his own conduct in these things without any reference to *purpose* and show that he really believes what he says about his own behavior—we might understand him. We have had no such personal application of the doctrine. This same consciousness which he would ignore tells him that his *conscious purpose* is a force in writing his book. If he does succeed in transferring all these intellectual forces to the neurones, he will simply endow them with the mysticism which he wishes to escape.

A short time ago, in talking with a defender of behaviorism who at least prides himself on his ability to direct his own thoughts, I said, "Wait a minute. Come squarely to the question. Do you mean to say that your present thoughts have absolutely nothing to do with the thoughts that shall follow?" Of course he hesitated and would not give an answer to the question.

Thus we have the heart of the behavioristic difficulty and the one that directs most of the disguised arguments in the treatment of instinct, of inherited traits, of talents or capacities, of imitation, of suggestion, of emotions as glandular and visceral action, of wit and humor as originating from the sensitive zones of the body.

Behaviorism has forced psychology to become more accurate and scientific. Secondly, it has demonstrated a much larger field of mechanistic behavior than psychology once recognized or admitted. Thirdly, it has forced a desirable modification of our ideas of instinct. Fourthly, it has extended, to great advantage, the place of habit and of the "conditioned reflex" in the formation of habit. Finally, behaviorism has helped to clarify the learning process.

With such an array of achievement, what could be said against the behavioristic doctrine? It is the same fault which Aristotle said we everywhere find in adolescents—*the fault of carrying everything to extremes.* Let us examine these views as represented by the extremes I have already mentioned.

I. *Instinct must go, we have no use for the word,* says the behavioristic theory. Some years ago when the behaviorists made gogues became frightened and said if we continue to use the word *instinct* we shall be classified with the *mystics.* Those who did these bold statements several psychologists and especially pedanot even surmise the pure materialism into which they were being led looked for some compromise term. So we find today such terms as *human urges, drives, organized impulses, original nature, prepotent tendencies, dominant tendencies,* and *innate dominate* adjustments. Will anyone be deluded into thinking he has avoided mysticism by the use of any of these terms? Or will he abolish any implication of *purpose* which is the chief concern of the behavioristic doctrine? Several of these educational writers set forth what they think is the behavioristic doctrine and proclaim their change of heart, and avow their *purpose* to use some of these terms instead of instinct. So we have two well known authors saying, "We follow strictly the line of argument used by the extreme physiological psychologists." Yet the whole book is built on the assumption that mind is a real cause of conduct. We are told that we "must recognize the child's interest," that "social impulses motivate adaptation." Dominant *drives* are often mentioned. We have a section on "our organism seeking its own end." In general, behaviorism avoids the use of such terms as above mentioned and uses instead *neural patterns, stimulus—response—mechanisms, chain reflexes, neuro-muscular units.* All of this brings to mind forcibly what Schwarz says about the semi- or pseudo-original man. "The appearance of originality is more to him than the reality of it." Many words become popular not because of their meaning or usefulness, but because of their noble origin.

I have just finished an examination of 150 books on psychology, all written in the last fifteen years. Fully eighty percent of them remain unmodified by the behavioristic movement so far as the use of the word *instinct* is concerned. It should be added that the behaviorists have compelled all psychologists to a more careful

use of the term *instinct,* and have shown us the excessive tendency to expand instinct into the field of habit. But Morgan as early as 1898 inaugurated this scientific inquiry as to the relation between habit and instinct in his book *Habit and Instinct.*

One behavioristic book tries to make an ingenious substitution for all instincts: *six prepotent tendencies.* Is not this all we have ever meant by *instinct*—a tendency to fight, to get angry, to manifest fear, love, and jealousy? No, he would save his behavioristic ideas by putting this prepotency in the nervous mechanism and reducing them to six physical manifestations. These are *starting and withdrawing, rejecting, struggling, hunger reaction* (not hunger), *sensitive zone reactions,* and *sex reactions.* These constitute the physical mechanism out of which all other activities develop. So our author talks of prepotent needs, prepotent urges, and prepotent habits. However, he has found that these did not supply *his need,* so he uses over thirty terms implying the essential idea as found in the most careful writers on instinct.

Here is the question we wish to put to any writer following these lines: If everything in this universe should be wiped out and nothing left but the physical conditions as we have known them since historic times, and the human race should start its development anew with just these *six prepotent tendencies,* would such a race not in the run of ages develop habits, customs and institutions similar to ours? I say *similar,* and that is all any believer in instincts expects. Would not men develop warring and strife, marriage and family life of some kind, crime and religion, poverty and wealth, jealousy and love? Have we not this proof in the history of mankind? The explanation that this generation was taught these things by the previous generation is only a delusion and a make-believe explanation. Where did the first generations get these things? Where did these patterns come from if acquired characteristics and habits are not transmissible?

If I were a strict behaviorist I would turn heaven and earth to prove that acquired characteristics are inherited. Then I could have some kind of argument as a substitute for purposive, dynamic action.

Professor Watson says there are thousands of variations laid down in the germ plasm. Here to deny both the inheritance of acquired characteristics and all kinds of purposive behavior takes us

clear back to Democratus with electrons and protons falling together by haphazard chance through an *eternity of time* until they *happened* to fall together and so produce what *only appears* to be purposive action. According to their doctrine even Professor Watson and his followers are not guided by any desire or purpose to make the world better or to teach us anything. By some chance variation in the protons and electrons, the brain processes have just chanced to develop in them this line of behavior.

Smith and Guthrie in their *General Psychology* say that "conviction and belief may be described as the attachment of response tendencies to verbal statements." Moral conviction consists in saying the thing is wrong. "A volitional act," they say, "is the outcome of a delayed reaction." If you should appeal to me for one hundred dollars to save a group of flood-stricken refugees from starving, and if I should think it over for an hour or even all night, and then say, "Yes, I will give it," such would be a delayed neural action. I might *think* that my *thinking* had something to do with the final outcome, but it did not. As soon as the brain reaction was completed the answer was inevitable. If you ask what delays the brain reaction a day, a month, or year, the only answer is other brain reactions.

II. There is no such thing as *inherited traits, talents,* or temperaments says the leader of this school. In all of these cases Professor Watson and others are careful to take the cases of moderate differences: hypothetical cases such as two boys, where one is the favorite of the mother and the other of the father. The one becomes a painter and the other a warrior. But why do they not account for our idiots and imbeciles, for Socrates, Mozart, Napoleon, Gauss, Leonardo, and Lincoln? If you want to see a psychological law, take your outstanding cases first. If any one admits that there are born into this world idiots and imbeciles, will he assume that there is a definite limit where imbecility ceases and from that point all individuals are alike? For example, if we admit any variation in natural mathematical ability at all, does it not stand to reason that there are all degrees of variation, even though we cannot detect it in all cases? If there are no degrees of inheritance, then the whole fabric of intelligence tests is a delusion and a snare.

Suppose the germ plasm should from some unknown cause vary so as to produce some physical modification in the endocrine glands,

and this in turn should be accompanied by some unusual neural activity which resulted in a *prepotent tendency* to music or to murder. Why not say the individual inherited a tendency for music or for murder? There is only one reason—this might imply that something intellectual or emotional was inherited—some *purposive behavior.*

Professor Watson rests his claim that there are no intellectual and emotional race differences largely on the assumption that *pride of race* has kept us from admitting that there are no differences. But how did this pride of race get started? Is there nothing in original nature that *inevitably* leads to *pride of race?* When he asserts that right-handedness is due to social usage, can he offer the slightest suggestion why it is so universal? Did it accidentally start with Adam and Eve and has it been scattered all over the world by social custom? It is easy to explain existing things by social custom as long as one does not attempt to explain the origin and development of social custom.

I thoroughly agree that many of the individual differences and a large percent of what is generally attributed to inheritance of traits and talents are due to early happenings in life. This is true whether you look at the facts from the point of view of the Freudians or the Behaviorists. I will even go beyond this and emphasize the place of chance happenings in life and their power to determine destiny. But, as already stated, the chief sin of behaviorism is to carry everything to extremes. Their fear lest they leave any indication of mind as a cause of purposive behavior sometimes drives them headlong into pure nonsense, such as the admission of instincts in animals but the denial of them in man, the development of all human behavior out of "squirmings," the denial of degrees of intellectual ability and thereby the discrediting of all intelligence tests, the futile effort to trace wit and humor to the sensitive zones of the body.

III. For obvious reasons, *imitation* has been one of the main lines of attack. No one denies that many of the early social psychologists and popular lecturers on human conduct unduly expanded and exaggerated the place of imitation. But the behaviorist sees in any kind of imitation the implication of purposive action. So they have worked hard and long with animals to show that they do not imitate. But why carry these results over to human conduct when Professor Watson says that because animals have in-

stincts in no wise proves that man has them also. If a positive result cannot be carried over with *some basis of scientific inference, why carry over a negative one?*

Professor Allport finds it very necessary to dispose of imitation in connection with the development of speech. He says, "The child does not imitate or duplicate the speech of his elders. There is evoked simply the nearest similar ear-vocal reflex, which, with his present limitation of pronouncing, he has been able to fixate." Again, the whole attempt is to rule out any implication of purposive behavior. He says, "Imitation would simply be voluntarily copying them." He seems unable to conceive of purposive behavior that is not voluntarily conscious.

As over and against this, Koehler states in his *Mentality of Apes* that "even animal psychologists have not always paid sufficient attention to this fundamental difference between "simple" human imitation and the imitation we so lightly expect from animals, and so people were to a certain extent astonished when it was first shown experimentally that animals do not as easily imitate as expected. Less astonishment would perhaps have been felt if it had been realized that, after all, man has first to understand in some degree before it even occurs to him to imitate." He finally shows that the chimpanzee does exhibit four kinds of imitation and that there is no *mere imitation* without a trace of insight.

IV. Suggestion is so closely related to imitation as to arouse the same fears. For this reason you do not find the behaviorist dealing with the striking difficulties that are presented in psychiatry and abnormal psychology in general. Suggestion is reduced to the power of the spoken word over the bodily mechanism. The strictly objective method precludes any consideration of dreams, delusions, subjective pains and symptoms.

V. "Emotion," we are told by Professor Watson, "is an hereditary pattern reaction, involving profound changes of the bodily mechanism as a whole, but particularly of the visceral and glandular systems. In *Psychologies of 1925* the same writer tells us that there are only three original pattern reactions which correspond to what we call fear, rage, and love. All others are developed out of conditioned responses. Professor Allport, following this line of conditioned responses, stretches it to the limit in explaining away sympathy. We all believe in conditioned responses, and thousands

of activities that once had no satisfactory explanation belong to this group. This is especially true in the field of sex peculiarities and abnormalities. But here is the point I want to emphasize. *Generally speaking the more securely grounded a conditioned response is, the closer related it is to some original prepotent tendency, and in many cases the relation is so close that it is only quibbling to say that one is an original pattern and the other acquired.* It seems that one carries with it the other. Herein lies the fundamental problem as to the number of inherited tendencies and instincts. It cannot be solved with our present state of knowledge. Jealousy, says behaviorism, is not inherent or instinctive, but is a result of human society. But would not any peoples, given the prepotent tendencies our behaviorists grant, develop jealousy? Are we not then quibbling as to whether it is a part of our native equipment?

Again, if human individuals everywhere develop a response called *laughter* and some degree of wit and humor, why not say that human individuals are so constituted that when adequately stimulated they show a tendency to such behavior, and save the stretch of our imagination in trying to show ther habitual origin from the *sensitive zone?* There is only one sound reason why they do not: these activities suggest purposive behavior.

VI. Finally, we owe much to the behaviorists for their diligent and *purposive* research work on learning by *trial and error.* Yerkes' and Koehler's researches do not substantiate the extreme faith of the behaviorists in *trial and error.* Koehler says, "I know that several psychologists will not easily believe that my description of intellectual behavior in apes is correct."

Even within their own ranks come many dissenting votes. Professor Tolman in *the Psychological Review* for July, 1925, shows that goal-seeking is an essential part of animal behavior. He says that prepotent tendencies are to be recognized by the *teleological patterns* of the final goals which they achieve.

All psychology attempts to explain behavior, while behaviorism is a study of mechanistic physiology. In this sense the behaviorist may apply a quantitative scientific method, but he can never explain behavior or evaluate conduct. On the other hand, I do not believe that it is possible for those of us who admit mental activity, consciousness, and purpose as causes of conduct to be scientifically accurate in the sense of the physical sciences.

By behavioristic methods we may measure physical behavior, but I for one do not believe we shall ever explain or understand human behavior without a consideration of the fundamental human impulses, motives, desires, needs, wants, and life-interests. The explanation of momentarily controlled behavior is one thing, and that of permanent life-interests quite another. Human life has its roots in life-impulses, cravings, and some kind of universal tendencies, while the environment is only secondary and a modifying force.

What a fruitless argument we have had about introspective psychology plunging us into mysticism. Did any one ever stop to contemplate the mystery of the synoptic theory? Can you think of a greater mystery than to place all that has ever been done and attributed to mind in the neurones! How misleading is the catchword *neural pattern!* Try to conceive what these neural patterns laid away in the brain are! Neural patterns have been even more misleading than the old idea of sensation as being produced by images transmitted from the outside object. One's imagination might stake off in the cortex a neural pattern for a mountain, but how shall one imagine a persistent neural pattern to write a *Faust*, to conquer the world, to be a Lincoln or a great world leader? Are these patterns localized in definite parts of the cortex? Does consciousness involve the whole of the cortex or only parts of it, or does it shift? Brain surgery and experiments on animals bids fair to revolutionize the whole neuro-synaptic theory.

I cannot help but conceive consciousness as the most complex form of energy known to man and one that is so stabilized as to be in turn one of the causes of human conduct. Even if consciousness is the direct result of cortical action, is it not in keeping with the order of nature that consciousness also may become a cause of activity in human beings?

In conclusion, it seems evident that the gap that separates behaviorism—or mechanistic physiology—from other forms of general psychology is the question of considering any form of mind as a cause, and the attacks of behaviorism on general psychology have as a matter of fact been directed mainly against the points I have mentioned because these manifestations imply *purpose* or some vitalistic force not reducable to electrons and protons as conceived by a mechanistic philosophy. Hence introspection is to be aban-

doned as absolutely unscientific and purpose is to be abhorred as leading only to mysticism. All forms of life are to be cast in quantitative measurable terms. All qualitative forms of existence and behavior must be relegated to speculative philosophy.

However, in spite of behaviorism, the value of everything and of life itself will continue to be determined by human desires, feelings, purposes, and strivings. Not only psychologists, but all men will continue to introspect their desires, feelings, ambitions, and destinies. The behaviorists, without knowing it, are on the road to the most incomprehensible mystery the mind of man has ever conceived—*the transfer of all human achievements and civilization to the neurones and synaptic connections.* Yes, even the neurones trying to explain themselves through the behaviorists. Most of us are only advocating and pleading for the legitimate use of any and all methods that will help us to better understand human behavior. That, we think, involves a proper consideration of our native equipment by heredity, the whole physical being, the whole outer conditions, stimulus-response, and all that it is possible to ascertain by legitimate and well-guided introspection. Man does not exist for science, but *science exists to give value to human life.*

A CENTURY OF IBSEN

BY HENRY CHARLES SUTER

ONE hundred years ago, there was born in a Norwegian town an "infant crying in the night" who grew to be a writer, but not one "with no language but a cry." For it has been well cited that Henrik Ibsen became the apostle of those who insist on self-realization and self-expression. In those days Ibsen sensed a devotion to formulas that fostered the use of fantastic phrases that possessed little positive potency. Crowd psychology took the place of individual thinking, and concerted action was more active than careful deliberation.

Echoes multiplied by artifice were glorified as public opinion; mathematical arrangements of votes contrived in consequence, a mechanical conception of society; and ultimately humanitarianism displaced humanism. Ibsen pilloried all this and made his appeal to those who were willing to pay the price of straight thinking.

Ibsen owed little to life's circumstances of lowliness, since his father became insolvent ere he reached the age of eight. So his youth was spent in studying poetry to relieve the monotony of apprenticeship to an apothecary. In his twenties he was aiding the management of the theater of Bergen, his home town, but the chief outcome was that comradery critics caused him to witness drama in larger cities. Before he had seen one play produced, he had written several himself, although these are not found among those preserved for us. The wretched attic in the *Wild Duck* was conjured up in his memory from childhood; when nearly forty he was often unable to buy stamps to dispatch his manuscripts; and even at successful maturity, a "poet's pension" arrived changing need into frugal comfort.

Meanwhile Norway, severed from Denmark in the Napoleonic

age, had a native culture which was considered crude, though confident, in the face of the Danish tradition. Sentiment served instead of sensible thinking, hence Ibsen laughs at the "League of Youth" and at all the fickle elements which compose the "compact liberal majority." In *The Pillars of Society* we see social order based on competitive business, which competition is cited as fraud in its hidden factors, and the conventions thereof as a sham. The pillars of Society are shaken, but society goes on, since its pillars rest on sounder supports and eternal elements in human life.

Sagas of the Norse people provided Ibsen with his subjects for some early plays, since we see something stupendous in the *Vikings at Helgeland,* but the energy is not equalled by the art. Interest was awakened; unity maintained; but the whole enterprise is made to miscarry because of a little lie at the principal point of the plot. All Europe sat up shortly afterwards to wonder at *The Pretenders,* a portrayal of the human stuff of which kings can be made. Earl Skule has been regent during the childhood of Haakon, his nephew, and is reluctant to yield to the adult king. He can put on the king's crown and mantle; but "the king's life task is not his but Haakon's." The constant memory of this haunts him, while a contrary assurance gives Haakon insight and sureness. Cleverness is crucified since it fails before character. But when the war is over and Skule is slain, Haakon tells the secret about his uncle—"He was God's stepchild," suggesting that he was all but the very highest.

The Prussia of Bismarck was meanwhile invading and annexing Danish provinces, and Ibsen entered Copenhagen just as word came of the decisive defeat. He knew that the result was accomplished by Sweden and Norway holding aloof. Scornful of his people and bitter over his poverty, he turned to Italy for cheap living, and thence uttered the protest of his soul in *Brand.* Then it became clear that a prophet had indeed arisen. A Lutheran priest of great scholarship happens, during a vacation tour, to see distribution of food to a famine stricken community. Beyond the fiord, lashed to fury by the storm, lies a man half dead by a wound self-inflicted in despair. Who will carry religious comfort? Brand will go if a boat be available, but what boat can live in such a sea? Brand can navigate if some one will bale the boat to keep her afloat. Two lovers stand in the crowd, and when the man refuses to share the risk, the girl leaps forward. In such a situation Brand found

his soul-mate, his wife, and his parish. From such a sunless valley where Brand buries first his child and then his wife, he will not retire, but spends his life in one struggle with the sordidness of peasantry, and the vulgarity of voluptuous officials. At length, disgusted with it all, he calls his people to follow him to the ice-capped summits where alone one can find a sanctuary worthy of God. But nature rejects him; the avalanche sweeps down; Brand is overwhelmed; yet a voice is heard, "God is Love." Brand was merciless on himself and stern with others, even like the Master; but what a certainty in his creed, and a solid security in religion for his soul.

The next year a wealth of imaginative creation gave birth to *Peer Gynt*. Based on Norwegian legend, Peer is seen as the reckless youth; careless of honor; and ruthless in indulgence, and even when wealth comes his heartless indulgence increases. At last, returning to Norway, he is shipwrecked on the shore, and, like Jacob, comes to his home stripped of all he possessed. In the woods he discourses with a wild onion—a model of himself—nothing but one coat over another, no heart or core to be found. Two figures crowd on him. One demands his destruction as worthless, without character of any kind, good or evil; while the other calls him to the sulphur pits that a life basically sound may be purged of its dross. Dreading each doom in turn, Peer sees an open door and, entering the hut, is welcomed by Solveig, the girl whom he had deserted forty years before. With clamorous demands from those outside for a list of his sins, Solveig mothers the stricken man, assuring him that he has lived all these years in her hope; in her faith; in her heart. Redemptive suffering defies judgment and doom; vicarious sacrifice closes such a career with a song; and Peer finds salvation as Solveig soothes him to sleep.

In *A Doll's House* Ibsen reveals domestic tragedy even in comedy as he shows the futility of the conventional training of women to be mere dolls. But *Ghosts* went beyond the joke and in the story of inherited disease that haunted this young man's mind, Ibsen showed that the time had come when the conspiracy of silence must yield to a decision for discussion.

This leads us to the eternal question as to whether the truth should always be told. In defense of such, Ibsen published *An Enemy of the People,* in which a medical man is acclaimed for suc-

cess in discovering that his civic water supply is tainted. But presently house-holders and business men silence him lest the tourist trade should fall off. One by one those who applauded fall under the control active behind the smug conventions. When, penniless and homeless, the doctor has only his daughter to befriend him, he is proud of the part he has played; spurns the sacrifice; and revels in a freedom of a remarkable satisfaction. The other side, however, to all this is seen in *The Wild Duck* where a whole social group becomes wrecked, because some one, infatuated with veracity rather than with truth, feels bound to break some happy illusion which alone makes life tolerable, and we are made to wonder whether Ibsen turns to criticise himself, or perhaps he merely panders to what the public persistently demands in plays.

When Ibsen was nearing the sixties, and crying for deliverance, he seemingly wonders whether one can start afresh when old and escape the taint of heredity and the grip of social codes. We see "Hedda Gabler," who, after her marriage, remains primarily the daughter of General Gabler, rather than the wife of her uninteresting husband. Still will she realize herself, and when this is found impossible, surrender is avoided by suicide. Again in *Little Eyolf,* Ibsen drowns a boy rather than leave him to be made conformable to his mother's ideas—she dresses him in soldier clothes, though he is a cripple—and to his father's ambition to reproduce in the son a scholar like himself.

In the closing decade of the century Ibsen gave out his *Master Builder.* Here is the conflict of two generations; but the younger generation comes to Solness in three forms: as his own earlier life coming back, as the pressure of a younger artist displacing him as he had displaced the father, and as the nine dolls lying in an empty nursery since his wife lost her babies in a fire which Solness had planned to achieve other ends. He used to build churches to the honor of God but had told God one day that he was through. Then he built homes for human comfort and found it unsatisfying. He proposes now to build "castles in the air." What has wrought the change but the return to him of Hilda with whom, while a mere child, he had flirted that day he turned from God? Now she drives him on to build her one castle with a spire and to crown it as of old with a wreath. But he has lived so long on low levels that he can no longer stand at the height. He climbs and falls to

the pavement—dead. He could seek to regain the past but alas had to die in the effort.

Ibsen scorned middle class conventions, and if we would understand our own young people it may be worth while to see what Ibsen saw, even if we finally reject his judgment. Some aspects of Puritanism call for compensation in creative art and creative ways of life, and the way out of that life which Ibsen pictured as stunted is not easy nor is it readily found, but Ibsen found his task and toiled at it like a master, and for this generation, at least, his voice will not cease to echo, while there be many modern writers who are about to die, and should therefore at least, salute him.

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

PORTRAIT OF PROFESSOR T. C. CHAMBERLIN

Frontispiece to The Open Court.

THE OPEN COURT

A MONTHLY MAGAZINE

Devoted to the Science of Religion, the Religion of Science, and the Extension of the Religious Parliament Idea.

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THE SUNSET OF A GREAT LIFE

BY J. V. NASH

DR. CHARLES W. GILKEY, of the University of Chicago, in his address at the funeral service for Professor T. C. Chamberlin, dean of American scientists and father of the Planetesimal hypothesis,[1] declared that the name of Chamberlin will go down into history in company with those of Galileo, Laplace, and the other great pathfinders in natural science who have preceded him. It is a prediction in which all who knew Professor Chamberlin will heartily concur.

As my relation with Professor Chamberlin during the last months of his life was one of peculiar intimacy, it has been recommended that I should put on record my recollections of the great scientist's interests and activities in those sunset days of his career.

It was my privilege to be a student of geology, in both the residence and the field courses, at the University of Chicago while Professor Chamberlin was the active head of the department. He had been called to Chicago from the presidency of the University of Wisconsin in 1892 by Dr. William Rainey Harper at the founding of the University, to organize and build up a strong department of earth science.

Not until after Professor Chamberlin's retirement in 1919, however, did I come into intimate contact with him. In 1925 I began a series of scientific articles for a popular magazine, and in connec-

[1] The Planetesimal hypothesis was developed jointly by Professor Chamberlin and his younger colleague, Professor F. R. Moulton, the astronomer and mathematician. Professor Chamberlin told me that the idea of planetary genesis from the sun through the attraction of a passing star (recently adopted in England by Jeans and Jeffreys as the foundation of their tidal theory) was his alone, but that in the working out of the necessary calculations which established its validity he was so dependent upon Moulton that he desired the theory to be considered a joint one and wished that the public should so understand it.

tion therewith I was asked, early in 1926, to prepare a write-up of the Planetesimal hypothesis and other fundamental discoveries by Professor Chamberlin. He cordially acceded to my request for an interview, which occupied a large part of a forenoon in his pleasant apartment at the Hyde Park Hotel. This was the beginning of a personal friendship which became closer as time went on.

In 1927, when I was assisting the late Dr. T. W. Goodspeed in work on the biography of President Harper, I wrote to Professor Chamberlin, asking if he would tell me, in a brief interview, of his recollections of Dr. Harper. He replied on the bottom of my letter:

"Come and take dinner with me at 6 P. M. Saturday evening.
"T. C. C."

He had prepared in advance some memoranda relating to President Harper, which he handed to me. Afterwards, as we sat talking in his study, he added a few oral reminiscences, which I took down in shorthand. Speaking quite extemporaneously, he said:

"I have a very definite picture of Dr. Harper's personality and mentality. He was a person who was very enthusiastic in almost everything. His enthusiasm was very wise. If you went to him with a scientific subject in which his knowledge was necessarily limited, he would catch on to it and become very enthusiastic about it.

"I remember my first meeting with him, a year before he came here and I came here. I had gone East to see Harper at Yale to get a young man to be assistant in Latin at Wisconsin. Harper was one of the two men at Yale that I wanted to see for recommendations. I met him coming down to one of those old dormitories that used to be in the center of the Yale campus where he had his room. I was able to recognize him and went up and asked: 'Are you Dr. Harper?' 'Yes,' he said. I told him that I wanted to have a talk with him. 'Come up to my room.' I went there and explained my business. He thought a little and then suddenly slapped his knee and said: 'I have just the man.' He went on to describe this young man. He was the co-author in the preparation of a *Caesar*. He described him to me, and so I went to see him. I took Dr. Harper's word that his scholarship was all right, but I wanted to know about his personality .

"I can see Harper sitting there thinking, and when the idea came, bringing down his hand with a quick slap and exclaiming: 'Just the man!'

"He was full of enthusiasm and quick to catch the essence of an idea. I don't think I ever knew him to throw cold water on a proposition—maybe he did. But he would catch a proposition and take to it very kindly. That was perhaps a leading characteristic—

that readiness to see an opportunity, to see something to be done, and his enthusiasm for pursuing it."

After the death of Dr. Goodspeed, only a few days later, I sent Professor Chamberlin one or two photographs which I had made of this old associate of his in the days of the organization of the University. On January 6, 1928, Professor Chamberlin acknowledged the pictures in the following note:

"Dear Mr. Nash:

"I thank you very cordially for the photos of Dr. Goodspeed. I shall appreciate them all the more because they were taken so near the close of his life, and because we were so close to him in interest just before he passed away.

"Yours truly,

"T. C. Chamberlin."

"Drop in and take a meal with me once in a while."

Speaking of Dr. Goodspeed in a later interview, Professor Chamberlin said:

"Goodspeed was always a great trouble in my dreams. I wanted him to write my biography, but I didn't want to die first. I couldn't solve the difficulty."

Early in the following May, I called on Professor Chamberlin in company with his former colleague and partner in the development of the Planetesimal hypothesis—Dr. F. R. Moulton. I had arranged this interview in order to secure some photographs of the two noted scientists together. On May 8, Professor Chamberlin wrote me as follows:

"Dear Mr. Nash:

"I appreciate very highly your kindness in sending me prints of the photos you took Saturday, as also the pleasure your call gave. It was an especial pleasure to meet and chat with Moulton. It was so much like old times. As you know, we began to work together thirty years ago.

"Very truly yours,

"T. C. Chamberlin."

In the summer of 1928, I prepared a little article on the scientific philosophy of Professor Chamberlin, taking the material from an interview that he had given me some time before. This manuscript I submitted to the editor of the *Open Court,* with the suggestion that it be published in the September number of the magazine, in honor of the eminent scientist's eighty-fifth birthday, which was to occur on the twenty-fifth of that month. The editor readily agreed

to the proposal, the contribution appearing as the leading article in that issue, under the title, "Professor Chamberlin, Dean of American Scientists, on the Future of Man."

I sent Professor Chamberlin a copy of the article. Later I called him on the telephone to tender him my greetings and to offer him a few copies of some reprints which I had received. Professor Chamberlin thanked me warmly for the article and suggested that I leave the reprints at his home, on my way downtown—"as you are going by."

Accordingly, the next morning I called at his apartment and paid him a little visit. As I was rising to leave, he motioned me back to the chair, with the request that I stay a few minutes longer, as there was another matter that he wished to speak to me about. He explained that he was now without any dependable secretarial assistance, and he wondered whether I would find it convenient to devote a little time daily to helping him. "I have been thinking, for about a year, of asking you to do this," he added. Of course, I gladly accepted his proposition, and a mutually satisfactory arrangement was entered into immediately.

His book, *The Two Solar Families: The Sun's Children,* summing up his many years' investigation of fundamental problems of cosmogony, was, after repeated delays, about to be published by the University Press. He now received a letter from the Press, promising that the book would appear without fail on September 25. The date happened to be Professor Chamberlin's birthday. I called the coincidence to his attention and it seemed to please him. There was a good deal of business to be transacted with the Press in connection with sending advance copies of the book to the reviewers and complimentary copies to personal friends. I handled all of this business for him.

On September 25, Professor Chamberlin observed his eighty-fifth birthday. He spent the day quietly in his apartment. Many messages, by letter, telegram, and telephone, came to him, offering congratulations upon his phenomenally long life of scientific achievement. The annals of history will indeed probably be searched in vain for another instance of a scientist publishing a work of important original research at the age of over eighty. His old friend, Professor J. Paul Goode, the geographer, called on the telephone to congratulate him. "Oh, thank you! You're good, Goode; you're very good, Goode!" he answered, chuckling over his little pun on

his colleague's name. A number of visitors dropped in, and there were flowers on his table. His three tiny grandchildren, accompanied by their mother, trooped into his study, shyly kissed him, and presented him with little gifts of handkerchiefs and pencils. In the afternoon, the newspapers sent reporters and photographers to interview him and take some flashlight pictures. Late in the day, a copy of his book, just off the press, was brought to him—I think by his son, Professor Rollin T. Chamberlin.

Writing the next day to Frank Leverett, for many years one of his field assistants on the staff of the United States Geological Survey, Professor Chamberlin said:

> "I appreciate more than I can tell you your kind words with regard to my eighty-fifth birthday. It passed in a way that was almost ideal to me, in that a few friends whom I hold most dear expressed themselves in very gratifying ways; at the same time I kept in the quiet of my study and remained entirely off—so far as I was prime mover—the stage. There has been a little staging, as perhaps you will see from the newspapers—perhaps not; but I was in no way responsible for that."

We had a session in his apartment every forenoon. I read his morning's mail to him; then we disposed of it, together with the mail that had come in late on the day before. To some letters he dictated replies; others he turned over to me to handle. His sight had been failing for many years. He did not use glasses, however, as his eye-trouble involved multiple images. Still, he could read with the assistance of a powerful lens held close to the print or writing. I tried to spare him so far as possible the necessity of reading. On some days he would dictate a few pages of tentative manuscript, mostly connected with certain studies in Pleistocene (Glacial) problems, the field in which he had done his first important geological work and in which he continued to the end to take a keen interest.[2]

Professor Chamberlin said that if his life should be spared, he hoped to publish a book on the Pleistocene problems, and also one dealing with the philosophical aspects of his scientific studies. This latter, I assumed, would have elaborated the ideas set forth in his address to the Association of Doctors of Philosophy at the University of Chicago in June, 1918, treating of "the Cosmos, the

[2] The particular Pleistocene problem which engaged his lively interest was that of the correlation of the several ice invasions, especially in Iowa, and the proper nomenclature to be employed in their differentiation.

Psychos, and the Theos," and in his great Boston address as retiring President of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, in December, 1909, wherein he envisaged an almost limitless future for the intellectual and social evolution of the race.

He discussed with me my own writing, especially in the way of popular scientific articles. He expressed cordial approval of this sort of work; indeed, he suggested my preparing at some future time a series of such articles based upon his own investigations. Scientific men like himself, he said, were glad to have their work placed before the general public in a popular style, but preferred to have it done by others.

One day he remarked that he had been thinking of a new term for the studies in which he had been chiefly interested. "It is *Geontology,*" he said. "I should like to see a chair of Geontology established at the University to continue my work."

About this time he was arranging for a distribution of scientific papers to his large mailing list; this we revised and corrected for the purpose. The distribution was handled by the University Press, with which I conducted the necessary negotiations by telephone, correspondence, and personal conference. The material, which was sent out to several thousands of names all over the world, consisted of (1) reprint of article in *Scientia,* "The Growth of the Earth" (editions in both English and French), (2) reprint of his last report to the Carnegie Institution of Washington, "Study of Fundamental Problems of Geology," and (3) prospectus, with specimen pages, of *The Two Solar Families: The Sun's Children.*

Meanwhile, an article by a British scientist, Professor Eddington, had appeared in *Harper's Magazine* for October, in which a quite erroneous impression was given as to the authorship of the theory of earth genesis based on the close approach of another star to our sun. Professor Chamberlin was much disturbed by this article, which seemed to him a further step in the apparent attempt of certain British scientists to distort the facts with reference to the Planetesimal hypothesis and the doctrine of "close approach" or "dynamic encounter," which was conceived by himself and developed to maturity in collaboration with Professor Moulton in the period 1896-1904. He suspected a desire on the part of these men "to get us out of it," as he expressed it during the visit which Professor Moulton and I made to him a few months earlier.

Professor Chamberlin was anxious to have Dr. Moulton answer

this article and, once for all, put the record straight as to priority rights in the new cosmogony, involving (1) the proof of the untenability of the Nebular hypothesis of Laplace, and (2) the development of the new theory of the birth of the sun's planetary family through tidal disruption effected by the passing of another star, a phenomenon which occurs only at intervals of billions of years.

Dr. Moulton, at Professor Chamberlin's suggestion during the conversation in May, had already agreed to review *The Two Solar Families: The Sun's Children,* when it should appear from the press. It seemed to Professor Chamberlin that the publication of the Eddington article called for immediate action. He dictated a letter to Dr. Moulton, directing his attention to it and urging upon him the importance of taking the matter up.

In order to facilitate Dr. Moulton's work, I requested Professor Chamberlin to give me an informal account of the history of the original announcement of the Planetesimal hypothesis. He did so, and I transmitted this, along with documents which I secured from Professor Chamberlin's files, to Dr. Moulton, for his use in formulating his paper. I kept in close touch with Dr. Moulton, giving Professor Chamberlin frequent reports on the progress that Dr. Moulton was making in the preparation of the paper, which he had arranged to have published in *Science* after first submitting a draft of it to Professor Chamberlin and to several others for criticism.

Professor Chamberlin was immensely pleased when he learned that Dr. Moulton was pursuing the matter vigorously. It seemed to lift a burden from his mind; he became more care-free and contented than he had been before.

On the other hand, his physical strength was obviously failing. He himself recognized this. He had been at the Billings Hospital (on the University quadrangles) during the summer for rest and observation. For some time he had been taking sleeping tablets for his insomnia. Then, too, ever since his return from the mission to China in 1909 he had suffered from stomach trouble. Early in October, at his request, I had called up Dr. Joseph L. Miller to arrange for a medical examination. The examination was made, and at the physician's suggestion the use of the sleeping tablets was given up.

Now that the publication of the book, the distribution of the reprints, and the matter of Dr. Moulton's article were off his mind, Professor Chamberlin said that he wanted to give up all activity so

far as possible in order to recuperate from "stress." So he abandoned the dictation of any further scientific material, and our sessions became very brief. I was now sufficiently familiar with his correspondence to handle most of it independently, under his direction. He seemed to suffer increasingly from exhaustion. As soon as we had disposed of the morning's mail, he would go to the couch and lie down. As his tiredness grew upon him, after a brief session in the study I would assist him into his chamber, where he reclined on the bed, covered with a steamer rug, and dozed through the day. Sometimes I read a little to him there before leaving, but he generally dropped quickly into a nap.

His great outside interest at this time was the approaching Presidential election. With the aid of his reading lens he continued to scan the newspapers during his leisure time, and in my daily visits I read to him articles of special interest. He was strongly in favor of Hoover, and we discussed together the progress of the campaign.

In the meantime, Dr. Moulton had completed his first draft of the review of *The Two Solar Families: The Sun's Children.* I copied it for him and then read it to Professor Chamberlin. He listened with the closest attention to the reading, frequently punctuating it with expressions such as "mighty good," "that's fine," and so on. When the reading was completed, he dictated the following little note to Dr. Moulton, under date of October 25:

"My dear Dr. Moulton:

"Mr. Nash has just finished reading to me the first draft of your review of the little book.

"I am delighted with it beyond measure, and you have my approval from one end to the other.

"I am so thoroughly with you in both manner and substance that I would advise you to go right ahead and polish it as you and your scientific colleagues advise, and not waste time on me. I am grateful to you to an extent I cannot express for this splendid work.

"Very truly yours,

"T. C. Chamberlin."

By this time he was becoming so feeble that his son, Professor R. T. Chamberlin, arranged to secure the services of a medical student to stay with him at night. This young man, Mr. Kenneth Sears, began his duties at the end of October, occupying a couch in the study. Professor Chamberlin had, however, brushed aside

my suggestion of a wheel-chair, to obviate the danger of falling. He did not want to come to that, he said, until he had to.

The first alarming symptom of Professor Chamberlin's condition occurred on the evening of Monday, November 5, when Mr. Sears reported that his patient was unable to eat his dinner. The next morning he failed to hold his simple breakfast. I acquainted Professor R. T. Chamberlin with the new turn that had developed. I endeavored to get Dr. Miller to come at once to make an examination, but as his engagements were such that he could not come for some time, I reached Dr. Steele, at the Billings Hospital.

That afternoon I stayed with Professor Chamberlin until about 5 o'clock, when his son arrived and took charge. I worked in the study, copying the last draft of Dr. Moulton's article, while Professor Chamberlin slept fitfully in his chamber, separated from the study by a small sitting room, into which the main entrance to the apartment opened. I hoped that the transcript might be finished in time to read to him before any further relapse should occur. But this was not to be.

Professor Chamberlin had not eaten during the entire day. Before I left, he sat up for a little while. I suggested a glass of grape juice, of which he was very fond. "That tastes good," he commented, after a few swallows of the cool, refreshing drink.

The next morning I learned that Dr. Steele had called early in the evening and, after an examination, had ordered Professor Chaimberlin's removal to the Billings Hospital. A serious heart weakening had been discovered.

Professor Chamberlin had said nothing to me of a realization that the end was approaching. But some time after I began my work for him, he took me into his private chamber and personally went through his chests of drawers with me, showing me what was in them, and indicating papers that he said could soon be "chucked." I learned afterwards, too, that he expressed to the maid who attended to the care of his rooms at the hotel, when she inquired how he was feeling, the thought that it was "only a matter of time now." This was about two weeks before the final collapse. Mr. Speed, a graduate student in geology, who was serving as an attendant at the hospital, reports to me that Professor Chamberlin, when he arrived at the hospital, remarked in substance, in reply to the young man's inquiry: "I believe that I have come into the hospital for the last time. My health seems to be poor. A person cannot expect

to last for too long, and I had many active years." When Mr. Sears, several days later, expressed the hope that he would soon be able to leave the hospital, he smiled quizzically and said, "Perhaps." On the other hand, the day after he entered the hospital he asked me to tell the Manager of the hotel, with whom his relations were very friendly, that his illness was not alarming and that he expected to return in a few days. So far as I know, he did not discuss with anyone the matter of his death. One day at the hospital he asked me jokingly whether I was troubled by "spooks" in his deserted apartment.

At the beginning of my service to Professor Chamberlin I had encouraged him to "reminisce" to me about the events of his long career, particularly in his early days. He did so freely, with the knowledge that I was taking it down in shorthand for possible biographical use. In this way I secured much valuable material for the story of his life; but we had only slightly tapped his vast store of personal recollections.

Professor Chamberlin's ailment, as I have indicated, was diagnosed as heart trouble. Digitalis was administered at the hospital, and he was given every aid that modern science could offer. But he grew progressively weaker. I visited him daily and kept him in touch, so far as possible, with his mail. Press clippings from all over the country were pouring in every day, warmly commending his book as a notable contribution to scientific progress.

The national election was held on the day of Professor Chamberlin's removal to the hospital. On my first visit to him there, the following day, I reported to him the results of the election, in which Hoover was swept into office by a great Republican landslide. Several of the Southern States had given Republican majorities, for the first time since Reconstruction days. Included among these States were Virginia and North Carolina. Professor Chamberlin had ancestral roots in both of these States; North Carolina was the birthplace of his father, which he had left as a young man because of his opposition to the institution of slavery. "Well," he chuckled, when he heard this interesting news, "that's better than medicine!" A few days before this, during one of our sessions at his home when we were discussing the election, I had remarked that if Virginia went Republican it would make Jefferson Davis "turn in his grave." "He'll roll over," commented Professor Chamberlin, smilingly.

Professor Chamberlin did not suffer pain, nor did his habitual cheerfulness desert him. He was a model patient; the confinement must have irked him, but he never complained. Two efficient young nurses attended him with a reverential tenderness. Several of his old associates visited him during these last days, including Dr. Moulton and Professor MacMillan. His son was in attendance as much as possible daily. Professor Chamberlin enjoyed having visitors call, and conversed with them freely.

Toward the end, his mind occasionally wandered. This, I was informed by medical authority, was due to poor blood circulation in the brain, resulting from the weakening of the heart action.

The last message which he gave to his secretary was in reply to a letter from Mr. James M. Nicely, of New York, informing him of resolutions which had been adopted at a meeting of the New York alumni and alumnae of the University of Chicago, in honor of his eighty-fifth birthday. "I appreciate very much the warm words of greeting," Professor Chamberlin said in answer. The last letter read to him by his secretary was from Sir Arthur Smith Woodward, the well-known British scientist, acknowledging the reprints sent him and telling of some recent excavations at Piltdown and of new fossils discovered by him in the Lebanon. Professor Woodward, it will be remembered, was the co-discoverer of the notable human remains familiar to anthropologists as the *Piltdown Man*.[3]

On Wednesday oxygen was administered, but Professor Chamberlin disliked it and it was discontinued. I saw him for the last time that afternoon. He was receiving oxygen under a large celluloid hood. Apparently he imagined that he was back in his old classroom, lecturing on problems in geology; he moved his hand feebly on the coverlet as he emphasized his points. "On the other hand" were the last words I heard him speak, as I turned sorrowfully away and left the room. I did not suspect at the time that

[3] Sir Arthur Smith Woodward, in a letter to the present writer under date of February 2, 1929, said of Professor Chamberlin:

> "I knew him as a geologist of very wide sympathies and knowledge, interested in all kinds of progress. When I first met him in 1900 he had lying on his table my then comparatively new book on Vertebrate Palaeontology, and we had long talks at the Hyde Park Hotel. I was with him again in 1904, both at Chicago and at the Congress of Arts and Sciences at the St. Louis Exposition. I learned to regard him with affection, and regretted I had no opportunity of meeting him in his later years. He left an enduring mark on American science, and the Geological Society of London (of which I am now Foreign Secretary) held him in high esteem among its Foreign Members."

the end was then less than twenty-four hours distant. Professor William H. Hobbs, head of the Department of Geology at the University of Michigan, whom Chamberlin had appointed to a professorship at Madison when President of the University of Wisconsin, later remarked to me at Ann Arbor that these words were significant, suggesting the persistence of Chamberlin's well-known rule of "multiple working hypotheses."

Thursday morning, November 15, his condition was unchanged. At about noon the nurse entered the room and saw him resting easily on his side. She gave him a drink of water, returned at about half-past twelve, and found that all was over.

That afternoon an autopsy was performed on the body. It was reported that the condition of the heart showed that it had worn out. A cancerous condition in the kidneys was discovered, but this in itself was not responsible for his death. I was one of the few who saw the remains in the coffin at the undertaker's the next day. The lines on his face had softened; his features bore a look of infinite peace.

The University funeral service for Professor Chamberlin was the first to be held in the magnificent new chapel, dedicated less than three weeks before. The chancel was banked with flowers, and the coffin rested at the head of the center aisle, a university student marshal and a university aide, in cap and gown, standing one at each end of the coffin until the service began. Dr. Charles W. Gilkey delivered a simple but feeling address on the significance of Professor Chamberlin's life and work. Without, a steady downpour of rain deepened the shadows of the November twilight within.

Burial was at Beloit the following day, among the fields of southern Wisconsin where he had played and worked as a boy on the farm, where he had spent many happy years as a student and later a professor in the College; in the midst, too, of the sloping, grass-covered moraines where he had made the first glacial studies which led on, step by step, to his far-reaching investigations in cosmogony which culminated in the Planetesimal hypothesis.

There was a remarkable thread of continuity running through Professor Chamberlin's long and fruitful life. Old students, whom he had taught as a young man, kept in touch with him while life endured. A typical instance is revealed in his correspondence, during the last year of his life, with Mr. Charles T. Harris, who was a student under Professor Chamberlin at Delavan, Wisconsin,

in the 1860's. Mr. Harris, now an elderly business man in New York, had read in the New York *Times* of the conferring of the Penrose Medal upon Professor Chamberlin, at Cleveland. He wrote a letter of congratulation, in which he recalled the aid and inspiration he had received from Professor Chamberlin in those far-off days. The letter concluded:

> "Therefore, today I voice these few and inadequate words of love and pride and tribute to my best teacher and friend, with joy in my heart for his wonderful professional and personal life and influence.
>
> "Your little boy pupil and friend,
>
> "Charles T. Harris."

Professor Chamberlin's reply, under date of January 11, 1928, is one of the most beautiful human documents that it has been the present writer's privilege to read. It follows:

> "My dear Charlie:
>
> "Let me call you that, for it is as Charlie Harris that I remember you, and the memory brings up so many things that were near and dear to me.
>
> "You are quite right that the associations of my first two years after leaving college, at the Delavan school, are full of fond recollections and that my little struggles and triumphs there still stand out large in my personal history. They were the deciding factors in my later life. I do not know how many times I have told of that first little outdoor afternoon excursion when we all went up the creek to the railroad and back to the cut through the ridge, and I tried to tell you a little about the rocks, etc. It led on in a singular way to my later studies and all that has come from them. All you high school boys and girls are entitled to some share in the medal that has been given me, for if you had not been eager, responsive and appreciative, it is not likely that I would ever have become a special student of earth science.
>
> "It is delightful to hear from you again. It is like a sweet breeze from the land of youth.
>
> "As my eyes grow dim it is hard for me to make new acquaintances and to remember people whom I meet, but I could call the roll of Delavan High School today without many omissions, and your faces are fresher and more vivid than any new faces I now see. I thank you sincerely for writing me and for your very gracious words.
>
> "Yours very truly,
>
> "T. C. Chamberlin."

Alfred Russel Wallace, co-discoverer, with Charles Darwin, of evolution by natural selection, in his book entitled *Man's Place in the Universe,* discussed at some length Professor Chamberlin's work in the field of cosmogony. In this book he quoted two stanzas from Tennyson, which to some of Professor Chamberlin's friends seemed a fitting requiem for the great geologist and cosmogonist as his life-work ended:

"(The Question)
"Will my tiny spark of being
Wholly vanish in your deeps and heights?
Must my day be dark by reason,
O ye heavens, of your boundless nights?
Rush of Suns and roll of systems,
And your fiery clash of meteorites?

"(The Answer)
"Spirit, nearing yon dark portal
At the limit of thy human state,
Fear not thou the hidden purpose
Of that Power which alone is great,
Nor the myriad world, His shadow,
Nor the silent Opener of the Gate."

So Professor Chamberlin's career closed, as he would no doubt have wished, on the grounds of the institution which had been the scene of his greatest scientific labors. And though he lived to within fifteen years of the century mark, there was for him no period of idleness and senile decay. His life went out on "an upward curve"—on the crest of his last superb contribution to the unfolding story of earth science.

THE ORGANIZATION OF PANDEMONIUM

BY MAXIMILIAN RUDWIN

HELL may be a region of disorder in comparison with heaven, but it is evident that some sort of order must prevail in the lower regions. It is certainly doubtful whether the Devil will permit any disorder or discord in his domain. This solidarity and amity among the exiled angels is explained by their common lot of suffering under adversity. Milton has himself said: "Devil with devil damn'd Firm concord holds" (*Par. Lost* ii. 496-7). Indeed, the Puritan poet, following the lead of Tasso, ascribed to the demons of hell a spirit of harmony, of loyalty, and of enthusiasm which is not often found among the inhabitants of this planet. He also granted them the power of governing and combining themselves on their own basic principles and endowed them with the faculty of deliberation and concerted action.

The demons of darkness form a regular social and political organization.[1] The infernal government was patterned after the celestial government. The Kingdom of Satan, mentioned in the New Testament (Matt. xii. 26), was established to rival the Kingdom of God. The diabolarchy was formed in imitation of the hierarchy of heaven. The Church fathers Hieronymus, Chrysostom, Cassianus and others speak of a hierarchy of devils. Previously, biblical authority had pointed to the fact that there are divisions in rank among the hosts of hell (Matt. xii. 26, 45, xxv. 41; Luk. xi. 15, 18; Rev. xii. 7, 9; cf. also Book of Enoch liii. 3). In Hesiod, too, the demons are divided into different orders, although the Greek poet, it must be admitted, has in mind good dæmons, who dwell above the ground and are donors of wealth to mortals.

[1] Historically considered, we might say that the demonologists collected Lucifer's routed forces after their expulsion from heaven and reorganized them according to a well laid-out plan.

At the head of the hierarchy of hell stands Satan, who, in Christian theology, is the ruler of the "accursed counter-kingdom of evil" (Book of Enoch). Satan is considered as *summum imperium infernalis*. He rules his kingdom by the law of the mailed fist. The arch-devil's Draconian disciple has become proverbial. No insubordination is tolerated in his realm. In all fairness to the Fiend, however, it should be added that he probably is no greater oppressor of his subjects than most monarchs, who rule on our own planet. This Cæsar-Satan is just like any other emporor, neither better nor worse.[2]

Satan, however, is not universally recognized as the present ruler of the "infernal kingdom" (*Titus Andronicus* v. 2. 30). It is believed by many demonologists that Satan now is a dethroned monarch and belongs in a class with William II of Germany, Ferdinand of Bulgaria, and other rulers who forfeited their crowns in the Great War. Johannes Wierus, in his treatise *Pseudomonarchia dæmonum* (16th cent.),[3] maintains that Satan was forced long ago to resign in favor of Beelzebub, who headed a revolution against the ancient leader of the rebel angels and wrested the crown and scepter from him. We offer the suggestion that the relation between Satan and Beelzebub in hell might correspond to that between Victor Emmanuel and Mussolini on earth. Satan is the nominal ruler of Gehenna, whereas Beelzebub holds in his hands the reins of the government. Satan may still wear the crown, but it is Beelzebub who is dictator of the devils.

In Milton's poem about the fall of the angels, however, Satan remains the chief of the infernal spirits, while Beelzebub is "Satan's nearest mate" (*Par. Lost* i. 192, 238). The Faust-book of 1587 reveals Beelzebub as one of the seven principal spirits introduced to Faustus by their chief (ch. xxiii.) According to Asmodeus, the hero of LeSage's novel *le Diable boiteux* (1707), Beelzebub is among the least important Helots of hell. He calls Beelzebub a "boob" and maintains that he is the demon of domestics.

[2] In Frederik van Eeden's novel *De kleine Johannes* (1887), Satan denies the fact that he is a despotic ruler and says boastfully: "I am a king of a constitutional democracy."

[3] Victor Hugo, in his novel, *les Travailleurs de la mer* (1866), calls Wier, Weier or Weyer (Latin Wierus or Piscinarius) "a *savant*, a good strygologue, and a man of much learning in demonology." For a biography of this physician of Rhenish Prussia, that man of enlightenment, who was the first to combat the persecution of witches, the reader is referred to C. Binz: *Doktor Johann Weyer, ein rheinischer Arzt, der erste Bekämpfer des Hexenwesens*. Bonn, 1885.

In popular belief, however, Lucifer is the Potentate of the Pit. The *Black Book* by Thomas Middleton (1604) dignifies the lord of all the powers of darkness with the following titles: "The high and mightie Prince of darkness, Donsell del Lucifer, King of Acheron, Stix and Phlegeton, Duke of Tartary, Marquese of Cocytus, and Lord High Regent of Lymbo."[4] The litanies of the Witches' Sabbaths always began with a laudation of Lucifer. Marlowe's *Dr. Faustus* (c. 1589) represents Lucifer as the "Arch-regent and commander of all spirits" (iii. 64) and Beelzebub as his "companion prince in hell" (*ibid.*, vi. 92).

In the medieval mystery-plays, Lucifer is lord of hell and Satan is his chief minister and bosom friend.[5] A sharp line of demarcation is drawn in the medieval German drama between the characters of these two devils. Satan's proud self-confidence stands in pleasing contrast to Lucifer's rueful self-abasement. Lucifer is a weakling, a cowardly despot, while Satan is his strong arm, his "clever rooster," as his lord calls him. The prime minister of hell never hesitates to speak his mind in the presence of Lucifer. He makes fun of his master even to his very face and upbraids him for his old womanish manners. The arch-regent of hell is nervous and timorous, sentimental and brutal, vacillating and temporizing, always whimpering and whining with regard to his past glory. Satan, on the other hand, is bold and proud, ever optimistic, never regretful. After the fall from heaven. Satan musters all his powers of oratory to cheer and comfort his crest-fallen and despairing lord and master.

The róles of these two devils are, however, often reversed by modern writers. Immerman's *Merlin* (1832), for instance, makes Satan the sovereign, while Lucifer is the vice-regent in the government of Gehenna.

The Italian writers, loyal to the classical tradition, consider Pluto the god of the underworld. This divinity will be found as chief of hell, among other writers, in Boccaccio, Machiavelli and Tasso. In Mérimée's *Fédérigo* (1829), based on a Neapolitan legend, Pluto is

[4] In the Renaissance period, the Christian lower world was identified with the heathen lower world. Elysium, as well as Hades and Tartarus, was confounded with hell.

[5] This relation between the two chief demons of hell will also be found in Gil Vicente's Portuguese play, *Historia de Deos,* of the sixteenth century. The *Praxis cabulæ nigræ Doctoris Johannis Fausti* of 1612, one of the many books of magic ascribed to Faust, mentions Belial as viceroy. But in many books of magic of the sixteenth century, Mephistopheles is called the vice-regent of Lucifer over all other infernal spirits.

likewise named as ruler of hell. Dante, in his *Inferno,* places Dis, the Western equivalent of Pluto, at the head of hell. Pluto appears as the monarch of the nether world also in the puppet-plays of Faust.

According to Jewish tradition, Samael is the chief of the infernal spirits, always having held undisputed sway and having never been replaced by Satan, Beelzebub, Lucifer or any of the lesser lights of hell.

In Arabian mythology, Eblis, the former Azazel, is the leader of the hosts of hell, while in rabbinic mythology, Azazel is not the king of the demons, but their viceroy.

Many systems of the infernal government constructed by the cabalists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries placed the supremacy of hell in the hands of Belial.

If we put faith in the words of Asmodeus, the hero of LeSage's novel already mentioned, hell is ruled by a triumvirate composed of Ashtaroth, Belphegor and Leviathan.

The belief in the four infernal chiefs, held by many demonologists, is based on the description in the Revelations of St. John of the four angels who hold the four winds, and to whom is given the power to afflict the earth (vii. 1). In connection with this passage, St. Augustine taught that the word "angel" is equally applicable to good and to bad spirits. Four devils were *sine qua non* in the medieval mystery-plays. This scenic incident explains the French expression *faire le diable à quatre* (to play the Devil as a group of four).[6] According to the teachings of demonology, four angels were set over the quarters of the world prior to the Fall, and it was the "Prince of the East" who rebelled, and to whom the other half of the universe was henceforth closed, so that he became the "prince of this (*i.e.* Eastern) world" (John xii. 31, xiv. 30, xvi. 11). In the Faust-book (ch. xiii), Lucifer likewise rules in the Orient. Marlowe, therefore, calls him "Prince of the East" (v. 104), although the same term in its Latin form ("Orientis princeps") is also applied in *Dr. Faustus* to Beelzebub (iii. 17). In other magical works, Amoyon is mentioned as king of the East, and Goap is designated as "Prince of the West." Beelzebub rules "in Septentrione," according to the Faust-book (ch. xiii). *Friar Bacon and Friar Bungay* by Robert Greene (c. 1589) gives to Asmenoth the titles of "guider" and "ruler of the North" (ix. 144 and xi. 109).

[6] Cf. A. Fabre: *Etudes sur la Basoche,* p. 248. A French revolutionary paper, which was founded in 1869, bore the title *le Diable à quatre.*

Reginald Scot, in his *Discoverie of Witchcraft* (1584), however, calls Zizimar "the lordly monarch of the North."[7]

The system of the infernal hierarchy constructed by the writers on magic in the seventeenth century considers hell as ruled by six chiefs, to whom must answer seven "electors" or grand dukes. The pseudo-Faust conjuration-book previously mentioned contains a full roster of the government officials of hell, listing Lucifer as king, Belial as viceroy, Satan, Belzebub, Astaroth and Pluto as "gubernatores" of Gehenna, and Aniguel, Anizel, Ariel, Aziel, Barfael, Marbuel and Mephistopheles as the seven "electors." The seven archdemons, whom we also find in Leconte de Lisle's pseudo-medieval fantasy *Smarh* (1839), match the seven archangels in the enemy's camp, first mentioned in the Book of Enoch. Thus seven is a mystic number, even where infernal matters are concerned.[8]

The "kingdom of perpetual night" (*Richard III* I. iv. 47) contains many other throned, crowned and sceptered spirits. The directory of the devils reads, in fact, like the pages of the *Almanac de Gotha.* We find in it kings, princes, dukes, marquises, earls, counts, viscounts, barons, knights, presidents, and other civil and military officials. Among the diabolical dignitaries the following may be pointed out; Bel and Pluto, princes of fire; Moloch, prince of the country of tears; Eurymone, prince of death; Pan, prince of the *incubi* (Jean Bodin: *la Démonomanie des sorciers* (1580); Agares, first duke under the power of the East; Leraie and Sabnac, marquises; Morax, a great earl and president; Marbas, a great president; Jupiter, Neptune, and Antichrist, barons (Huon de Méri's *Tournoiement d'Antechrist* (1235).

The only order of knighthood which appears to exist among the demons of hell is the Order of the Fly founded by Beelzebub. The decoration of the Grand Cross of the Order of the Fly is bestowed for signal services to Satan. Among the demons who have received this much coveted distinction are Adramelech, Baal, Eurymone, Leviathan and Moloch.

*
* *

The court of the infernal monarch is in its splendor second to none held by the rulers of this earth. The king of hell, clad in a

[7] This book, from which much of the information summarized in this paper has been taken, contains a regular muster-roll or army list of the infernal government in the sixteenth century. Collin de Plancy, in his *Dictionnaire infernal* (1818), offers later data on this subject.

[8] Cf. Friedrich von Adrian: *Die Siebenzahl im Geistesleben der Völker.* Wien, 1901.

flowing red robe, is seated on a throne of diamonds and holds the scepter of hell in his right hand. His daughters, as princesses of hell, sit on lower thrones on both sides of their father, wear sparkling crowns on their heads and hold scepters of gold in their hands (Chateaubriand's *les Martyrs,* 1809). Royalty is highly respected at the court of the infernal monarch. The crowned heads of this earth are received in hell with great ceremonies.

Johannes Wierus has presented us with a partial list of the demons attached to the royal court of Gehenna. Chemos holds the post of grand chamberlain in hell, and Verdelet is grand master of ceremonies. The banker at the *baccarat* table in the infernal casino is Asmodeus, and the manager of the court theater of hell is Kobal. The great juggler and romancer is Antichrist, and the court-fool is Nybbas, whom the German demonologist calls "the great parodist." Rimmon is chief physician to his Infernal Lowness. Behemoth fulfils the function of grand cup-bearer, while the principal *valet de chambre* to his Satanic Majesty is Mullin. The grand almoner and master of the pantry is Dagon; the chief cook in the hellish kitchen is Misroch. The captain of the eunuchs, in the harem of the infernal sultan, is Succor-Benoth.

According to Wierus, the cabinet of the government of Gehenna is composed as follows: Adramelech is grand chancellor of the lower world. Baal-Berith is master of alliances (corresponding probably to a modern minister of foreign affairs) and secretary and keeper of the archives of hell. Astaroth is grand treasurer, while Melshom is assistant treasurer and disburser of the public moneys. Moloch is general-in-chief of the Satanic army, and Baal is second in command of the fighting forces of the dread domain of darkness. Leviathan is admiral of the infernal navy.[9] Lucifer is grand judiciary and minister of justice. Nergal is chief of police in the Principality of the Pit. Pluto is the superintendent of the infernal punishments, and Alaster holds the distinguished office of executioner. Marbuel is chief engineer and superintendent of all public buildings in the underworld. The supervision of the fortifications in the infernal regions is entrusted to Sabnac. Leonard is grand master of the Witches' Sabbaths and inspector-general of magic and sorcery. Demogorgon is master of the fates. Barfael holds the

[9] This statement must be erroneous inasmuch as water is an unknown element in the lower regions. In fact, the Kingdom of Nether Darkness has no more navy than Switzerland. Byron calls Leviathan "master of the oceans without shores and of the humid universe" (*Heaven and Earth,* 1822).

secret of the philosopher's stone. Asmodeus is superintendent of the gambling houses, and Nybbas has the management of dreams and visions on earth.

Although the different duties connected with the administration of hell are thus distributed among a number of demons, the holder of one portfolio will often persist in interfering with the department of another minister. The demons, in fact, constantly thrust their claws wherever they are not wanted, to the great detriment of each other's projects. But, naturally enough, this interference accrues to the benefit of man.

*
* *

The ruler of hell holds occasional receptions for his demons, to hear their opinions on matters of state and to listen to the reports of their recent achievements on his behalf. The source for the parliament of devils is the Descensus Christi ad Inferos, which forms the second part of the Evangelium Nicodemi (3rd cent.). In the account of this apocryphal gospel, Christ's descent to hell is followed by a session of Satan's sanhedrin called for the purpose of devising ways and means for the repopulation of hell after the delivery from limbo of our first parents and the other patriarchs and prophets of the Old Testament. The Harrowing of Hell, with its subsequent infernal council, formed an important part of the medieval mystery plays. The deliberations of the infernal deputies are also recorded by Wynkyn de Worde in his metrical tract entitled *The Parlement of Devils* (1509). A council of infernal peers is likewise found in Boccaccio's *Filocopo* (1381-8) and in Jerome Vida's *Christiad* (1535). Tasso, Milton and Chateaubriand present us also with a "Pandemonium."[10]

Democratic freedom of speech and discussion prevails at the infernal council. Its members conduct themselves as gentlemen and reason as accomplished statesmen. A disturbance may sometimes occur during the session of the infernal parliament, but not oftener than in the chamber of deputies of any European government. The accounts of frequent Tartarean tumults are pieces of propaganda directed against the government of Gehenna by its enemies. If the

[10] Professor Olin H. Moore, in his interesting paper "The Infernal Council" (*Modern Philology*, vol. XVI, pp. 169-93), has traced the development of the infernal council from Claudian and the Gospel of Nicodemus through Roert de Boron, Boccaccio, Sannazaro, Vida, and Tasso to Milton. The parliament assembled by Henry VI at Coventry, in 1459, was called the Devil's Parliament because it passed attainders on the Duke of York and his chief supporters.

diabolical deputies cannot always control themselves in council, let us not be too harsh with them, but remember what Byron said: "Even saints sometimes forget themselves in session" (*The Vision of Judgment,* li).

Chateaubriand, in his novel *les Martyrs* already mentioned, pictures a disturbance during a session of the infernal council and calls upon the Lord, who, in the eyes of this royalist and Romanist, permits no disorder in the lower as well as the upper regions, to restore harmony among the spirits of darkness. "A terrible conflict would have resulted," he tells us, "if God, who maintains justice and is the author of all order, even in hell, had not ended the turmoil" (*ibid.,* ch. viii).

The infernal council, with its variety of horns, forms a very respectable and cosmopolitan company. We find among its members Adonis, Astarte, Beelzebub, Belial, Chemos, Dagon, Mammon, Moloch, Rimmon and Thammuz of the Semitic races; Bali and Brahma of the Hindus; Mithra of the Persians; Anubis, Osiris, Isis and Orus of the Egyptians; Apollo and Iris of the Greeks; Vulcan and Neptune of the Romans; Erminsul and Odin of the Scandinavians; and Dis and Teutates of the Gauls. Many of the pagan gods are thus seen to be gathered in this deliberative assembly.

The Kingdom of hell has representatives in all parts of the earth. Wierus presents us with a list of the infernal embassies and the countries to which each is assigned. Belphegor is the accredited ambassador from the infernal regions in France, Hutgin in Italy, Belial in Turkey, Thamuz (or Tharung) in Spain, Martinet in Switzerland, Mammon in England and Rimmon in Russia. Wierus, as physician to the Duke William of Cleves in Westphalia, did not care to admit that any of the German states would entertain diplomatic relations with the court of hell.

Berbiguier de Terre-Neuve du Thym, author of a very curious and voluminous work *les Farfadets, ou Tous les demons ne sont pas de l'autre monde* (1795), maintains that each great devil of hell has also a human representative on earth. The mandatories of the infernal spirits among men are too numerous to mention. Among them will be found Nicolas, a physician of Avignon, who represents Moloch; Bouge, who represents Pluto; Pinel, a physician of the Salpêtrière, who represents Satan; and Moreau, magician and sorcerer of Paris, who represents Beelzebub on earth.

But to return to hell.

Each craft and class among men has a special representative among the infernal spirits. If we are to believe Asmodeus, LeSage's limping imp of hell, Lucifer is the patron of mountebanks and other kinds of scoundrels. Beelzebub, according to the testimony of this arch-bohemian, is the demon "of governesses and gentlemen-ushers or waiting-men." Uriel, Asmodeus also maintains, is the patron of "traders, tailors, butchers, and other third-rate thieves." Marbuel, in the opinion of certain demonologists, is the patron of artisans. It is this devil who assists poor architects and mechanics to carry out their contracts and often to accomplish work that is beyond ordinary human skill. Atoti, according to *Maler* Müller, is the demon of literary men, and Babillo is the patron of painters. The Devil's friendship for artists, particularly painters, is too well known to require further comment.

Martinet is the master of the magicians. Hermes is the patron of alchemists, who practise the "hermetic" arts. Kobal is the companion of the comedians. Leviathan is the demon of the diplomats. Zamiel is the patron of archers and hunters in general.

Flagel, according to LeSage's Asmodeus, is the patron of men of law. He is "the soul of the law and the life of the bar. . . . It is he who makes out the attorneys' and bailiffs' writs; he inspires the pleaders, possesses the jury and attends the judges." Griffael, this demon affrms, is the companion of the court-clerks. It is wholly in the spirit of popular belief that the lawyers should select for their patron the Devil, who is known as the father of lies. Indeed, many legends go to show that the lawyer is more unscrupulous in robbing his neighbors than the Devil himself.[11] The tavern of the lawyers at No. 2 Fleet Street, London, was called "The Devil." When the lawyers in the neighborhood left for dinner, they hung a notice on their doors: "Gone to the Devil" so that those who wanted them might know where to find them.[12]

* * *

An atmosphere of unadulterated industry prevails in hell. Industry is, in fact, the great virtue of the demons. Diligence, it has

[11] Cf. Archer Taylor: "The Devil and the Advocate" in the *Publications of the Modern Language Association of America,* vol. XXXVI (1921), pp. 35-59. Dr. O. A. Wall, in his book *Sex and Sex Worship* (1919), also has several items on the popular belief in the alliance betwen the Devil and the lawyer.

[12] A pleasant account of the Devil's Tavern in London will be found in John Timbs's *Clubs and Club Life in London* (1873).

been said, is the crowning quality with which man has invested the devil of his dreams. "If we were all as diligent and conscientious as the Devil," observed an old Scotch woman to her minister, "it wad be muckle better for us." Anatole France assures us that "the Devil never tires," and in a medieval Italian play entitled *Brighellas* myself." The only object of the unceasing activity among the infernal spirits is to lead men to evil.

Satan says: "I am so busy that I cannot find time to scratch

A specialization and division of labor seems to exist in hell. The distribution of labor among the demons is carried out with great precision. Each of them is given his allotted or enforced task. The functions of the various hellish agents parallel the rôles of the angels. As the latter specialize in their virtues, so the former particularize in their vices. Each evil deed is assigned to its special representative. The various misdeeds cultivated by the hellish specialists range from prattling in church to arson and murder. Such crimes as Sabbath-breaking, making music, attending the theater, and dancing also are included.

Asmodeus is called "prince of lechery" in *Friar Rush,* a romance of the sixteenth century. Baal, in the French medieval mysteries, is the demon of idleness, and Baal-Berith the demon of disobedience. Beelzebub is termed "prince of envy" in *Friar Rush.* He also has pride among his vices. Behemoth, in the French medieval mysteries, is the demon of despair. Belial is generally considered the demon of revolt and anarchy. Belphegor is the demon of international rivalry and enmity. Chemos is the spirit of flattery. Esau-Samael is, in Jewish mythology, the source of strife. Federwisch is the German demon of vanity. Hoberdidance, Hobbididance and Hop-dance are names given by Harsnett and Shakespeare to the dancing demon. Kränzlein is the German demon of obscenity and immorality. Lästerlein is the German demon of theft and robbery. Lucifer is called "prince of gluttony" in *Friar Rush.* Mammon is the demon of wealth and greed (Matt. vi. 24). Nahema is the demoness of debauchery and abortion. Nisroch is the demon of hatred and fatality. Rosenkranz is a *confrère* of Kränzlein. Ruffo is also a demon of robbery. Schönspiegel shares with Federwisch the vice of vanity. Schorbrandt is the German demon of discord and conflict. Succor-Benoth is the demon of jealousy. Sydragasum is the demon "who makes the girls dance all naked" (Victor Hugo: *Notre-Dame de Paris,* X, iii). Tutevillus is the

demon of church gossip. Urnell, in the German medieval mysteries, is the demon of drunkenness.[13]

Tutevillus is among the most tenacious and ubiquitous demons of hell. It is his duty to attend all church services in order to listen to the gossips and to write down their speeches, with which these women are later entertained in hell. It is related that one fine Sunday morning this demon was sitting in a church on a beam, on which he held himself fast by his feet and his tail, right over two village gossips, who chattered so much during the Blessed Mass that he soon filled every corner of his parchment on both sides. Poor Tutevillus worked so hard that the sweat ran in great drops down his black brow, and he was ready to sink with exhaustion. But the gossips ceased not to sin with their tongues, and he had no fair parchment left whereon to record further their fool words. So having considered for a little while, he grasped one end of the roll with his teeth and seized the other end with his claws and pulled hard in order to stretch the parchment. He tugged and tugged with all his strength, jerking back his head mightily at each tug, and at last giving such a fierce jerk that he suddenly lost his balance and fell head over heels from the beam to the floor of the church.[14]

This legend runs counter to the popular belief that the demons avoid holy edifices and have a mortal fear of the sound of the church bells, the ringing of which, according to Sir James Frazer, originally had for its aim to drive away devils and witches. In Edgar Allan Poe's story, "The Devil in the Belfry" (1839), an imp of hell was not afraid of invading the church tower. The Devil, in Alphonse Daudet's story, "les Trois messes basses" (1889), not only enters the church, but even performs the duties of a clerk at the foot of the altar in order to tempt the priest, during the reading of the masses, with thoughts of food and drink. Thus it is seen that man can find no safety even in sacred edifices against Satan's snares.

[13] For a full list of the vices over which the demons presided in medieval German belief, the reader is referred to the present writer's monograph *Der Teufel in den deutschen geistlichen Spielen des Mittelalters und der Reformationszeit* (Göttingen, 1915), pp. 98-103.

[14] This legend has been incorporated by Mr. Francis Oscar Mann in his story "The Vision of Saint Simon of Blewberry," which will be found in his work, *The Devil in a Nunnery and Other Medieval Tales* (1914).

ORIGINS OF SINISM

BY H. G. CREEL

THROUGH the preceding chapters there has run, perhaps to the point of monotony, the reiteration that the Chinese world-view is a peculiar socio-intellectual complex, not properly to be understood by piecemeal equation with any other. This fact is far from having won universal recognition.

That the history of thought is inseparable from the history of terminology is a proposition so patent that it does not require the support of the elaborate case which could be made out for it. Suffice it to say that a gap in terminology is beyond doubt one of the prime reasons for the existence of this conceptual lacuna. To fill this need it is proposed, at least for purposes of this study, to coin the word "Sinism."[84]

The pattern on which the word is formed is, of course, that of "Hinduism." Because of the existence of this word, everyone recognizes that there is a typical Indian (since Hinduism has pervaded India) world-view. Hinduism is the complex pattern of concept and custom which limits, in a very general but very definite way, the thought and action of every Hindu. Sinism is a complex pattern of concept and custom which limits, in a very general but very definite way, the thought and action of every Chinese.

Both of these formulas must be modified in the case of foreign intrusions, but even here the parallel holds. The action of Hinduism,

[84] Two reasons, among others, may be assigned for the lack of a term to designate what I call "Sinism." The first is the textual interest which dominated early workers in the Chinese field. Thus, since Confucius edited the texts of Sinism, and since he and his disciples originated several of them, what more natural than to call it "Confucianism"? The second is the fact that this same pre-occupation, combined with their desire to find primitive monotheism in China, made it impossible for them to see the common socio-intellectual background out of which "Confucianism," "Taoism," and the popular religion evolved.

in assimilating Islam and Christianity more and more to its pattern, is in many ways reminiscent of the very large degree to which Sinism has assimilated Buddhism to itself. Incidentally, this latter case illustrates the need of the proposed term very well. It is said that Chinese Buddhism has appropriated many elements of Confucianism and of Taoism to itself. Yet many of these, as for instance the "Five Relations," antedate both Confucius and Lao Tse by centuries if not by millenia. They are, as a matter of fact, ancient elements of Sinism, within the stream of which Confucius and Lao Tse (the latter much more than the former) figure as initiators of special emphases.

The analogy with Hinduism may fruitfully be carried a little farther. Within the stream of Hinduism we find arising, from time to time, innovators who seem, at first glance, to be utter rebels against the old order, insisting on breaking the dykes of tradition, both in thought and in action, and carving out new paths for themselves. Gautama is a conspicuous Indian example. For a time they and their followers seem actually at war with orthodoxy, and they conceive their position to be absolutely opposed to all that has gone before. Yet a careful examination shows that they have, after all, drawn the materials of their thinking from the source of orthodoxy. Something they have added, something they have rejected; but the points in which they differ from the past are as nothing compared with the points of resemblance. The landscape over which the flood-waters boil is after all, very similar to that from which the main stream has been collected; and gradually the lay of the land drains all back into the parent river. It is a little deepened, a little broader, for the swelling of its current, but as it nears the sea never a ripple betrays the erstwhile deadly enmity of these waters, now inextricably mingled. So, in India, Buddhism becomes, about the tenth century A. D., an organic part of Hinduism.

Such also is the story of Taoism (which I shall call "Laoism") in China. Taking almost all of its materials from old Sinism, it is for a time the bitter enemy of orthodoxy, and later not only becomes itself orthodox but is completely assimilated to the Chinese world-view. Here again the term "Sinism" proves useful, for while it is not correct to say that Taoism was entirely absorbed by Confucianism, it is correct not only to say that Taoism became entirely assimilated to Sinism, but also that, in a larger sense, it

never ceased to be a part of Sinism at all, but was merely a special stress within it.

For the economy of labor it would be well if we could stop content merely to have proposed the addition of a useful word to the vocabulary of sinology. But if we go thus far, logic pushes us farther. If these further steps led into greater confusion, this would be a legitimate cause for considering retreat. It is believed, however, that they lie in the direction of greater clarity.

First, as regards "Confucianism." This has always been a somewhat awkward term, which often had to be used with the apologetic explanation that what it described did not really spring, logically or historically, from Confucius. One is often in some doubt as to whether it is used, in a specific context, to denote the general Chinese world-view, or to denote the particular discipline of the post-Confucian "literati" (*ju* 儒), one of whose most prominent characteristics was their veneration, almost amounting to a cult, of the "Confucian" *Classics*. If one extend the term, as it has been extended, to cover the former, he finds himself in the difficult position of affirming that Lao Tse, a *senior* contemporary of Confucius, took the fundamentals of his thinking from Confucianism, which he so greatly ridiculed.[85]

We shall confine the term "Confucianism," therefore, to denote the discipline of the post-Confucian *ju* based on the Confucian edition of the *Classics*.[86] The older material is covered by the term Sinism, which of course includes Confucianism as an integral part.

It might be urged that this leaves Confucius in the doubtful position of not having been a very good Confucianist. But al-Asheri, in Islam, was not Asherite, either, although his disciples were. Jesus was not a Christian in the Pauline, Roman Catholic, or Evangelical Protestant sense. Indeed, this condition might be urged to be more usual than its reverse.

There remain two avenues not yet considered through which it might be maintained that what is here called Sinism is in reality Confucianism. These are two methods of establishing the position that this world-view was actually the invention of Confucius, rather than a heritage from a previous age. The first method of justifying this contention would be to allege that the classics, espe-

[85] I am assuming here, of course, that Lao Tse took the the fundamentals of his system from Sinism. I shall prove this proposition in a later chapter.

[86] The more popular *Confucian cult* is, of course, already adequately and properly so designated.

cially the *Shu King* and the *Shi King,* were written *in toto,* or at least drastically rewritten, by Confucius himself, rather than merely selectively edited. The second method would be to allege that this rewriting of the classics, in which they were saturated with the philosophy of Sinism, took place after the burning of the books, when they were, according to tradition, reconstituted from memory. It might plausibly be argued that the *ju* who did this work of reconstruction were so thoroughly impregnated with the philosophy of Confucius that they would unconsciously have read this into their manuscripts.

But it must be remembered that the Sinism in the *Classics* can not be accounted for by any introduction of a few characters or even of a great many paragraphs. This philosophical background is as integral to the *Shu* and to most of the *Shi* as is its woof to a fabric. Remove it from the *Shu* and you leave a record as threadbare as is Confucius' own *Ch'un Ch'iu* without commentary (which incidentally does not reveal the sage as a very prolix author).

Confucius' own testimony is on the first point explicit.

> The Master said, "A transmitter and not a maker, believing in and loving the ancients, I venture to compare myself with our old P'ang."[87]
>
> The Master said, "I am not one who was born in the possession of knowledge; I am one who is fond of antiquity, and earnest in seeking it *there.*"[88]

The history of pseudepigraphy may well cause us to hesitate to accept this testimony unsupported. But Confucius' disciples do not claim originality for him either,[89] nor do his enemies accuse him of forgery in his own time.

Finally, we may cite the fact that in the time of Confucius and within a few centuries following we have abundant evidence of a civilization *embodying* Sinism. One man may, in a brief time, completely rewrite a document. No one man can completely and permanently alter a civilization.

Concerning the second proposition, that Sinism might have been written into the *Classics* after the burning of the books, it is sufficient to point out that at least the *Shu* must, then, have been written *de novo* at that time. But the *Shu King* is one of the great books of the world's literature, and its forgery under such circum-

[87] Analects (noted hereafter as *An.*) 6, 1.
[88] *An.* 7, 19.
[89] *An.* 19, 22; 7, 17.

stances would have been indeed a magnificent labor. It is equally difficult to believe that it could have been done or have succeeded. Further, it stands in harmony with the *Yi King,* which according to tradition was never burned.

Such is the case for the institution of the term "Sinism," and the restriction of the use of "Confucianism." What of "Taoism?"

"Taoism" (more strictly "Philosophic Taoism," to distinguish it from the later popular religion) is the term used to designate that philosophy, to be described in a later chapter, the peculiar characteristics of which were originated (or, at least, transmitted) by Lao Tse.

The older sinology showed a marked tendency to consider the Taoism of Lao Tse as an insert into Chinese thought, rather than an evolution out of it. This was done both by neglecting his connections with previous Sinism and by overlooking very considerable similarities of his thinking with that of his supposedly antithetic contemporary, Confucius. Both Granet and Wilhelm, writing recently, recognize that the philosophic concept which Lao-tse represented by *tao* takes most of its elements from Chinese antiquity.[90]

In no work which I have examined, however, is there mention of a fact which would seem to be of prime importance, namely, that not only the idea but the very character *tao* 道 is almost as integral a part of Sinism in general as of the system of Lao Tse.

The character *tao* is used in the *Shu* a total of thirty-three (33) times, in twenty-six (26) of which cases it is used as a philosophical concept. Lao-tse's *tao* is an *extension* of this concept, but by no means an innovation.[91] This fact is even more striking when we consider that the same idea occurs almost on every page of the *Shu,* denoted by other characters, often by *ti* 廸, which is similar in form and, in the context, very often identical in meaning with *tao* as a philosophical concept.[92]

In the Confucian *Analects,* the occurrence of the character and the idea is even more striking. Confucius refers to the *tao* as a philosophical concept, in the *Analects,* no less than fifty-three (53)

[90] Richard Wilhelm, *Lao-tse und der Taoismus.*

[91] The following references to Legge's translation of the *Shu,* in the *Chinese Classics,* show its occurrence *as a philosophical concept*: pp. 55, 61, 64, 65, 159, 183, 186, 210, 211 (twice), 250, 254, 261, 312, 331 (twice), 332, 349 (twice), 477, 527, 567, 572, 575, 576, 577. In other meanings it is used on pp. 99, 102, 112, 119, 345, 388, 558.

[92] Watters, in his *Essays on the Chinese Language,* p. 154, says that *tao* is "nearly or quite synonymous with *ti.*"

times, which is very remarkable when one considers the brevity of the book and the small amount of direct quotation of the Sage. In quotations from others, the character is used, philosophically, twelve (12) times in the *Analects*.[93]

The character *tao* 道 is composed of 辶 meaning "to go" and 首, "chief," "leader." It is often used in the classics for "road." In the *Tribute of Yu* (one of the earlier books of the *Shu King*) it is used four times to denote the "channel" of a river. It seems fairly clear that the generally understood meaning of the "way" or the "path" is acceptable as its metaphorical philosophical meaning. It is often used to denote the manner of conduct of an individual; there may be a bad *tao* as well as a good *tao,* even a better and a worse *tao.* So far it is evident that we are dealing with a word which is fairly free from moral or metaphysical connotations, since these must be supplied by adjectives.

But the character *tao,* standing alone, came to have a richness of connotation rivalled by few words in any language. It came to be, in itself, the very epitome, the heart, soul, and symbol of Sinism. In this connotation it was used alike by Confucius and by Lao Tse, *and it acquired this connotation centuries before the birth of the philosopher whose system has been labelled "Taoism."*

In the *Counsels of the Great Yu,* the third document of the *Shu King,* traditionally ascribed to the latter half of the twenty-third century B. C.,[94] occurs the following passage:

Do not violate the *tao* to obtain the praise of the people.[95]

Already *the tao* is a definite, specific concept. Of all possible ways of action, and of cosmic activity, there is *one* way which is above all others. Later, Mencius says, "Prince, do you doubt my words? The *tao* is one, and only one!"[96]

Precisely here is the very nerve center of Sinism. The *Shu*

[93] Following are the passages in which Confucius uses the character *tao* in its philosophical sense in the *Analects*: 3,16; 4,4 (twice); 4,8; 4,15,1; 5,1,2; 5,6; 5,15; 5,20 (twice); 6,15; 6,22; 7,6,1; 8,13,1; 8,13,2 (twice); 8,13,3 (twice); 9,29 (twice); 11,23,3; 12,19 (twice); 13,25 (twice); 14,1 (twice); 14,4 (twice); 14,20,1; 14,30,2; 14,38,2 (twice); 15,6,1 (twice); 15, 6,2 (twice); 15,28 (twice); 15,31 (twice); 15,39; 16,2,1 (twice); 16,2,2; 16,2,3; 16,5; 16,11,2; 17,4,3; 18,5,4; 18,7,5: In other senses he uses it eleven times. *Tao* is used in its philosophical sense by others than Confucius in the following *Analects* passages: 1,2,2; 1,12,1; 3,24; 4,15,2; 5,12; 6,10; 19,2; 19,7; 19,12,2 (twice); 19,19; 19,22,2. They use it in other senses a total of eight times.

[94] My case does not, of course, rest on any claim of such antiquity for the document, but only on its antedating Lao Tse considerably.

[95] *Shu* p. 55.

[96] *Mencius* (hereafter cited as *Men.*), 3,1,1,3.

says, "To revere and honor the *tao* is the way ever to preserve the decree (or favor) of Heaven."[97] To this Lao Tse and Confucius would have joined in a fervent "amen." There *was* a *way,* the right way, and the only way, for the affairs of the cosmos to be carried on. This idea was a development of the concept of order, regularity, and harmony, ideally prevailing in the social as in the natural world, whose origin we have already traced. In one way or another, these Chinese were confident, they had come into the possession of the formula of the universe, a sovereign prescription of which only an adequate dose was needed to right all of the ills of the world in a twinkling. Thus, the theory of "majestic isolation." If they possessed the proper theory for running a state, why should they allow foreigners to come in with different (and *ipso facto* false) ideas and bother the smooth functioning of things?

Confucius is a confirmed Taoist.[98] According to Confucius, a great minister is one who serves his prince according to the *tao.*[98] The superior man (the ideal which Confucius was continually preaching) does not, according to him, worry concerning food, comfort, or personal success; his sole concern is that he may find the *tao,* and hold fast to it.[100]. Confucius' oft-repeated formula for a state in which good government prevails and in which things are as they should be is that it "possesses the *tao";* a state in which things are not as they should be "lacks the *tao.*"[101]

The *tao* pervades the texts of Confucianism. The case of the *Analects* has been presented. The *Great Learning* opens with the words, "The *tao* taught by *The Great Learning* is . . ." The *Doctrine of the Mean* is built about the idea, and uses the character on almost every page. Mencius, as has been said, uses the character frequently and builds his theories, patterned on Confucius, around the concept.

Close investigation will reveal that the concept of the *tao,* as we find it, for instance, in Confucius, closer to the old Sinism, contains two elements (a third element, added by Lao Tse, will be discussed later). The first and more important of these two elements is the conception of an ideal and universal order, harmony, and

[97] *Shu* p. 183.

[98] Not, of course, in the traditional sense, but in that he uses the character and the idea constantly.

[99] *An.* 11,23,3.

[100] *An.* 15,31.

[101] *An.* 14, 4, etc., etc.

perfection, social and cosmic, which had once existed and which, it might fervently be hoped, could be brought to exist again. This, the universal or cosmic *tao,* is an idea common and fundamental to both Confucius and Lao Tse. We have seen the origin and development of this idea in its social background. It is because this idea is thoroughly Chinese in origin, and because it is the very *sine qua non* of the philosophies of Confucius and Lao Tse alike, that they are classed together as preachers of Sinism.

But there is a second meaning inherent in *tao,* namely, the *way* in which the prevalence of the *tao* in the present social world is to be brought about. This latter is not a metaphysical concept, but a matter of technique and discipline. Here it is that Lao Tse and Confucius part company. Confucius probably had this in mind when he said. "Those whose *tao* is different can not lay plans for one another." Of course, in practice each school identified its own discipline with *the* (cosmic) *tao.*

The foregoing presentation, if successful, has established two points: Lao Tse was one of the preachers, philosophers, teachers, of Sinism, to which he gave a very special and peculiar emphasis. He did not originate the philosophical concept of the *tao,* which far antedated him, nor were he and his disciples by any means alone in using it in their own day.

Lao Tse did not originate Taoism. To call his system or his school by that name is confusing and misleading. He did (if our records be at all trustworthy) originate a very unusual and peculiar emphasis within Sinism, which served to attract to him a group of particularly keen-minded disciples, who kept his thought and his system alive long after his death. Lao Tse's peculiar contribution to Sinism should be called by his name, and would be most properly, most clearly, and most serviceably so designated. Henceforth in this study, therefore, what has traditionally been known to sinology by the name of Taoism will be called "Laoism."

A further justification for this term is found in the fact that, while Sinism was in existence before Confucius and would beyond doubt have persisted in some form had he never lived, Laoism is a form of Sinism so special and so different from what had gone before that we can hardly think that it would have come into being without the personality of Lao Tse to originate or to mediate it.[102]

[102] This last phrase leaves room for possible (though I think improbable) influence on Lao Tse from India, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

* * *

Sinism, at its full development, is one of the most interesting systems of social theory and practice to be found anywhere in world history. Many systems have resembled it, in one way or another, but nowhere else, to the writer's knowledge, has the mind of man dared rise to the supreme audacity of envisaging the whole of mankind, nay of the universe, as a single, harmonious, cooperating whole, *every* part of which properly and ideally worked toward a common end of the welfare of all. Even in the sublimest reaches of the Christian dream there remained the "evil," to be overcome indeed, but to exist still, though impotent. But in Sinism there is no conception of evil as substance, but only as disharmony, which becomes good as soon as proper relationships are restored. It is in the Roman Catholicism of the middle ages that we get the nearest approach, in this respect, to Sinism. There, in the actual theory of the Church, if not in its avowed theory, the Pope is finally supreme on earth, the head of all things religious, the arbiter of all things political, the director of the educational system, the Father (in the sense of patriarchal authority) of all men. So it is to an even greater degree with the "Emperor of All Under Heaven."

Since the emperor is beyond all doubt the head and the keystone of Sinism, the system can not, in its full development, antedate the existence of an emperor. And since the emperor as an institution seems beyond question to be a development from the feudal system, a thorough investigation of the origins of Sinism must be pushed back to the origins of Chinese feudalism. At this point we meet something very close to an impasse.

Chinese feudalism is a datum, given in our earliest trustworthy records of Chinese history. The earliest specimens of Chinese writing of which I am aware are feudal records. Indeed, the very impulses leading to the most ancient compositions seem dependent on feudalism. Little use, then, to look to the literature for contemporary evidence of the origins of feudalism. At present the subject is obscure. The best one can do is to present the more plausible theories, leaving selection to be the result of future research.

The theories seem to group themselves into three classes, according to whether they propose feudalism to have sprung from a ruling group or caste, from ancient brotherhoods, or from military necessity.

The theory of an early aristocratic group is one which, on the surface of the evidence, recommends itself most strongly. Maspero tells us:

> La société chinoise, telle qu'elle apparaît à l'époque des Tcheou, était divisée en deux classes distinctes: en bas la plèbe paysanne, en haut la classe patricienne, les nobles *che*. Les principes d'organisation de chacune des deux classes étaient absolument opposés: dans l'une une sorte de grégarisme, une vie en groupes, en communautés où individus et familles doivent se perdre et ne comptent pas; dans l'autre, au contraire, une sorte d'individualisme familial. Les nobles étaient libres de leur personne, dans les limites de leurs devoirs et leur parents; les paysans étaient tenus dans les liens étroits d'une organisation méticuleuse qui ne leur laissait aucune initiative. Les patriciens avaient un nom de clan, des ancêtres, un culte familial, ils pouvaient posséder des fiefs, recevoir des charges officielles; les plébéiens n'avaient rien de tout cela, ils ne pouvaient jamais posséder la terre. Jusque dans les règles morales de la vie, la différence se retrouvait; les patriciens pratiquait les rites, *yi-li*, les plébéiens n'avaient que des coutumes, *sou*: "les rites ne descendent pas jusqu'aux gens du commun."[103]

The noble was a city-dweller, the peasant, of course, never. As in feudal Europe, one class of non-nobles, the artisans, was attached to the urban scheme.

The gulf between noble and peasant is, as Granet points out in the introduction to his *Danses et Legendes*, far-reaching. For example, the number six is associated with the noble scheme, five with the common. All of these considerations produce a strong predisposition to regard the feudal class as being in some way an original caste, such as would be the result of conquest by an outside group.[104] Yet, if we consider the matter for a moment from its *a priori* aspect alone, we must realize that the facts do not preclude any other explanation.

At the height of the development of feudalism in medieval France and Germany we are presented with a picture of human society in which stratification has reached, probably, an extreme as great as any to be found in human history. A serf was considered hardly human. Contemporary accounts tell us that he was a dirty,

[103] Maspero, *op. cit.*, p. 107-8

[104] The Norman conquest of England and its effect on English nobility provides a neat analogy.

evil, misshapen brute, fit for nothing but hard-driven work in the fields. He stank so vilely that lords and ladies (none too dainty themselves in those days) could not bear to be in his vicinity. Yet what was the origin of this situation? We have here no difference of race, nor even any ancient difference of caste. We know that a few centuries earlier the barbarians, from whom lords and serfs alike were recently descended, made it their proudest boast that all were free and all were equal, and that no chief, even, was strong enough to coerce the sovereign will of one of his followers.

The human mind is very quick to adapt itself to an unchallenged *status quo,* and to believe that what is is what has always been. In the United States there is many an aristocracy, based on the wealth of the grandfathers of its members, whose chief claim to glory is that its ranks are forever closed to the merely wealthy. We may not then assume that the mere existence of a Chinese aristocracy in a thoroughly entrenched position necessarily proves for it any great antiquity. Indeed, this argument may be partially reversed. The Chinese, like any good aristocracy, depends on ancestors.[105] People who need ancestors, like people who need anything else badly enough, usually find them. We cannot, therefore, allow ourselves to be led astray by mere genealogies going back to very early times. The effect of ancestor-manufacturing on Chinese historical records has been profound, and cannot yet be accurately gauged. Granet has pointed out that the traditions relating to the ancestral founders of the Yin and the Chow dynasties are so nearly identical that one has certainly been modeled on the other, perhaps the former after the plan of the latter.[106] If this were true, it would mean that the history of the founding of the Yin dynasty was written, almost from the whole cloth, half a millenium after the event. This is an indication of the extreme caution to be used in handling Chinese records dealing with antiquity.

The theory of a ruling caste is strongly advocated by Dr. Tai, who pictures it as a conquering group. He is by no means alone in this position, which as we have seen makes a great appeal. The first difficulty with it is that, like all the other theories, it lacks any considerable body of real historical evidence. Furthermore, close investigation of its claims reveals certain fundamental weaknesses. According to Granet, who is a careful student of the facts,

[105] *Cf.* Maspero, *op. cit.,* p. 119.

[106] *Danses,* p. 398.

"Rien ne permet de découvrir. . . des espèces de castes ethniques antagonistes."[107] Ethnic diversity in China, he points out, is everywhere admitted, but any evidence to show an ethnic duality, or to link the variations of custom to such a dual system is wanting.

Furthermore, Chinese history is full of episodes in which men are raised from the humble position of following the plow or the like, to that of directing the state. When this is merely the elevation to the position of minister the case for caste distinctions may be kept up, but when, as in the case of Shun, a commoner is made emperor, maintenance of the theory is difficult.

> The emperor said, "Oh! you *chief of the* four mountains, I have been on the throne for seventy years. You can carry out my appointments;—I will resign my throne to you." His Eminence said, "I have not the virtue; I should *only* disgrace the imperial seat." The *emperor* said, "Point out some one among the illustrious, or set forth one from among the poor and mean." All *in the court* said to the emperor, "There is an unmarried man among the lower people, called Shun of Yu." The emperor said, "Yes, I have heard of him. What is his character?" His Eminence said, "He is the son of a blind man. His father was obstinately unprincipled; his *step*-mother was insincere; his *half-brother* Seang was arrogant. He has been able, however, by his filial piety to live in harmony with them, and to lead them gradually to self-government, so that they no longer proceed to great wickedness." The emperor said, "I will try him! I will wive him, and then see his behaviour with my two daughters." On this he gave orders, and sent down his two daughters to the north of Kwei, to be wives in the family of Yu. The emperor said to them, "Be reverent!"[108]

In due time Shun succeeded Yao. His humble origin is very far from tarnishing the glory of his memory. Throughout the classical period, the highest praise which can be bestowed on an emperor is to compare his reign to those of "Yao and Shun."

The passage just cited concludes the first document of the *Shu King*. Its historicity is, of course, most doubtful, but its historical importance may not be questioned. For it means that, well before the time of Confucius, the ruling class was willing to admit such an origin for one of the most ancient and most venerated of em-

[107] *Danses,* p. 10.

[108] *Shu* p. 26-7.

perors. It means, also, that if the Chinese feudality did originate as a caste, then that caste, which doted on records and genealogies, must not only have forgotten its origin and even its very existence, but must have lost its very impulse to exclusiveness. All of this seems doubtful.[109]

After the theory that Chinese feudalism finds its origin in a conquering ruling group, differing ethnically from the mass of the people, we may certainly write "not proven" in large letters.

A second approach to the establishment of the early existence of a ruling group is quite as attractive and perhaps more tenable. According to this theory the aristocracy was not ethnically different from the peasantry, but was composed of the descendants of the leaders of nomadic groups which settled China at an early period. Such bands necessarily have some leadership, and such control often becomes localized in certain families. In a settled agricultural condition such families may easily develop into a settled ruling group, without in any way negating or even forgetting the common origin of the whole people. Such a condition is, in fact, what we have in India, in the history of the *Kshatriya* caste. In the late Vedic period, when caste had not yet become rigidly formalised, we have a condition in many ways similar to the Chinese.

This gives, also, a plausible explanation for a phenomenon of the religion which was noted in Chapter I, namely, that it appears that in ancient times the cultus of the peasants was concerned chiefly with the *shê* and the affairs of agriculture, while the aristocratic cult seems from the first to have been attached to Heaven, *T'ien*. The common people, settling down to an agricultural life, would naturally have had their interests quickly assimilated to the new situation. The rulers, on the other hand, would tend to be more conservative, holding to the sky-power which is perhaps the most usual of nomadic deities and which, in China, appears always to have been the sanction of governmental authority.

The hypothesis is so plausible as to be almost irresistible, if—we possessed any real evidence of a previous nomadic state of the Chinese, or even of any very considerable migration which they would have had to make to the present China. But this is, as we have already seen, quite lacking. A comparison of the historical

[109] I am aware that Shun's origin is referred to the rulers of the principality of Yu, somehow reduced in circumstances in Shun's generation. This is only to be expected. But I believe that the text of the *Shu* and the opinion of Mencius (4,2,1,1) give sufficient support to my position.

ethnology of Europe and America will serve to make out a case, of some plausibility, for the origin of man, as such, in Asia, and in precisely what part of Asia one can not say. The Chinese may well have arrived at their present situation, after no very long journey, in small groups entirely lacking any real leadership. This whole question is in a state of suspension, and while it is so no theory of Chinese feudalism which bases its origin on the assumption of an early nomadic stage or a wholesale migration can be accepted without reserve.

Granet's two-volume work, *Danses et Legendes de la Chine Ancienne,* is devoted largely to the development of his "brotherhood" theory of the origin of Chinese feudalism. It is a complicated and ingenious hypothesis, which impresses the reader either as a wild flight of fancy or as a most profound analysis, according to whether or not he agrees with its author. In either case, it is undeniable that Granet's searching investigation of the sources has contributed information of the highest importance to the ultimate solution of the problem. It is impossible to do more than sketch Granet's hypothesis here.

The heart of his scheme is that "Les chefs, semble-t-il, furent d'abord des chefs de confrérie." These brotherhoods were essentially religious organizations, possessing certain religious symbols, totems, dances and ceremonies. This ritual was enacted chiefly, Granet believes, during the winter time, the season when the men were not busy in the fields.

> Celui-la devient un Chef qui, riche de talents religieux et techniques, possède des danses, des chants, des légendes, des emblèmes, des talismans, des joyaux et, créant une clientèle en faisant circuler ce patrimoine, semble le dépenser, mais en accroit le prestige,—et reste maître, quand le moment est bon, de le convertir en valeurs qui, si elles semblent d'ordre matériel, gardent encore toute l'efficacité symboliques des valeurs premières.[110]

The chief was able to appropriate to himself the prestige and properties of the Sacred Place. This was done either by means of the sacrifice of the founding ancestor of the noble line, or of his chief follower, on the spot.[111]

This whole complex reminds one most insistently of the social

[110] Granet, *Danses,* p. 588.

[111] Granet, *Danses,* p. 44, p. 296, p. 402f.

organization of the American Indians of the Northwest Coast area, whose life is so pervaded by the potlatch idea (which Granet mentions often) that they have been said to have a "potlatch psychology." This might be another and striking evidence that the American race derives from Asia and is related to the Chinese.[112] However, the separation in time and space is so great that only a very exhaustive study of all the intervening peoples, and of minute details of each complex, could serve to show psychological relationship. Certainly, the Indians of the Northwest Coast prove that the situation which Granet pictures is not impossible.

A thorough evaluation of Granet's contribution is beyond the scope of this study.

The various theories for the origin of Chinese feudalism are by no means mutually exclusive. Another factor may well, and indeed must, have been operative alongside of any other. That factor is military necessity. The history of the Chinese is that of a peaceful, civilized, agricultural people, inhabiting a particularly fertile and favorable section of Asia, in which they were surrounded on three sides by peoples of somewhat less culture and on the whole warlike disposition. There have been constant incursions of these peoples into the "Middle States," which have resulted in the fact that from time to time a "barbarian" has occupied the throne of the Son of Heaven. It is perfectly obvious that, in such a situation, some kind of provision for military protection was inevitable. Whether or not a conquering people settled down as a ruling caste in China, whether or not a system of religion and ritual resulted in a complex organization of societies whose heads became feudal lords, a military class might be expected to have arisen in China, from the very logic of the situation. And once this class had arisen, there is no question but it would certainly, on the one hand, have developed many of the earmarks of an exclusive class, and on the other hand it would beyond doubt have accumulated for itself certain symbols, rituals, and religious sanctions.[113]

Once more a glimpse at European feudalism is enlightening. The "Chanson de Rolande," the Arthurian cycle, the ritual of knighthood and of the tournament, rich traditions of feudal fam-

[112] The announcement of Professor Sapir, that he has found a relationship to exist between certain Athapascan languages and certain old Sinitic stocks serves to lend additional color to this general proposition.

[113] Even in a country so aggressively democratic as the United States of America, army officers as a group show many of the characteristics of a caste.

ilies, etc., form a background against which one might, with judicious use of the allegorical method, build a formidable hypothesis of an origin like that which Granet gives for the Chinese feudality. Yet, as opposed to this, we know that the fact is that European feudalism came into being largely because not every Frankish farmer could afford a horse and all the accompanying trappings which war with the Saracens made necessary. For this reason, those who were to fight had to be subsidized by the others who stayed at home and looked after their farms. With this subsidy went blue blood and the divine appointment as supermen.

Obscure as is the origin of Chinese feudalism, the origin of the Chinese empire is as much so. As has just been said, although we do not have any trustworthy evidence as to the precise manner of the origin of feudalism, we have no difficulty in conceiving that it must in some manner have come into being. The existence of such an ancient empire as the Chinese, and of such relative stability, is, however, hardly what we would expect. Was it the outgrowth of some vaguely recognized chieftainship over a migrating horde? This would be an attractive theory, if we knew that there had been a migration.

The *Shu King* opens as follows:

> Examining into antiquity, *we find that* the emperor Yaou was called Fang-heun. He was reverent, intelligent, accomplished, and thoughtful,—naturally and without effort. He was sincerely courteous, and capable of *all* complaisance. The display *of these qualities* reached to the four extremities *of the empire,* and extended from earth to heaven. He was able to make the able and virtuous distinguished, and thence proceeded to the love of the nine classes of his kindred, who all became harmonious. He *also* regulated and polished the people *of his domain,* who all became brightly intelligent. *Finally,* he united and harmonized the myriad states *of the empire;* and lo! the black-haired people were transformed. The result was *universal* concord.[114]

That which immediately follows this is pure mythology, and I should not wish to lay myself open to the accusation of taking any of this material literally. Nevertheless, it contains an account of the origin of the empire which is, on the whole, most acceptable.

[114] *Shu* p. 15-17.

Precisely what we should expect is that some ruler of a petty state, possessed of an unusual degree of ability and prestige, should first consolidate his position at home and then proceed to the gradual conquest of the entire group of principalities. To hold them, and make of them a real empire, he would have been obliged, in the words of the text, to "harmonize" them.

Not only is this what we should logically expect to take place, but we are so fortunate as to have records, more or less accurate, which tell of the re-enactment of this very process several times in Chinese history. The rise of each successive dynasty is the story of a similar program, complicated, of course, by the necessity of removing the preceding house.

Whatever may have been the historical relation between the empire and the feudal system, there is no question that in historical times the feudal system was headed up (theoretically, if not always in terms of actual power) by the emperor. The system was very much like that of medieval Europe, each vassal being invested with his fief by his next superior, and the great feudatories receiving their charge from the emperor himself. The emperor had, always in theory and often in practice, the power of removing any vassal at will. He was himself amenable only to the will of Heaven. (The principle, *Vox populi, vox dei,* worked here, however, even more rigorously than elsewhere, as will be developed later).

In the last chapter attention was called to the "philosophical map" of China (see page 408), which contained two imaginary lines running NE-SW and NW-SE, dividing the country into four sections not unlike the quarters of a pie. At the intersection of these lines, the precise imaginary center of the empire, the emperor was located. His influence radiated in all directions, and was mediated by his vassals. This scheme was dramatized by the use of the five colors and the *shê* which have been mentioned before. At the imperial capital was located a mound, symbolizing the earth potency of the whole empire, playing for the larger unit the same rôle as did the *shê* for the village district. Here were made sacrifices for the empire as a whole, and here also was held the service of investing a newly created vassal with a fief. This mound was composed, according to the records, of earth of five colors, the north slope being white, the east green, etc., and the center, symbolizing the imperial power extending over the whole earth, yellow. Now,

when a vassal of royal blood was invested with a fief lying to the east, he was given a piece of earth, green in color, taken from the eastern side of the imperial mound. He, in turn, took this to his capital and embedded it in a similar mound which he built for himself, but which was all of one color (in this case, green).[115] Precisely how old this interesting ceremony may be is difficult to say. Chavannes believes it probably existed before 1000 B. C.

There was a network of mounds, one at each capital, comprising a material symbol of the graded system of feudal power. But it appears at once that this mound is something different from the *shê* which has been described, for that was a symbol of fertility, of the agricultural bounty of the earth, while this mound is rather a symbol of territory possessed by a ruler. The earth to a peasant means fields, but to a prince it means power. The difficulty is cleared up when we find that there were *two* mounds existing side by side in the capitals, one of which typified the earth as agricultural potency, the other as territory. The latter, Chavannese tells us, was called the "Great" or the "Regional" mound, and was located directly opposite the ancestral temple of the ruler of the district. The other, associated with agriculture, was located in the field in which the ruler himself performed the ritual of cultivating the millet destined to be used in the sacrifices in the ancestral temple. The rulers were interested in agriculture, indirectly, almost as much as were the people.[116]

But territory alone does not constitute an aristocracy. An aristocrat must have ancestors, and he usually has an ancestral hall of one kind or another in which he preserves certain memorials of their greatness. The Chinese carried this process very far indeed. The The ancestral temple is, to the present day, one of the essentials of a really great Chinese family. Here are kept the tablets representing, first, the great founder of the family, and after him, the tablets of six generations of ancestors reading back from the present. In the ancestral temple, honors of various kinds were preferred, and rewards bestowed, just as punishments were administered "in the presence of the *shê*." It seems also that divination, probably believed in some cases at least to have been communication with the ancestors, was carried on in the ancestral temple.

The possession of territory and ancestors made a feudal lord

[115] Edouard Chavannes, *Le T'ai Chan*, p. 452-6.

[116] *Ibid.*, p. 447-8.

what he was. The territorial mound and the ancestral temple, facing each other, made a capital. These two necessities were the first matters to be attended to in founding a new capital.[117] Here is the philosophical and religious essence of the feudal system.

> En 515 av. J.-C. le sage *Ki Tseu,* du pays de *Wou,* dit: "Si les anciens princes ne sont pas privés de sacrifices en sorte que le peuple ne manque pas de gouvernement, et si les dieux du sol et des moissons recovient les offrandes prescrites en sorte que l'état ne soit pas ruiné, il est mon souverain (celui qui veille a cela)." Voila pourquoi le prince doit avant toute chose "presider aux dieux du sol et des moissons et s'occuper des sacrifices aux ancêtres." On pourrait relever dans le littérature chinoise d'innombrable passages où on verrait un souverain rapporter, comme le fit l'empereur *Wen* en 167 av. J.-C., la prospérité de son règne "à l'appuie surnaturel (*ling*) que lui a prêté le temple ancestral et au bonheur que lui ont envoyé les dieux du sol et des moissons."[118]

Furthermore, the wiping out of these two potencies was necessary if one were to completely eradicate the menacing influence of one's vanquished predecessor. In the case of the ancestral temple, this seems to have been accomplished by simple demolition. This accorded with the fact that the unfortunate ancestors of the displaced house would no longer continue to receive sacrifices and would soon cease to enjoy even the shadowy kind of immortality accorded to a Chinese noble. In the case of the mound, however, it seems to have been deemed impossible to destroy it completely. This feeling of awe, which forbade the breaking of it into pieces and carting it away, is perhaps another evidence of the antiquity of the cult of the *shê*. The measures taken with it were, first, to cut down the tree which grew on it, and then to build a roof over it so as to break its communication with the heavens. In this way its potency was destroyed.

Two further proofs are at hand to show that these two institutions were the very *sine qua non* of feudalism. As the ancestral temple contained tablets representing the ancestors, so it was customary to erect on the mound a stone column which symbolized its power.[119] When a lord left his capital, he could not take his

[117] *Ibid.,* p. 511.
[118] *Ibid.,* p. 515.
[119] *Ibid.,* p. 476-78.

temple or his mound with him, yet he could not dispense with their support in such undertakings as war, etc. Therefore one of the ancestral tablets from the temple and the stone column from the *shê* were mounted on a special carriage, called the "car of purity" and taken along.[120]

It is surely evident that the various factors which have been discussed since the beginning of this study are not merely rational consequents of the philosophical system described in Chapter II. The two pillars of feudalism are probably reminiscent of a period which knew little of philosophy[121] yet they, as many other elements, have been harmonized to it. Thus, the *shê* and the ancestral temple stand opposite each other and dominate society as the *yin* and the *yang* oppose each other and generate the cosmos. The *shê* stands to the west, and represents *yin,* the temple stands to the east, its proper direction as the representative of the *yang.* Between these two stands the palace of the ruler, who is in himself the center of the universe, the harmonizer of Heaven and Earth, the regulator of all things.[122] Seldom has a philosophy been worked out so prettily in the concrete.

The dynastic histories were likewise harmonized with the system of the five *hsing,* the five colors, and some of their other correlates.[123] Each dynasty had a color and an element corresponding to it. Thus it was red for the Chow (II, 312), white for the Yin (II, 312), yellow and earth for the Han (II, 291). Various omens, such as dragons, of the color proper to the dynasty, were eagerly expected, and believed to presage a prosperous reign. It should be noted that the succession of dynastic *hsing* is made to correspond to the succession in which the *hsing* triumph over one another

> First the white fish was caught, afterwards the red crow, that meant to say that the sway of the Yin (white) was broken and their glory transferred upon the Chow. Prognisticating Wu Wang's[124] fate from the appearance of the fish and the crow, we see that the Chow were destined to obtain control of the empire. (II, 312)
> Wên Wang received a scarlet bird, and Wu Wang, a white fish and a red crow (as omens). The scholars are of the

[120] *Ibid.,* p. 512.
[121] *Cf. Ibid.,* p. 525.
[122] *Ibid.,* 510-11.
[123] Granet, *Religion,* p. 119.
[124] First emperor of the Chow dynasty.

> opinion that with the bird Heaven's decree was transmitted to Wên Wang, which in the case of Wu Wang was done by the fish and the crow. (I, 130).
> Kung-Sun Ch'ên of Lu, under the regime of Hsiao Wên Ti, sent in a memorial to the effect that, the ruling element of the Han being earth, its correlate, a yellow dragon, ought to become visible. Subsequently a yellow dragon put in an appearance and became the style of a reign. (II, 291)[125]

This color motif runs very consistently, and sometimes surprisingly, through the histories. Thus we find that King Wu, after defeating the last of the Yin emperors, decapitates him with a yellow ax (because yellow is the imperial color?), but when he comes to the task of killing the two female favorites of the king, he first strangles them and then decapitates them with a *black* ax, because, we are told, black is the color of the north, the *yin,* and therefore, feminine.[126]

Precisely how much of this by-play is history and how much is commentary it is hard to say, but certainly this accepted theory of things must have played some rôle in a political scene so thoroughly dominated by popular psychology as was the Chinese during a considerable part of its history.

Yet another element of this complex tapestry is so important that it must be dealt with even in this rapid survey. *T'ien,* "Heaven," was referred to in Chapter I. It was suggested there that two origins of this concept are possible. On the one hand, it might be an idea retained from very ancient pastoral nomadic times, strengthened and brought into prominence, as the patron of government, with the rise of the feudal system, and, especially, of the empire. On the other hand, it might have originated as a vague sky-power, recognized by the agricultural Chinese as the source of rain and sunshine and the seat of a certain regulatory function, and have later undergone this same emphasis under the governmental stimulus. In any case, we do find that Heaven is the patron and even the arbiter of government, and that the former kings and their chief officers are vaguely conceived as maintaining a shadowy existence for some time in an upper region associated with the Heaven-power. Discussion of the precise function of Heaven in the government must be postponed a little, while we inquire into

[125] The style *huang-lung,* "Yellow Dragon," under the emperor Hsüan Ti, 49-48 B. C.

[126] Granet, *Danses,* p. 112.

the origin of another figure which occupies a similar, if not the identical, sphere.

This similar figure is that of *Shang Ti* 上帝. The latter character standing alone is regularly used to designate the earthly emperor, although it alone may also be used to stand for *Shang Ti* if the context is clear. The former character, *shang,* is very common, meaning "above, up, superior," etc. *Shang Ti*[127] then means "Superior Ruler," or "Emperor who is above." As a matter of fact he was believed, from an early period, to have his seat in the north polar star, and his ministers to have theirs in the stars of the Great Dipper.

T'ien and *Shang Ti* present, to the Westerner, a pretty puzzle in mixed identities. They have distinct attributes and associations, as will be shown, but they are now and then used synonymously by Chinese writers, apparently to avoid repetition. They are so used in the *Shi King*:[128]

> When *Shang Ti* decreed
> They became subject to Chow.
> They became subject to Chow;
> The decree of *T'ien* is not constant.

It is almost as puzzling at times as is the Christian Trinity, yet the Chinese of the ancient period seldom if ever felt the need of rationalizing the confusion. They had not the Jewish taunt of polytheism which spurred the Church Fathers. Lu Shih wrote:

> *Ti* is *T'ien; T'ien* is *Ti* . . . He is called Heaven, when we look from the point of his overshadowing the entire world; he is called sovereign, when we look from the point of his rulership.[129]

Because of certain differences in characteristics between *T'ien* and *Shang Ti,* it has long been a widely accepted theory that one of them, and probably *Shang Ti,* originated as a deity of some people other than the ancient Chinese proper, and was taken over by them and eventually became fused with *T'ien.* Well authenticated cases of such fusion of deities are legion, so that there is no *a priori* diffi-

[127] I have referred to *T'ien* as "it" and now to *Shang Ti* as "he" because the former is, in general, conceived impersonally, the latter personally.

[128] *Shi King* (in *C.C.*) p. 430.

[129] Quoted by Quentin Kuei Yuan Huang, "The Life of Meh Ti" (*The Open Court,* vol. XLII, no. 863) p. 232, note.

culty in this. Dr. T'ai[130] has made an extensive study of the various theories, and believes that *Shang Ti* was taken over from the Miao-li people, a group which we know was incorporated into the composite Chinese race. He says:

> We have no direct evidence to show that the Chinese got these two terms (*Shang Ti*) from the Miao people. So strictly speaking the conclusion we come to is at best a hypothesis. . . The characteristics of *Shang-ti* indicate that the *Shang-ti* cult had an independent origin from the *T'ien*-worshippers group. From the few instances of the Chinese relations with the Miao people, I am inclined to believe that the latter's influence was very strong on the development of Chinese ancient culture and that they might have supplied the first Chinese immigrants with the concepts and terminology for the *Shang-ti cult*.[131]

T'ai believes that the Miao origin of the *Shang Ti* cult is strongly evidenced by the tradition that Huang Ti, the first Chinese ruler who brought the Miao tribes to complete submission, was also the first to build a temple to *Shang Ti*.[132] He interprets this as having been perhaps a conciliatory gesture. Dr. T'ai concludes that his hypothesis, while not certain, is "very reasonable and probable." That it is reasonable, may be agreed, but it would be well to substitute "possible" for "probable."

The whole position rests on the contention that *Shang Ti* must have originated among a group other than that which first possessed *T'ien*. This in turn rests on certain differences in the two concepts. What were these differences?

T'ien was originally the sky, vaguely conceived as the regulator, first of the seasons and the weather, then of all socio-cosmic affairs.[133] In one passage Wang Ch'ung distinguishes between "blue *T'ien*" (the sky) and "*T'ien shên*" (the intelligence or activity of Heaven) but this is a phenomenon of late sophistication and even then not characteristic. All things, good and bad alike, are ultimately motivated by Heaven.[134]

Shang Ti is a more specific figure.

> The original conception of *T'ien* was very naïve while

[130] *Cf.* Kwen Ih T'ai, *op. cit.*
[131] *Ibid.*, p. 201.
[132] *Ibid.*, p. 228.
[133] *Cf.* Granet, *Religion*, p. 62.
[134] *Cf.* John Ross, *The Original Religion of China*, p. 131.

> *Shang-ti* was conceived from the very beginning as a lofty lord with all the royal dignity and authority.[135]
> [*Shang Ti*] was an urban deity to be worshipped in a temple with cooked offerings, dancing and music.[136]
> *Shang-ti* was to be worshipped by the "Son of *T'ien*" alone, and his association was limited to the deceased ancestors of the ruling dynasty and the spirits of distinguished worthies.[137]

With a lack of dogmatic finality equalling that of Dr. T'ai, I wish to present an hypothesis of my own. It seems that such a figure as *Shang Ti* probably would have arisen, with the appearance of the empire, in any case, *as a transcendentalization of the imperial office and function.* It is a truism among historians that the success of the monotheistic idea in the Roman world is traceable, very considerably, to the existence of the human emperor. In the light of this, nothing is more natural than that the first Chinese emperor who was able firmly to establish his power should be the first to celebrate the fact by raising a temple to *Shang Ti.*

From another point of view, according to this theory, *Shang Ti* appears as a personalization of the political function of *T'ien.* This process is equally common with that of the fusion of deities; the "Holy Ghost" is such a personalization of a function of *Jahweh.* In neither of these cases does the process infringe the basic unity of the original deity; the new name merely denotes an aspect of the old concept. We have, as it happens, a Chinese case of this of which we can be sure, that of the *shê* referred to above. With the rise of feudalism, the old agricultural *shê* had to take on a new function, that of representing the land as political territory; the result was the creation of two mounds, one for the prince, the other for agricultural purposes. So it is with Heaven. The old vague nature-power did not suffice to give the strong cosmic sanction which the new political system needed. What more natural, then, than that *Shang Ti* should be "conceived from the very beginning as a lofty lord with all the royal dignity and authority"?

Through history, the two aspects of the heaven-power remain in much this status. The "will of *T'ien*" is to be learned by consulting the wishes of the people, but *Shang Ti* is more closely allied to the aristocracy, and to its typical symbol, the ancestral temple. In

[135] T'ai, *op. cit.*, p. 171.
[136] *Ibid.*, p. 237.
[137] *Ibid.*, p. 232.

the *Doctrine of the Mean,* (one of the specifically Confucian *Classics*) we read:

> By the ceremonies of the sacrifices to heaven and earth they served *Shang Ti* and by the cermonies of the ancestral temple they sacrificed to their ancestors. He who understands the ceremonies of the sacrifice to heaven and earth, and the meaning of the several sacrifices to ancestors, would find the government of a kingdom as easy as to look into his hand.[138]

It must be noted, however, that the attributes of *T'ien* and *Shang Ti,* while different, rarely if ever conflict. Thus, even *Shang Ti* does not practise favoritism, for he is limited by the impersonal justice of *T'ien.* "Heaven has no affections; only to those who are reverent does it show affection."[139]

This completes our brief account of background from which Sinism developed. During the remainder of this entire study we shall treat of it as *fait accompli.*

* * *

It is desirable, for the sake of clarity, to set down certain minimal and definitive characteristics of Sinism as a philosophy. I should list them as follows:

First, the conviction that there exists a potential and pre-established pattern according to which all existent things ought to be arranged and regulated, that all things are good in their proper place, and that all deviation from this pattern is unnatural and the result of perversion. This is the belief in the *tao.*

Second, that the emperor is the center of all things on earth (including human and animal society), that he is the earthly viceroy of more than human power, and that it is only necessary for him to adjust perfectly to the *tao* in order to bring about earthly harmony; conversely all disorders on earth are caused, finally, by failure of the emperor to follow the *tao.* The sage has special knowledge of the *tao* and should be employed to advise the emperor.

Third, that in remote times the "Holy Emperors" of the "Golden Age" knew and followed the *tao* and it is therefore

[138] *Doctrine of the Mean,* 19,6.
[139] *Shu,* p. 207.

only necessary to learn and follow their formula in order to bring about universal felicity.[140]

These principles are basic for Confucius and for Lao Tse as well.

Sinism, it must be remembered, was not a political, moral, religious, social, educational, or cosmic philosophy, but all of them as a unified complex. In this respect it represented the facts more nearly than does our Western tendency to artificial departmentalization.

As is not unusual in a feudal situation, the emperor, when strong, was concerned more closely with the people than with his vassals. This was, of course, a recognition of the fact that the people possessed the power to overturn the throne, but it was more than this, too.

The principle of the division of labor was explicitly recognized,[141] with its corollary, that the prime function of the ruler, and the justification of his special privileges, was his care for the welfare of the people. Theoretically, Heaven supervised the process, and appointed the most able and most virtuous man in the empire, regardless of his former position, to be "Son of Heaven."[142] Heaven also removed him when he ceased to act for the good of the people.[143]

But this action of Heaven came about through the action of men. The crucial test was similar in principle to the "trial by combat" in medieval Europe. If an emperor did not bring about the welfare of the people, or if he seemed to forsake the ancient *tao,* one of his vassals simply announced that the decree of Heaven had been removed from the reigning house and was lodged in him, the rebel. The success or failure of his revolution, which hinged on the adherence of the people, was the test of his claims.

He who soothes us is our sovereign, he who oppresses us is our enemy.[144]

Heaven sees and hears as our people see and hear.[145]

This exalted view of the people, represented by the common

[140] This last principle is specifically set forth in the *Shu King,* p. 210. "To maintain the same *tao* as those who secured good government will surely lead to prosperity."

[141] *Cf.* Mencius 3(1),4,6.

[142] *Cf. Shu,* p. 24, p. 283; *Doctrine of the Mean,* 17,5; *Men.* 5,5,4.

[143] *Shu,* p. 186.

[144] *Shu,* p. 296. *Cf.* also *ibid.,* p. 55-56, and Wieger, *Histoire des Croyances,* p. 14.

[145] *Shu,* p. 74.

saying "Consult the grass and firewood gatherers,"[146] runs throughout the materials in opposition to another common attitude, that of "dealing with the mass of the people as children."[147] Confucius himself alternates between these two attitudes. In the last analysis it is not, however, the people who are to be followed, but the *tao*. "Do not go against the *tao* to get the praise of the people."[148]

It will be readily seen that the verdict of the *Shi*, "It is not easy to be king,"[149] was richly justified. The king was literally responsible for everything which occurred. Among the most tragic passages in the *Classics* are the laments of unfortunate rulers, who, in the midst of some such calamity as famine, know that they must have transgressed, yet are unable to discover how. King Seuen, despairing at the misery of his people suffering from drought, cries "Would that it fell (only) on me!"[150]

The influence of the emperor on the people acts, to be sure, in what we should call "natural" ways. His is the duty of educating the people.[151] Example is recognized as a powerful channel of his influence.[152] But it is also indubitable that there is an element of what we Westerners should call the distinctly metaphysical in its operation.

> The Master said, "When a prince's personal conduct is correct, his government is effective without the issuing of orders. If his personal conduct is not correct, he may issue orders, but they will not be followed.[153]
>
> Mencius said, "If the sovereign be benevolent, all will be benevolent. If the sovereign be righteous, all will be righteous.[154]
>
> You (the Emperor) are the wind; the inferior people are the grass. [*I.e.*, when the wind blows, the grass *must* bend].[155]

[146] *Li Ki* (in *S.B.E.*), 501.

[147] *Doctrine of the Mean*, 20,12.

[148] *Shu*, p. 55.

[149] *Shi King* (in *C.C.*), p. 432.

[150] *Ibid.*, p. 529.

[151] *Li Ki* (in *S.B.E.*), p. 82.

[152] *Ibid.*, p. 418.

[153] *An.* 13,6.

[154] *Men.* 4(2),5.

[155] *Shu King*, p. 539. (Quoted in *Analects.*) *Cf.* also *ibid.*, p. 211, and *Shi King* (in *C.C.*), p. 406.

This becomes even more plain when we learn that the actions of the ruler affect the very weather.

> People reasoning on heat and cold assert that, when the sovereign is pleased, it is warm, and when he is angry, it is cold. (I, 278).
> If, in the last month of spring, the governmental proceedings proper to winter were observed, cold air would constantly be prevailing; the plants and trees would decay; and in the states there would be great terrors.[156]

It is evident that even the slightest action of the emperor was not without significance or effect. Consequently, every act, even to the slightest, had to be performed in the one way which accorded with *li* and the *tao*. ". . not making a move contrary to propriety:—this is the way for a ruler to cultivate his person."[157] The very food which the emperor ate was designated according to the season. The house in which he lived was ritually prescribed, Granet tells us, and he moved from room to room to accord with the succession of the months.[158]

Since his actions were so important, the emperor could not, of course, be left with only the guidance of his own whims or even of his own knowledge. Specialists of two sorts directed him. First there were his teachers.

> The three kings and the four dynasties were what they were by their teachers.[159]

The ruler treated his master with special respect, and his status was not that of a subject.[160] In the second place, it was the duty of the ministers of the emperor to see that he acted properly. A truly loyal minister, Confucius declares, will not be afraid to tell his sovereign what is right and what is wrong.[161] Asked how a ruler should be served, he replied, "Do not impose upon him, and, moreover, withstand him to his face."[162]

The minister occupies a very important place in Chinese history. It is more than probable that this is due partly to the fact that the history was written by members of this class. Confucius goes so

156 *Li Ki*, p. 266.
157 *Doctrine of the Mean*, 20,14.
158 Granet, *Danses*, p. 117-19 notes.
159 *Li Ki* (in *S.B.E.*), p. 88.
160 *Loc. cit.*
161 *An.* 14,8.
162 *An.* 14,23.

far as to make the ministers entirely responsible for the actions of the emperor. Zan Yu declared to Confucius that he was unable to restrain his chief from waging an unjust war. Confucius rebuked him, saying:

> How can he be used as a guide for a blind man, who does not support him when tottering, nor raise him up when fallen?
> And further, you speak wrongly. When a tiger or rhinoceros escapes his cage; when a tortoise or piece of jade is injured in its repository:—whose is the fault?[163]

It is evident that the minister is supposed to act neither for his own profit nor so as to please the Emperor, but according to the *tao*.

The sovereign ruled through the ministers.[164] Thus the *Shu* tells us:

> Good and bad government depend upon worthy officers.[165]
> "If you [the minister] can be correct in your own person, none will dare but be correct."[166]

The Doctrine of the Mean says:

> The administration of government lies in *getting proper* men. Such men are to be got by means of *the ruler's own* character. That character is to be cultivated by treading in the *tao*.[167]

It will be recalled that we have stressed, throughout, the dynamic emphasis in Chinese thought, the tendency to classify things according to action rather than according to substance. This appears in the present situation. It is through his ministers that a ruler acts, and it is by the standard of his actions that he is allowed to retain, or dispossessed of, his throne (in theory). Therefore, if a bad ruler happen to have good ministers, he may still prosper.

> The Master [Confucius] was speaking about the unprincipled course of Duke Ling of Wei, when Ch'i K'ang said, "Since he is of such a character, how is it that he does not lose his state?
> Confucius said, "The Chung-shu Yü has the superintendence of his guests and of strangers; the litanist, T'o, has the management of his ancestral temple; and Wang-sun Chia has the direction of the army and forces:—with such officers as these, how should he lose his state?"[168]

[163] *An.* 16,6-7.
[164] *Li Ki* (in *S.B.E.*), p. 448.
[165] *Shu King*, p. 256.
[166] *Ibid.*, p. 580.
[167] *Doctrine of the Mean*, 20,4.
[168] *An.* 14,20.

Le Prince a du Prestige quand il a des bons Conseillers.[169]

That the ministers were not uniformly worthy men, in actual practice, is proved by the frequent laments in the *Shi King* against their oppressions.[170]

The cosmos of Sinism may be compared to a huge machine, which functions with perfect smoothness so long as every part remains in proper place and performs its proper function. For even the most insignificant being to fail to do this impaired the harmonious operation of the whole to some extent. It is but natural, therefore, that the greatest emphasis should have been put upon conformity to custom and the keeping of one's proper place.

> When the people keep their several places, there will be no poverty; when harmony prevails, there will be no scarcity of people; and when there is such a *contented* repose, there will be no rebellious upsettings.[171]
>
> The superior man does what is proper to the station in which he is; he does not desire to go beyond this.[172]
>
> *There is government* [and general felicity] when the prince is prince, and the minister is minister; when the father is father, and the son is son.[173]

Conformity to custom was so important that even to change the fashion of clothes was punishable by death.[174]

The problem of status is, of course, the chief one in feudalism. The feudatories compose a sort of pyramid of ascending rank; the desire of each one is to raise himself in the scale, but ordinarily he can do that only by displacing his suzerain. This ambition is a constant force working for disintegration; on the other hand, feudalism seemed, in China, necessary in order to give governmental unity to the Empire. Sinism as a philosophy worked as a prop to support the feudal pyramid against its tendency to crumble; it also was so admirably compounded that it left the greatest freedom for rebellion against despotism without impairing its own force or integrity.

> *The king* said, "May a minister put his sovereign to death?"
>
> *Mencius* said, "He who outrages the benevolence *proper to his nature,* is called a robber; he who outrages righteousness is called a ruffian. The robber and ruffian we call a mere fellow. I have heard of cutting of the fellow Chow,

169 Granet, *Danses,* p. 79.
170 *Shi King* (in *C.C.*), p. 170, etc.
171 *An.* 16,1,10. 172 *Doctrine of the Mean,* 14,1.
173 *An.* 12,11,12. 174 *Li Ki,* (in *S.B.E.*), p. 277.

but I have not heard of putting a sovereign to death."[175]

The bad ruler ceases to be emperor, and the ruler so unfortunate as to be killed does not go down in history as good, in any but the rarest cases!

But, while it may be an act of the greatest piety to kill the emperor, it is utterly wrong to impose upon him while leaving him in his office, even if one be strong enough to do so.[176] Such action is to leave one's proper place in the scheme of things. It is because they thus presumed upon their power, and forced the impotent head of the nominally ruling house of Chow to do their bidding, that none of the powerful chiefs of the "Warring Kingdoms" period was able to found a dynasty, Chinese historians are convinced.[177] Had they killed him, and occupied his place instead, the order of things would have been left unimpaired.

> Confucius said, "When the Empire follows the *tao,* ceremonies, music, and punitive military expeditions proceed from the Son of Heaven. When the Empire lacks the *tao,* ceremonies, music, and punitive military expeditions proceed from the princes. When these things proceed from the princes, as a rule, the cases will be few in which they do not lose their power in ten generations.[178]

Like the emperor, the lesser rulers had to keep careful watch over their actions, even to the smallest, for all were of the greatest import. Even the number of wives the noble might marry was rigidly fixed according to his rank.[179] The noble hunted and fished, Granet declares, not for pleasure but in a ceremonial manner for ceremonial purposes.[180] The story is told of a noble lady who, caught in a fire and unable to go forth without a chaperon, allowed herself to be burned alive rather than transgress the code.[181]

As the emperor was known by the quality of his ministers, so the ruler of any rank was known by the vassals who made up his court.

> Le premier mérite du Chef est de promouvoir les meilleurs vassaux. Son mérite est plus grand, s'il sait attirer à sa cour des fidèles nouveaux et qui vaillent mieux encore que les autres.[182]

[175] *Mencius,* 1(2),8.
[176] *An.* 3,1; 8,20,4.
[177] Granet, *Danses,* 104.
[178] *An.* 16,2.
[179] Granet, *Danses,* p. 97-98.
[180] *Ibid.,* p. 384.
[181] Granet, *Religion,* p. 134.
[182] Granet, *Danses,* p. 83.

SOME OF THE INABILITIES OF HUMAN THINKING

BY T. B. STORK

IT is the purpose of this paper to briefly review the powers of thinking, the reasoning capacity bestowed on the minds of men. And this with a view to ascertaining where these powers fall short or fail to satisfactorily function, and more especially to inquire into the exercise of these powers in a critical way upon what are somewhat loosely denominated religious subjects, the existence and nature of God, his government of the world, the relations of man and God, the credibility and authority of the Bible.

That the thinking of man plunges into a maze of intellectual difficulties the moment it passes beyond a certain fairly well defined limit will probably be conceded. If there be any doubts about it they may easily be resolved by reference to many instances where thinking fails to justify itself. The most common phenomena of daily life present problems which man while accepting them as facts of his life must simply pass over as perfectly refractory to his thinking. These puzzles of thought are so common that their very existence is ignored in practice. Take the simple fact so familiar to us all of Change, the transforming, let us say, of a plant from the dull earth into green foliage, bright flowers, luscious fruit. How and when did that marvellous—one might almost say miraculous—change take place, that metamorphosis of earth, air and sunlight into plant, blossom, fruit? To think the process is impossible. Even in the far less complicated change involved in the simple motion of a body from one place to another the difficulty is no less. Where is motion and how does it occur, is an unanswerable question. What starts a quiescent body into movement or are all bodies in a constant state of motion? Is there a universal and continual flux of all things? Is there a preordained order in this flux by which

one change succeeds another and so continues year after year, century after century? It is a fair statement to say that we cannot understand this, our reasoning power has here reached its limit.

Leaving this single example as an introduction to the more complicated questions of thinking, let us take up the limitations set forth by the philosophers. In this connection the names of Hume and Kant will naturally occur to the reader and we may for our purposes confine ourselves to them.

Hume as is well known has destroyed the validity of causality save as an intellectual conception. Causality is a figment of the mind to express his doctrine briefly. And to add a further argument to his brilliant indictment we may instance a subtler but none the less effective objection that when we come to think of the world we cannot apply the notions of causality to it. We cannot think it as either caused or as existing eternally uncaused. In spite of which we are compelled to think by the law of contradiction that either the one or the other alternative must be true, that in other words the world must be caused or uncaused.

A hyper critic might well ask what grounds we have for so declaring the world: is there no third possibility? And the answer would have to be that there may be a third, perhaps thirty other possibilities but they are possibilities beyond our ken, possibilities which we have no capacity to think. We get a hint of what these possibilities may be from the suggestive remark of Kant that while contradictions may be impossible to our thought yet in reality contradictions do actually exist. The law of contradiction as interpreted by him amounts simply to this that an intellectual affirmation cannot contain a negative. Nor does Hegel's famous union of contradictories shed much further light on the difficulty. That all contradictories must unite in a third element which is their truth may only make the darkness visible. To say that there is no truth in Being or Not-being but only in the Becoming serves once more to make us realize the disabilities of our thinking. That is to say the law of contradictories may be only another of our disabilities of thought. The mind commits a species of Felo de Se, an intellectual suicide, so to speak, when one figment of the mind destroy another, when the figment of non-contradiction impeaches the figment of causality.

Hume was, however, anticipated by Bacon when he made the deeply significant remark that we could not know whether the ex-

ternal world of reality corresponded with our conception of it; whether the unity which we thought into the world did truly exist there. This goes to the very heart of the discussion, the seriousness of its import cannot be exaggerated. It is a knife that cuts both ways with automatic impartiality. It does not spare the teleological proof of God's existence which depends on the doctrine of Causality, at the same time it cuts down all scientific truth, all knowledge of external nature to the dignity of a more or less probable guess. It is reassuring to find that later philosophers confirm this doctrine of the earlier men. Bertrand Russell declares in a recent essay on Science that: "Laws of nature have turned out to be in some cases human conventions," and again, "that best men of science as a result of technical progress have been led more and more to a form of skepticism closely analogous to Hume's;" he quotes Wittgenstein to the effect that "Superstition consists of belief in causality."

And latest of all, A. S. Eddington tells us that scientific men themselves look with suspicion on the doctrine of Causality. "The fact that a causal basis had been lost sight of in the new theories was fairly well known. Many regretted it and held that its restoration was imperative."[1]

Perhaps a few more quotations from this treatise on science will emphasize as nothing else could the inability of even the highest type of scientific investigator to think the external world intelligibly. Referring to the study of the atom and the electron these remarkable words are used: "Something unknown is doing we don't know what."[2]

All this must put us on suspicion of our reasoning powers in other directions, directions of spiritual and religious truth far more subtle and difficult intellectually considered.

Perhaps this branch of our discussion may be sufficiently dwelt upon if we cite the famous and familiar instance of the inabilities of thinking known as the Kantian Antinomies. To enter upon them in detail is of course not feasible in a paper like the present, but it may be permitted to refer to their conclusions, namely, that the mind cannot think the world as caused or uncaused, cannot think that there are any simple substances or any composite substances, cannot think that there is any self-determination in the world or

[1] *The Nature of the Physical World.* (The Gifford Lectures for 1927) p. 294.

[2] Ibid p. 291.

that everything is determined by a fixed law of cause and effect. Man cannot think himself as free or as chained in an ineluctable series of causes and effects with no power of escape.

It is now possible to make practical application of these preliminary observations to the matter in hand, that is to the various and many sided criticisms that have been brought to bear on God's conduct of the world. We are now in short in a position to criticize the critics.

It is hard to realize the silliness of some of them. One for example arguing that there was no soul, brought forward the astonishing argument that there could be no soul, forsooth, because we cannot think the beginning of the soul in the human body. It never occurred to the wise gentleman, apparently totally ignorant of philosophical speculation, that it is impossible for the mind to think the beginning of anything. Of the Kantian antinomies he was either utterly ignorant or if informed failed to apply them. Many of these critics seem not to be aware that they are venturing into the realm of the subtlest and most abstract philosophical speculation. At every turn it behooves them to watch their steps if they would avoid pitfalls such as the one just mentioned.

Some critics formulate a rule of conduct for the Almighty in accordance with their notions of human conduct. The absurdity of this may be readily seen if we for example take the ten commandments and seek to apply them to the conduct of God, if God is enjoined from stealing, bearing false witness, etc., etc. It is not so evident, however, when we consider God in his character of a loving father and endeavor to understand how we can reconcile this with his allowing the suffering, disease and misery that is so prevalent on the earth: when we behold the entire animal creation at war with itself, so that it seems to be in accordance with the preordained design of the Creator that all animals should kill and devour each other from the great lions of the desert to the tiniest insects of our dwellings. If, however, our intellectual capacity is so strictly limited to our practical needs so that the moment we pass from them we are beset with unanswerable problems it is not unreasonable to suppose that in these spiritual and moral questions we are likewise restricted to the needs of our terrestrial life and quite unable to measure the conduct of the Almighty in the affairs of the Universe.

Conjectures we may have, it is hard indeed to avoid making

them, if we think at all. Perhaps all this welter of misery may be character forming, perhaps there are certain things to be attained of which we know nothing, of which we do not even dream and this misery is the appointed means to them. Sin, errors, misery, accidents may be the price of freedom. The power to err, to sin, to make mistakes and to suffer the penalties that follow may be the inevitable consequence of freedom, of the liberty of the individual to do as he will. This to be sure gets us very little farther, for back comes the ever recurring question, why should an Almighty all wise, all powerful, to whom all things are possible, be compelled to make use of these particular and painful methods. Could not the Almighty make all the world and all its inhabitants, human and brute, happy, peaceful, and free from suffering mental or physical?

That the human intellect cannot answer these questions satisfactorily to itself proves nothing with regard to the Almighty, but only testifies to a human incapacity similar to the incapacity already pointed out in respect to the physical facts of the world.

The criticism of the Bible is of a different sort: It questions the truth of the facts related. Here we are on surer ground: It is easy to demonstrate how little such criticism touches the essential truth of the Bible; for the Bible is a work of Art. To criticize a work of art for the truth of its facts has never, I think, been held legitimate. We do not fault Fra Angelico's frescoes because there is no evidence of the existence of his celestial angels, nor do we ask, supposing such exist, whether they possess the sweeping wings with which he endows them. I have never heard Paradise Lost questioned because there was no evidence of the facts alleged in that poem respecting God, Satan, or the Angels that are said to serve although they only stand and wait. Works of art are refractory to all such mistaken criticism. This must be at once apparent if we for a moment consider what a work of art purports to be and to do. It does not undertake to state facts, to furnish information, to deal with history, to detail statistics. Its mission is to transmit feeling, to inspire emotion from the artist to his recipient hearer or seeer. Properly understood the Bible in its sacred character, apart from its narratives, its history, its legal pronouncements, is a work of art. Its purpose is to inspire certain feelings, to create spiritual conditions in men's souls. Looked at in the broad and large sense it appears as a book through which pours an unending

stream of spiritual inspiration. That it is made up of many writings by various and widely differing hands, that these writings were selected and endorsed by a great Church Council composed of learned, able, but still fallible clerics does not affect the matter one way or the other. The writings depend for their authority not on any official sanction but on innate power which they bear within themselves. They furnish their own credentials. They are genuine and authoritative as a picture or a poem is genuine and authoritative, because of the spiritual message they bring to men. Some of the books, Esther, Canticles, perhaps Revelation do not seem to modern thinkers very profitable spiritually or well calculated to furnish spiritual inspiration as effectually as some others. In like manner possibly other books that were excluded might have been included with advantage in the Canon. Again it is to be observed that this spiritual inspiration is conveyed through human interpreters, by prophets, priests, kings, inspired instruments yet coloring their utterances each with his own individual character. These are all to be accepted by those to whom they are addressed with due allowance for the human element in them.

In this sense as a work of art the Bible's purpose is to inspire feeling, to create in the soul a certain spiritual quality or condition and so to bring men into right relations with God, with their fellows, with the world, in short to reshape their souls.

If it be asked in what way it is possible to do this, by what process the Bible accomplishes its business, it must be conceded that like any other work of art it has to work by material means, by narrative, by statements of fact, exhortations, persuasion and the like. Only thus can it approach the soul. Music alone has power without these to create feeling, emotion in the soul. No one would think of calling for its facts or of censuring it for lack of truth. Its truth is of a different sort. Does it make me feel and are the feelings it creates right and good: this is its test of truth. So the Bible is one vast and mighty strain of music inspiring, teaching, educating men's souls.

Difficult it may be to define in words the process by which this work is done: how the story of a good man overcoming temptation, the tale of a noble deed, a virtuous act, instances of self-sacrifice, aspirations and petitions to God, all widely differing, setting forth of men's vicissitudes can have this effect on the soul. But every

one by reference to his own experience can gain some notion of the effect upon himself of the faith of the Hebrew youths in the fiery furnace, the courage of Daniel in the den of lions, the devotion of Abraham. It may be due in part to what is called the force of example: we naturally wish to be like our fellows, to follow their leadership in acts and in feeling. But there is much more than this in the transformation of character that the Bible creates. An evil man is transformed into a good man by a process that has for us much of the mystical in it. That we cannot think the process intellectually may be only another instance of our inability to think change of any sort. For it is a great fundamental change of soul that this outpouring of spiritual power is to create, the power shall we say of the Holy Ghost: although that but puts a name to the mystery, without enlightening us as to its real nature. Of its reality we see examples almost every day when, as the Scriptures tell us, we behold the "wicked man forsake his way and the unrighteous man his thoughts."[3] In this respect it is no more a mystery than the change of earth, air and sunlight into a plant, of which we also see daily examples.

In the education of youth we are familiar with similar processes. To give a boy fine impulses, create desirable features of character we cite to him the heroic stories of the past so moulding his character with them that he will have no mean or ignoble ideas. If the spirit conveyed by these stories is right and true and the boy has absorbed it, what matters about the truth of the facts that made that spirit known? The boy recognizes the vital truth of the spirit of the facts which is the real gift to him. He has the spirit and the ideas they gave him and that is the only important matter.

Thus is made to appear how futile all criticism of the truth of the facts of the Bible really is. It touches not at all the vital point of its inspiration. Whether the whale swallowed Jonah or Jonah swallowed the whale is of no consequence. Whether the world was made in six days or six centuries is not material nor does it concern us whether wine was made out of water at Cana or whether the five thousand were fed on the scanty loaves and fishes. The true vital criticism of the Bible must be upon its inspiration, on the quality of its teaching. So far as I am aware no such criticism has ever been made. It is a question of spirit to spirit, the Divine Spirit of the

[3] Isaiah 55:7.

Bible, the human spirit of the man as they meet and unite, the man losing himself in the Divine, thus the work of the Bible fulfills itself. The happy harmonious condition of soul thus brought about is the final and only test of the truth of the Bible. That this is a purely personal, individual test may be objected by the critic, but in the last resort this personal test is the only test in all matters spiritual or purely physical.

To quote Eddington again we are told that "Mind is the first and most direct thing in our experience and all else is remote inference—inference either intuitive or deliberate."[4]

[4] *Nature of the Physical World.* p. 281.

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AMERICA AND MEDIAEVAL EUROPE

BY LEWIS SPENCE

EVEN the most conservative historians now agree that the records relating to the Norse discoveries and settlements on the North American continent during the tenth century bear the stamp of authentic and acceptable narrative. But alert as our generation may be in research, it seems either to have lost sight of, or fails to appreciate at its proper value, the later mass of evidence which leads to the amazing conclusion that the descendants of these early settlers maintained a connection with Europe until the middle of the fourteenth century, that the Crusades were actually preached to them on American soil by missionaries sent thither for that purpose by European prelates, and that Peter's Pence were contributed for the upkeep of the armies of the Cross by the people of at least one Norse-American colony in 1282 and 1325. These tithes duly found their way across the Atlantic to certain Italian banking-houses, as documents in the Vatican definitely bear witness.

Nor does it seem to be generally understood, even in knowledgeable circles, that it was from personal examination of records referring to these lost lands in an Icelandic library that Columbus first received corroboration of the existence of a Western Continent. Indeed the clue to the American connection had never been altogether lost, and it seems now quite apparent that the great discoverer gained his information concerning America from certain Papal officials aware of its existence through the records of the bishoprics which the Norse had established there and which had been preserved in the Vatican. It is now scarcely open to question that he received a strong suggestion from official circles in Rome that, were he to betake himself to Iceland, he would certainly discover there definite evidence of the existence of land in the Atlantic.

Before justifying these rather startling statements it will be necessary to relate briefly the story of Norse discovery in the American Continent, a story so seemingly incredible that it has received the recognition of cautious authorities only after the most rigorous examination of its bona fides. The first mention of Greenland, whence sailed the Norse discoverers of America, is in the *Description of the Northern Islands* of Adam of Bremen, written about 1070, in which he accounts for its name by saying that its inhabitants derive their blueish-green colour "from the salt water," and that they had adopted Christianity. But "the best informed man in Iceland" Ari Frode, or "the Wise, born in 1067, tells us that Greenland was discovered and colonized from Iceland by the Norseman Erik the Red about 985 or 986. Ari received this information from his uncle Thorkell Gellison, who in his youth had been personally acquainted with at least one man who had accompanied Erik to Greenland.

The history of the Norse colony in Greenland is that of a white people, few in numbers, isolated in a dreary and remote region, yet keeping in contact with its parent Iceland, building at least one monastery and producing the beginnings of a literature. But it is not with the Greenlanders we have to do, interesting as is the saga of their courageous struggle against overwhelming conditions and their ultimate and absolute disappearance in a continent of ice. It is rather with their exploration of the American coast, their settlements on its shores, and the contact of these with European civilization with which we are here concerned.

It is in the *Book of Hauk Erlendsson,* an Icelander, that we find the earliest authentic notice of the explorations of the Norse Greenlanders in America. This document was probably written about 1305. The facts as Hauk knew them, are contained in his Book, part of which is written in his own hand, and in another MS. of the fifteenth century, No. 557 of the Copenhagen collection of Arne Magnusson, generally known as *The Saga of Erik the Red.* Portions of this latter document can readily enough be referred, so far as its materials are concerned, to the eleventh century, and the spirit of the work is archaic to a degree. It will be found in its entirety in Mr. A. M. Reeves' *The Finding of Wineland the Good,* published so long ago as 1890. It is obviously a transcript of a much older MS. and contains a number of copyist's errors.

These documents briefly outline the discovery of the North American regions known as "Helluland," "Markland" and "Wonderstrand" by Thorfinn Karlsefni in 1020. Within a six day's sail from Greenland, we are told, these northerly countries were found, but tempests drove the enterprising voyagers far to the south, to "Vinland," where they dwelt for a year, trouble with the Skraelings, or natives, at last forcing them to withdraw. Another manuscript also in the Arne Magnusson collection, generally attributed to Nicholas, Abbot of Thingeyri, who died in 1159, seems to corroborate this information, and states that "Southward from Greenland is Helluland, then comes Markland; thence it is not far to Vinland the Good which some men think is connected with Africa. . . . It is said that Thorfinn Karlsefni hewed a timber house and then went to seek Vinland, and came to where they believed this land to be." The topography of these accounts agrees with that of the actual coastline of North America as observed sailing southward from Greenland—first a desolate stony region, next forest-country, and lastly the warmer lands to the south—and seems to point to a voyage past the coasts of Labrador, Newfoundland and the more fertile region of Massachusetts.

In the later *Eyrbyggja Saga,* written in 1250-1260, the *Islendingabok* or *Book of Iceland,* written by Ari Thorgilsson and the *Grettisaga,* dating from 1290, the story of the Norse discoveries in America is detailed at greater length, and is now recognized as agreeing in substance with the earlier accounts so entirely as to leave little dubiety that its details were drawn from common and authentic sources. It may be summarized as follows:

It was in the year 1002 that Leif Eriksson, son of Erik the Red, sailing from Greenland to Norway, was thrown out of his course by a great tempest, on a coast where he found cornfields and wild vines flourishing and where he wintered. On his return to Greenland, he did not fail to give his adventure every publicity, and in 1020 an expedition was fitted out under the leadership of Thorfinn Karlsefni to search for this land of plenty. It consisted, like the flotilla of Columbus, of three vessels, and was manned by 140 men.

Some days after setting sail from Vestribygdh in Greenland, Karlsefni's ships came in sight of Helluland, or the Land of Rocks, which is now thought to answer to the coast of Laborador. There they found nothing to detain them, so, sailing southward, they ar-

rived in a couple of days at the country of Markland, or the Wooded Land, a region covered with forests and frequented by numbers of wild animals. Pushing south-westwards, they came in turn to Kjalarnes, or the Cape of the Keel, then to Furdhurstrandhir, or Wonder Strand, so called "because it was so wondrous long," where they anchored. Here they sent out two Scottish slaves, male and female, called Haki and Hakia, to forage. These explorers returned to the coast laden with wild corn and grapes.

Once more taking to the sea, the Norsemen sailed onward to a place they called Straumsfjord, or the Bay of Currents, where they discovered an island to which they gave the name of Straumey. Here they resolved to winter, and shortly afterwards came in touch with the natives, to whom they gave the rather contemptuous designation of Skraelings or "chips," because of their small stature. These Skraelings were dark and ill-favoured and were probably of Indian race. Karlsefni had brought his wife Gudrid with him on the voyage, and a son Snorri was born to him at Straumsfjord during the first autumn, "and he was three winters old when they left." Snorri was the first European to be born on American soil.

A feud arose with the Skraelings, and because of the swarming numbers of these people, the Norsemen were compelled to evacuate their winter quarters and set sail again. Passing Markland they found five Skraelings there, and seized two of their children, whom they took to Greenland and taught the Norse Language. This concludes the account as given in the *Saga of Erik the Red* and elsewhere. But in a manuscript known as the *Book of Flatey,* supplementary details are given relating to even earlier Norse discoveries in America. We are told that Björn, the son of Herjulf, an Icelander, when sailing to Greenland in 985 or 986, was cast by a tempest on the coast of a strange land, and discovered regions known as Helluland, Markland and Vinland. Voyaging to Norway in 994, he gave an account of his discovery to Jarl Erik of that country, and to Leif, who afterwards reconnoitred the coast. The account given of the regions discovered by Leif is similar to that in the *Saga of Erik the Red.*

But Leif's voyage led to a second expedition, that of Leif's brother, Thorwald Erikson. Setting out with one ship and 30 men in 1004, he found without difficulty the place where Leif had wintered, and thence he pressed southward, coming upon a land well-

wooded and fertile. At Kjalarnes, he and his company fell foul of the Skraelings, and several were slain, Thorwald himself being killed by an arrow. He and his dead followers were buried at a place called Krossness and the rest of the expedition returned to Greenland.

That the Norse people of Greenland at this time or later actually founded a colony in an American locality known as Vinland is now a matter of history. Grapes grew in Vinland, we are told, so that it must have been situated in a comparatively warm climate. Professor Hovgaard has even suggested that there may have been two Vinlands, that of Leif being much farther south than that of Karlsefni.

But Mr. G. M. Gathorne-Hardy has argued very convincingly that the country in which Karlsefni wintered and where Snorri was born was actually the Hudson River end of Long Island. Long Island is of interest to naturalists as a meeting place for equatorial and arctic species of birds, and was formerly the centre of a whaling industry,[1] which accounts for the Peter's Pence of whalebone which, as we shall see, the Vinland colony paid as a tithe to the exchequer of the Crusades. But if Mr. Gathorne-Hardy credits the discovery of Vinland, he appears to be of the impression that no colony was ever settled thereon. This, however, can be proved by existing documentary evidence.

At the close of the thirteenth century, the influence of the Scandinavian race extended from Palestine to America. Its devout pilgrims were numerous in the Holy Land, and the Church, realizing the zeal of the northern nations, made efforts to enlist their hardy sons in the ranks of the Crusaders by preaching the holy war in Norway, Iceland and Greenland. Nor was its propaganda limited to these countries, for the missionaries dispatched thither actually travelled in furtherance of their labours to that Vinland discovered in America by Leif and Karlsefni some centuries earlier.

Abundant evidence exists that this isolated American colony of the Norsemen was not only well-known to the Europe of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, but that it was familiar to the Vatican through missionary effort and correspondence. Pope Gregory X, as Archdeacon of Liege, had accompanied the Frisian Crusaders to Palestine in 1270, and was well acquainted with the geography and seafaring conditions of the north. In 1273 he con-

[1] *The Norse Discoverers of America*, 1921.

voked at Lyons an œcumenical council, the purpose of which was to organize crusading effort in western and northern Christendom, and to Sighorte, Canon of Trondhjem, and Arne, Bishop of Skalholt, in Iceland, he entrusted the task of propaganda throughout the Scandinavian realms. Bertrand Amaury, Canon of Rheims, was moreover dispatched as papal legate to these dominions and was instructed to extend operations to those outlying Norse colonies to which crusading endeavour had not as yet penetrated. Lapland, Finland, the Orkneys and Hebrides were embraced in the scheme, and their settlers, impressed by the necessity for liberating the Sepulchre, contributed generously according to their means. In Iceland Arne Thorlaksson preached the Cross with a fervour unsurpassed by Peter the Hermit himself and its clergy willingly agreed to resign a tithe of their substance to the crusading war-chest, while its manpower, with equal readiness, enlisted under the banner of the Church militant.

King Hakon of Norway had dispatched Olaf, as Bishop of Gardar to Greenland in 1261, with instructions to keep the Norse colonies both there and in America more closely in touch with the motherland. Olaf made further good use of his time while in Greenland by preaching the Crusade. For some years prior to this a republican or separatist spirit had appeared in the colony at Greenland, precisely as some centuries later it was to do in the British transatlantic settlements and, perhaps, for similar reasons. But equilibrium had been restored. In 1276 the Pope authorized the Archbishop of Trondhjem, Jon the Red, A Scot, to dispatch a commission to Greenland to assist Olaf in his crusading efforts, and to insure that the edicts of the Council of Lyons were being carried into effect. In 1279, seizing the opportunity of a vessel sailing to America, Jon sent "a grave and discreet person" thereon to preach the Holy War and to recover the tithes due from the colonists. The name of this American Peter the Hermit we do not know, but his commission was confirmed by Pope Nicholas III, in a letter dated from Rome, January 31, 1279, conferring on him full powers to further the crusading movement by every lawful means. Three years later this emissary returned to Norway with a cargo of sealskins, walrus-tusks, and whalebone, the offerings of the American colony of Vinland to the soldiers of the Sepulchre. Archbishop Jon, embarrassed by the strange nature of the tithe, which he could not

dispatch to Italy, communicated with the Vatican as to the best method of disposing of it, and in March 1282 Pope Martin IV replied, authorizing him to sell it in the best market. This was done, and the sum realized was sent to Italy, to the banking houses of Squarccialupi and Giudiccioni. The correspondence relative to these missions and payments still exists in the archives of the Vatican and in the national records of Iceland and Norway.[2]

After the Council of Vienna in 1312, we find Arne, Bishop of Gardar, acting as agent and collector of Peter's Pence for that council in respect of the American colonies. It would seem that the zeal displayed in these far outposts of the Scandinavian world had lapsed somewhat since 1276, and that efforts were once more made to awaken it. In the same year Laurence Kalfsson and a certain Björn ardently preached the Crusade in Iceland, whose hardy sons were greatly in request in the ranks of the Cross. That emissaries were once more dispatched to Vinland in America at this time is undoubted and is, indeed, proved by the results, but who they may have been, and what were their adventures, we have no means of discovering. In the event a Vinland ship arrived at Greenland in 1325, bearing the tithes of the colony, consisting of 127 lispounder of walrus tusks, which were duly sold to Jean du Pré, a Flemish merchant, for 12 livres, 50 sous of Tour.[3]

This shows that Vinland must have existed as a dependency of the Norse Crown until 1325. If Vinland was of sufficient importance to be the object of a special crusading mission, it must have had at least several thousands of a population . What was the fate of the Vinlanders? Probably they were overwhelmed by the invading Red Men, who would speedily destroy all traces of their occupation. Perhaps they mingled with them, as did the Norsemen of Greenland with the Eskimo. Charles Godfrey Leland, in his *Algonquin Legends of New England* showed how Norse influence has penetrated Indian mythology. He believed that the Norse tale of Balder is to be found as an Indian legend, and indicated that the name of the Scandinavian evil spirit Loki, is connected with it. Moreover he reproduced ancient Indian drawings showing Norsemen pursued by Indians.

Now there can be no doubt that documents relative to the exist-

[2] Riant, *Expeditions et pélérinages Scandinaviens*, p. 364; Torfæus, *Hist. Gron.* p. 25; Malte Brun, Lib. 18. tom. 1., p. 289.

[3] Paul Riant, *Expedition et Pélérinages Scandinaviens.*

ence of a Norse colony on American soil are to be found in the Library of the Vatican. More than one of the Catholic writers who have evidently had access to them allude to such sources. The Rev. Wm. F. Clark S. J. of St. Joseph's Church, Philadelphia, a Catholic priest, mentioned them in his centennial discourse, delivered on July 4, 1876, and Mrs. Marie A. Shipley, a Protestant American lady, in her "English Re-discovery of America" (1890) writes:[4] "I have obtained a mass of corroborative testimony from Roman Catholic sources proving the statement in my book *The Icelandic Discoverers of America* that in the Vatican and other monastic libraries of Europe are the records and documents that will fully establish the fact . . . . that Norse colonies existed there for several centuries." A memorial submitted to the Congress of the United States in 1888, asking for research on the subject and signed by over a thousand persons of influence states that: "there is a vast amount of evidence in the shape of documents, records and manuscripts of all descriptions that has been buried for centuries in the libraries at Rome—in fact the Church annals of six centuries, containing the minute details of the ecclesiastical work and establishments, the succession of bishops for 263 years, etc., etc., in the colonies of Greenland and Vinland. . . . These it is the right of the American nation to incorporate in its archives."

That the mother of the first European born in America actually went later in life on pilgrimage to Rome and gave the Papal officials there an account of her transatlantic adventures is a fact sufficiently historical. That Gudrid who was wife of Thorfinn Karlsefni, and who had accompanied him to America, "went abroad," says the Book of Flatey, "and made a pilgrimage to Rome." Later she became a nun at Glaumbæjar in Iceland. At Rome she was well received and her accounts of the new countries beyond the seas were listened to with attention by her spiritual advisers as relating to a new field for the preaching of the gospel.[5]

Only 152 years elapsed between the last known attempt of the Greenlanders to reach Vinland and the visit of Christopher Columbus in a Bristol ship to Iceland in 1477. That the discoverer visited Iceland with the definite object of collecting information relative to the existence of lands west of Greenland is not now open to question. Indeed he himself recorded the fact, and the letter in which

[4] P. 62.

[5] Shipley, *The English Re-discovery of America*, pp. 110-111; C. Gravier, *Discovery of America by the Northmen.*

he did so was published by Diego Columbus, his son, in the first, and perhaps the best biography of the world's greatest adventurer. "In the year 1477, in February," he says, "I navigated 100 leagues beyond Thule, the southern part of which is 73 degrees distant from the equator, and not 63 as some pretend; neither is it situated within the line which includes the west of Ptolemy, but is much more westerly. The English, principally those of Bristol, go with their merchandise to this island, which is as large as England. When I was there the sea was not frozen, and the tides were so great as to rise and fall 26 fathoms."

It is certainly strange that more attention has not been directed to the circumstances of this extraordinary visit, for if it proves anything, it shows conclusively how indefatigable was the discoverer in his researches concerning the character of that part of the globe he proposed to navigate in his search for an uninterrrupted sea-passage to India and China. That he voyaged hundreds of sea-leagues from Spain to Britain, and from Britain to Iceland for the purpose of verifying statements in certain Norse sagas relating to a north-western land lying in the Atlantic from the lips of the authority best qualified to enlighten him, is now well authenticated.

It is also recognized that while in Italy and perhaps at Rome, Columbus had heard or read of the Book of Flatey, that beautiful manuscript volume, in which the saga of Thorfinn Karlsefni was incorporated. At that period its manuscript was still in Iceland, though now housed at Copenhagen. Fin Magnusen, the learned Icelandic scholar, makes it abundantly clear that in the year of Columbus's visit to his island, Magnus Eiolfson, Bishop of Skalholt, then the greatest living authority on Icelandic literature, met and conferred with the discoverer. Since 1470 Magnus had been abbot of the monastery of Helgafell, where many venerable documents relating to the discovery of Greenland, Markland, Vinland, and the other parts of the American continent settled by the Norsemen of Iceland were carefully preserved. It was, indeed, from this very district that the most distinguished of these early pioneers had gone forth. The contents of these documents were familiar to Bishop Magnus, as indeed they were to most Icelanders of that period, and it is therefore in the highest degree improbable that Columbus should have omitted to seek for and receive information respecting them, primed as he was with the clues to their existence which he appears to have collected at Rome.

He arrived at the port of Hvalfjardareyri, on the south coast of Iceland, at the season when that harbour was most frequented, and it has been found that Bishop Magnus visited the neighboring churches during the winter or spring of 1477, the year of his arrival.[6] From the records at Helgafell Columbus must have learned how the coasts of Vinland, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland were first sighted by the Icelander Bjarni Herjulfson in 983, and how Leif and Thorwald, sons of Erik the Red, the colonizer of Greenland, made an exploration both of the coast and the interior.

In the archives of Iceland is to be found authentic corroboration of the circumstances of Columbus's visit. In the letter quoted by his son the discoverer states that the sea at the time of his arrival was free from ice, and this is confirmed by the public records of Iceland, which refer to the unusual circumstances of the port of Hvalfjardareyri being ice-free during the months of February and March in the year 1477. It may have been merely by chance that Bishop Magnus happened to be visiting the port in question, which was situated in his diocese, at the very time when Columbus arrived in the haven, but it seems more probable that the bishop had been apprised of his coming beforehand through ecclesiastical channels. In any case they met and conversed in Latin, and it is on record that Columbus questioned Magnus "concerning the western lands."[7] What precise information he actually received from the bishop we cannot tell, as record is silent on this point. But that he obtained what he came so far to seek can scarcely be doubted.

Sailing to Iceland from Bristol, Columbus must have heard many traditions of land in the western Atlantic from the mariners of that port, who, from 1491 to 1498, according to Pedro de Ayala, the Spanish Ambassador to England, had annually dispatched three or four caravels "in search of the isle of Brazil and the Seven Cities." Through their long commercial associations with Iceland the Bristol traders could scarcely have failed to hear the many traditions of the former existence of the Norse colonies in America, and to have picked up clues to the probable sea routes thither.

But if Columbus received while in Iceland information so authentic concerning the existence of a western continent, why did he not take steps later to verify this by sailing towards the latitude

[6] O. Moosmüller, *Europeans in America before Columbus.*

[7] Rafn., *Antiquitates Americanæ*, p. xxiv, note 1.

indicated by Bishop Magnus instead of steering almost due west from Palos, as he did 15 years later on his first voyage of discovery? The fact that he did not make for Vinland is a powerful vindication of the theory that his intention was not so much to discover a new continuent as to find a new sea route to India and the Orient. The very knowledge that the north-western Atlantic was occupied by land would naturally militate against his acceptance of it as a feasible route to the rich Indies of his dreams.

This evidence notwithstanding, it is strange that not a single trace of the Norse occupation of North America exists to-day. Fairly abundant ruins and recognizable sites of the presence of Norse colonies are to be found in Greenland, but despite the quests of archaeologists in more southern American latitudes, no authentic relics of Norse colonization have as yet been encountered there.

Yet many antiquaries have endeavoured to prove that vestiges of Norse buildings and inscriptions are to be found on the American Coast. Perhaps the most remarkable of the latter is the Dighton Rock inscription on the River Taunton in the State of Massachusetts, which Rafn believed to be Runic, attesting the presence of Thorfinn Karlsefni. But Sir Daniel Wilson doubted these conclusions. At last an Indian Chief, Shingwauk, assured Schoolcraft, an authority on Indian customs, that the inscription was the work of Wabenaki Indians and was pictographic in origin.

On the Island of Monhegan, on the coast of Maine, was found another inscription which seemed much more akin to the Runic, but this also Wilson disallowed as a genuine piece of Norse antiquity, attributing it to the agency of ice. Still more romantic is the Tower of Newport, Rhode Island, on which Longfellow wrote a striking threnody. Rafn hailed this also as a relic of Norse occupation. But it was found that Governor Arnold, ancestor of the notorious American traitor, had built it after the model of Inigo Jones's mill, which still stands at Chesterton in Arnold's native Warwickshire.

More recently, 1890, Mr. E. N. Horsford startled American antiquarian circles by announcing his discovery of the ancient Norse city of Norumbega in New England. But this site was proved to have been discovered previously by Verazzano and others, including Sir John Hawkins, who visited it in 1569, and it was certainly an Indian town.

To account for this surprising absence of the remains of the

Norse Occupation of American soil is indeed difficult. In all probability the colonies or settlements—and Vinland seems the only one among them the existence of which has been authenticated—were small and not very thickly populated. If, then, we take it that a colony actually flourished in the vicinity of Long Island, as the evidence goes to prove, it must not only have occupied a most isolated position, but have had little power of resistance because of its inability to draw to any great extent upon the population and resources of the parent colony in Greenland. Yet it is evident that bishops and missionaries were dispatched thither with some regularity. In 1059, Bishop Jon of Iceland went to Vinland, and fell a martyr beneath the arrows of the Skraelings whom he was endeavouring to convert to the Christian faith.[8] He had been especially consecrated for work in the North by Adalbert, Archbishop of Bremen-Hamburg. In 1121 Erik, Bishop of Gardar in Greenland, travelled to Vinland, and seems also to have been assassinated there.[9] Pope Nicholas V mentions in a letter written in 1448 that the Greenland colonists had then been Christians for six hundred years, and the last Bishop of Gardar in Greenland, Vincent, was consecrated so late as 1537, forty-five years after the discovery of America by Columbus, and nearly five hundred years after the erection of the see.

Mr. J. C. Shea in his *History of the Catholic Missions Among the Indian Tribes of America* states that Bishop Erik led a body of clergy and colonists to Vinland in 1121. The incident is indeed, alluded to in the Icelandic annals under that date, and is also referred to by a late Danish writer, Lyskander, in 1609. The Icelandic annals also tell us that in 1347 a Greenland ship arrived in Iceland which had been to Markland in America, but had been driven out of her course on her return.

The above facts seem to indicate actual contact between the American colonies and Europe in the years 1059, 1121, 1282, 1325 and 1347, and it seems almost incredible that, if communication were feasible during periods so widespread, it was not also available between these occasions. It is indeed most unlikely that, had no connection been maintained between Iceland and America from 1121 to 1282, missionaries would actually have been sent from Iceland

[8] Mallet, *Introduction a l'histoire de Dannemarc*, t.l. p. 254; *Islendnamabok*, p. 396; Torfæus, *Historia Vinlandiæ, Antiqua*, p. 71.

[9] Rafn, *Antiquitates Americanæ*, p. 261.

to America in the latter year, and the very fact that they were then dispatched goes far to prove the probability of the statement in the Icelandic annals wih reference to Bishop Erik's colonial enterprise in 1121.

But we must wait patiently for the results of research in the archieves of the Vatican, where the original records of episcopal and missionary effort in Vinland would appear to await discovery. Is not the quest peculiarly one for the generous and enthusiastic spirit of American scholarship?

PHILOSOPHY VINDICATED

BY CLARENCE ERICKSON

IT has become the custom of late years to liken philosophy to the search in a pitch-dark room for a black cat that, after all, does not really exist. Philosophy is often considered a curious species of Solitaire, in which such terms as "substance," "mode," "percept," "concept," "matter," and "spirit" are manipulated about to beguile the excess leisure of a muscle-bound intellect, rendered unfit to participate on the battle-ground of the world of action by too great subtlety and over-sensitivity.

Philosophy, say its detractors, is a now abandoned method of searching for truth, by means of speculation and ingenious spinning out of words, which has been supplanted by science, which gets at, and observes the "facts." Like religion, philosophy is held to represent and immature stage in the evolution of human intelligence, and to be now well-nigh obsolete among enlightened people. But old superstitions die hard; millions of people still belong to the churches, and a few living fossils of academic erudition still cultivate philosophy.

Such is the attitude of a certain superior class of persons toward philosophy: a class that has just been emancipated from the mediaeval superstitions of Fundamentalism, and, like a delighted child, is trying out its newly acquired wings of intellectual freedom in flights of polite heresy; a class that has been newly converted from the Babbitry of Dr. Frank Crane to the Babbitry of H. L. Mencken; a class that rejects the fallacious creed of the ignorant majority only to embrace the liberal dogma of the enlightened minority that reads the *American Mercury*. H. L. Mencken in an editorial of his makes some caustic jibes at philosophy, and forever afterwards the American Mercury reading public, the class that has been freed from intellectual dictatorship and now does its own thinking, goes about

repeating parrot-like the gospel of our lord, H. L. Mencken.

The chief reason for this widespread disdain of philosophy is the popular acceptance of materialism, which is commonly supposed to be identical with science, and to have rendered philosophy no longer necessary. But in reality, materialism, far from being science itself, is only a philosophical inference drawn from some of the results of science. Far from having supplanted philosophy, materialism is itself a philosophy.

Materialism had a large following in learned circles during the latter half of last century. Its votaries were principally men of science, with no genuine philosophical training, suddenly turned into philosophers through whim. The works of these amateur philosophers are full of crudities and self-contradictions, but they are comparatively easy to read and fascinating in their naive simplicity, which accounts for their vogue among the uninitiated. Like all doctrines that have had to fight their way into favor, materialism is only now winning a popular acceptance, long after it has been left behind in philosophical circles.

Materialism is based on the unwarranted assumption that there is only one science of nature, the science of mechanics. All the other sciences, such as chemistry, biology, psychology, sociology, are considered more complicated phases of mechanics. The ideal towards which materialism strives is the ultimate explanation of all phenomena, whether chemical, biological, or psychical, in terms of motions of indivisible unit particles of matter. Nothing is said to exist but matter in the form of atoms, and the motions of these atoms. If the position of every particle in the universe together with the direction and the velocity of its motion were known, it would be possible to reconstruct the past history and to predict the future of the universe down to the smallest detail. A hypothetical all-knowing mind, from the positions and velocities of the particles of the primeval nebula from which the solar system evolved, could have deduced, by mathematical calculation, the future history of the earth down to every word of Homer, every chord of Beethoven, every formula of Einstein, every nuance of Fritz Kreisler. This is the logical corollary of materialism. Such is the miracle the skeptics so piously believe.

This exaltation of mechanics into the one master science is the outcome of the magnificent results the physics of Kepler, Galileo, and Newton yielded in reducing the motions of the planets to infal-

lible law and order. At one time geometry was considered the fundamental science, and Plato had the motto, "Let no one ignorant of geometry enter here," placed over the entrance to his academy. The present enthusiasm for mechanics is a mere fad, which will pass like the former enthusiasm for geometry.

As a matter of fact, there are at least five fundamental sciences of reality; Physics (Mechanics), Chemistry, Biology, Psychology, and Sociology, each succeeding science treating of a new and higher order of reality, which could not be treated by the preceding sciences. The simplest fact of chemistry cannot be explained in terms of mechanics. When two atoms of hydrogen combine with one atom of oxygen, the product, water, has qualities and properties which could not have been predicted from our knowledge of the properties of oxygen and hydrogen. Or, carrying the example out to its ideal limits, if every electron and proton, their positions, velocities, and masses were known in the reaction, if we had no previous experience of water, we should be unable to predict the result of the reaction.

If the mechanistic hypothesis is inadequate to account for the simplest chemical reaction, how much more far-fetched is the attempt to reduce the phenomena of biology, or even psychology, to mechanics.

The term materialist, or mechanist, is sometimes improperly applied to those scientists who would reduce biology and the higher sciences to organic chemistry. Much has been done in the field of Bio-chemistry, as it is called, but the knowledge of the chemistry of living organisms by no means exhausts the science of biology. Bio-chemistry and biology represent two different viewpoints from which the same set of phenomena may be studied, and each uses a different set of concepts. Bio-chemistry is based on the concepts of atomic and molecular proportions, transformations of chemical energy, etc.; biology is grounded on the concepts of life, growth, development, and evolution. The latter set of concepts cannot be reduced to the former; they are supplementary, not higher or lower terms of the same thing.

The phenomena of life involve complicated chemical processes it is true, but new qualities, biological qualities, *emerge* from the aggregate of chemical qualities which a knowledge of the latter alone would never reveal. In the same way, in our previous example of the chemistry of water, new qualities, of the chemical order, emerge from the aggregate of physical qualities of hydrogen and oxygen.

This doctrine of emergence is one of the most generally accepted of the philosophical tendencies of the present day. It may be abstractly stated thus: Aggregates have properties which are more than, and cannot be predicted from, the sum of their constituent parts.

Each succeeding science in the hierarchy of fundamental sciences, physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, sociology, deals with a higher order of emergent qualities than the science immediately preceding it. The realm of inert, dead, mechanical law emerges from "events" in the space-time manifold. The chemical order of reality emerges from the mechanical order. When the phenomena of chemistry become sufficiently complex a new order of reality, called life, emerges. Mind emerges from life, and the phenomena of society emerge from aggregates of minds.

It is thus seen that the fundamental axiom of materialism, that all phenomena can ultimately be explained in terms of mechanics, or in terms of physics and chemistry, is a mistaken dogma, as fallacious as the dogmas of mediaeval theology.

Materialism also meets insuperable difficulties in its treatment of the mind and body problem. In keeping with its fundamental postulate, that the one reality is matter, materialism attempts to reduce mind to body. Mind is explained as the functioning of matter of especially complex organization, namely, brain and nerve tissue. Consciousness is an accidental something accompanying these complex material phenomena in the brain, much the same as an accidental humming sound accompanies the operation of complex machinery. Consciousness is without utility of any sort, a mere epiphenomenon accompanying brain and nerve processes.

If this view is correct, the plays of Shakespeare, the music-dramas of Wagner, the paintings of Michaelangelo, might equally well have been produced and appreciated by a race of unconscious automatons, since consciousness has no effect on our conduct and is a mere accidental spectator enjoying (or lamenting) the mechanically determined operations of our body-machines.

Recent developments in the physical sciences, which formerly were the chief prop of materialism, have tended to discredit materialism. The materiality of the once dreaded "matter"—that object of the invectives of theologians and the spiritually inclined—has been impeached by recent researches into the nature of the electron. The electron, the ultimate unit of matter, has been reduced

to a mere centre of reference, from which radiations emanate at certain intervals, and since the electrons are known to us only through these intermittent radiations we are unjustified in attributing to them the properties of "matter" as common-sense conceives that term. From a strictly empirical stand-point, all that can be said of a piece of matter is that it consists of a series of "events" in the space-time manifold, having a more or less persisting identity. The definition which defines matter as "nothing in motion" is more than a witticism. Physical science is becoming more and more ghostly and spiritual, and the former hard, impenetrable ultimate particles of matter are now immaterial centres of force. There is no longer any absurdity in supposing these centres of force to be psychical in nature, the expression, mayhap, of nescient will or intelligence. While psychology, under the influence of behaviorism, is becoming materialistic, physics is fast approaching panpsychism!

Materialism being thus archaic and inadequate, the problems of philosophy are not mere hallucinations, and philosophy is as real and valid a discipline as ever.

But despite the fact that materialism is dead among philosophers, it is gaining multitudes of converts, especially among the younger generation. The reasons for this growth of materialism are its attractive extremism; its appealing, but specious, simplicity; the gradual extinction of Christianity; its ethical indifference, which condones an empty life of frivolous pleasure seeking; and above all, the appalling and almost universal ignorance of philosophy.

The Fundamentalist Christianity of the older generation is losing ground rapidly, and after a few more pyrrhic victories, such as that of the Tennessee evolution trial, will be well nigh extinct. Modernism has not been able to repair the breach in the dam of faith left by Fundamentalism crumbling before the debacle of modern enlightenment. Supernaturalism, with good old-fashioned miracles and hell-fire, is the very life and blood of popular religion, and for that reason Modernism makes little appeal. The unenlightened person wants a religion of the old brand, with a heaven to reward the virtuous and downtrodden, and a hell to punish the sinful and prosperous, or else he had rather not bother with religion at all. The person with sufficient intelligence to get along without a future heaven and hell is not attracted by pale, anemic Modernism, which appears to him to be nothing but words, cleverly juggled so as to

reconcile science and theology. The widespread ignorance of philosophy leaves no alternative but materialism, in either case. Hence it is not surprising that materialism is succeeding decaying fundamentalism.

The passing of the old religions will leave the world as dogmatic as ever. The dogmatism of materialism will have become substituted for the dogmatism of Christianity, and new philosophical ideas will meet the same hostile reception as of old. The only solution of the difficulty lies in a more widespread study of philosophy.

One of the chief enemies with which philosophy has to contend is a complete and almost universal misapprehension of the problems, scope, and field of philosophy, and its relations to the other branches of human knowledge.

It is popularly and erroneously believed that science—that is, observation and experiment—has superseded and put into discard philosophy—that is, loose, unverified speculation. A certain superior class of hack writers, who style themselves "scientific," because they have read and half-understood a few unauthoritative, popular books on science, are fond of alluding to the misguided efforts of certain medieval, theological philosophers, and placing a stigma upon all philosophical activity in consequence.

The question of how many teeth a horse has became a subject of debate at some time during the Middle Ages, and a group of worthy Schoolmen wasted an astonishing amount of brain tissue, ink and paper, breath, and ill temper without arriving at an agreement. It never occurred to these Scholastics to get a real, living specimen of a horse, open his mouth, and count his teeth. The pseudo-scientific writers mentioned above regale the magazine-reading public with this delectable story, and then, fearing that the point will be missed, proceed to give the reader a good dose of moral, in the shape of the conclusion that philosophy is obsolete, and has been superseded by science.

There are several errors in this specious moral. In the first place, the Schoolmen of the Middle Ages were theologians rather than philosophers, and all their so-called philosophizing was obliged to arrive at pre-ordained conclusions fixed by the authority of the Church militant. Scholastic reasoning was the process of finding new proofs for old "truths," fixed by authority, not the process of arriving at new truths. In the second place, the mistakes of indi-

vidual philosophers do not invalidate philosophy as a whole. Scientists also have often made mistakes, but no one outside of Billy Sunday or John Roach Straton would hold that these acknowledged errors constitute a refutation of science.

A misapprehension of what philosophy really is lies at the bottom of these attempts to ridicule philosophy.

We shall now attempt to arrive at a more exact idea of what philosophy really is. The successful defining of philosophy constitutes perhaps the most difficult problem of philosophy. A fair sized volume could be filled with various definitions which have been tried and found inadequate during the history of philosophic thought.

The reason for the difficulty, nay, impossibility, of defining philosophy has been aptly summed up by Hegel, who said that philosophy cannot be defined since it defines all else. A definition of philosophy in one sentence must be given up as an impossible undertaking, so we shall attempt to define philosophy by pointing out a few of its more salient tasks.

The principal aim of philosophy is to arrive at a unified conception of the universe, a *Weltanschauung,* or world-view, through a critical and synthetic examination of all the humanly possible ways of knowing reality.

These modes of knowing are Common Sense, Religion, Art, and Science, each of which represents a distinct and peculiar view-point, in accordance with which the multiplicity of phenomena is interpreted. Common sense looks at things from the undisciplined point of view of the man on the street. Religion attempts to formulate the individual's emotional relationship, and moral responsibility to the Invisible Power behind the universe. Art interprets reality in terms of beauty, and hence is more or less subjective and capable of an infinite variety of forms. Science describes the universe in terms of mechanism, and lays bare the mechanical means through which the cosmic purposes are realized. In other words, science studies the technique of the Composer of the cosmic symphony.

The function of metaphysics, the central discipline of philosophy, is to construct a dispassionate, composite view of reality, from all that it finds valid in the claims of common sense, religion, art, and science. Such a broad, unprejudiced, synthetic attitude toward the cosmos constitutes one's *Weltanschauung.*

It frequently happens that conflicts occur between common

sense, religion, art, and science. But such clashes are due to ignorance of the proper sphere of each of these apparently contending points of view; in other words, an ignorance of philosophy.

Take science and religion for example. Religion has often attempted to do the work that legitimately belongs to science, as in the Book of Genesis in the Bible, where a would-be scientific explanation of the origin of things is given. Because of such encroachments of religion upon the domain of science, incessant warfare has been waged between these two rivals since the beginning of human thought, and continues to-day in the invectives of theologians against evolution. The so-called conflict between science and religion is in reality a conflict between the three thousand year old science of Moses and modern science.

Now there could be no conflict between a rational religion, based upon a study of philosophy, not spurious revelation, and science. Each represents a different "universe of discourse." Science can no more invalidate the religion of a philosopher than a knowledge of the number of words, the kind of type, or the grade of paper used in the printing of Hamlet can invalidate the lofty strength, truth, and beauty of Shakespeare's immortal lines.

In this connection, there is an interesting story on record of a certain natural mathematician, who could do unheard of problems, such as cube roots and adding whole pages of figures, mentally. Once out of curiosity, a group of this extraordinary man's friends took him to see a performance of Hamlet, to see what his reaction would be. The looked for reaction was most curious; the mental mathematician stated the exact number of syllables, words, and speeches in the play, but was totally unable to recount the story, meaning, philosophy, or any of the aesthetic qualities of Hamlet.

Here we have a splendid example of the study of the identical subject-matter from more than one view-point, each of which belongs to a different universe of discourse, and hence does not in the least impinge upon, or invalidate, the other view-points. The mathematician studied Hamlet from a mathematical point of view, and arrived at purely quantitative results. A literary student, seeing the same production of Hamlet, might have gained a comprehensive view of Shakespeare's philosophy of life. Still another auditor might have studied the play from the viewpoint of grammar, and compared the grammar of Shakespeare with the grammar of to-day.

These three methods of studying Hamlet give us three sets of results not at all like one another. But no one would say that these different results contradict one another. The number of words in Hamlet has no bearing upon Shakespeare's grammatical usages, or upon the ethical implications of Hamlet's soliloquy.

Similarly, the universe may be studied from the viewpoints of common sense, art, religion, science, and philosophy without any contradiction ensuing, because the results of these various viewpoints are incommensurable with one another and belong to different universes of discourse.

Hence, the world-views given us by common sense, art, religion, science, and philosophy are equally valid, provided that they do not mistake their proper places, and do not encroach upon territory properly belonging to the others, as has so often happened in the past, through ignorance of philosophy. But it is to the world-view of philosophy that the greatest credence must be given, since, as we have seen, philosophy is a synthesis based upon an examination of all means of attaining knowledge.

It is sometimes erroneously held by the philosophically illiterate enemies of philosophy that philosophy is in conflict with science. Such cannot be the case, for philosophy draws part of its data from the results of science. There may indeed be conflict between materialism and other schools of philosophy, but, as we have seen, materialism is not science itself, but merely one of the possible philosophical interpretations of science.

Philosophy supplements, does not contradict science. One is philosophical after one has been scientific. Herbert Spencer said, "Knowledge of the lowest kind is *un-unified knowledge;* Science is *partially-unified knowledge;* Philosophy is *completely-unified knowledge.*" (First Principles, page 119.) That is, common sense knowledge consists of scattered, isolated maxims and rules not yet reduced to a system by classification under general principles. Scientific knowledge consists of general theories and principles unifying one particular science, for example, as the atomic theory unifies chemistry, or the evolution theory, biology. According to Spencer, a philosophical generalization is one that involves the complete body of science as a whole. We should prefer, however, to give the term "philosophical" a broader application, and extend it to cover all possible knowledge, not merely scientific knowledge.

Properly speaking, that branch of philosophy which deals with

the results of science, is Natural Philosophy. The tasks of philosophy in connection with science consist in the analysis of the axioms and unanalyzed fundamental concepts of the special sciences; the examination and possible improvement of the methods and procedures of science; and the extension of broad, general scientific theories, such as the evolution theory, to all departments of human knowledge.

Each of the empirical sciences is based upon certain basic concepts, in terms of which the subject-matter of the particular science is described. The physical sciences, for example, are built upon the concepts of *matter, energy, space, time,* and *motion.* These terms are taken for granted, and physics makes no attempt to tell us what they really are.

It is through the identification of these terms with the significance common sense has attached to them that mistaken philosophical interpretations arise. For example, the *matter* of physics is confused with the hard, enduring, impenetrable matter of our daily experience. In reality, the term *matter* as used in science is a mere abstraction, a short-hand expression by which we express the idea that certain groups of sensible properties of our experience always occur together and maintain a persisting identity. This confusion of the scientific and common sense meanings of the word "matter" is one of the root fallacies of materialism.

Similarly, the phenomena of biology are described in terms of *life, structure, function, development, evolution,* etc. The subject-matter of psychology is reduced to the fundamental concepts of *sensation, perception, cognition, affection, volition,* etc., or, in the psychology of John B. Watson and the behaviorists, merely *stimulus* and *response.*

It is one of the tasks of natural philosophy to define and analyze these elementary concepts, such as *matter, energy, evolution, perception.* If philosophy were more widely studied there would be fewer faulty interpretations of the axioms of science, and less credence given to the ridiculous philosophizings of scientific specialists suddenly turned philosophers for the sake of publicity.

One of the chief tasks of natural philosophy is the application of certain far-reaching scientific to the entire body of human knowledge. The theory of evolution is such a theory. Every art, every science, literature, practically every pursuit of man, no matter how far removed from the field of biology, has been profoundly affected

by this revolutionizing and epoch-making conception. It is obvious that no one of the special sciences is general enough in its scope to undertake the task of tracing all the manifold implications of the theory of evolution. Hence this work must be undertaken by philosophy.

Another task which falls to the philosopher is the unifying of the results of the separate special sciences into an organic whole. This is an age of extreme specialization, and the workers in the different fields of scientific research are getting more and more out of touch with one another, so that were it not for the synthesizing activity of philosophy, chaos would inevitably result and science would degenerate into an unorganized, unconnected congeries of random facts and details.

It has been protested that this labor of unifying the sciences is no longer practicable for the philosopher. It is said that the results of the various sciences now form a body so inconceivably vast that no one man could hope to master it all in a lifetime.

But it is not necessary to know every particular fact in all the sciences to build up a philosophy of science. A knowledge of the principles, general laws, methods, and basic concepts is all that is requisite, the mass of details being irrelevant. The mastering of the fundamental principles of the sciences surely is not the work of a lifetime. Hence, Spencer's conception of philosophy as a completely unified universal science is still valid, except that he should have used the more restrictive term, "natural philosophy."

In addition to metaphysics and natural philosophy, which we have already examined, philosophy includes several other disciplines. The most important of these are Epistemology, Aesthetics, and Ethics. Lack of space obliges us to dismiss each of these with a word. Epistemology investigates the conditions, possibility, and validity of human knowledge. Aesthetics treats of the problems of beauty, taste, and artistic norms. Ethics studies the principles underlying moral conduct.

It is evident that these subjects are not capable of being subjected to exact scientific treatment. Hence, philosophy is necessary for their study, if for no other reason.

Philosophy is sometimes impugned on the ground that the only certain knowledge is the knowledge given us by the sciences, and that philosophy is the work of fancy and unbridled imagination in a sphere where the truth is not vouchsafed to human intelligence.

This attitude is known as *positivism* and is not to be confused with materialism. Materialism dogmatically asserts that there is no other reality than mass particles in motion. Positivism does not deny the possible existence of an underlying reality of which the world of mass particles in motion is only a manifestation. It merely says that knowledge of this underlying reality is impossible to human minds, and that our efforts should be confined to the less pretentious, but practical field of science.

Positivism is usually associated with the name of Auguste Comte, the French philosopher of the first half of the eighteenth century, who called his system the *Philosophie Positive*. Comte banished metaphysics from his philosophy and concerned himself entirely with the "positive" results of the empirical sciences. Within the field of science itself, Comte recommended complete reliance upon observation, and the exclusion of all speculation that might be of a metaphysical nature.

The result of this dread of the bogey of metaphysics was that Comte relegated so many problems of science and philosophy to the category of the "unknowable" that, had men of science followed his teachings, science would have stopped in its progress then and there and advanced no further. The nature of light, the chemical composition of the sun and the stars, the ultimate nature of matter, said Comte, were to be given up by science as problems incapable of solution by human intelligence, and scientists who dealt with them were wasting their time pursuing metaphysical will-o'-the-wisps.

Fortunately, men of science pursued these "will-o'-the-wisps" despite the warnings of the positivists, and every High School child now knows, or should know, that light consists of inconceivably rapid vibrations of what was once called the ether, that matter is composed of electrons and protons, and that the chemical element Helium was discovered in the sun even before it was found on the earth.

It will be readily seen that an over-emphasis upon mere observation to the exclusion of speculation, or imagination, in science is as fatal to progress as pure, unverified speculation. Scientific discoveries are made, not by the application of hard and fast rules of experimental procedure, but by employing the imagination in framing ingenious hypotheses, which are tried out in actual experience to see if they will work. Imagination, trial and error, even "metaphysical" speculation, are indispensible in giving the scientist his

first guesses and crude hypotheses, to be refined later, through succesive modifications and verifications, into accurate laws and theories rich in practical results to mankind.

Speculation, in other words philosophy, is an indispensible part of scientific method. Pure observation and experiment, or *empiricism*, is as useless as pure, untested speculation, or *rationalism*. Throughout the ages, these two motives, the rationalistic and the empirical, have existed side by side, apparently incompatible with each other. The reason why science and philosophy were so slow in arriving at lasting and substantial results is that a happy balance between the two irreconcilables, rationalism and empiricism, had not been attained.

For the scientific method is really nothing less, nothing more, than the harnessing of the two incompatible steeds to a common purpose. Leonardo da Vinci, Galileo, and Descartes (not Bacon as is commonly supposed) developed the characteristic, wonderfully productive scientific method, and each of the three was even more a philosopher than a scientist. Galileo in his writings mentions that he had studied philosophy as many years as he had studied months of science and mathematics, and this statement is significant. For the devising of the methods of science is a task involving deep thought and philosophy. Fortunately, Leonardo and Galileo tested the efficiency of their methods by actual observation, and modern science was born.

Science is rational-empiricism. Science is the base metal, found by empiricism, transmuted by the touchstone of rationalism into pure gold.

The atomic theory of Dalton, which put chemistry upon a solid foundation; the evolution theory of Lamarck and Darwin, which has enriched not only biology, but the whole of human thought; what are they but philosophical theories, verified by their magnificent results? For who has seen, or ever will see, an atom? Who has ever seen one species turn into another? These two theories are the work of speculation, rationalism, philosophy, and not observation.

Philosophy thus plays an indispensible part in science itself. Without "metaphysical" speculation the progress of science would immediately cease. Without philosophy, the methods of science would never have come into being.

Far from philosophy having no place in science, science, whether it acknowledge it or not, assumes a metaphysical attitude in every

formula, every law, every generalization. This metaphysical attitude amounts to a matter of faith, and is the very apostle's creed of science, without which science would be as helpless as the Fundamentalist who had just lost his faith.

Science assumes as a working hypothesis, as a sacred article of faith, that the same cause must always be followed by the same effect. But from a purely empirical-skeptical standpoint there is no compulsion in causal relationships. All that can be predicated of the recurrence of phenomena is *probability,* not certainty, that the same effect will follow the same cause. Scientific laws and formulae are but "short-hand descriptions" (Karl Pearson, *Grammar of Science*) of certain regularities and uniformities in the flux of perceptual experience.

The practical applications of science, control of the forces of nature, the application of mechanical laws to machines, *assume* that the same effect *must* follow the same cause.

When George Babbit steps on the starter of his Ford, he has faith that a sequence of phenomena of electricity, dynamics, mechanics, compression and expansion of gases, and centrifugal force will occur that will enable to get to his destination on time. When a lady driver stops suddenly in front of him, he trusts that the mathematical and mechanical laws under which his brakes operate will hold good in this particular instance as they have in all observed instances in the past, provided the mechanism is in working order.

The sun has been observed to rise (apparently) in the east and set in the west in all recorded instances in the past; hence it is extremely probable that it will rise in the east and set in the west to-morrow. But the proposition that the sun must inevitably rise in the east and set in the west to-morrow is incapable of logical proof. All that we can say with the authority of logic is that it is very likely that no exception to the rule will occur to-morrow.

There is no compulsion in the passing of one phenomenon into another, a cause into its effect. All reference to a causal force or agency that brings about the effect, that makes the cause a cause, is a matter for metaphysics, not for science. We assume as a working hypothesis, "same cause, same effect." Scientists are willing to stake everything on this creed, and it constitutes their gospel.

If a metaphysical assumption, an article of faith, is necessary for science, the pursuit of life even more urgently demands a working hypothesis, a philosophy, some sort of creed. Indeed, the most

practical benefit of philosophy, the point of contact between philosophy and average human being, lies in its supplying the individual, and the age in which he lives, with an attitude toward life and the universe that will serve as the basis of his conduct.

It may be true that such an attitude toward things involves beliefs incapable of proof, faith, and a measure of dogmatism. But a certain degree of dogmatic self-assurance is necessary for successful living. Hamlet is a classic example of a man so undogmatic, so open-minded, that all action is suspended in favor of self-scrutiny, and the neutralizing influence of conflicting arguments. Hesitation, indecision, impotence, and suspended animation are the results of a too thorough-going open-mindedness.

We may concede, then, the need for a modicum of dogmatism, or faith, in a philosophy of life that is to carry conviction and which is to be capable of functioning.

Even if we grant, for the sake of argument, that the cause and purpose of existence is unknowable to human intelligence, still our minds demand that we adopt some attitude, some sort of faith, toward things, to supply a background, a justification of our behavior. Even the most unphilosophical, the most unlettered, or the most skeptical person has some sort of philosophy, conscious or unconscious, whether he admits it or not. In his conduct out in the world of life and action he acts a philosophy, though he may disdain to acknowledge it. The most self-questioning scientist belies his intellectual creed of accepting nothing without proof the moment he forgets his studies, the moment he leaves his laboratory and goes forth as a human being.

There are some individuals who prefer to have their philosophy expressed in articulate, communicable form, rather than leave it unconscious, vauge, and unverbalized. Such are we poor, misguided individuals, who waste our time poring over books of philosophy, who reach out for the unattainable, who seek to render ever more complete, emotionally and intellectually satisfying, our *Weltanschauung*.

We revel in the fierce, exhilarating joy of the chase, though our quarry ever eludes us, is ever a step beyond us. What hunter pursues his prey for the mere business of filling his larder, and prefers the disappointing satisfaction of capture to the wild, innervating ecstasy of pursuit?

Malebranche said, "If I held Truth captive in my hand, I should

open my hand and let it fly, in order that I might again pursue and capture it." Philosophic Truth offers joy without end, is the one pleasure which will not allow us to become blase, because of its very uattainable nature.

As has already been hinted, science makes no claim to absolute knowledge. It seeks theories, hypotheses, laws, and formulae such that will enable us to predict and control phenomena, so that we may alter and reconstruct our experience and environment, making this world a better place in which to live. From the scientific stand-point, the value of an item of knowledge lies in its fruits, and the criterion of truth is usefulness. That which is true from this pragmatic stand-point is that which enables us to attain a fuller and more abundant living. Old truths are constantly giving way to new and more adequate truths, which better fulfill that purpose in experience.

Let us carry the pragmatic motive into the field of the life of an individual. A philosophy, or a religion, is useful, or necessary, for an individual to attain that abundant living, adjustment with his environment, that harmonious functioning of all his capacities, which are the aim of the individual's life. Hence, though we cannot attain an ultimately true philosophy, we can shape and acquire a practical and intellectually satisfying attitude toward life, that will give us those ideals that determine our character and our actions.

We have dire need to-day for some such attitude toward life. John Dewey has written well in this connection. "Where is the moral progress that corresponds to our economic accomplishments? The latter is the direct fruit of the revolution that has been wrought in physical science. But where is there a corresponding human science and art? Not only has the improvement in the method of knowing remained so far mainly limited to technical and economic matters, but this progress has brought with it serious new moral disturbances. It need only cite the late war, the problem of capital and labor, the relation of economic classes, the fact that while the new science has achieved wonders in medicine and surgery, it has also produced and spread occasions for diseases and weaknesses. These considerations indicate to us how undeveloped are our politics, how crude and primitive our education, how passive and inert our morals. *The causes remain which brought philosophy into existence as an attempt to find an intelligent substitute for blind custom and*

blind impulse as guides to life and conduct." (*Reconstruction in Philosophy,* p. 123. Italics mine.)

Science, unallied with a program of ethical idealism, threatens to wipe out civilization, through its perfecting of the efficiency of instruments and destruction. We hear rumors of scientists at work, in every world power, at the problems of chemical and even bacteriological warfare. Explosives have been developed of late that make the explosives used in the last war seem like children's firecrackers. The next war will be fought from the air, and will be directed against the civilian populations as well as against the armed forces at the battle-front. With modern electrical, chemical, and bacteriological methods of destruction civilization itself will be jeopardized if another world-war occurs. Perhaps the human race will render itself extinct through its useful slave, science, rising up and slaying its master.

Would it not be better, for themselves and society, for these men of science, devoting their energies to the means of destroying mankind's painfully, slowly, and laboriously acquired civilization, to hold some religious, philosophical, or ethical view that would restrain them from that diabolical work, even if that view could not be empirically proved, than to be free from all dictates of conscience whatever through an ethically indifference agnosticism? Even a false theory that furnishes a basis for ethically responsible conduct is certainly more conducive to the welfare of society than the lack of any guiding theory whatever.

True science, as distinguished from the pseudo-science of certain commercial scribblers, makes no claim that its results represent absolute truth. A scientific "truth" is merely a concept abstracted from the perceptual flux, to be used as an instrument in the control of our environment. When a more efficient instrument is found, the old "truth" is either discarded or revised. The results of science, like the programs of a certain vaudeville theatre that I was once dragged into by a friend, well-meaning, but in need of philosophy, are "subject to change without notice."

If then the results of science are useful to us even if they do not represent absolute truth, we can say the same of a philosophy of life. If a scientific theory is "true" because of its useful applications, we may say with equal justification that a particular philosophy of life is "true" because of its useful applications in the conduct

of life. The argument that absolute truth is unknowable does not invalidate philosophy anymore than it invalidates science. Philosophy, when approached and studied in the right spirit, is as practical as science.

Decriers of philosophy are fond of alluding to the clash between rival schools of philosophy. It is declared that the points on which all philosophers are agreed would not fill a page of a pocket notebook.

As to the matter of disagreement among philosophers, the very nature of the problems investigated by philosophy precludes unanimous results. Furthermore, philosophy does the pioneer work in fields which are not yet ready for the exact methods of the special sciences. A great part of the work of philosophy consists of such pre-scientific work. As soon as a field of research has reached the point where scientific exactness is possible, that field automatically ceases to be philosophy and becomes science. Thus science claims credit for a great deal of accomplishment that really belong to philosophy.

Again, scientists are not as universally agreed upon their results as is commonly supposed. Take the theory of evolution for example. While practically all scientists now accept the bare fact of evolution, we find at least five conflicting theories of the *modus operandi* of evolution. Lamarck, Darwin, Weismann, Eimer, and De Vries have each given us a distinct theory of descent. The theory of natural selection unaided by the inheritance of acquired characters, of Weismann, has been losing ground of late before a revival of Lamarckianism. Thus certain questions within the field of science are as far from final solution as the questions of philosophy.

While there is no complete agreement among philosophers, still, tendencies originated by certain philosophers persist and reappear in the works of all later philosophers, often many centuries later. Thus the Heraclitan idea of the harmony of opposites has played its part in the philosophy of Hegel, twenty-two centuries later. Even today a new philosophical tendency-movement, called the New Heraclitanism, is under way.

Although, let us say Plato's philosophy as a whole is no longer adequate, many of his views continue to play a role in modern thought. Plato believed in a supernal, perfect, eternal world of Ideas, divine models of things from which earthly things derive their imperfect, material existence. While we no longer believe in

the actual existence of the Ideas, the conception of them is still useful to us, as ideals towards which we may direct our efforts.

Anaximander and Empedocles, the Ancient Greek philosophers, had evolution theories. Anaximander taught that all things had their origin in a fiery vapor, the *apeiron;* that living creatures came from the slime; and that man evolved from water creatures. We have here the modern naturalistic view of the world.

Empedocles taught a doctrine amazingly like the theory of natural selection. According to this fertile imagination, four simple elements, air, water, earth, and fire, through the operation of two fundamental forces, love and hate, were sufficient to the explain the eternal flux of integration and disintegration. A vast number of combinations of the simple elements were formed in the past, but only the more stable ones, those that could successfully survive the conditions of the environment, remained. Such monstrosities as headless men, lions with woman's heads, had come into existence from time to time, only to perish in the struggle for life. We have here a very fanciful, but unmistakable statement of the theory of natural selection.

The idea of evolution thus was not an innovation of Lamarck, or Goethe, or Darwin, but had been floating as a seed through the ages, finally to land on the favorable soil of the nineteenth century. Some of the philosophical speculations of twenty-five centuries ago thus still appear in our science and philosophy, though with a new significance. The statement that nothing is ever accomplished in philosophy is obviously false.

Man in his early attempts at philosophizing is naive, and sees greater simplicity and order in Nature than there really is. As philosophy advances, the simple, unqualified formulae of the pioneers become antiquated and displaced by more subtle and elaborate interpretations. Greater and greater becomes the range of phenomena, the extent of the known universe, the discordant elements to be resolved to a more and more embracing formula. As science and human observation, aided by increasingly effective instrumental apparatus, expand, more and more things undreamt of in philosophy —that is, the current philosophy—arise, and philosophy must expand to take account of the new factors.

Philosophy, like science, is thus constantly correcting and revising itself, so that the lack of permanent achievement in philosophy is more apparent than real.

The quest of truth is like Achilles' pursuit of the tortoise in the celebrated paradox of Eleatic Zeno; strive as we may, the ultimate truth can never be attained, for like the tortoise, it is more and more nearly reached, but never over-taken.

The world-view, or *Weltanschauung,* of any particular age may be likened unto a musical chord with discordant elements included, a chord of the seventh or the ninth, as it were. With further progress of philosophy these discordant elements resolve into a consonance, but in the meanwhile new discordant elements have entered, through the discovery of new problems, to resolved in the next step forward. Thus the progression of chords never comes to a final concord, but is rather a sequence of discords, such as the sequences of chords of the seventh or the ninth which we often hear in music, each chord ever resolving into the chord following.

The end of the sequence, the final philosophy, would be the contemplation of the perfect, concluding tonic chord of the cosmic symphony, the evolution of the cosmos brought to its final, infinitely distant ideal; the world process regarded *sub specie aeternitatis,* past, present, and future blended into one glorious, diaphanous, everlasting present moment, in the consciousness of some all-knowing mind.

CONFUCIUS AND CONFUCIANISM

BY H. G. CREEL

THE most famous exponent of Sinism was K'ung Fu Tse, or, as his name is latinized, Confucius (551-479 B. C.).[183] The son of an obscure military officer in the state of Lu, he was orphaned early. The *Analects* tell us that he had no teacher, but studied the ancient books and traditions for himself. This seems probable. He worked his way up in the government of Lu until he became one of the chief ministers of the state. As a protest against the improper actions of the Marquis who employed him he resigned, as the code of his class required, at the height of his career. He went thereafter from one state to another seeking employment, but was unable to find a permanent post. Later, he settled down with a circle of disciples about him to teach and to write. He edited the *Shu King* and the *Shi King*, but his original compositions include only the *Ch'un Ch'iu*[184] and, probably, one of the appendices to the *Yi King*.

Confucius has been greatly misunderstood and greatly misinterpreted to the West. Beyond doubt this is due to the fact that the teaching which bears his name formed the strongest bulwark against the entrance of Christianity into the country. In requital, such scholars as Wieger have, perhaps not deliberately, but thoroughly, misrepresented him.

In the Occident he is believed, at least popularly, to have originated Sinism. This has already been shown to be untrue. On the basis of the *Analects* (our most reliable source of information

[183] Wieger, *Histoire des Croyances*, p. 123.

[184] This book is a brief, laconic, and unembellished record of events. Several commentaries have been written on it, and numerous commentaries have been written on these commentaries. The book is supposed to have accorded praise or blame to the persons mentioned, by means of extremely delicate niceties of phrasing. It was probably written with this intent. See Legge's preface to the book in the *Chinese Classics*.

concerning the Sage) it may be seen that he was conspicuously unoriginal as compared with his famous contemporary, Lao Tse, and as compared with the outstanding Chinese thinkers of the centuries which followed him. His teachings are almost entirely a setting forth and elaboration of the philosophy stated in the *Shu* and the *Shi;* many of his statements in the *Analects* are taken verbatim from these sources. Confucius did not pretend to be original.

On the other hand, he has been represented as having been, personally, almost entirely negative, an inhuman, formal, stiff, timid prig. Nothing could be farther from the truth. The Confucius who is revealed by an unprejudiced reading of the *Analects* is modest, kindly, earnest, sincere, above all "human." It is, in my opinion, his greatness of character, not exceeded by any figure in world-history, rather than his intellect, which makes him significant for the history of Chinese thought. Confucius lived in a time when all of the old standards were being thrown over, due to the breakdown of the Chow dynasty. The system of thought which we have been sketching had been in existence long before his time, and had been expounded by many men before him. But Confucius, by the force of his personal greatness, was able to catch the imagination of men, and eventually, through his disciples, to reinstate the old philosophy, to some extent, for another two thousand five hundred years.

Part of the injustice done to Confucius derives from the error of considering him the originator of Sinism. To be sure, he insists on formalism, but in this he only attempts to better the ordering of human affairs in the way which had been prescribed from antiquity. In so far as he allows his personal preferences to intrude, he figures as a rationalizer and *humanizer* of the old formulas.

> The Master said, "The linen cap is that which is prescribed by the rules of ceremony, but now a silk one is worn. It is economical, and I follow the common practice.
> The rules of ceremony prescribe the bowing below *the hall,* but now the practice is to bow *only* after ascending it. That is arrogant. I continue to bow below the hall, though I oppose the common practice."[185]
> In the ceremonies of mourning, it is better that there should be deep sorrow than a minute attention to observances.[186]
> The Master said, " 'It is *li,*'[187] they say 'It is *li,*' they say.

[185] *Analects,* 9,3.
[186] *Ibid.,* 3,4,3.
[187] *I. e.,* "It is according to the rules of propriety."

> Are gems and silk all that is meant by *li?* 'It is music,'[188] they say. 'It is music,' they say. Are bells and drums all that is meant by music?"[189]
>
> The Master said, "High station filled without indulgent generosity; ceremonies performed without reverence; mourning conducted without sorrow;—wherewith should I contemplate such ways?[190]
>
> The Master said, "Though a man have abilities as admirable as those of the Duke of Chow, yet if he be proud and niggardly, those other things are not really worth being looked at.[191]

Confucius' way of following the *tao,* which was the way prescribed in the *Shu* and the *Shi,* was to study carefully the methods of the successful emperors and dynasties of the past, and then to apply them.

> The Master said, "Follow the seasons of Hsia.
>
> "Ride in the state carriage of Yin.
>
> "Wear the ceremonial cap of Chow.
>
> "Let the music be the Shao (the music of Shun) with its pantomimes."[192]
>
> The Master said, "Without knowing the ordinances of Heaven, it is impossible to be a superior man.
>
> "Without knowing *li* (the rules of propriety), it is impossible for the character to be established."[193]

Confucius puts great emphasis, therefore, on learning and study.[194] He does not, however, allow himself to become entangled in the philosopher's error of mistaking words for things,[195] nor does he, in setting up the past as criterion, leave no room for growth.[196]

The picture of Confucius the man can be painted most accurately by a few quotations from the *Analects.* A disciple said of him:

> There were four things from which the Master was entirely free. He had no foregone conclusions, no arbitrary predeterminations, no obstinacy, no egoism.[197]

He himself said:

> To conceal resentment against a person, and appear friend-

[188] Chinese music of this period had deep moral and ceremonial significance.
[189] *Ibid.,* 17,11.
[190] *Ibid.,* 3,26.
[191] *Ibid.,* 6,11.
[192] *Ibid.,* 15,10.
[193] *Ibid.,* 20,3.
[194] *Ibid.,* 2,16; 8,12; 11,24.
[195] *Ibid.,* 15,40.
[196] *Ibid.,* 3,14; *Cf.* also *Li Ki* (in *C.C.*), p. 390.
[197] *An.* 9,4.

> ly with him;—Tso Ch'iû-ming was ashamed of such conduct. I also am ashamed of it.[198]
>
> The Master angled, but he did not use a net. He shot, but not at birds perching.[199]
>
> The Master said, "In letters, I am perhaps equal to other men, but *the character of* the superior man, in carrying out in his conduct what he professes, is what I have not yet attained to.[200]
>
> The Master said, "A youth is to be regarded with respect. How do we know that his future will not be equal to our present?"[201]
>
> When any of his [Confucius'] friends died, if he had no relations who could be depended upon for the necessary offices, he would say, "I will bury him."[202]

Actual incidents related of the Sage show him as unusually kindly and considerate.[202a] It must be remembered, also, that the things which are said of him are not of the sort of myth with which the disciples of every great man seek to glorify him. Legends about Confucius abound, but we are not dealing here with those. Most of the material in the *Analects* rings true. If the reader doubt, let him take two or three hours to read through the book himself.

There is little of the dilettante or the pedant about Confucius. He is tremendously in earnest.

> Though a man may be able to recite the three hundred odes, yet if, entrusted with a governmental charge, he knows not how to act, or if, when sent to any quarter on a mission, he can not give his replies unassisted, notwithstanding the extent *of his learning,* of what practical use is it?[203]

Such a question would have been sacrilege to a Confucianist of a later day, when the *Classics* had become sacrosanct and their knowledge a badge of caste.

Confucius has been interpreted by various schools of thought, in East and West, to accord with their systems. Especially has there been an effort, under rationalistic influence, to make him a mere ethical teacher, without any system of metaphysics. Enough has been said, I trust, to discredit this position. To be sure, Confucius believed in the force of teaching and example, but he also

198 *Ibid.,* 5,24.
199 *Ibid.,* 7,26.
200 *Ibid.,* 7,32.
201 *Ibid.,* 9,22.
202 *Ibid.,* 10,15.
202a *Ibid.,* 5,1; 15,41.
203 *Ibid.,* 13,5.

believed that the same ends might be achieved without them if the transcendent harmony of the universe were brought about by the emperor, treading in the *tao*. He has been thought likewise to have been a sceptic on the subject of the existence of "spirits," the *kwei* 鬼 and the *shên* 神. Perhaps he was, but our materials do not warrant the assumption.

> Fan Ch'i asked what constituted wisdom. The Master said, "To give one's self earnestly to the duties due to men, and, while respecting the *kwei* and *shên*, to keep aloof from them."[204]

The rule of Confucius in regard to these beings, as in regard to all others, is to treat with them no more and no less than *li* prescribes, and in the manner which it prescribes.

> The Master said, "For a man to sacrifice to a *kwei* which does not belong to him [is not of his family] is flattery."[205]

For this philosophy, as for any anthropocentric cosmology, the great problem is, of course, that of evil. If all which exists is properly part of the great harmony, and if at one time that harmony was in existence, how could it ever have ceased? This problem, Confucius never deals with. His practical emphasis did not admit of it. We must, however, consider his doctrine of human nature, since that has been called into question by Dubs.[206] Dubs makes the flat statement that Confucius did not teach that human nature was originally either good or evil.[207] He is mistaken, as the following quotations from the *Analects* will show.

> The Master said, "Man is born for uprightness. If a man lose his uprightness, and yet live, his escape *from death* is the effect of mere good fortune.[208]
> The Master said, "By nature, men are nearly alike; by practise, they come to be wide apart."[209]

Nothing could be more explicit than these two statements. And it will be seen that this is the only position which is really consistent with pure Sinism. For *properly* and *naturally* all things were good, and it was only by perversion that they became evil. And likewise, all things properly worked out for the good, and evil was surely punished and virtue surely rewarded. It was a noble faith—too

[204] *Ibid.*, 5,20.
[205] *Ibid.*, 2,24.1.
[206] H. H. Dubs, *Hsüntze, The Moulder of Ancient Confucianism.*
[207] *Ibid.*, p. 78-79.
[208] *An.* 6,17.
[209] *An.* 17,2.

noble to maintain itself intact in the evil times upon which China had come.

Yet we have not answered the question as to the origin of evil in this once perfect universe. Nor does Confucius answer it, in the *Analects* at least. One passage indicates that he would trace it to a gradual deviation from the original path of rectitude.

> The Master said, "Extravagance leads to insubordination, and parsimony to meanness. It is better to be mean[210] than to be insubordinate.[211]

It must be remembered, of course, that our record of Confucius' teachings is partial at best. But it is not probable that Confucius ever did meet this problem directly, for his interest was in practical statesmanship and social engineering, and he refused, like Gautama, to spin logical spider-webs. Such an emphasis was thoroughly compatible with his belief in the efficacy of certain techniques which we should call magical. To the man who uses magical technique, it is as much a valid and common-sense means of achievement as our magical category, "Science!", is to us.

The error of thinking Confucius a sceptic regarding the existence of superusual beings, which had its origin in this practical emphasis, has been touched on. His pragmatic attitude has been still further misinterpreted by Wieger to be "opportunism," action with a view to getting results without much reference to principle or means.[212] It is not without whimsicality that Wieger, himself a Jesuit scholar, should libel Confucius with the very accusation of "Jesuitical" tactics which has followed his own order. What are the facts?

> The Master said, "The superior man, in the world, does not set his mind either for anything or against anything; what is right he will follow."[213]

"What is *right* he will follow." The character used here is *i*, but *tao* or *li* might be substituted equally well. If there exists in the world a more exacting code of principles than this one, I do not know it. Confucius means simply that a man is not to follow his own whims and personal opinions as over against the cosmically grounded principles of right action—a fundamental principle of Fr. Wieger's own Church. The learned Jesuit makes the mistake of believing

[210] *I.e.*, at all costs, *order* must be preserved.
[211] *An.* 7,35.
[212] Wieger, *Histoire des Croyances,* p. 133.
[213] *An.* 4,10.

that lack of Christianity means, *ipso facto,* lack of any body of settled principle.

Unsparing of himself, Confucius demanded that others, and especially those of his own class, the scholars in government service, should be equally selfless in working for the prevalence of the *tao.* Again and again he tells us that the man of complete virtue will give up his life if need be rather than violate it. No matter how ancient an agreement may be, it must be kept. One who calls himself a scholar, and yet who devotes himself to truth so little that he can be ashamed of bad food and bad clothes, is not worth talking to. He is especially scornful of the mercenary scholar.

> The Master said, "With coarse rice to eat, with water to drink, and my bended arm for a pillow;—I have still joy in the midst of these things. Riches and honors, acquired by unrighteousness, are to me as a floating cloud."[214]

Is there any asceticism in Confucius' teaching? He does, to be sure, declare that it is not the part of the superior man to take undue enjoyment in fine food and ornamentation of his dwelling. He stigmatizes some music as "licientious," and he left the employ of the Marquis of Lu, at the height of his own career, because the Marquis was devoting his time to dancing girls. Yet the objection in the latter case was chiefly, at least, that the Marquis was neglecting his governmental duties; in other cases, too, devotion to pleasure was disapproved because it made devotion to duties impossible. In each situation, *li* was the guide, and *li* was the code of good manners made sacred. Obviously, few ascetic practices could have been tolerated within it; even a slight deviation in dress was sacrilege. Mutilation of the body (although practised by the government as punishment) was a serious breach of filial piety if performed by the individual, since it destroyed part of what was given by one's parents. A good Chinese had too many duties, within the order of Sinism, to have time for much asceticism.

Confucius was by no means a foe to happiness. The bringing of universal happiness was, in fact, his great ideal, and he approves the enjoyment of life, in conformity with *li,* wherever he finds it. On one occasion he asked several of his disciples to name their wishes. Three named more or less grandiose ambitions, to govern states well, and the like. Confucius turned to the fourth, who said:

[214] *An.* 6,15.

> In *this,* the last month of spring, with the dress of the season all complete, along with five or six young men who have assumed the cap, and six or seven boys, I would wash in the *I,* enjoy the breeze among the rain-altars, and return home singing." The Master heaved a sigh and said, "I give my approval to Teen."[215]

Incidentally, this approval of participation in an ancient and homely rite by one of his disciples does not show Confucius as the rationalistic sceptic he has sometimes been made out.

Confucius' devotion to duty was intensified by a sense of mission such as most great men have had. He feels very definitely that he has been appointed by Heaven to further the *tao,* and that so long as this mission is yet to be fulfilled he can not be harmed.[216] This was in part responsible for the very great personal courage which he displayed on several occasions. The corollary of this position, at which Confucius merely hints in moments of despair, is that Heaven is also responsible for his lack of success. Here again the problem of evil raises its head. Like his successors, Confucius seems to have been given to a degree of fatalism.[217] Neither of these problems was recognized squarely until the time of Wang Ch'ung (the first century A. D.).

Sinism had as one of its integral parts, it will be remembered, the arrangement of society, as well as of authority, in a system of graded ramifications from the center, which might be compared to an arterial system. All were bound to the center, *i.e.,* the emperor, but by a graded series, which extended from individuals to the head of the family, thence to the petty feudal lord, to the greater lord, and so on up to the imperial throne. It has been said that the theory of the empire was a magnification of the theory of the village. The village was a family, or a group of families; the empire was also conceived on the pattern of a great family. The centrality of the family concept in Confucius teaching was therefore thoroughly consistent. One of the very corner-stones of Sinism was the "five relations," that of father and son, of elder brother and younger brother, of husband and wife, of elders and juniors, and of ruler and minister. It will be seen that three of these are specifically within the family. These five relationships are mentioned in the *Classics,* from the earliest to the latest, as being of paramount im-

[215] *An.* 11.25,7.
[216] *An.* 7,22; 9,5; 14,37-38.
[217] *An.* 12,5,3.

portance. The family was, in fact, the most important Chinese institution, as it remains today. Religion and philosophy, which always rationalize the status quo, were inevitably built around this center. When Mo Tse treated family loyalties as of relatively little importance he was rightly accused of heresy from the ancient point of view. Confucius, in this as in most other matters, followed the ancient way.

> The Duke of Shê informed Confucius, saying, "Among us here there are those who may be styled upright in their conduct. If their father have stolen a sheep, they will bear witness to the fact."
> Confucius said, "Among us, in our part of the country, those who are upright are different from this. The father conceals the misconduct of the son, and the son conceals the misconduct of the father. Uprightness is to be found in this."[218]

This does not mean, however, what has sometimes been attributed to Confucius, an attitude of indifference toward all but one's kin. He was a persistent preacher of altruism, which he also practised, and he advocated practical charity. It was only to the evil-doer who was not of one's kin that he denied the claim of help. Although, when asked to define benevolence, he replied, "It is to love men," he also said, "Recompense injury with justice, and kindness with kindness."

One of the chief reasons for which Confucius is important for sinology is the fact that he edited the *Shi* and the *Shu*. A vital problem, which will probably never be solved, concerns the extent to which he altered the materials which came to his hand. The matter has been referred to before, and little can be added here. The general opinion is that, while he eliminated much of what he found, he altered the remainder but little if at all. Confucius, in so far as we can see him, is a traditionalist, not an innovator. The true traditionalist may easily select those materials which harmonize with each other and with his own views, but his reverence for the past will probably interdict any great amount of tampering with those records which he believes correct and therefore sacred. We know that in at least one instance, that of the songs of Ch'ing in the *Shi*, Confucius included materials of which he violently disapproved.[219]

[218] *An.* 13,18.
[219] *Analects,* 15,10,6. *Cf.* Legge's note, in *Chinese Classics,* v.I, p. 162.

It is Confucius who gives us the first, the most complete, and the most faithful picture of the orthodox Sinism which had flourished up to his time. After him, and starting in his own day, we enter the period of criticism and of philosophical embellishment of the old system. As we have seen, there is little of this in Confucius, and the lack makes him invaluable. Had he been more original, he would be less important for this study.

In treating next of Mencius, we take up the most important successor of the Master, often called the Second Sage, and credited with having given its wide vogue to the teaching of Confucius. We skip a hundred years, to which we must return later to deal with those trends of thought which differed more from the way of the ancients.

Mencius is the latinization of Meng Tse. The philosopher, who lived from 372 to 289 B. C.,[220] was born in Confucius' native state of Lu. He received his training, it is recorded, from the sole grandson of Confucius, who is generally agreed to be the author of the *Chung Yung* or *Doctrine of the Mean,* which is the third of the *Four Books.* The book of Mencius, entitled simply by his name, is the fourth and last of these documents, which might together be called the "New Testament" of the Confucian school. Mencius' book is said to have been written by himself, but there is reason to believe that it was probably composed after his death by a disciple. This was the more usual procedure.

Mencius, like Confucius, travelled widely, but the object of his travels was very different. Confucius sought, above all, an opportunity to put his principles into practice; Mencius, although he occasionally held office, relinquished it easily, and sometimes for reasons which seem to be mere petulance. On one occasion he complains that a king who had employed him did not really want him, else he would have kept a representative perpetually beside the philosopher to compliment him and assure him of the great esteem in which the king held his services, and of how sorry the king would be to lose him![221]

The fact is that Mencius was a philosopher and a teacher, while Confucius before him was primarily a man desperately concerned to save the empire. Mencius really cares far more that his own brilliance shall be recognized, and that his dignity shall be un-

[220] Wieger, *Histoire des Croyances,* p. 226.

[221] *Mencius* 2(2), 11.

impaired, than for the prevalence of that hazy thing called the *tao*, which is so far away and which Heaven itself does not yet wish to prevail. The rôle of harsh and unbending critic, which he filled to perfection, suited him far better than did that of practical reformer. In originality, and in intellectual penetration, he far outshone Confucius; in personal greatness he is not to be compared with him. For some incomprehensible reason, the opposite view seems to have gained currency in the West.

Mencius is conspicuously lacking in that uniform courtesy and kindness which was perhaps the outstanding characteristic of the great Master.[222] He considered himself so eminent that it was the place of kings to approach him for advice, rather than for him to go to them (one can hear, and enjoy, the stinging rebuke which Confucius must have uttered from the tomb for this arrogant breach of *li*.)[223] Time after time he dodges the issue when questioned, saving his reputation for omniscience by a bit of cleverness.[224] On one occasion, when asked by the ruler of Ts'e if the state of Yen might properly be attacked, he answered "It may." But when, after the attack had been made, he was accused of having countenanced an unjust aggression, he denied the charge. He had only been asked, he declared, if the State might be attacked, nothing had been said of *who* might properly conquer it. Oh, by no means, he had not advised the attack![225] Confucius despised such slyness.

On the other hand, the good qualities of Mencius were not a few. His loyalty to the memory of Confucius is implicit. He does not hesitate to decline large sums of money offered him, though he accepts gifts when in need. And his very arrogance compels our admiration when he carries it, as he often did, to the point of telling a king to his face that he ought to be put to death if he does not govern his kingdom well.[226] And it is Mencius who has given us our most inspiring statement of the ancient Chinese ideal of character.

> To dwell in the wide house of the world, to fill his correct place in the world, and to walk in the great *tao* of the world; when he obtains his desire *for office*, to practise his principles for the good of the people; and when that desire is disappointed, to practise them alone; to be above

[222] *Men.* 2(2), 11, etc.
[223] *Men.* 2(2),2,7.
[224] *Men.* 6(2),1; etc.
[225] *Men.* 2(2),8.
[226] *Men.* 1(2),8,2; 5(2),9,1.

> the power of riches and honors to make dissipated, of poverty and mean condition to make swerve from principle, and of power and force to make bend:—such is the man who may be called truly great and courageous.[227]

After Confucius, the integrity of the old Sinism, as a metaphysical system, began gradually to disintegrate, but the enfeeblement in Mencius is very slight. Mencius still insists that to follow the *tao* absolutely is the way to bring about felicity, and declares that a king who fails to do so is responsible for the death of his subjects as surely as if he put them to the sword.[228] The power of virtue is so great that the untrained peasants of a state which practises righteousness, though they be armed but with sticks, will utterly rout the mail-clad soldiers of a state which has forsaken the *tao*. Likewise, there will be no famine if only agriculture, fishing, etc., be carried on in the proper and prescribed manner. On the other hand, if the people are not given the benefit of the Confucian teaching, but are led astray by the perverse doctrines of Yang Chu and Mo Tse, they will forsake the *tao* so far that the harmony of the world-order will be shattered, and beasts will be led on to eat men—more, men will take to eating each other.[229] All of this is in strict conformity with Confucius.

But Mencius says other things which Confucius would never have said. These aberrations are due, not so much to a genuine difference in philosophy, as to an inability clearly to hold in mind, at the same time, all of the various elements of the Sinistic system. Mencius was incisive and analytical, but neither he nor any of the other later philosophers of the period had the mellowness, the breadth of wisdom, and the firm intellectual grasp of the old philosophy which Confucius had. This may have been due in part to the fact that Confucius taught himself, and did not receive a "predigested" system from a master.

When asked by a king what was necessary in order to attain the imperial sway, Mencius replied, "The love and protection of the people; with this there is no other power which can prevent the ruler from attaining it."[230] Again, he approves the appointment, as minister, of a scholar who is neither vigorous, wise, nor well informed, but whose sole qualification is that he loves what is good.

[227] *Men.* 3(2),2,3.
[228] *Men.* 1(1),2,2; 1(1),4,3.
[229] *Men.* 3(2),9,9.
[230] *Men.* 1(1),7,3.

Questioned on the point, Mencius declares that "The love of what is good is more than a sufficient qualification for the government of the empire."[231] Now, this is scandal from the ancient point of view. To be sure, motivation must be correct, but in addition a man had to know *li* (Confucius stresses learning more than piety) and he had actually to follow the *tao*, properly *performing* the necessary rites and duties. Were Mencius here, his ubiquitous cleverness would provide the answer that of course, if a man really loved what was good, this action would follow as a matter of course. But we must over-rule the objection. Unwittingly, he was helping in the gradual corruption of the old philosophy. His stand on tradition represents another divergence, for he tells us that

> "It would be better to be without the *Book of History* [the *Shu*] than to believe all of it."

Confucius was not a book-worshipper, but he would have asked which were better, to have a book with a few errors, or to lack the *tao* entirely?

Concerning the nature of man Mencius is, however, in essential agreement with Confucius, though Dubs has denied this. As is well known, Mencius teaches that men are naturally good, and this is, as has been shown, in conformity with Sinism. He shows great ingenuity in defending this position against attacks. It is, apparently, their understanding of the *tao* which distinguishes men from the beasts.

> "Men possess the *tao;* but if they are well fed, warmly clad, and comfortably lodged, without being taught at the same time, they become almost like beasts."[232]
> "That whereby man differs from the lower animals is but small. The mass of people cast it away, while superior men preserve it."[233]

Mencius further says that the man who knows his own nature thoroughly knows Heaven. This would seem to be based on the organic unity and harmony which pervade the cosmos. Another reminder of the natural philosophy is the fact that men, like other objects, differ among themselves not in substance but in *action*. Any man may be like Yao or Shun, if his conduct be so.[234]

But still we ask why, starting equal, men become so widely

[231] *Men.* 6(2),13.
[232] *Men.* 3(1),4,8.
[233] *Men.* 4(2),19,1.
[234] *Men.* 4(2), 28; 4(2),32.

different? The only clear answer which Mencius gives refers us to environment. He uses the figure of a field of barley, sown with the same seed, but giving an unequal yield in different sections; this is due, he says, to inequalities of soil, rain, and dew, and to unequal cultivation of the various portions. He rejects all hereditary differences. Another time, when hard pressed. he answers:

> "The senses of hearing and seeing do not think, and are obscured by objects. When one thing comes into contact with another, as a matter of course it leads it away. To the mind belongs the office of thinking. By thinking, one attains *the truth;* by neglecting to think he fails to do so."[235]

But he has not yet told us why it is that one man thinks, and another fails to, although he pretended to answer that very question. This throws him back on the first portion of his statement, which is much like contemporary deterministic behaviorism. In fact, Mencius is much inclined to fatalism. He declares that Heaven does not yet wish the right to triumph, and proclaims a doctrine familiar to the West, that Heaven sends calamities in order to strengthen men. Although cheerfully ascribing some of his own failures to destiny, he adds that the man who properly understands the decrees of Heaven will not stand beneath a precipitous wall.

Mencius could afford to be a fatalist. The plight of the Empire was not a matter of burning personal distress to him. His most biting criticisms only exalted his fame and his self-esteem, and in any case his needs were well taken care of. He was received with the greatest respect, even kings quailed before him—he was having a very good time. "It is fate"—well, why not?

Mencius' chief claim to intellectual distinction lies, probably, in his social psychology. He declares that all possess the capacity of natural sympathy.

> "If men suddenly see a child about to fall into a well, they will all without exception experience a feeling of alarm and distress. *They will feel so* not as a ground on which they may gain the favor of the child's parents, nor as a ground on which they may seek the praise of their neighbors and friends, nor from a dislike to the reputation of *having been unmoved by* such a thing."[236]

From this point he builds, in outline, an entire system of ethics, which, being so firmly grounded, is not without force today. His criticism of the ethic of "enlightened self-interest" is penetrating.

[235] *Men.* 6(1),15. [236] *Men.* 2(1),6,3.

It is impossible, on this basis, to build a genuinely cooperative society, he asserts, because at the end one still has no more than a group of self-seeking individuals, whose reactions in crises may not be depended upon to be social.[237]

In next considering Hsün Tse, we come to a philosopher who is, in the history of Chinese thought, a figure of paradoxes. Dubs calls him "the moulder of ancient Confucianism," and he is one of the most important Confucianists in history; as a matter of fact, he is the destroyer of the principles of Confucius, for he utterly and explicitly denied and rejected the heart and soul of Sinism. Lao Tse and his teachings are considered the arch-opponents of Confucius, and Hsün Tse is considered a disciple of the latter. Yet, as compared with Hsün Tse, Confucius and Lao Tse stand solidly together on the basis of Sinism, which Hsün Tse discarded.

It is evident that the technique by which Hsün Tse nullified the teachings of Confucius must have been subtle. It was. And yet it is the simplest and most usual technique imaginable. Hsün Tse simply "modernized" and "interpreted" Confucius. The procedure is that which has been used numberless times, and is still used, to substitute some more favored philosophy for the teachings of Gautama, Zoroaster, Mohammed, Jesus, or another, while at the same time preserving for the substituted system the prestige of the famous teacher. In most cases, the persons who make the change are quite sincere, and innocent of any intent to deceive. This was true, I believe, of Hsün Tse.

The life of Hsün Tse is little known. Dubs dates him as having lived approximately from 320 to 235 B. C. Hsün Tse strikes one as a man more interested in his task than in himself. He lived toward the end of the period of the "Warring Kingdoms." The time was one of constant bloodshed and ruin. The fifty-five states, which had been, were now consolidated to ten, but the struggle went on more fiercely than ever between these. A student of Hsün Tse, Han Fei Tse, was counselor to the T'sin emperor who finally did consolidate China, but this was after the time of Hsün. His day was one of slaughter, licence, and sophistry. From this came his very low estimate of human nature, cardinal in his philosophy. He saw that while the idealism of Confucius might have worked in the ancient "Age of Peace," something sterner was needed for his own "Age of Trouble." He did not attain fame until middle

[237] *Men.* 6(2),4.

age, and it is probable that he had already worked out his own ideas, at least in outline, before he came in direct contact with the Confucian tradition.

What Hsün Tse does is to retain the outward forms of Confucian ethics and politics, while discarding the cosmic sanctions and metaphysical guarantees which were central for Confucius. For Hsün Tse, Heaven is merely the active principle, invisible and impalpable, which pervades all beings in the whole world. It is wrong to say that good and bad fortune come from Heaven. Drouths, floods, etc., are merely the natural activities of the cosmos, which may injure men but do not do so intentionally; it is for man to use his intelligence and industry to provide against these things, and so to make himself independent of Heaven and earth.[238] Ancient tradition should be followed in government *because it is, after all, that which has proved useful in experience,* but it is to be used experimentally, and modified and adapted to suit new conditions. Confucius and his disciples were wrong in considering it an absolute standard, to be applied as found in the *Classics.*[239] The right of revolution is affirmed, but Hsün Tse declares that Heaven has nothing to do with the tenure of kings. The "Decree of Heaven" is "what one meets at the moment." "The supernatural sanction is entirely gone."[240] Hsün Tse agrees with Confucius and Mencius in deploring war, which disrupts society and causes misery, and like them he declares that righteousness is worth more than a standing army. But they believed that this was true because Heaven prospered the man who followed the *tao,* and the whole universe was with him. Hsün Tse's argument is that all the people would love a good ruler so much that it would be impossible to get an army to oppose him.[241] Again, he says:

> If a man's deportment is respectful, his heart loyal and faithful, his methods according to the rules of proper conduct and justice, and his ruling passions love and benevolence, were he to rule over the empire, although he were harassed by the four barbarian tribes, the people would not fail to honor him.[242]

But Confucius would have declared that such a ruler could not possibly have been harassed by anything or anybody, else the very structure of the universe must have been altered.

[238] Wieger, *Histoire des Croyances,* p. 277. [239] *Ibid.,* p. 280.
[240] Dubs, *op. cit.,* p. 260. *Cf.* also p. 54. [241] *Ibid.,* pp. 268-69.
[242] *Ibid.* p. 258.

How could Hsün Tse pass such teachings as true Confucianism? In the first place, he attributed his own contempt of human nature to Confucius. He declared that Confucius realized that the men of his time did not wish to see the real truth. For this reason Confucius gave them the ancient axioms, to be accepted as a matter of faith. Common men believe, and wait foolishly for Heaven to help them. But the sages, Hsün Tse assures us, use their own wits and ability to solve their problems, and worry little or not at all about Heaven. The sages know that the speaking of the ancestors through the tortoise and the milfoil, the bringing of rain by prayers and offerings, etc., are only ways of explaining obscure natural phenomena to the unintelligent people.[243]

This is the old doctrine of the "symbolic scriptures" and the "esoteric tradition." That Hsün Tse should have used it is natural, but that he should have succeeded in imposing the unconscious fraud, not only upon a large portion of subsequent Chinese Confucianism, but on a large portion of modern Western scholarship, is astounding. Yet it is Hsün Tse's Confucius that many of us are given today—a rationalistic sceptic, looking down on, but tolerating for pragmatic reasons, the silly superstitions of people and princes. Dubs says of Hsün Tse, "His logical mind grasped the Confucian philosophy in systematic form, and he set to work to express and defend the Confucian teaching in its wholeness as none before him had done." On this point, either Dr. Dubs has misunderstood Confucius, or I have. Let those who are competent judge.

First of all, it is beyond question that the *Classics* are saturated with the metaphysical relation existing between Heaven, men, and all things. This is that universal harmony which composes the *tao*. But did Confucius, as Hsün Tse declared, have his tongue in his cheek when he pretended to take this seriously? To answer this question it is necessary to live with the *Analects* for a time, and to come to know Confucius well. No mere citation of passages can settle the point; we must, however, be content with that here. No one who has read the *Analects* will doubt that Confucius mentions the sacrifices very often. But did he believe in their efficacy?

> Some one asked the meaning of the great sacrifice. The Master said, "I do not know. He who knew its meaning would find it as easy to govern the empire as to look on this;"—pointing to his palm.[244]

[243] Wieger, *Histoire des Croyances*, pp. 277-79. [244] *An.* 3,11.

It has already been shown that Confucius felt a very definite personal relation with Heaven.

> He [Confucius] said, "After the death of king Wan, was not the cause of truth lodged here *in me?* If Heaven had wished to let this cause of truth[245] perish, then I, a future mortal, should not have got such a relation to that cause. While Heaven does not let the cause of truth perish, what can the people of K'wang do to me?"[246]
>
> I do not murmur against Heaven. I do not grumble against men. My studies lie low, my penetration rises high. But there is Heaven;—that knows me![247]

Hsün tells us that the sages were far above the belief in divination, omens, etc., which the foolish people clung to. Why, then, does Confucius declare that his decay is extreme merely because for a long time he has not seen the Duke of Chow (whom he considered his preceptor) in his dreams? Why is the low point of the *Analects* the passage in which Confucius declares that all is over with him, because no phoenix has been seen, and the river has given forth no map?[248] All of these are traditional omens of political good fortune.

According to Hsün Tse, law (*fa* 法), propriety (*li* 禮), and righteousness (*i* 義), are not natural, but are artificial restraints devised by the sages to make a sort of straight-jacket in which to confine evil-natured humanity. Thus, the *tao* was empirically established, and is from time to time revised and amplified.[249] Is this experimental, piecemeal, non-cosmic ethics the true spirit of Confucius' teaching? Emphatically, no!

> The Master said, "Ts'ze, you think, I suppose, that I am one who learns many things and keeps them in memory?" Ts'ze-kung replied, "Yes,—but perhaps it is not so?" "No," was the answer; "I *seek* an all-pervading unity."[250]
>
> The Master said, "Sin, my *tao* is one pervading principle."[251]

Confucius declares, "Heaven produced the virtue that is in me,"[252] and asserts that if it be so ordered that his *tao* is to advance,

[245] I am aware of the difficulty of this translation, but I believe this rendering is substantially accurate.

[246] *An.* 9,5.

[247] *An.* 14,37,2.

[248] *An.* 7,5; 9,8.

[249] Wieger, *Histoire des Croyances,* p. 276.

[250] *An.* 15,2.

[251] *An.* 4,15.

[252] *An.* 7,22.

no mere mortal can prevent it.[253] Confucius was one of the most firm believers in metaphysics who ever lived, as Hsün Tse was one of the most thorough-going naturalists of ancient times.

Among certain of the American Indians there are medicine-men, who heal disease by magical ceremonies in which the sweat-bath figures as a part. Certain scientific medical practitioners also use the sweat-bath in healing. May we say, because their technique coincides in this case, that their theory of healing is the same? If their technique coincided in a hundred instances, we would still not infer that their philosophies were alike, nor that they would approach new problems in an identical manner. The analogy applies to Confucius and Hsün Tse. On empirical grounds Hsün Tse took over many of the moral axioms, etc., of Confucius. Hsün Tse thought they had worked, because the history, written by men pervaded with Sinism, showed that they always had worked. But Hsün Tse's theory was far different; on his principles, if these axioms failed to work in the future, they must logically have been discarded. According to Confucius, on the other hand, the only remedy for the failure of Sinism was "more Sinism."

Since he refused to accept truth as an absolute datum, cosmically established, Hsün Tse needed a theory of knowledge. It was very much the theory we have today, simply that truth is that which we arrive at when we do the best thinking of which we are capable. He carefully laid down the conditions for thought, with especial reference to lack of bias and disturbance of any sort. For this reason he has sometimes been said to have borrowed the "meditation" of Laoism, but this seems improbable. His dependence on that school of thought has probably been exaggerated, although it probably did influence him. Hsün Tse's distrust of human beings in general made him unwilling to leave thinking to the tender mercies even of the scholars, and led him to set up his theory of authoritarianism.

The doctrine that human nature is evil, and that man's goodness "is only acquired training," is Hsün Tse's most famous teaching, and caused him to be declared unorthodox. He "showed that according to Mencius' statement that virtue was just the development of innate impulses, there would be no use for the Sage-Kings or for any standards of conduct at all, such as those embodied in the concepts of *li* and *i* (proper conduct and justice). Here he

[253] *An.* 14,38,2.

made a criticism," Dubs comments, "that must have cut very deep."[254] On the contrary, the objection is easily met. Dubs, like Hsün Tse, fails to recognize the central dogma of Sinism, that goodness (*i.e.*, harmonious cooperation) is the natural, normal, proper state of all things. In the "Golden Age" men were born good, kings were sages, animals did not eat men, men were kind to each other and to animals, men followed *li* without the necessity of punishment and kings were good without admonishment from their ministers, all as a part of the naturally ordained scheme of things. It is evil (*i.e.*, disharmony) which is unnatural, abnormal, and transient. As Confucius said, "Man is born for uprightness. If a man lose his uprightness and yet live, his escape *from death* is the effect of mere good fortune."[255] It is the existence and persistence of evil, not of good, which should provoke astonishment.

As we have seen Hsün Tse so far, he is the freest thinker and the most modern spirit we have encountered. Given his empirical and experimental method of attaining and amplifying ethics and politics, we might expect that China would have made unprecedented strides of social and political amelioration. But here we encounter the final paradox of this remarkable man. As he was, in his opinions, the least traditionally-minded of his fellows, he was, in his theory of education, the most rigid authoritarian. He distrusted men, and was unwilling to allow them to think *ad libitum*. The thought of what may have been lost, by that lack of faith, is staggering. There is no other knowledge, he asserted, than the knowledge of the ancients. To acquire that knowledge it is necessary, not to think, but to listen to one's teacher. The student's studies are finished when he has so thoroughly learned the teachings of his master, and especially the *Li Ki*, that he is able to become the echo of his teacher for a new generation.[256] This rigid authoritarianism was fixed upon the Confucian school from his time.

But his rationalistic basis of ethics, and his related doctrine of the viciousness of human nature, were too heterodox and too heroic for most of the members of the Confucian school. And it is for this reason that Sinism survived, past the time of Hsün Tse, as something more than an external shell of precepts without a living heart.

[254] Dubs, *op. cit.*, p. 81.
[255] *An.* 6,17.
[256] Wieger, *Histoire des Croyances*, 282.

JOURNEYS TO HELL

BY MAXIMILIAN RUDWIN

AMONG the travellers' tales which delighted our wonder-loving ancestors, the greatest popularity was enjoyed by reports of journeys to the realms of the dead. Visions too numerous to tell were invented for their delectation and edification. It would, indeed, be too great a task to follow the mythical stream of a Beyond flowing out of and into the hearts and imaginations of men. It is found in Indian, Iranian, Greek, Roman, Jewish and Christian mythology, and its sources reach far back, to a time whereof "the memory of man runneth not to the contrary."

Many have been the visits of the living to the dead. Some went in the body and others out of the body. Some travelled by night and others in the light of the day. The first record of a journey to the World of the Spirits is found in Plato. The Greek philosopher recorded the testimony of Er the Arminian to the effect that he had been admitted to witness the distribution of rewards and punishments to the souls of the departed and had been permitted to return to earth and tell his story (*Rep.* x. 614ff.). Homer described the descent of Ulysses to Hades to consult Tiresias (*Odyss.* xi). From the Greek poet, the idea descended to Virgil, Seneca, Ovid, Lucian, Statius, and other Greek and Roman writers. It also entered Jewish-Christian thought, the Church fathers elaborating it into a doctrinal system. The New Testament furnished the starting-point with its visions of the Beyond. The Book of Revelations offers many glimpses of the Unseen World, and in the Epistles we learn that St. Paul was caught up to the third heaven (2 Cor. xii. 2). Details of this journey are suppressed by the biblical writer as "unspeakable words, which it is not lawful for a man to utter" (*ibid.*, 4), but are given in the apocryphal Vision of St. Paul (4th cent.). Other biblical passages (Acts ii. 31; Eph. iv. 8-10; Rom. x. 7 and

especially 1 Peter iii. 19-20) were interpreted to mean that Christ after his burial descended to hell for the purpose of redeeming from infernal pain the patriarchs and prophets of the Old Dispensation. This idea was elaborated in the apocryphal Descensus Christi ad Inferos, which is the second part of the Evangelium Nicodemi (3rd cent.). It also forms part of the Apostolic formula of the Christian creed.

But while Christ visited hell after his death, others journeyed thither during their life-time. Zoroaster is said to have made midnight journeys to heaven and hell; and, according to Jewish tradition, Moses also visited the upper and lower worlds in his body.[1] The Holy Virgin and the Great Apostle likewise wandered, according to tradition, through hell and witnessed the torments inflicted upon the wicked. It would seem, in fact, that when the ancient world of spirits was divided by Christianity into two realms, an upper and a lower, the majority of travellers preferred to go in the downward direction. The idea of hell seemed to have had a great fascination for the Christian mind. What wonder that hell is writ large on the manuscripts of the medieval monks and missionaries! Many, indeed, were the visions of hell in medieval times. What we call the Dark Ages were, in fact, a perpetual spiritualistic *séance* with lights lowered. We need but refer to Beda Venerabilis, St. Brandan, Tundalus, Albericus, Wettin and Hildegard. Prominent among the medieval pilgrims to the Pit is Owaine the Knight His descent into St. Patrick's Purgatory, as told by Henry of Saltrey, took place in 1153.[2] The most distinguished visitor, however, that Satan ever received at his court was Dante Alighieri, the first and greatest of the poets of Italy.

Dante, to be sure, visited all the three realms, to which the Catholich Church assigned the dead. His journey included hell, purgatory and heaven. It would seem, however, that our poet was most impressed by hell. Of his trilogy, the "Inferno" undoubtedly commends itself most to our imagination. The "Inferno" is the most powerful poem in the *Divina Commedia*. Next in importance is the "Purgatorio." The "Paradiso" comes last. "If Dante's great poem," says Francis Grierson, "had been a description of heaven, no one would read it. The interest centers in hell and purgatory."

[1] *Cf.* Louis Ginzberg: *The Legends of the Jews* (4 vols., Philadelphia, 1908-25), I, 309 ff.

[2] See *St. Patrick's Purgatory;* an essay on the Legends of Purgatory, Hell, and Paradise, current during the Middle Ages. London, 1844.

The great Italian poet was most successful in his description of the domain of the damned. Chateaubriand has aptly remarked that it is easier to conceive of eternal unhappiness than of endless happiness (*le Génie du Christianisme,* II. iv. 14). We can, indeed, grasp hell and even purgatory but not heaven. "Our imagination," says Anatole France, "is made up of memories." We can easily form a hell out of the material taken from earth, but we lack on our planet the stuff with which to construct a heaven. Dante had no difficulty in assembling the material for his description of moral sufferings and physical pains. "I have found," said the poet of "Inferno," "the original of my hell in the world which we inhabit." It was hell and not heaven which, according to the testimony of his contemporaries, had left the deep marks on Dante's face. It is hell and not heaven which is the most real in the consciousness of man. We all know what hell is, but when questioned in regard to heaven, we feel embarrassed to answer. The information is so scanty, as a brilliant French woman once remarked to Sainte-Beuve. "There may be heaven, there must be hell," is the conclusion reached at the end of Browning's poem, "Time's Revenges" (1845). A further illustration of this idea is the legend of the three monks of Mesopotamia, who set out one day on a journey to the dwelling of the departed and who found hell and purgatory, but not heaven.

Dante's conception of hell is not original but universal. Many of his ideas were current in his days. The "Inferno" is but a highly poetical elaboration of medieval notions. The flaming and frigid divisions of hell point to the two mythical currents, the Christian and the classical, which meet in Dante's vision of the inferno. Following the lead of all Roman writers, our poet shows, in his description of the Christian Underworld, a love of horrors and a delight in terrors for their own sakes. This predilection for bloodshed and corruption is especially typical of the art of the Etruscans.

The Devil in Dante's "Inferno" is an incarnation of ugliness, foulness and corruption. As he stands half sunk into the frozen fastness of his pit, in all his pervading brutality and cruelty, malignity and monstrosity, he is an appalling rather than an appealing sight. We cannot enter into his psychology. The action of his mind or will is closed to us. We do not even know whether it is sorrow over his departed glory or impotent fury which brings the tears flowing over his three chins. "The imagination of Dante," says Chateaubriand, in his work already mentioned, "exhausted by

nine circles of torment, has made simply an atrocious monster of Satan, locked up in the center of the earth" (II. iv. 11). What wonder that the Devil in G. Bernard Shaw's *Man and Superman* (1905) is discontented with this description of himself!

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* *

Dante had many imitators who also ventured to visit the Lower World. Emmanuel Swedenborg, in the eighteenth century, is said to have journeyed to heaven and hell. Perhaps the most prominent guest that Satan welcomed in modern times was the popular French poet Jean-Pierre de Béranger (1780-1857). In his ribald song, "la Descente aux Enfers" (1812), impiously named after the Descensus Christ ad Inferos, our ballad-maker tells how he descended to the domain of the Devil on a broomstick in company with a modern witch, a young and beautiful woman. As the imps of hell by no means lack appreciation of beauty, they came in swarms to kiss the naked feet of his companion. The nether world, according to the testimony of this modern visitor to Satan, is different from the description given by the priests, who employ the fear of hell as a means of driving men into the church. From the report of this traveller, we would say that the underworld resembles more a voluptuous Turkish harem than a vaporous Turkish bath. The court of the Kind-Devil canont be surpassed in luxury by that of any earthly ruler. Our visitor to the infernal regions found no traces of kettles or cauldrons and heard there no howling or gnashing of teeth. On the contrary, he found the floor strewn with oyster shells and empty bottles. The souls who are fortunate enough to go to hell eat and drink and make merry. Nothing is less frightful than the sight of Satan. The infernal monarch is a devil of a good fellow *chez lui*. He issues his severest decrees to the clinking of glasses and the playing of reed-pipes. Satan is a very genial host and entertains his guests most royally. His Infernal Majesty is surrounded at the banquet table by a crowd of red-faced drinkers, for whom he keeps pouring bourgogne and champagne. There is not much decorum in the halls of hell. Ixion is sleeping on the shoulder of Tantalus, who is dead drunk, and Epicurus is making love to Ninon de Lenclos.

"After reading this poem, one is inclined to exclaim with St. Paul: O death, where is thy sting? O grave, where is thy victory?" (1 Cor. xv. 55). The author draws the following lesson from his description of the Devil's domain:

"Si, d'après ce qu'on rapporte,
On bâille au céleste lieu,
Que le diable nous emporte,
Et nous rendrons grâce à Dieu."

*
* *

No man who descended to hell after his death is known to have returned to earth to tell others what he has seen in that dread and dismal darkness. But letters purporting to come from the inhabitants of hell appeared on several occasions during the past century.[3]

A very interesting visit to the infernal world has been paid some time ago by our own cartoonist, "Art" Young, who introduced himself to "Sate" as a newspaperman from Chicago and who reported that "Hell is now run on the broad American plan."[4] "Captain" Charon, who began his career with a little tub of a "rowboat," is now running big steamers on the Styx, "the only navigable river in hell." Judge Minos sits in court, and an Irish policeman introduces the poor wretches one by one. The lawyers are condemned to be gagged, and their objections are overruled by Satan. The inventor of the barbwire fence is seated naked on a barbwire fence; tramps are washed; policemen are clubbed until they see stars; quack doctors are cured according to their own methods; poker fiends, board of trade gamblers, and fish-story tellers are treated according to their deserts; monopolists are baked like popcorn; editors are thrown into their waste-baskets, and clergymen are condemned to listen to their own sermons, which have been faithfully recorded on phonographs.

This goes to show how much truth there is in the words of the old Gœthe that

"Culture, which the whole world licks,
Also unto the Devil sticks."

[3] Ferdinand Gregorovius: *Konrad Siebenhorns Höllenbriefe an seine lieben Freunde in Deutschland.* Hrsg. von Ferdinand Fuchsmund. Königsberg, 1843. *Letters from Hell.* Translated from the Danish by Julie Sutter. With a Preface by George MacDonald. London, 1886. 2nd ed., New York, 1911.

B. Piscator started a series of *Modern Letters from Hell* (*Moderne Höllenbriefe*) with his book *Psychologische Studien der Hölle* (*Psychological Studies of Hell*). Berlin, 1907. Rachel Hayward published a novel with the title of *Letters from Là-Bas*, named after J. K. Huysmans' novel *Là-Bas* (1891).

On letters from heaven and hell see W. Höhler's article "Zu den Himmels— und Höllenbriefen" in the *Hessische Blätter für Volkskunde,* vol. I (1902), pp. 143-9.

[4] Art Young: *Hell Up to Date.* Chicago, 1892. Wilhelm Waiblinger has written a report of his subterranean sojourn under the title *Drei Tage in der Unterwelt.*

SPINOZA AND THE CARTESIAN PHYSICS

BY BIRGER R. HEADSTROM

THOUGH Spinoza was deeply indebted to the philosophical conceptions of Descartes, it was rather on the physical side that he felt the latter's power more fully; and this is to be expected for it was through his physical teachings that Spinoza first made his acquaintance. Such being the case, it would be reasonable to assume that the Cartesian physics played no small part in defining his philosophical development; and that this is so can be seen not only by the appearance in *Deo et Homine,* and by traces in the *Ethica,* of Descartes' account of motion, but equally as well by the bearing of the Cartesian theory of dynamics on Spinoza's conception of the material world. Yet, exactly to what extent this influence extended can only be shown by a comparison of various passages in his writings with the second part of Descartes' *Principia Philosophiae,* a work from which Spinoza derived most of his physical ideas.

In several places, Spinoza speaks of "certain things immediately produced by God," in explanation of which he offers the following passage in his essay on *God and Man*: "As pertaining to Natura naturata in general, that is, the modes or creatures which immediately depend on God or are created by him, of such we know two and only two, namely, motions in matter, and understanding in the thinking thing. Of these we say that they have been from all eternity, and to all eternity shall remain immutable, a work certainly as great as befits the greatness of the master-worker (part i, cap. 9)."[1] In another passage, he says that extended bodies differ only in "proportion of rest and motion;" and that a body is impelled to motion by the impact of another body possessing motion greater than its rest (Deo et Homine, part ii, note ad init. and cap. 19);[2]

[1] *Vide Eth.* 1. propp. 21, 23, 28, schol.; Ep. 66, No. 8.
[2] *Cf. Ethica,* 4, 39.

while in the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* (c.vii. No. 27) we read of *res maxime universales et toti naturae communes, videlicet motum et quietem, eorumque leges et regulas.* And in a letter of 1675, he gives motion and rest as examples of those "things immediately produced by God." For Spinoza, then, motion and rest were not relative terms but real things.

According to Descartes, matter, or any body considered generally, consists only in extension in three dimensions, and not in hardness, weight or any other such quality; and that all matter is ultimately homogeneous (*in toto universo una et eadem existit*); while the variations in its properties are determined by differences of motion (*omnis materiae variatio, sive omnium eius formarum diversitas, pendet a motu*), the relative nature of which is shown by *nullum esse permanentem ullius rei locum, nisi quatenus a cogitatione nostra determinatur.* Furthermore, he tells us, the quantity of motion in the universe is constant, a proposition which he demonstrates a priori from the perfection of God; and from which we are to assume that God not only maintains a rigid immutability in his operations but that in the beginning he created a certain quantity of motion and rest which he preserves unchanged: *materiam simul cum motu et quiete in principio creavit, iamque per solum suum concursum ordinarium tantundem motus et quietis in ea toto, quontum tunc posuit, conservat.* Rest, however, is not a real thing, and though Descartes did not probably look upon it in that sense, he yet appears to be somewhat confused on this point for he says somewhat later that motion is contrary to rest, and that speed is contrary to slowness "inasmuch as such slowness shares the nature of rest." And though Spinoza speaks of finite existence as "de nihilo participans, "partaking of nullity (*cogit. Met.* pt. ii.c. 3. No. 1), it is clear that he did not view nothing as a real thing. In any case, he accepted without question the conservation of motion as prescribed by Descartes, which principle, though not true, indicates at least that Descartes was not far from a definite truth, only he lacked the patience to carry his speculations to their logical conclusion.

By the term "quantity of motion" Descartes understood what is now known as momentum, a quantity which has direction as well as magnitude, though he failed to take this into consideration for he assumed that the sum of indiscriminately directed quantities was constant, a proposition not only erroneous but incomprehensible as

no method is given by which velocity can be determined. To him, motion is separate from its direction, "the determination of motion towards this or that part;" and further asserts that the total quantity of motion is not only the same after as before a collision of two bodies but remains the same even though the direction is reversed. And though he avers that such two bodies must be viewed as an independent system (*a reliquis omnibus sic divisia ut eorum motus a nullis aliis circumiacentibus impedirentur nec iuvarentur*), he mentions cases in which one of them is at rest, as well as of cases in which they move with different velocities. That his results were wrong is beside the point; what is more interesting is that Spinoza accepted all his rules except one.[3]

What Descartes was after was a principle which would enable him to treat the material universe as a machine self-acting and self-contained; and by postulating an original creative act which furnished the matter of the universe with its fixed "quantity of motion," he was able to effectively meet theological criticism, at that time a no small matter; while Spinoza, fully convinced of the perfect unity of the divine nature and its manifestations, found in his system scientific evidence in proof of that unity and uniformity which speculation had already led him to anticipate in the physical world.

In naming *motus et quies* as being those things not only infinite in their kind but necessary to the existence of finite things of the same kind, looking upon water as merely figured extension, Spinoza's views of motion and rest, though derived from the most confused part of the Cartesian physics, become, in a sense, intelligible, for by substituting energy of motion and energy of position a rather happy result is attained. Beside being the most fundamental property of the physical world, energy is continually passing, in all natural phenomena, from one portion of matter to another; while equally as well the sum of kinetic energy and potential energy is constant. From which it follows, that if energy is taken as this sum, it becomes that which is infinite and immutable.

Spinoza, besides being indebted to Descartes for his physical ideas, derived from him, as well, his starting-point for human psychology and ethics. According to Descartes (*Princ. Phil.* 2.c. 37), "everything, in so far as it is simple and undivided, remains in the same condition and undergoes no change unless from external causes," a proposition which is repeated by Spinoza in much

[3] Epistle 15, No. 10.

the same words of his "Principles of Cartesian Philosophy:" *Unaquaeque res, quatenus simplex et indivisa est, et in se sola consideratur, quantum in se est, semper in eodem statu perseverat,* though the demonstration he offers is couched in such language as to indicate that to him it was something more than merely physical;[4] while in the *Cogitata Metaphysica* appears the idea of the self-preserving effort of things, "conatus quo res in statu suo perseverae conantur," this effort being merely the thing itself, in illustration of which Spinoza gives the first law of motion: "Motion has the power of persisting in its actual condition. Now this power is nothing but the motion itself, that is, the fact that such is the nature of motion."[5] While furthermore, *Unaquaeque res, quantum in se est, in suo esse perseverare conatur,* (Everything, so far as it is in itself, endeavours to persist in its own being)[6] and *Conatus, quo unaquaque res in suo esse perseverare conatur, nihil est praeter ipsius rei actualem essentiam,* (The endeavour wherewith everything endeavours to persist in its own being is nothing else than the actual essence of the thing itself)[7] expressed in physical terms simply means that no change can take place in a system without work being done.

Yet, despite all he owed to the physical conceptions of Descartes, Spinoza, towards the end of his life, became deeply dissatisfied with them, as can be seen from his letters to Tschirnhausen in 1676. Asked how we would prove a priori the existence of bodies figured and in motion,[8] Spinoza answers that "From extension as conceived by Descartes, i. e. an inert mass (*molem quiescentem*) it is difficult if not impossible to prove the existence of bodies. For matter at rest will, so far as in it lies, persist in its rest, and, as well, will not be impelled to motion unless by a more powerful external cause; for this reason, I did not hesitate to affirm long ago that the Cartesian principles of natural philosophy are useless, if not absurd." According to Tschirnhausen, Descartes, as he supposed motion to have been given to matter by a creative act, did not view the material universe as a product of inert matter; to which Spinoza replied somewhat as follows: "As to your question if the

[4] To Descartes it was the most general law of physical action *Princ. Phil.* 2. c. 43.

[5] *Cogit. Met.* pt. i. c. 6. No. 9.

[6] *Ethica* iii. 6.

[7] *Ethica* iii. 7.

[8] *Epistle* 69.

diversity of things can be proved a priori from the conception of extension, I believe I have already sufficiently shown that it is impossible; and that, therefore, matter is ill-defined by Descartes as identical with extension (*materiam a Cartesio male definiri per extensionem*), but must rather be explained by an attribute which expresses an eternal and infinite nature." And though he hoped to be able to make himself clearer on this point, the opportunity never came. But what is clear at least is that Spinoza did not accept, in his last days, the Cartesian conception of material substance as consisting purely in extension.

THE COMET

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Celestial migrant, taught of endless force
  The wanderlust of an untold desire,
Eternal urge that fills a wanderer's course
  With trailing flames of friction-lighted fire,

Your journeyings command so wide a sweep,
  Man's sense of distance finds no unit clear
To mind's instruction—trails ethereal keep
  The secret of your passage far and near!

What grand extremes your visitations know,
  Your tropic and your frigid zones of space!
What meteor tides upon your sky-ways flow!
  What planets flag your strange, erratic race!

Projectile sun, or weird celestial toy,
  A boomerang from some exploded sphere
That force may sunder yet cannot destroy,
  While atoms find ethereal media clear,

Grand spectacle of Earth's unclouded night,
  You held man's gaze in undivided awe,
When, marvelling upon your giddy flight,
  He sensed the strangeness of celestial law.

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

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JESUS AND JOHN THE BAPTIST

BY ROBERT P. RICHARDSON

ONE of the most interesting episodes in the life of Jesus of Nazareth was his initiation into a religious career through the influence of John the Baptist. Up to the time of his contact with the latter he who was to gain renown as the Prophet of Nazareth, and ultimately be enthrowned in the hearts of Christians as a God, was merely a humble artisan: a carpenter. Of this there can be no question, for *Mark* vi. 3 tells us that when in the course of his evangelistic work Jesus came to his home town, Nazareth, the town's folk, deriding his claim to speak as a religious authority, said sneeringly: "Is not this the carpenter?" Justin Martyr describes Jesus as a *tecton,* and informs us he made plows and ox yokes. The statement of *Mark,* which biblical scholars agree was that of the original narrative, was modified by *Matthew* who, evidently thinking it unseemly that the Messiah should ever have earned his living by hard honest work, transmuted the comment of the people of Nazareth into: "Is not this the carpenter's son?" It is, of course, not improbable that in becoming a carpenter Jesus was merely following in the footsteps of his father, and tradition tells some marvellous tales of how Jesus, when but an infant, aided in Joseph's carpentry work. One such story is that Joseph, filling an order for a couch, six cubits long, sawed off two lengths of wood for the sides but made one too short and grieved over his mistake. Whereupon the child Jesus seized hold of one end of the plank and persuading his father to hold the other end, stretched the wood to the requisite length. Naturally we cannot accept this tale, and we must likewise reject the story of how Jesus, while

assisting a neighbor, Salem, the dyer, threw all the pieces to be dyed into the same vat of dye and yet drew forth each cloth dyed a different color and to precisely the shade desired by the customer. And fortunately we can, by parity of reasoning, refuse to believe that the boy Jesus struck his little playmates dead whenever they crossed him, though a number of such deaths inflicted by the petulant progeny of God are recorded by the apocryphal gospels, gospels which can hardly have been written by men with a lower standard of veracity than that of the authors and redactors of the canonical writings.

Joseph, whatever trade he may have followed, no longer figured in the annals of the family when his son entered public life, and we may reasonably assume that part of the earnings of Jesus the carpenter were devoted to the support of a widowed mother to say nothing of several unmarried sisters. At all events, towards his late twenties Jesus threw aside his carpenter's tools, left Nazareth, and became an itinerant evangelist. He "got religion" as we would now say, through John the Baptist who was then strenuously carrying on a religious revival and immersing his converts in the Jordan. This remarkable man, we are told was "clothed with camel's hair and had a leathern girdle about his loins, and did eat locusts and wild honey." He "baptised in the wilderness and preached the baptism of repentance unto remission of sins." According to Josephus, John admonished the Jews to practice virtue and justice towards one another and piety towards God. He gave them to understand that baptism alone would avail them nothing, that it could not in itself wash their sins away, but would be acceptable to God only if their souls had been cleansed beforehand by righteousness. To baptise persons who were Jews by birth was an innovation, the accepted doctrine being that this rite was necessary only for proselytes from paganism, who were by baptism admitted within the Jewish fold. The contention of John that the Jews themselves were in as much need of baptism as the pagan proselytes would naturally be controverted, and among the audience of John were scoffers as well as seekers. It was evidently to the people on the scoffers' bench that he addressed the words: "Ye offspring of vipers! Who hath warned you to flee from the wrath to come!", though, as the scoffers were certainly not there in obedience to any warning of this description, we could

hardly go wrong in supposing what was really said to have been: "Who can make you heed the warning of the wrath to come!" The remaining words of the alleged address of John are more plausible. Those who hung back from repentance and baptism on account of their faith, that being of the Jewish race gave them sufficient merit in the eyes of God, might well have been told by John to "bring forth fruits worthy of repentance, and begin not to say to yourselves: 'We have Abraham to our father' for I say unto you that God is able of these stones to raise up children to Abraham", a warning that if the Jews did not follow the dictates of God, as voiced by John, the Deity might perhaps look elsewhere for a "chosen people."

The work of John, it would seem, found scant sympathy among the more cultured classes. The "chief priests and the scribes and the elders" would not accept his teachings. But the common herd, "the people", "the multitude", regarded him as a heaven-sent prophet. And "there went out unto him all the country of Judea, and all they of Jerusalem, and they were baptised of him in the river Jordan confessing their sins." It would seem that some of his admirers regarded John the Baptist as Elijah sent back to earth again; at all events this view was taken by Jesus of Nazareth as we learn from *Matthew*, xi, 14 "this [John the Baptist] is Elijah" and xvii, 12-14 "I say unto you that Elijah is come already and they knew him not. . . . Then understood the disciples that he spoke unto them of John the Baptist." The fourth gospel (I, 21) however gives us to understand that John the Baptist declined having this honor thrust upon him, and when asked "Art thou Elijah?" replied flatly "I am not." Jesus and John are thus, according to the Bible, in flagrant contradiction upon this point, and the orthodox harmonizers have never succeeded in effecting a reconciliation.

John appears to have laid down a fixed formula of prayer, since *Luke* records that the origin of the Lord's Prayer was a request on the part of one of the disciples of Jesus: "Lord, teach us to pray, even as John also taught his disciples." Fasting as well as praying he enjoined, "The disciples of John fast often and make supplications; likewise also the Pharisees." This however failed to conciliate his enemies: "John the Baptist is come eating no bread nor drinking wine; and ye say he hath a devil" declared Jesus. John urged his hearers to care for their impoverished fel-

low citizens, saying "He that hath two coats, let him impart to him that hath none; and he that hath food let him do likewise." He admonished the tax collectors to exact no more than was due, and the soldiers who came under his influence were told to do no violence to any man, to accuse no one wrongfully, and to be content with their lawful gains.

That the influence of John should extend to the very soldiers of the government could not but arouse the anxiety of the authorities. And the words attributes to John "Repent ye, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand!" "Even now is the axe laid unto the root of the trees; every tree therefore that bringeth not forth good fruit is hewn down and cast into the fire" might easily be interpreted as a public declaration of John's intention to interfere with the affairs of the government and force some much needed reforms. Add to this the fact that John was sometimes looked upon as Elijah returned once more to Israel: Elijah, who it was believed would return to herald the restoration of the Jewish nation to the independence and glory it possessed under David, and we cannot be surprised to learn that the career of John the Baptist was cut short by his arrest and execution at the order of Herod Antipas, the ruler of Peraea and Galilee, who tradition says also put to death John's father, Zacharias. Josephus gives the story as follows: "Because men flocked to him [John], for they took the greatest pleasure in listening to his words, Herod took fright and apprehended that his vast influence over people would lead to some outbreak of rebellion. For it looked as if they would follow his advice in all they did, and he came to the conclusion that far the best course was, before any revolution was started by him, to anticipate it by destroying him; otherwise the upheaval would come and plunge him into trouble and remorse. So John fell a victim to Herod's suspicions, was bound and sent to the fortress of Macherus, . . . and there put to death." One objection which has been raised to this account is that Macherus, being either in the possession of Aretas, the father in law of Herod Antipas and his enemy or on the border between the domains of the two princes, could hardly be a suitable place for the confinement of a dangerous agitator. This argument however is based on the assumption that Herod at first merely held John prisoner and only ultimately decided to have him killed. An imprisonment of some length is in-

deed a part of the gospel story, but intrinsically it is far more probable that Herod, sending John to a remote spot where no local commotion would be caused by his execution had him quickly put to death. According to *Mark,* Herod "sent forth and laid hold on John, and bound him in prison for the sake of Herodias, his brother Philip's wife; for he had married her. For John said unto Herod: it is not lawful for thee to have thy brother's wife." We know however from Josephus that Herodias was not the wife of the tetrarch Philip but his mother in law. For she was originally married to another son of Herod the Great (by Mariamme, daughter of Simon) thus being before her divorce the wife of the half-brother of Herod Antipas, and it was Salome, the daughter of this first marriage, who became the wife of Philip. To obviate this difficulty and save the credit of the gospel authors the curious stand has been taken that, since we may not suppose *Mark* and *Matthew* were in error, we must assume that Herod the Great had two sons named Philip. And this notwithstanding the fact that Josephus gives a list of the children of Herod the Great and only one Philip appears among them! At all events the gospel narrative goes on to say: "And Herodias set herself against him [John] and desired to kill him; and she could not; for Herod feared John, knowing that he was a righteous man and a holy, and kept him safe." That Herod Antipas should either fear John on account of his holiness or spare him on account of his righteousness is quite out of keeping with what we know of the character of this tetrarch, and *Matthew* is more plausible in telling us that Herod hesitated to execute John for the reason that he "feared the multitude, because they counted him as a prophet." Inveigled on his birthday by the dancing of Salome into promising to give his step-daughter whatever she might ask, which proved to be the head of John the Baptist," Herod Antilas was, we are informed, "exceeding sorry but for the sake of his oaths, and of them that sat at meat he did not reject her" and had John speedily beheaded and his head brought on a charger to Salome and her bloodthirsty mother who the gospels tell us had instigated the whole affair.

It is quite possible that John may have voiced his disapproval of the domestic affairs of his sovereign, but as has already been shown, there were other ways in which he had given umbrage to the government. It is noteworthy that all through the New Testa-

ment there is in constant evidence a desperate endeavor to exculpate Jesus and all those connected with him of any suspicion of opposition to the constituted authorities, and to such lengths is this pushed that an impartial reader must have grave doubts whether the story which makes Herodias and Salome responsible for the killing of John may not have been fabricated out of the whole cloth for the express purpose of obscuring the fact that John the Baptist was from the governmental point of view a dangerous incendiary. And this surmise is strengthened by the fact that anyone desiring to curry favor with the Romans would find Herodias an excellent scapegoat. In Roman annals she would appear as an enemy of the imperial authorities, since it was Herodias who incited her husband to those political intrigues that brought about the deposition of Herod Antipas from his tetrarchy and his banishment to Gaul where he and Herodias passed the remainder of their lives under the suspicious eyes of the Roman government.

The gospel writers would have us believe that John regarded himself as a mere forerunner of a much greater prophet and was continually impressing upon his hearers how subordinate his own role was. He is quoted as having said: "There cometh after me he that is mightier than I, the latchet of whose shoes I am not worthy to stoop down and unloose. I baptised you with water; but he shall baptise you with the Holy Ghost." (*Mark*, i. 7-8). Even more emphatic are the words cited by *Matthew*: "I indeed baptise you with water unto repentance; but he that cometh after me is mightier than I, whose shoes I am not worthy to bear; he shall baptise you with the Holy Ghost and with fire; whose fan is in his hand, and he will thoroughly cleanse his threshing floor, and he will gather his wheat into the garner, but the chaff will he burn up with unquenchable fire."

It is obvious that this description of a Messiah who shall come, fire in hand, to regenerate the world and bring about a Millenium by separating the wheat of humanity from the chaff, by no means fits the person of Jesus of Nazareth who instead of sitting in judgment was given a place in the dock, and himself judged, condemned and executed by the constituted authorities of Palestine. Orthodox Christians hence have to regard the alleged statements of John as predictions of what will happen at the long-deferred second coming of Christ. The predicted "baptism with the Holy Ghost" is

indeed supposed to have been realized, yet strangely enough not by Jesus himself but by his apostolic successors (see *Acts* xix 1-7, xi, 15-16). This baptism, effectuated by the laying on of hands, was marked by "prophesying" and such charismatic gifts as "speaking in tongues," exemplified in the doings of the famous day of Pentecost (see *Acts*, ii, 1-4). Certain Christians of the present day claim still to have at their command "baptism by the Holy Ghost," and claim to duplicate at their services the speaking in tongues and other marvellous doings of apostolic times, a claim that an unprejudiced student of the subject must regard as by no means without foundation.[1] But the more conservative Christians of today are inclined to disdain the alleged ministrations of the Holy Ghost and to stigmatise those who accept them as "Holy Rollers."

Not only is there difficulty in making the career of Jesus fit into the alleged predictions of John: there is also good reason to doubt whether the latter ever did make announcement of the imminent coming of a Messiah or even of a prophet greater than himself. A cogent argument for this doubt can even be found in the canonical gospels. For we are told that when after the execution of John the Baptist the fame of Jesus began to spread, speculation was rife as to his identity. Yet at this juncture no one recalled that a prediction had been made by John of the impending coming of a greater prophet. There were those indeed who regarded Jesus as Elijah or Jeremiah or another ancient prophet brought back to earth once more, and others who regarded him as an entirely new prophet. But none said he was the fulfilment of the announcements of John the precursor. Some thought Jesus was John the Baptist himself come back to life, and according to *Mark* and *Matthew* even Herod Antipas, who was presumably well informed as to just what John had been preaching, took this view, saying: "John whom I beheaded is risen." And parenthetically we may remark that the nonchalant way in which certain persons in Palestine seem to have accepted as credible the report that John, after being beheaded, had come back to resume his preaching, shows of just what value even a wide-spread belief in the resurrection of Jesus would be as evidence of it having actually taken place.

John the Baptist, as we have seen, stressed in his preaching the

[1] An account of what takes place in our own time under the alleged inspiration of the Holy Ghost will be found in an article by the present writer, "Pentecostal Prophets" in *The Open Court* for November, 1928.

necessity of repentance, and unquestionably the state of mind of those who heeded his words and submitted themselves to be baptised was quite similar to that of a person who is "saved" at a modern religious revival by coming forward at the call of the evangelist to kneel before the altar and avow himself a miserable sinner. It has always been a stumbling block for the orthodox Christians that Jesus, the Messiah, should have acquired a conviction of his own sinfulness under the preachings of John the Baptist, and humbly crept forward, proclaiming his repentance and begging for baptism. And to obviate this the author of the *Histoire de saint Jean-Baptiste attribuee a Saint Marc l'evangeliste* (published in *Patrologia Orientalis*, Tome IV, Fasc. 5) tells how the angel Gabriel came to John who was sojourning in the desert, and transmitted to him the command of God to leave this desolate region and go to inhabited parts and baptise all who should come to repentance. "My own son" the message said "will go to find thee and be baptised by thee to sanctify the water, and all who follow will be sanctified in it." The Nazarene *Gospel according to the Hebrews* narrates that the mother of the Lord and his brothers said unto him. "John the Baptist baptiseth unto the remission of sins; let us go and be baptised of him." But he said unto them: "Wherein have I sinned that I should go and be baptised of him unless perchance this very thing that I have said is a sin of ignorance?" Finally however Jesus consented to go, and the ceremony took place. "It came to pass that when the Lord ascended out of the water that the whole fountain [*fons*] of the Holy Ghost came down, rested over him and said "My son, in all the prophets I awaited thee that thou shouldst come, and I might rest upon thee. For thou art my resting place. Thou art my first born son. Thou art king for evermore." *Mark* however merely says that "It came to pass in those days that Jesus came from Nazareth of Galilee and was baptised of John in the Jordan. And straightway coming out of the water he saw the heavens rent asunder, and the Spirit as a dove descending upon him, and a voice came out of the heavens, Thou art my beloved son, in thee am I well pleased." *Matthew* would have us believe that John recognized his own unworthiness to baptise the man from Nazareth. "Then cometh Jesus from Galilee to the Jordan unto John to be baptised of him. But John would have hindered him, saying, I have need to be baptised of thee, and cometh thou to me? But Jesus

answering said unto him. Suffer it now, for thus it becometh to fulfil all righteousness. Then he suffereth him." *John* is still more explicit and informs us that, at the baptism of Jesus, John the Baptist proclaimed that here was the one who would come after him and baptise with the Holy Ghost, and testified that Jesus was the "Son of God" and "the Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world." Indeed according to this fourth gospel, John the Baptist came into the world for one sole purpose: to bear witness to Jesus.

The alleged recognition by John of the Messianic rank of Jesus at baptism is accepted without a question by the more orthodox Churchmen who do not even perceive how inconsistent this is with the story that later on, during the imprisonment of the Baptist, "when John heard in the prison the works of the Christ, he sent by his disciples, and said unto him, Art thou he that cometh, or look we for another?" We are told that in reply Jesus set forth his claims to be recognized as "he that cometh" in no uncertain terms, but without any reminder that the recognition had long ago been given. We are given to understand that on this occasion a number of publicans and other of the multitude who had previously been baptised with the baptism of John accepted Jesus as their new leader. But we are left in ignorance of the attitude finally taken by John himself and his more intimate disciples. To arrive at the truth in this matter we must evidently look beyond the gospels that the Church has edited and expurgated for the benefit of the faithful. One extra-canonical source of information is afforded by the *Recognitions* and *Homilies* that were erroneously attributed to Clement of Rome. These Pseudo-Clementine writings are derived from certain heretical works that the Church thought fit to suppress, and in them is a vivid picture of ardent disciples of John the Baptist who utterly deny the supremacy of Jesus over their master and debate the question with the apostles. Peter is here quoted as making the accusation that certain Jews "being baptised by John and holding the word of truth received from the tradition of Moses as the key of the kingdom of heaven, have had it from the hearing of the people. Yea, some even of the disciples of John who seemed to be great ones, have separated themselves from the people, and proclaimed their own master as the Christ." It would seem that in argument with the Christians the disciples of the Baptist were in

the habit of making use of the celebrated saying of Jesus given by *Matthew* xi. 11-12, (*cf. Luke* VII, 28) "Verily I say unto you. Among them that are born of women there hath not arisen a greater than John the Baptist." For Peter narrates that in one of the controversies that took place after the death of Christ "Behold one of the disciples of John asserted that John was the Christ, and not Jesus, inasmuch as Jesus himself declared that John was greater than all men and all prophets. 'If then,' said he, 'he is greater than all, he must be held to be greater than Moses and than Jesus himself. But if he be the greatest of all, then must he be the Christ.' To this Simon the Canaanite, answering asserted that John was indeed greater than all the prophets, and all who are born of women, yet that he is not greater than the Son of Man.[2] Accordingly Jesus is also the Christ, whereas John is only a prophet." Evidently the answer of Simon does not meet the argument at all unless he be understood to take the ground that Jesus was not born of a woman, a doctrine that was in fact held by the Docetists who contended that the body of Jesus instead of being flesh and blood was a phantom and thus his apparent birth from Mary was merely an illusion. But the Christians who would take this position were very few, and evidently it involves rejecting the authenticity of much of the accepted gospels. The saying of Jesus concerning John the Baptist is very probably authentic since none of his followers would willingly have put it in the mouth of the Master. But it may very well have been detached from its original context and put in absurd juxtaposition to an account of Jesus making claim of superior rank for himself. In all probability the statement belongs to an earlier stage in the career of the Prophet of Nazareth when he had not yet acquired a Messianic consciousness and had no thought of ranking himself above the man whose eloquence had brought him to repent of his sins and had turned his thoughts towards religion.

Evidently the significance of the passage in the Pseudo-Clementines is not dependent on any theory as to the authenticity of what it relates. Be the story true or false we may be certain that he who wrote it was not setting up a man of straw as opponent of Christianity, and that at the time it was penned there must have been very much in evidence a body of believers who upheld the claims of John the Baptist while denying those of Jesus. And as a matter of fact

[2] The whole argument shows that what Jesus really said was: "Among them that have been born of women the greatest is John the Baptist."

such a religious body exists even at the present day in the Sabians (Baptists) more commonly known as Mandaeans (that is, Gnostics or those good at knowing) of Mesopotamia. Adherents of this interesting faith are to be found particularly on the lower Euphrates and Tigress, but a small colony exists in almost every town except probably the Holy Cities of the Shiah Mohammedans, Nejef and Kerbela. It was roughly estimated in 1924 that their numbers totalled about ten thousand. Formerly they were however much more numerous, and it is said that when Mesopotamia was under Abbasid rule the Mandaeans had there four hundred places of worship. They are generally artificers or tradesmen, skillful and hard-working, and almost monopolize the making of the *mashhufs* or shallow bitumen-coated boats used on the marshes of the Tigress and Euphrates. The workers in silver and gold of a Mesopotamian town will frequently be found to be Mandaeans, and they are reputed to turn out very artistic wares. Physically they are a tall well-built race and their women are usually handsome. In Saq-esh-Shuyukh they have a temple through which courses a rivulet, but edifices are not essential in their religion which merely requires easy access to running water. With some of them bathing or 'baptism" is practiced as a religious rite in the morning and evening of each day, while all of them "baptise" every Sunday and every feast day and the day preceding. Their religion tends not only to cleanliness of body but also to that of food, the proper washing of which is enjoined upon the faithful. The Mandaean religious literature is in an Aramaic dialect which developed in lower Babylonia, but the local Arabic is what is usually spoken by the members of the sect.

While the Mandaeans exalt John the Baptist as their prophet, there is reason to believe that their religious lineage should not be traced to him alone. Distinctly Gnostic elements enter into their cosmology which is based upon the idea of creation by emanations. Persian dualism, somewhat on the order of Manichaeism is also in evidence in Mandaean theology. The Mandaeans keep Sunday as their day of rest, and there is no indication in their literature that they ever kept the Jewish Sabbath or practiced circumcision. They regard Moses as a false prophet, and contend that in his day the depositaries of true religion were the Egyptians. They have been persecuted from time to time, alike by Jews, Nestorian Christians

armed with the authority of the Sasanian monarchs, by Mohammedans and in modern times even by Roman Catholic missionaries. These Jesuits of Portugese nationality, settling at Basra in the sixteenth century, classed the Mandaeans as "Christians of Saint John"—as descendants of the "Christians" baptised only with the "baptism of John"—and succeeded in getting the local pasha to adopt this view of their proper spiritual allegiance. The Mandaeans were, in consequence, ordered by the authorities to attend the Roman Catholic religious services or incur punishment by fines or bodily penalties. It is hence not surprising that a feeling of bitterness towards Christianity should be evinced in Mandaean literature, and that one maxim of the faith should be: "When he [Jesus] compels you to say: 'We are thine,' acknowledge him not in your hearts, and deny not the word of your Lord, the exalted King of Light. For hidden things are not known to the Lying Messiah." To these poor victims of "Christian" persecution Christ appeared in the light of a merciless fiend and to comfort the sufferers in their afflictions the exhortation was given out: "If he oppresses you and kills some of you, do not despair. He can kill only your bodies, and your souls will dwell in the world of light. Be ye not terrified, despair not, and have no fear of Christ." It would, however, be a mistake to assume that the later feelings of the Mendaeans towards Christianity and its founder necessarily existed from the very beginning. Antagonism between those who fell away from the Baptist fold to follow Christ and those who remained true to the faith of John there must have been. But the bitter animosity shown in the Mandaean writings towards the Christian faith is probably largely a later growth.

The Mandaean tradition of the career of John the Baptist is preserved in the *Sidra d'Yahya or Book of John*.[3] In this, as in the

[3] Also called *The Discourses of the [Celestial] Kings*. A German translation: *Das Johannesbuch der Mandaeer* by Mark Lidzbarski, was published in 1915. Portions of this were translated into English by G. R. S. Mead and published in *The Quest*, V.15, and later in book form as the *Sidra d'Yahya, the Gnostic John the Baptiser, selections from the Mandaean John Book* (London, 1924). In 1925 appeared the translation of another important work edited by Lidzbarski: *Ginza, der Schatz oder das Grosse Buch der Mandaeer*. In this also John appears on the scene, but we seek in vain in the Mandaean literature for a coherent story of the career of John the Baptist. These books tell us, not the history of John the Baptist, but rather the sentiments of his followers. Nothing is to be found about any arrest or execution of John. He dies, apparently in the ordinary way, and his soul ascends to heaven under the guidance of the *Manda d'Hayye*, i.e. the Gnosis of Life, or Life-giving Knowledge.

gospel story, the parents of John, Zacharias (Zakhria) and Elizabeth (Enishbai), are said to have been highly advanced in years at the time of his birth, the former, often referred to in the tale as "Old Father," being ninety-nine and the latter eighty-eight, these nominal figures probably having some symbolic significance. Preceding the birth of John a portentuous dream announced that some remarkable event is to take place. In the dream a star appeared and stood over Elizabeth, three heavenly lights flickered around Old Father Zacharias, fire burst out of the synagogue, smoke poured out of the temple. The sun was eclipsed, the earth quaked and a star fell to earth in Jerusalem. The sun shone by night and the moon appeared by day. The priest who had this dream hurried to the temple to announce that some dire calamity threatened Judaism. "He opened his mouth in blasphemy and his lips in lying," the chronicle says. When the other priests heard him they threw dust on their heads and wept, and Elizar, the High Priest, sought far and wide an interpreter of the dream. The ordinary priestly interpreters of dreams could make nothing of this one, but finally an interpreter was found who rose to the occasion and expounded the dream as follows: "Woe unto you, all ye priests, for Elizabeth shall bear a child. Woe unto you, ye rabbis, for a child shall be born in Jerusalem. Woe unto you, ye scribes, for Elizabeth shall bear a child. Woe unto thee, Mistress Torah [the Law] for John shall be born in Jerusalem." The Mandaeans, in fact, hold that John the Baptist was by no means an admirer of the puerilities of the Jewish Law, and had found in Gnosticism a much better path for his followers to tread.

Alarmed by the prediction that "John shall take possession of the Jordan and be called a prophet in Jerusalem," Elizar turned to Zacharias and said: "Old Father, depart from Judea, lest you cause strife in Jerusalem." In reply Zacharias denounced the stupidity of those who imagined a man of his age could become a father, and wound up by saying: "It is twenty-two years today since I have known woman. Not through me, not through Elizabeth, could a child be born!" He then left the temple, and as he walked away unearthly lights were seen hovering around "Old Father Zacharias" which confirmed the fears of the High Priest. In consequence the Jews were "filled with wicked anger" against Elizabeth and said to one another: "What weapon shall we make ready that the com-

ing one and his mother may be slain by our hands?" But their evil schemes were foiled by Enoch who, shortly after the birth of John, spirited away the babe and took it to Mount Parwan "on which sucklings and little children are reared on holy drink."

The Mandaean story of the baptism of Jesus is quite different from that of the Christian gospels. According to the former Jesus came to John and said: "John baptise me with thy baptism and utter over me the Name thy wont is to utter. If I distinguish myself as thy pupil I will remember thee in my writings. If I attest myself not as thy pupil, then wipe out my name from thy page." John, the story goes, was reluctant to baptise Jesus, the "liar" or "imposter" as the latter is usually termed by the Mandaeans. "Stinking fish is not a tasty morsel," he bluntly remarked. But Jesus urged him again and again, and finally a mandate came from heaven: "John, baptise the liar in the Jordan." And John proceeded to do so. The Holy Ghost which the Christians claim descended upon Jesus on this occasion duly puts in an appearance in the Mandaean story, bringing a cross, and causes a magnificent color display to appear on the waters of the Jordan. By Mandaeans the Holy Ghost is regarded as female and identified with Ruha, the mother of all evil spirits, her first born being Ur, the devil of Mandaean theology, who serves as sire for the rest of her offspring. It is interesting to note the parallelism between the Mandaean view of the Holy Ghost as feminine and that of certain heretical Christian writings which likewise make the Holy Ghost a female and describe her as the mother of Jesus. In Mandaean cosmology Ruha with her son Ur is depicted as dwelling on the surface of a watery expanse that preexisted at the beginning of creation, and it has been held that we may correlate Ruha with the female "spirit of God," which *Genesis,* I, 2, tells us was "brooding upon the face of the waters," and Ur with the light produced in one of the very first acts of creation in the *Genesis* story.

The Mandaeans claim that Jesus learned wisdom from John and then so distorted the teachings he had received as to nullify and falsify the revelations heaven had given to the Baptist. The fragments which the New Testament give us of the sayings of John and the recorded sayings of Jesus are indeed of much the same order, and its is probable that a large part of what Jesus taught was based on the teachings of John, just as today we find one evan-

gelist after another reiterating the thoughts of his predecessors, even the phraseology tending to become stereotyped. As to a distortion of the doctrines of John, that is another matter, and the blame for this should probably be cast on the "Christians" who, giving lip-service to Jesus have continually nullified and falsified the teachings of their own master.

In one passage Ruha is depicted as boasting of what she has accomplished in the way of deforming the rites which John imparted to Jesus and by implication the pure spiritual doctrines for which they stood. "The Jordan in which the Lying Messiah was baptised have I made into a font. The bread which he received have I made into a sacrament. The drink which he received have I made into a supper. The head-band which the Lying Messiah received have I made into a priest's hood. The staff which the Lying Messiah received have I made into a dung stick [crozier]." The thought here would seem to be that John, besides baptising his disciples, gave them bread and drink, put bands around their foreheads and staffs in their hands, and that his simple symbolism was in the Christion Church replaced by elaborate ecclesiastical mummery, the teachings which the ceremonies of John served to enforce meeting a like fate.

The Mandaean view of religion is quite different from that of Judaism and Christianity, its deviation being all for the good. The Hebrew doctrine of the Fall, in which knowledge is described as a forbidden fruit, is quite alien to the Gnostic thought that true religion begins when man acquires knowledge of good and evil, of truth and error. The bloody sacrifices of the Jews in the temple, the cutting the throats of poor helpless animals as an act pleasing to God, is given no condemnation in the New Testament; neither Jesus nor his apostles, nor Paul, nor the latter's disciples have ever a word to say against this beastly practice. The more moral Mandaeans, however, proudly boasted of their God, the King of Light, that "no victims are sacrificed before him." The Christian view that this world can never be anything but a vale of tears, a stage in existence which ought to be devoted to mortifying the flesh and preparing for death, is rejected by the healthy minded Mandaeans who do not even practice the fasting which the Christian scriptures attribute to John the Baptist. Into the follies of asceticism the Mandaeans thus do not fall, and they roundly denounced the celibacy

so highly extolled by the early Christians. According to their tradition John the Baptist said: "It would be pleasant to take a wife and delightful to have children," but for a time feared that if he had a family he might neglect his religious duties and forget the Lord. But this error was corrected by a message from heaven: "John, take a wife and found a family, and see that thou dost not let the world come to an end." As the Christian advocacy of perpetual virginity worked out it tended to make the kind and gentle, the thoughtful and the altruistic, pass away without leaving any progeny, the care of propagating the next generation being left to the least worthy specimens of the humanity, and no words are sufficiently strong to use in stigmatising this system and the false prophets who upheld it. And since the Mandaeans held Jesus responsible for the official doctrines of the so-called Christian Church we can understand why they put into the mouth of John addressing Jesus the words: "Thou hast lied to the Jews and deceived the priests. Thou hast cut off their seed from the men, and from the women bearing and being pregnant." Coming in contact with Christians the Mandaeans saw them worshipping a wooden cross, and this idolatry found no favor in their eyes. An eloquent passage well exhibits their sentiments. "Let me warn you, my brothers! Let me warn you, my beloved! Let me warn you of the God which the carpenter has joinered together. They [the Christians] lay it on the wall and then stand there and bow down before the block. If the carpenter has joinered together the God, who then has joinered together the carpenter?" The Mandaeans developed a theology more inspiring than either cross worship or Jewish monotheism. Too moral to take the position that "whatever is, is right," the only logical standpoint of anyone who believes in a single omnipotent God, they held to a lofty dualism which refused to ascribe to the God they worshipped the manifest evils which lay before their eyes. In nature they saw two supernatural kings, one to hate and oppose, the other to love and support. The King of this world "girt on a sword," they said, "and put on a crown of Darkness. A crown of Darkness he put on his head and took a sword in his right hand. A sword he took in his right hand; he stands there and slaughters his sons, and his sons slaughter one another. The King from outside the worlds set a crown of Light on his head. A crown of Light set he on his head, and took Truth in his hand. Truth in his right

hand he took, and he stands there and instructs his sons. He stands there and instructs his sons, and his sons instruct one another."

Just how far the early followers of John the Baptist advanced in their spiritual progress up from Judaism we have no means of ascertaining. We do know, however, that the hand of the persecutor fell heavily upon them. The Jewish authorities vowed "We will slay them and make Miryai scorned in Jerusalem." "Miryai" being the poetic personification of the religious body composed of the Jewish followers of John. And carrying out their threat "They split open their fellings and snared the doves in Jerusalem," i.e. they killed and imprisoned those who were taking part in the movement for reform. In consequence, forced to flee from their persecutors, the little flock emigrated to Mesopotamia where there now seems to have taken place an amalgamation with a larger body of religionists of somewhat similar sentiments from whom part of the Mandaeans doctrines may have been derived. Here for some time they found peace: "Miryai am I, a vine, a tree at the mouth of the Euphrates. The leaves of the tree are precious stones. The fruit of the tree is pearls. Blessed be the man who hath freed me from my fetters and planted me here. Miryai am I, a daughter of the King of Babel, a daughter of the mighty ruler of Jerusalem. The Jews bore me. The priests brought me up. My father went to the synagogue; my mother went to the [Jewish] temple. They charged me: 'Miryai, close thy inner door and bolt the bar. See that thou goest not forth unto the street.' But I, Miryai, heeded not what my mother did tell me, and harkened not to what my father did say. I opened the inner doors and the outer let I stand open. Out went I into the street and the sun of my Lord fell upon me. I would have gone to the synagogue, but my steps led me to the [Mandaean] Temple. I went in and found my brothers and sisters." Lidzbarski holds that Mandaeanism originated either in a heretical Jewish sect or in a Judaizing heathen community in or close to Palestine at an early date, and he even conjectures that it may have been transplanted to Mesopotamia before the downfall of the Jewish kingdom. In view of the various far-fetched theories that have been put forth concerning the lost tribes of Israel it is surprising that no one has as yet claimed this distinction for the original Mandaeans.

Of more importance, however, is the probable connection between the Essenes described by Josephus and the Mandaeans. These Essenes who subsequently disappear from the annals of Judaism leaving not the slightest trace of what became of them, already, in the time of Josephus, had a reverence for the sun, or the light streaming from it, cognate to the Mandaean worship of the King of Light. They practiced daily bathing in cold water as a religious duty, and in their general cleanliness and mode of life showed distinct Mandaean tendencies. It is true they were inclined to asceticism, just as John the Baptist himself (if we can rely on the New Testament account) was inclined to favor fasting. But subsequent generations of the same people might easily have outgrown this tendency. In fact even in the days of Josephus, growth away from asceticism was manifest. He tells us: "There is yet another order of Essenes, which while at one with the rest in its mode of life, customs, and regulations, differs from them in its views on marriage. They think that those who decline to marry cut off the chief function of life, the propagation of the race, and what is more, that, were all to adopt the same view, the whole race would very quickly die out." The view of these more advanced Essenes thus parallels the heavenly correction of John's original view concerning marriage as told in the Mandaean tradition. It seems highly probable that most of the Essenes were ultimately drawn into the Mandaean movement, and their consequent emigration to Mesopotamia affords a good explanation of the disappearance of this sect from Jewish history. Some authorities find traces of Mandaeanism in the references made to "the Hemerobaptists" (i.e. those who baptise daily) by the early Christian writers. An example of such references is the following pasage from the Pseudo-Clementine *Constitutions of the Holy Apostles*. "For even the Jewish nation had wicked heresies: for of them were the Sadducees. . . . . and the Pharisees. . . . . and the Masbotheans. . . . . and the Hemerobaptists, who every day, unless they wash do not eat,—nay and unless they cleanse their beds and tables and platters and cups and seats, do not make use of any of them."[4] Comparison of the passage with the account of Jewish

[4] To appreciate the implied reproach here we must remember that the orthodox "Christians" of the time actually cherished filthiness as a virtue, and that when an ecclesiastical historian wished to bestow especial praise on some holy man he told his readers that the saint never took a bath from the day of his baptism to that of his death.

sects given by Josephus shows, however, these "Hemerobaptists" ought to be identified with the Essenes rather than with the Mandaeans, if indeed at this later time there really remained any distinction between the two.

Ultimately, it seems, overtures were made by the Jerusalem priests for a reconciliation with Judaism. Priests came to the mouth of the Euphrates to plead with Miryai. They appealed to her: "Leave the man who is not of thy dwelling place." But she replied: "Go! Go hence, ye who have bore false witness and lied about me." In Judaism, said Miryai, "there is naught for supporting the poor, naught to revive the tormented souls." Taunts were tried: "Look at Miryai! She has left Jewry and gone to make love with her Lord!" But Miryai replied: "Far be it from me to love him whom I have learned to hate! Far be it from me to hate him whom I have come to love! Far be it from me to hate my Lord, the Life-giving Knowledge, who is for me a helper and a guide from the region of darkness to the region of light! Dust in the mouths of the Jews! Ashes in the mouths of all priests! Thou hast won the victory Life-giving Knowledge and hath helped all thy friends to victory! And life is victorious!"

HERDER AND THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION

BY BIRGER R. HEADSTROM

HAVING mentioned in an earlier paper[1] that Herder, more or less, grasped the point of view which we now know as Darwinism, how near he actually did come to our modern views on evolution can be seen from an examination of the first part of his Ideas for the Philosophy of the History of Mankind, generally known as the Ideen, and its comparison with the Origin of Species.

After beginning with the position of the earth in the universe of the stars, followed by some chapters on its crust, its formation, the influence of its atmosphere, and the revolutions through which it had to pass before man could make his appearance, Herder continues by tracing the various forms of life, from the lichen up to man, in the order in which he supposed they were produced, to finally enunciate what might be considered as the text of his book: "Thus has Nature produced the greatest variety out of a simplicity in endless progression"; and to illustrate this unity of creation he employs practically every branch of organic natural science, geology, botany,[2] comparative anatomy, reproduction, and embryology, as well as "that strange uniformity or typical form (Hauptform) which is in force through vast numbers of distinct species and is the foundation of the great generic distinctions," of which Darwin says: "This truly wonderful fact the wonder of which we are apt to overlook from familiarity." While, moreover, "If species had been independently created no explanation would have been possible of this kind of classification."[3]

[1] "The Scientism of Goethe," *The Open Court, August,* 1927.

[2] See Part 1, book ii. chap. 2, for his account of the fertilization of plants and uniformity of generation; book iii. chap. 4, for his suggestion of the possibility of a sensitive system in plants.

[3] *Origin of Species* (6th edition), p. 104; cf. book ii. chap. 4.

But interesting as his views on the uniformity of nature may be, we are rather concerned, however, with the manner in which he traces and accounts for the boundless variety that has arisen out of this uniformity, in short, for the origin of species. That he, at all, recognized the difficulty of the origin of species seems, in the first place, remarkable in view of the state of scientific knowledge at his time, even though it occurred to him in somewhat this form: "Why did the creative mother separate species from each other? For no other reason, but to make and preserve the image of their conformation more perfect. We know not how many of our present species of animals may have approached nearer to each other in an earlier age of our Earth; but we see, that their boundaries are now genetically separated," that is, as he explains, they breed true, or the hybrids are wholly or partially sterile.[4]

It was this difficulty that led him to suppose that "new forms arise no more, for when the door of creation was shut, the forms of organization already chosen remained as appointed ways and gates by which the inferior powers might in future raise and improve themselves within the limits of nature," an assumption which, happily, he does not consistently maintain.[5] And in trying to establish laws which are as operative now as when life first appeared, he disposes to the view, like so many naturalists of the past century, that climate has exerted a profound influence in determining the laws and variations among the lower animals as well as among the tribes of men, saying, "Thus do all animals vary; and shall not man, who is also in the structure of his nerves and muscles an animal, change with the climate? According to the analogy of nature, it would be a miracle, did he remain unchanged."[6]

To this theory may also be regarded as a part what he calls "the chains with which Nature binds us from our infancy to our country, manners, language, and possessions";[7] and from such passages, which occur throughout the book, the law of adaptation to environment can be deduced, in illustration of which we may consider the following sentences: "The bird flies in the air: every deviation of its figure from the structure of the quadruped is ex-

[4] Book vii. chap. 4, end; cf. *Origin of Species,* chap. 9.

[5] Book v. chap. 3.

[6] Book ii, chap. 3, and throughout the second part of the work; contrast with Origin of Species, pp. 43-112, etc.

[7] Book i. chap. 4.

plicable from its element. The fish swims in the water: its limbs have few articulations. But when, as in the manatee, it touches the earth, its forefeet at least are set free, and the female acquires breasts. . . . . Thus from the slime of the worms, from the calcareous abode of the shell-fish, from the web of the insects, a better limbed and superior organization gradually rises. . . . . And thus it is anatomically and physiologically true, that the analogy of one organization prevails through the whole animated creation of our Globe."[8]

Again in explaining the gradual development of the brain from the end of the spinal cord, and of the senses, as well as of the special sense organs which characterize certain species,[9] he employs this same method; but had he only been able to explain the ultimate law of this development, in short, the necessity of variety of an organ, before the advantageous change occurred, which, by its serviceableness, was grasped and developed by natural selection it is possible that he may have been able to have given us a complete theory. As it is, however, he omits the active cause of development, though in some passages he comes near to it, as, for example, where he discusses the law of persistence and the struggle of each species and individual to persevere. And though it is the struggle for existence which changed the law of persistence into one of development, unfortunately Herder did not quite comprehend the means by which the change is effected.

"Self-preservation," as he says, "is the first object of every existing being: from the grain of sand to the solar orb everything strives, to remain what it is."[10] And in the absence of struggle or competition this law of persistence suffices, and there is no development for "the less a nation is pressed upon, the truer it must remain to its rude and simple way of life, and the more pure must it preserve its original form."[11] However, such cases are rare, for: "Nothing in nature stands still; everything exerts itself, and pushes on. Could we contemplate the first periods of creation, and see how one kingdom of nature was erected on another; what a series of powers urging onward would be displayed progressively unfolding

[8] Book ii. chap. 4.

[9] Book vi. chap. 1, middle; cf. *Origin of Species*, pp. 159-164, "Utilitarian Doctrine;" and pp. 108-112, and 397, for growth of organs by use.

[10] Book viii. chap. 4.

[11] Book vi. chap. 1, end. Herder's hints at this important law in several places; cf. *Origin of Species*, pp. 82, 83, for the persistence of anomalous forms, e.g. the Ornithorhynchus.

themselves."[12] But in this struggle, "millions of creatures have perished: what ever could preserve itself abides and, still, after the lapse of thousands of years, remains in great harmonious order.[13] . . . In short, every species extends its possession of the Earth in proportion to its capacity, cunning, strength, or courage. Each strives with each, as each is pressed upon; each must provide for his own substance, and defend his own life. But why acts Nature thus?" he asks, "and why does she thus jostle her creatures one upon another? Because she would produce the greatest number and variety of living beings in the least space, so that one crushes another, and an equilibrium of powers can alone produce peace in creation. Each species cares for itself, as if it were the only one in existence; but by its side stands another, which confines it within due bounds: and in this adjustment of opposing species creative Nature found the only means of maintaining the whole. . . . I concern myself not, therefore, whether whole species of animals have perished from the face of the Earth. Has the mammoth disappeared? so have giants; when these existed, the relations between the several creatures were different: as things at present are, we perceive an evident equilibrium, not only over the whole Earth, but in particular regions and countries."[14]

That Herder regards each special organ, or the adaptation as a whole, as having been designed, or developed, simply for the preservation of the particular species in its struggle for existence, and not for the benefit of any other, nor for man, who is but "a fraction of the whole,"[15] seems rather clear, although he, unhappily, depends too much on climate as the first causes of variety, even though he does admit that "climate is a chaos of causes, very dissimilar to each other, and in consequence acting slowly and in various ways, till at length they penetrate to the internal parts and change them by habit, and by the genetic power itself," (or heredity).[16] And though he allows that species are capable of wide variation within their own limits, he does not go so far as to presume that one species can develop into another; in addition to which we must mention the power of inheritance,[17] especially important to him for his theories of the

[12] Book v. chap. 3.
[13] Book xv. chap. 2.
[14] Book ii. chap. 3.
[15] Book iii. chap. 5.
[16] Book vii. chap. 5.
[17] Particuarly book vii. end of chap. 4.

laws of reproduction and generation—that "eternal wonder of wonders;" and so much does it appeal to him that he suggests inheritance as a solution to the old question of innate ideas,[18] a view which later found general support.[19]

From these principles, Herder arrives to the conclusion that advance in organization implies differentiation of structure in the organic being, a deduction which is singularly agreeable with our present views. Saying that the mouth is what first distinguishes animals from plants, he traces points of differentiation in polyps, worms, and birds, to observe that "the higher we ascend the more complicated are the parts;"[20] and similarly with the difference in sex, "the more complicated the internal organization of a creature, the more we perceive its capacity for conceiving and producing living beings," a principle which he follows in a similar manner from the plants that are wholly or partially hermaphroditic, through those with distinct sexes, the fish, birds, etc., up to the higher animals.[21] He also offers, as further evidence for the same law, the sensitive divisions and the many complications of the nervous system in those animals which are considered to come nearest to reason,[22] as well as the instincts of, for example, spiders and bees, which he presumes become more complex and more difficult to acquire with a rise in the scale of organization.[23] He even applies this physiological division of labour to the history of society, saying in part: "Man is the most perfect of earthly creatures, only because in him the finest organic powers we know act with the most elaborately organized instruments."[24]

That Herder did not fully grasp the significance of his theory is clearly evident from his frequent deviations, and the many contradictions which his work contains, as for instance, despite what he has said on development we might assume from certain passages that the various degrees of development came suddenly and spontaneously into being, instead of being developed by a gradual proc-

[18] Book viii. chap. ii. 5.

[19] Book vii. chap. 4; cf. Law of Correlated Variations, *Origin of Species*, pp. 114-115.

[20] Book iii. chap. 1; cf. *Origin of Species*, pp. 89, 97-100.

[21] Book iii. chap. 1, end; cf. *Origin of Species*, pp. 76-78.

[22] Book iii. chap. 2, end.

[23] Book iii. chap. 4; cf. *Origin of Species*, pp. 205-207.

[24] Book vii. chap. 4.

ess.[25] Likewise, he entertains the teleological view that the elephant, the lion, and man, for example, were all endowed with special organs for definite purposes,[26] an error which is not so surprising as even the Origin of Species was at first viewed as a proof of teleology. Finally, he often fails to appreciate the full value of the universal struggle for existence, though at times he clearly recognizes it to be necessary for his theory, as without it development is not possible.

That such confusion is apt to lead one to depreciate the value of the book cannot be gainsaid, yet anyone who is familiar with the conditions of natural science at his time, and the difficulties under which he labored, can fail to appreciate, in spite of all his omissions, the method by which he builds, nor the nearness with which he approaches our present-day theories. That he did not go further is because the world was not ready to receive the principle which we have come to know as Darwinism. Nor was he in a position to gather that vast mass of evidence which made the strength of Darwin "as calm and irresistable as the movement of a glacier." Yet, at any rate, the fact that he at least recognized the point of view which later became the foundation of our laws of evolution and natural selection seems to us to entitle him to a place in the history of biological science.

[25] Book x. chap. 2.
[26] Book iii. chap. 3.

DIABOLUS SIMIA DEI

BY MAXIMILIAN RUDWIN

THE Devil is represented in Christian theology as a duplicate of the Deity. The Fiend in hell has been set up by the Church fathers as a foil to the Father in heaven. Lucifer has been limned by the Catholic Schoolmen after the Lord. The Adversary, in waging war against the Almighty, is understood to copy all of his acts and attributes. Popular tradition, moreover, asserts that the Devil, impotent to do anything original, has set his heart on aping everything created by the Deity. In Immermann's drama, *Merlin* (1832), Satan complains: *"Dass uns nichts bleibt als nachzuäffen"* (That nothing but imitating is left to us) (Prologue, 199).

The similarities between pagan and Christian belief and ritual were explained by the Church fathers as diabolical travesties of divine truths. When the early Christian missionaries discovered that the heathen rites and observances were identical with their own, they could explain the fact only by assuming that the Devil, in his efforts to pervert the truth, mimicked the exact details of the sacraments of the Lord in the mysteries of the idols. The doctors of the Church postulated the belief that, long before the advent of Christianity, Satan had put Christian ideas into the heads of the pagans in order to confound the faithful. The Church fathers assumed that, by overhearing the words of the inspired prophets, the Adversary had learned the intentions of the Almighty and had anticipated them by a series of blasphemous imitations (Justin Martyr: *Apologia* i. 54). From the identity of Mithraic and Judaic baptismal rites, Tertullian was led to declare that "Satan imitates the sacraments of God" and "goes about to apply to the worship of the idols those very things of which the administration of Christ's sacraments con-

sists." Referring to the Mithraic eucharist, Justin Martyr also maintained that Satan had plagiarized this ceremony, causing the worshippers of Mithra to receive the consecrated bread and cup of water[1] in imitation of the followers of Christ. St. Augustine similarly saw the subtlety of Satan's power of imitation in the parallel between the observances of Christians and pagans. Even Cortés, the famous Spanish explorer, who conquered Mexico in the sixteenth century, complained that Lucifer had positively taught the Mexicans the same things which the Lord had taught the Christians. Thus the similarities in creed and cult between Christianism and paganism were interpreted by the Church as infernal counterfeits of eternal verities.

The early Christians further believed that Lucifer, in his efforts to copy the Lord, actually pronounced oracles and worked miracles among the pagans, but that when God brought his miraculous displays of power to an end, the Devil was no longer permitted to perform prodigies among the pagans, either. The Church did not doubt the supernatural power of the idols but ascribed its source to the Devil's aim to counterfeit the Deity with a view of confounding the Christians. "But the fundamental cause (*consummativa*) [of idolatry]," affirms St. Thomas Aquinas in his work, *Summa theologica* (II. ii. 94), "must be sought in the devils, who caused men to adore them under the form of idols, working in them certain things which excited their wonder and admiration." Even Edmund Spenser, writing in the sixteenth century, described the Devil as dwelling beneath the altar of an idol in a heathen temple and, in its name, uttering oracles and performing miracles.

* * *

In every other respect, Lucifer was represented by the fathers and doctors of the Church as a replica of the Lord, as the unholy counterfeiter of all things divine, playing in the world the part of "God's ape." The triceptic form, which the Devil inherited from the pagan gods of the underworld, was interpreted by the Church as his parody of the tripersonality of the Godhead. Lucifer, in imitation of the Lord, wears a long beard in the iconography of the Eastern Church. The Devil's diadem is the counterpart of the Creator's crown. As Jehovah has "principality, and power, and might and dominion" (Eph. i. 21), Satan is the possessor of "prin-

[1] Water was used instead of wine by certain early Christian sects.

cipalities and powers" (*ibid.*, vi. 12). If God is the father of truth, the Devil is the father of lies (John viii. 44). The sons of Belial (Jdg. xx. 13; cf. John viii. 44) parallel the children of God (John viii. 42; 1 John iii. 10).

If Spirit emanated from God, Matter was formed by the Fiend. It was a Gnostic notion to regard the whole world of objective existence as the work of the Devil. The Church adopted this view and considered all nature as the incarnation of the Evil Spirit. In fact, the Devil was looked upon down to the sixteenth century as in some sort the creator and controller of the physical order of things. The world, the flesh and the Devil are joined together in the formula of Christian baptism. Although the Catholic catechism does not contain this belief, it formed the principal doctrine of many heteredox sects. The Priscillianists, an ascetic and Gnostic sect of the fifth century, had for their central belief that the world was created by the Devil. They abstained as much as they could from all contact with the material world and rejected many foods as coming from the Devil.[2]

If God created man, Satan created woman.[3] The Manichæans held the belief that woman was fashioned by the Devil, and that the forbidden fruit with which the Serpent tempted Adam was woman herself.[4] When Adam was created (so runs the teaching of Mani), the Devil, wishing to show that he could equal and perhaps even surpass the Deity in creative power, fashioned Eve, who, in contrast to Adam, was wholly sensual, and thus soon caused Adam to sin through carnal lust. According to another Gnostic belief, Adam was likewise the handiwork of the Evil One, who fashioned him as well as Eve out of dust. Adam, however, had a spark of light in him, inasmuch as Satan, in previous struggles with the good angels, had obtained from them some elements of light

[2] Gœthe and Hebbel shared this belief in the Devil as the creator of the world; consult the present writer's essay: "Des Teufels Schöpferrolle bei Gœthe und Hebbel" in *Neophilologus*, vol. VI (1918-19). pp. 319-22. Anatole France, in his work, *la Rôtisserie de la Reine Pédauque* (1893), also expresses the belief that a demon has created the world.

[3] The Devil is at least the dispenser of charms to women. The famous courtesan of Alexandria maintains that if she is so beautiful it is because the Devil adorned her with all her attractions (Anatole France: *Thais*, 1890).

[4] The apple-story in Genesis is thus interpreted as an allegory. "Love," says Henry O'Brien in his book, *The Round Towers of Ireland* (1834), "however disguised, and how could it be more beautifully than by the scriptural penman—love, in its literal and all-absorbing seductiveness, was the simple and fascinating aberration couched under the figure of the forbidden fruit."

and passed them on into Adam's nature. Eve, on the other hand, was wholly sensual and consequently could not fail soon to bring about Adam's fall.

If the Lord created the human soul, Lucifer, according to the belief of the Albigenses, fashioned the human body as a prison for the celestial soul. Even if the upper parts of the body were created by God, its inferior parts, according to the belief of other heretical sects, were made by the Devil. The Paternians, who held this belief and who wished to render to both their creators what was theirs, indulged to their hearts' content in eating and drinking and debauching themselves.

If God is the creator of beauty, ugliness is, according to the French novelist Joris-Karl Huysmans, the Devil's handiwork (*les Foules de Lourdes*, 1906).

As heaven is the habitation of the Most High, hell is the dwelling of the Devil. The Christian hell of pitch and brimstone is the counterpart of the Hebrew heaven of gold and precious stones. The scarlet gates of Gehenna form a striking contrast to the pearly portals of paradise. The Devil, who has always wished to rival the Deity, has developed his domain in all details after the pattern of the celestial organization. Each infernal institution is copied from a corresponding eternal establishment. The diabolical monarchy was founded in opposition to the celestial kingdom. The hierarchy of hell was formed in imitation of the hierarchy of heaven. The infernal council was instituted in imitation of the celestial assembly described in the Old Testament (1 Kings xxii. 19; 2 Chr. xviii. 18; Job i. 6, ii. 1).

The malignant spirits form a contrast to the benignant spirits. The seven demons of royal rank match the seven archangels. Satan holding the keys of hell is a pendant to St. Peter, the warden of the celestial portals. The Eternity of Sorrows in hell, a creation of Chateaubriand in his novel, *les Martyrs* (1809), is the infernal counterpart to the Augustinian *æternitas felicitatis*. Hornblas, the demon, who, in the German medieval mysteries, blows the horn or Tartarean trumpet to call together the demons of hell for a session of parliament, is the diabolical counterpart of the Angel of the Last Trumpet. The functions of the fiends in hell parallel the rôles of the bright spirits in heaven. As the latter specialize in virtues, the former particularize in vices. As each angel is set over a good act,

each demon is allotted an evil deed. As the angels sing hosannah in the highest, the demons pour forth pæans of praise to the Prince of the Pit. The choir of the angels in the medieval mysteries has for its counterpart a choir of demons. The spirits of hell even parody the prayers addressed to the Lord in heaven. According to Cæsarius of Heisterbach, the Devil does not even refrain from reciting in a burlesque fashion the *Paternoster* and the *Credo*. In imitation of the supernal spirits, the infernal hosts sing the *Silete* in the French medieval mysteries. Beelzebub, as chaplain to Venus, the goddess of voluptuousness, in Gil Vicente's play, *Triumpho do inverno* (1530), offers a parody of the breviary hymns for the amusement of the pious Portuguese spectators.

As the Lord works for the extension of his kingdom on earth, Lucifer also endeavors to extend his power on this planet. As the Almighty sends his angels down in order that his will be done on earth as it is in heaven, the Adversary dispatches his demons to effect his will among the children of man. The intervention of the demons in human affairs parallels that of the angels. Inasmuch as the spirits of darkness are incessantly plotting the ruin of men, the spirits of light are continually intent upon saving them. As the angels of heaven must answer to the formulas of invocation pronounced by those who have made a sacramental compact with their chief, the infernal agents can be summoned by those who have shared a sacrament with Satan. If the messengers from heaven are the guards and sentries of men, the agents of hell act as their tempters and tormentors. If the good spirit whispers good counsel into man's right ear, the evil demon whispers evil counsel into the left.

As the Lord has his elect, so Lucifer has his chosen. "The Devil has his elect" as well as the Deity, the devout George Herbert assures us. As the Creator closes a covenant with his faithful, his copyist enters into a pact with his adherents. If the bond with the Eternal is concluded with water, the pact with the Infernal is signed with blood. Satan as well as the Saviour demands from his subjects an act of deep devotion and a declaration of loyalty. *"Dæmones divinis honoribus gaudent,"* says St. Augustine (*De Civitate Dei*, x). If the Deity spreads grace on his people, the Devil distributes evil spells among his devotees. If the men of the Lord do good and practice charity, the followers of the Fiend do evil and spread hatred. As

the Deity distributes crowns of gold to his elect (Rev. ii. 10; cf. Pet. v. 4), the Devil in the medieval mysteries rewards his deserving demons with crowns composed, however, of far ignobler substances.

* * *

The synagogue of Satan (Rev. ii. 9) is the counterpart of the Church of God.[5] No sooner is a temple erected to the Deity than the Devil builds a chapel near by. There is a Spanish proverb to the effect that "Where God has his church, Satan will have his chapel." The Spaniards also say, "Detras de la cruz está el diablo" (Behind the Cross is the Devil). In the words of Daniel Defoe: "Wherever man erects a house of prayer, the Devil always builds a chapel."

Sweden, and the North in general, fairly swarm with the synagogues of Satan. It is believed that the Devil has a church in the village of Elfdale, situated in Sweden. The "cursed tower" of Vygla in Iceland, mentioned in Victor Hugo's juvenile novel, *Han d'Islande* (1823), was believed to be "the oratory of the Devil."

The adoration of the Devil is the obverse of the worship of the Deity. The rites of hell, mentioned in Victor Hugo's novel, just cited, correspond to the sacraments of heaven.[6] The ceremonies of the devil-worshippers were considered as blasphemous travesties of the blessed sacraments of the Church of God. Satan as well as Jehovah has his ministers (2 Cor. xi. 15), who perform his sacraments. The *magica diabolica* or *magica nigra* is in contrast to the *magica alba*. Sacred days, as is well known, are printed in the Catholic calendar with red letters, and the Devil also employs them in the books of black magic. The "Devil's mark," found on the wizards and witches, is the counterpart of the Lord's baptism. Tertullian has already said that the Devil, as the ape of the Deity, practises baptism on his subjects. The "Flying Ointment," with which the witches rub themselves in preparation for their mid-air flights to the Sabbath, is an obverse of the seventh Christian sacrament. The stick, which serves them as a steed, is, according to Arias Mon-

[5] The noted German-Polish novelist Stanislaw Przybyszewski, author of *Homo Sapiens* (1895-98), has written a novel in German under the title *Die Synagogue Satans* (1897). Adolf Paul has composed a comedy entitled *Die Teufelskirche* (Berlin, 1915). The novel, *The Devil's Chapel*, has Miss Sophie Cole for its author.

[6] A description of the ritual at the infernal court was given by Hroswitha, a nun of Gandersheim in Germany, who lived in the tenth century.

tano, the diabolical counterpart to the rod of Moses and the budding rod of Aaron (Numb. xvii. 2). The Black Mass is "a blasphemous parody of the Blessed Mass." The Devil assists with the Black Mass, just as the Lord is present at the Holy Eucharist. As candles burn before the altar of God, lights are carried in front of the Devil, as he performs the rites of the Witches' Sabbath. The table and cup used in the sacrament of Satan (1 Cor. x. 21) correspond to those employed in the sacrament of the Saviour. A Basque legend tells us that the Devil makes his chalice out of the parings of fingernails trimmed on Sundays. Another instance of the mimicry of the sanctities of the Church by "God's Ape" is the belief that the Devil exacts from the witches a kiss on an ignominious part of his body in imitation of the kiss of charity with which the early Christians greeted each other (1 Pet. v. 14).

Man can be as devout with respect to the Devil as in the worship of the Deity, says Victor Hugo in *Actes et Paroles*: "Depuis l'exil" (II. xvi). "In more ways than one," says St. Augustine, "do men sacrifice to the rebellious spirits" as well as to the Heavenly Powers. According to Biblical authority, man can drink of the cup and be a partaker of the table of Lucifer as well as of the Lord (1 Cor. x. 21). Sinners can obtain indulgences from Satan as well as from the Saviour. "There are some consciences so tender," says Victor Hugo, "that they must seek indulgences even from Beelzebub. They wish to be irreproachable even in the eyes of Satan. Sins against the Devil exist in certain morbid imaginations" (*les Travailleurs de la mer,* 1866). The sins against Satan, of which Victor Hugo writes, parallel the crimes against the Creator. The doctrines of the devils (1 Tim. iv. 1) correspond to the precepts of the priests.

As God is always nigh unto them who call upon him, so Satan always appears when summoned. "Lucifer," says Richardson in *Pamela* (1740), "always is ready to promote his work and workmen." The proverb says: "Call the Devil, and he will come or send." The Devil as well as the Deity lends his ears to the prayers addressed to him by man in need. What the Lord has refused him, man seeks to obtain from Lucifer. He may even address himself directly to the Devil. Northern belief leans to the idea that man has a better chance of getting a hearing in hell than in heaven.

There is a significant saying among the Danish and Prussian peasants to the effect that you may obtain a favor by calling on the Deity, but that if you wish to be sure of getting what you want, you must deal with the Devil. An ancient tradition exists in Northern Europe that the Antecessor, as the Devil is called in a certain Swedish myth, is present to hold out promises where the Intercessor has broken all that his sponsors had made for him when the populace accepted his baptism.[7]

* * *

Satan as *simia Salvatoris* also has a mother, who, as Queen of Hell, is the exact copy of the Queen of Heaven. This *Mater tenebrarum*—Our Lady of Darkness—is the counterpart of the *Mater dolorosa*—Our Lady of Sorrows. The infernal madonna appears in the *Juttaspiel,* the most famous secular play of medieval Germany, as Lilith, Adam's original paramour. This Mater malorum was the first to claim that woman was essentially man's equal and left her husband on account of his old-fashioned ideas about the husband's right to be head of the family. In the Alsfeld Passion Play, dating from the end of the fifteenth century, this "diabo-lady" is called Höllenkrücke (hell's crutches) on account of a lameness, which forces her to walk on crutches. In James Huneker's story, "The Vision Malefic" (1920), this counterfeit madonna appears on a Christmas Eve to the organist of a Roman Catholic church in New York.

The idea of the Devil's grandmother, on the other hand, is wholly foreign to Judeo-Christian tradition.[8] It belongs to Germanic belief. Satan's grandmother is none other than Grendel's granny mentioned in *Beowulf*.[9] The Christian Devil has simply usurped the place of the Anglo-Saxon monster in his grandmother's affections as well as in the popular mind. The Devil's grandmother is called Freya in North Germany, having been named after the Scandinavian goddess. She has also been identified with Hecate, the classical goddess of magic and witchcraft (Heine: "Ich rief den Teufel und er kam," 1824).

[7] In Maurice Magre's recent novel, *Lucifer,* the Devil says: "I give what I undertake to give. God promises much and gives nothing."

[8] Cf. Juilius Lippert: *Christentum, Volksglaube und Volksbrauch,* Berlin, 1882, p. 561.

[9] Cf. Jacob Grimm: *Teutonic Mythology.* Transl. from the German (4 vols., London, 1880-1888), p. 986.

The Germans also knew of "the giant's old grandmother" and of "the mother or grandmother of earth." The Romans similarly had a mother or grandmother of ghosts.[10] The Devil's grandmother is in reality a degraded form of the Germanic goddess of fertility and domestic activity, whose symbols were the pitch-fork, the plough, the broom and the spindle.[11] This association accounts for the prominent part these implements play in medieval demonology. The witch, who was a degraded priestess of the ancient goddess of fertility, used the broom as a mount when she rode through the air to the Witches' Sabbath. The Devil himself is often represented with a pitch-fork or a broom in his hands. The Devil's pitch-fork is not the forked scepter of Pluto, to which a tine has later been added, as is commonly assumed. It is the ancient symbol of fertility, which is still employed as a fertility charm by the Hindus in India and the Zuñi and Aztec Indians of North America and Mexico. A related symbol is the trident of Poseidon or Neptune. The Devil often carried a besom on the medieval stage. This fact leads Mr. Chambers[12] to identify the Devil in some English mystery-plays with the chimney-sweep in others, especially since both are black-faced.[13]

We do not know much about the Devil's grandfather, but in a well known German fairy-tale he is called Old Night, and Beelzebub swears by his grandfather's horns in Charles Deulin's story, "le Grand choleur" (1874).

* * *

The Devil, in imitation of the Deity, will toward the end of days send his son to men. Antichrist as the foil of Christ (2 Thess. ii. 3-10) will, according to Bellarmine, Suarez, Malvenda and *tutti*

[10] Cf. Sir James Frazer: *The Golden Bough* (*London,* 1890-1915), VIII, 94, 96, 107.

[11] Cf. Karl Pearson: *The Chances of Death and Other Studies in Evolution* (2 vols., London, 1897), II, 28.

[12] E. K. Chambers: *The Mediæval Stage* (2 vols., Oxford, 1903), I, 214-5.

[13] On the German legends of the Devil's grandmother, the reader is referred first of all to the two articles by Eduard Lehmann: "Fandens oldemov" in *Dania. Tidsskrift dansk sprog og litteratur samt folkeminder,* vol. VIII (1901), pp. 179-94, and "Teufels Grossmutter" in the *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft,* vol. VIII (1905), pp. 411-30. The following books and magazine articles will be of further interest: Saintine: *la Mythologie du Rhin et les contes de la Mère-Grand* (1862); A. Götze: "Des Teufels Grossmutter" in the *Zeitschrift für deutsche Wortforschung,* vol. VII (1905-6), pp. 28-35; and Isabel C. Chamberlain: "The Devil's Grandmother" in the *Journal of American Folk-Lore,* vol. XIII (1900), pp. 278-80.

quanti, be born of a Babylonian virgin and the Devil, just as Christ was born of a Palestinian virgin and the Holy Ghost.

It is thus evident that the Devil has always been striving to equal the Deity in each and every detail of character and conduct. The designation of *simia Dei* given Diabolus by the Church fathers is thus well deserved.[14]

[14] The idea of Satan as a parody of God will also be found in Mark Twain's posthumous romance, *The Mysterious Stranger.* For further discussion of the subject of *Diabolus simia Dei, Satan simiæ Salvatoris, Lilith simia Mariæ* and *dæmones simæ angelorum,* the reader is referred to the present writer's monograph, *Der Teufal in den deutschen geistlichen Spielen des Mittelalters und der Reformationszeit* (Göttingen, 1915), pp. 128ff.

BELIEF AND REASON: A STUDY IN THE NATURE OF BELIEF AND ITS PLACE IN RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

BY JOHN W. WATERHOUSE

I

TO every man of thought there comes a time when he faces the question, "what, rationally, am I to believe and what am I to reject?" Feeling that in the past so much has been taken for granted, he joins in sceptic mood with the cry of Pope, "what can we reason but from what we know?"

It is perhaps in the works of Plato, "the first true theist and systematic philosopher," that one may trace the beginnings of a rational and logical attempt to distinguish "opinion" from "reasoned knowledge." Although Plato adopted a theistic attitude, it was scarcely religious, rather was it of a purely philosophical nature. In other words his theism had no essential religious value in itself. In fact, Plato was ofttimes at a loss to reconcile his beliefs with his experience. It is a significant fact that, in many cases, not finding sufficient rational proof for his belief, he narrated a myth claimed to be symbolic of the truth.

Yet recent thought demands truth that is something more than merely symbolical. Many thinkers nowadays seek argument and proof for their belief to which they can affix a Q. E. D. finding like Plato did, there is much in religion that seemingly cannot be proved by cold reasoning. Something more than a myth is required to explain such doctrines as, for example, the Trinity: there is a perpetual cry for "commonsense" proof and so often it is not found. In failing to reconcile vague religious ideas with what seem the certainties of everyday life, the "man in the street" is led to disparage religious belief in general.

Some even are convinced of the idea that their more religiously

inclined fellows act against the dictates of intellect, and refusing what their mind logically implies, blindly follow ideas socially accepted. Though often derided, are they not regarded with an element of envy? Surely this is because deep down in mortal hearts there is a craving for something in which to place belief. Certain sceptics may lay claim to the fact that they rejoice in believing nothing, yet how often is this due to their having in early days put belief in something that has betrayed or failed them! How ofen does it appear that the sweet milk of belief has been soured by a stormy crossing over life's turbulent seas!

The majority of modern psychologists would deny that belief is an instinct, yet admit that in every man lies an inborn tendency towards it. This is patent from infancy upwards: in fact "make-believe" is surely one of childhood's most popular games. From earliest days there is a continual seeking for objects of belief.

Man, then, by nature is prone to accept belief blindly. Afterwards, a little more seasoned by experience he sets out on the same quest as Plato, to distinguish belief from "reasoned knowledge," and fails. Then the question comes as to how much he is to believe of what he cannot prove by experience or logical argument. But one point will probably strike him before this. It is, why does belief seem to stand aloof from and irreconcilable with "rational knowledge?" An obvious answer suggests itself to this; the realm of belief stands just halfway between the domains of logic and psychology. Every belief has its logical and also its psychological aspect. These two have to fit together in some way, for neither logic or psychology have sheltered belief wholly. Thus belief, to quote Dr. F. C. S. Schiller, has fallen a prey to theology and become annexed purely to religious terminology instead of being used in a better, broader sense.

The whole root of the question, however, lies in what is the ultimate nature of "rational knowledge." To the plain man it would stand merely on merit of its name, but epistemology sheds a different light on the general prospect. It denies the "rational knowledge" our ancestors would have accepted that a flower is blue because one sees it so, that a table exists because it is tangible. What was proved for them is not necessarily proved today. A great revolution of thought has come about and even the "rational" proofs of logic and mathematics are not left unchallenged; many

are asking afresh whether there is such a thing as definite and fixed knowledge at all!

Thus we see that the distinction between knowing and believing in a thing is not so very marked. This is largely because "rational knowledge," such as we find in logic and mathematics is based upon fixed postulates, in other words, on assumption, whence it proceeds abstractedly from what is postulated.

This form of abstract reason surely is liable to arrive at absurd and incredible results. To take a familiar case of schoolboy days. If a man papers a room in one hour, sixty men will do so in a minute. Unfortunately the defects of human nature and the limited character of space render this impossible, yet it is mathematically sound. It is claimed that two plus two can lead to one result only, yet do, for example two caterpillars plus two systems of tariff reform make four? Four what? Also what do two plus two drops of water make?—one drop. If religion is abstract surely science is too! There would seem, in fact, to be little certainty at all. Certainty, then, is not absolute, it possesses various degrees of probability. Three types of certainty may be roughly picked out, they are not wholly distinct yet will serve for general, normal purposes.

First, there is "commonsense" certainty, a very valuable *guide* in life, yet nothing more. It is "commonsense" to suppose if winter comes spring cannot be far behind. In other words, one relies on what has happened before to take place again, following the outcome of experience; a necessary step in a great deal that we do. It is sometimes surprising to realize how much of life is carried on under the assumption that as things have been, so they will be. Were it not possible to assume this ofttimes one would indeed be much at a loss! Most branches of mathematical certainty would probably fall under this heading; it is a "commonsense" truth that two and two make four.

Next comes "intuitive" certainty, i.e. what is known *within* to be certain. One may feel "intuitively" certain that one exists yet if called upon absolutely to prove that existence, some very formidable barriers would be found in the way, and it is improbable that a final proof could be given that would satisfy modern philosophy. Yet one feels "intuitively" certain of a conscience at work within directing towards what is felt sure to be right, but which could

hardly be proved so. This is probably because "right" is not a thing in itself, it is relative to what is accepted good. The human conscience, though one of the greatest gifts bestowed upon man, surely is not a divine oracle; sometimes it is corrupted and gives a perverted answer. Does not a conscience owe its growth to what is customarily considered right and wrong in the social life of its possessor? A South Sea islander would, it appears, feel little, if any, pangs of conscience at eating his fellow—such has been the custom of his fathers and his father's fathers. Yet a white man might feel conscience-stricken at drowning a kitten! Thus one is led to assume that even the dictates of conscience are largely of a social nature: they often direct aright yet deserve not to be called by any means absolute.

The third certainty is "moral." One may feel quite certain, for example, in allowing a close friend to manage one's money matters. Yet this does not rise much beyond the level of "commonsense" and "intuitive" certainty.

To return to the original question:—how is belief reconcilable with rational certainty? The varying types of certainty have been examined and found based on certain inabsolute yet accepted postulates. In other words, the bases of belief and rationality have been placed on a similar level. Does it not seem that it is impracticable to draw a hard and fast line between belief and certainty, for certainty needs a basis of belief before it becomes such—the two are part and parcel of one another? Such is the position so far assumed.

In this light, therefore, surely religious belief has as much right to demand postulates as has mathematics and "rational knowledge." It remains to find the essential postulate of religion. It lies in a world-wide phenomenon which may be found in the fact that every form of worship postulates some sort of a sympathy between the cosmic order and man's destiny. Should it be objected here that certain oriental religions postulate the utter wretchedness and generally abject nature of existence, it is an accepted belief that some respite will be granted in the end; the deity will be compassionate at some time and alleviate his distressed worshippers. Although the Buddhist looks upon life as a state of misery one of his most assured convictions is that of a Nirvana: there is an ultimate element of sympathy between creator and created.

Christianity, from a different viewpoint, regards that sympathy to be of the present—God is forever compassionate. Dr. W. R. Matthews, the Dean of King's College, says that the Christian faith in the phrase "God so loved the world . . . . ." speaks of God, the world and the relation between them; the quest of philosophy put in a nutshell. Thus Christianity and Buddhism, the West and the East, meet in agreement that the great postulate of religion is sympathy. This element is found, too, even in the most savage and primitive religions of the world that regard the deity as a hostile being to be propitiated, it is the fact that attempts *are* made to propitiate him that shows there is an expectance of mercy, of ultimate sympathy. Sympathy may not be characteristic, yet it lies within "The all powerful."

The Christian postulate of religion has just been mentioned: Christianity by saying God is love gives the clearest form of this universal belief. It is incredible that in his heart of hearts a man can claim an absolute misfit between value and reality, to do this would be to stultify the whole of human life and work: the amazing creation is not a meaningless mockery. This is the essential belief of religion that claims as much right to her postulates as science has to her axioms; and there is, incidentally, no insurmountable barrier between the postulated and the axiomatic, indeed Dr. Schiller supports this by claiming axioms are but successfully established postulates.

Religious belief is but a portion of the whole field of belief, and it is unfortunate that this latter should so frequently have attached a theological connotation. Familiar and recognized sequences in natural phenomena are known by reason of "common-sense," but as soon as one passes beyond the evidence of the senses the world of "hypothesis" is entered. Religious belief is thus dubbed "hypothetical" yet surely it is not more so than other forms of belief.

Science, for example, thrives upon beliefs. Probability is "the guide of life"; this is illustrated well by the continual biological variations, by these the developments of nature have been made possible. Natural organisms of the present times are the result of countless years of development occasioned largely by gradual variation: the modern horse, for example, is known to be descended from an animal some three feet high. The theories of Darwin,

despite continual criticism, seem to remain for the most part undeniable; more recent discovery strengthens rather than questions their truth. Man, whether or no he be stamped by God in His own image, is the outcome of thousands of years of development. Mendel, the secluded monk in his monastic garden, has brought the world to see that variation is an essential factor in the course of the existence of every living organism.

Hypotheses, experiments and beliefs seem as essential to the progress of nature as to religious thought, for nature puts things forward "in trust" that they will adapt themselves to environment and flourish. A creeper gradually sends out its climbing tendrils to explore the way, for example, up the side of a house entirely "on trust" that they will find root. To continue the parallel, religious belief is in like manner ever climbing and clinging "in trust" to God to find a fixed resting place for the soul. Nature develops herself by experiment and hypothesis, likewise does man in the course of his religious development, in the process of coming into closer knowledge or fellowship with God. It is not a matter of accepting dogmas or fixed creeds, but a yearning of the soul towards the truth: some indeed may claim to have attained that truth, yet even after that there still remains a never ending state of experimentation to perfection.

To sum up the position taken: Science has her axioms and postulates, which though not absolute, are justly applicable. So has religion, which claims as much a right to them as does science and "rational knowledge." Religion demands some sympathy between creator and created, whilst the fellowship between the two is a gradual and experimental process of development according to natural lines. The phenomena of the religious experience *do* harmonize with other phenomena; so often they are regarded as being entirely exceptional, not as reconcilable with the rest of human life.

Religion, says one modern writer, can claim, in common with the sciences, the right first to describe its own particular sets of phenomena, secondly to set out what they implicate, and finally to examine the validity of the postulates relied upon, for the nature of belief as connected with the religious experience concurs with that of other phenomena.

II.

There are many who entirely disavow the accepted religious beliefs and, along with Herbert Spencer, sarcastically call religion "a hypothesis supposed to render the universe comprehensible." As has been said, it is not infrequently thought that the religiously minded are consciously and purposely blinding their eyes to fact in their endeavor to find an unfindable why and wherefore for "the way things act," to put it in the words of Byron, "sapping a solemn creed with solemn sneer." A certain school of thought forbids the looking upon religious belief as the normal and very natural process of deepening one's fellowship with, and knowledge of, the divine. Rather does it "look for a sign," or something unnatural, for men of today do not very greatly differ from their brethren of two thousand years ago, whilst those who are still expectant one day of entering a city of gold resounding with the music of harps would seem to forget Him who said, "The Kingdom of Heaven is within you."

Religious belief is essentially natural, can and should be gradually developed according to the believer's mind, is not separate from the rest of human experience. In other words it should not be isolated and kept in a realm apart, though Schleiermacher claims for religion "an independent domain over and above metaphysics and ethics." Whether it be an instinct or no, religious belief is natural to man who feels his need for the divine in the same way as for the many other necessities of life. This is strengthened by the fact that there is not a tribe in the world entirely void of some sort of religious beliefs: they may be there in a very crude form yet are certainly present in some way. How it comes about is a subject of much dispute: Wundt, for example, expresses the view that an ideal existence is the original source of religious feeling, all ideas are religious that refer to the ideal. Though this holds good in much it can hardly be claimed conclusive for all. Hegel identified religion with philosophy whilst David Hume discovers its origin "not from a contemplation of the works of nature, but from a concern with regard to the events of life and from the incessant hopes and fears which actuate the human mind."

Differing as these theories may be there is underlying them a gradual and natural realization of the divine. It is true that no reference has so far been made to the religions that embody magic

and the supernormal. Where religion begins and magic ends is not a clear cut line, yet in this essay the viewpoint of Martineau has been adopted distinguishing religion as "the belief in an ever living God, that is, a divine mind and will ruling the universe and holding moral relation with mankind. It is the word "moral" that is the great "differentia" of religion as we understand it, and distinguishes it from magic and witchcraft. Moreover, the aim of religion is to deepen that moral relation, and this deepening is a gradual, normal process.

Belief in God has not unsuitably been likened to deep trust placed in a friend. One may put utter trust in that friend on the very first day of acquaintance, and utter belief in God the first time He is realized, yet just as in friendship, the divine fellowship broadens as the years roll by, growing more perfect and complete. True religious belief, then, is a gradual, slow yet sure strengthening of one's fellowship with God, its essence lies here rather than in tenets and creeds, dogmas and fixed phrases, as sceptics are often led to think. The Christian church, especially today is much misunderstood with regard to its beliefs. Its object is not to lay down the law "you must believe this, you must do that"—rather does it seek to lead men to a clearer knowledge of God through Jesus Christ, or to quote its aim in the words of the title of a famous work of theology, "Through Christ to God." Naturally, the church according to its varied branches and denominations has different ways of expressing this belief. Sceptics are apt to lay hands on these differing ways, find one or another of them irreconcilable with their own viewpoint, and reject the whole because of the part. Any belief that savours of dogma is dropped upon and often a far more dogmatical proclamation is made against the validity of an accepted truth, for, as Dr. Schiller has remarked, all disbelief is really belief in something else.

Yet few would deny that the really genuine sceptic (there are indeed very few of them!) really plays quite a valuable part in the progress of religious belief. It is he who helps to keep alive that necessary spirit of inquiry preventing the all too common tendency to take things for granted. There are doubtless still such people as the now famous peasant, who, when questioned as to his creed, replied, "I believe what the Holy Church believes." "But what does the Holy Church believe?" he was asked. "How am I

to know?" said he, "but I expect the priest could tell you." One cannot feel wholly devoid of sympathy for the man who is sceptical of such things as this, and it can be well argued that nowadays there can be found no sufficient reason why positive belief should be considered meritorious simply because it *is* positive whilst disbelief is wicked merely because of its negativeness.

Those strongly convicted of their belief would sometimes damn the "doubter" as lost, yet as one well known Oxford philosopher writes, "to know when to doubt and when to believe, when to deliberate and when to act, may make all the difference between sanity and insanity, success and failure in life." It is in this realm that truth is discovered and discriminated from error and from it are fully tested truths brought into the field of belief whilst proven errors are transported to that of disbelief. It is not always patent that the way to truth is often found through mistakes, not through "uncontradicted affirmatives." This was realized even by very ancient philosophy; the doctrine of Heraclitus was that truth owed its source to conflict, whilst, as Pythagoras wrote, "Of everything two views may be taken."

The main issue of this little essay is that true knowledge of God is a natural experimental development, progressing much in the same way as other form of knowledge or science. Yet many have taken the view that religion is the very "last word" in finality and absoluteness, and therefore, incidentally, unprogressive. This is how religion and science are so often seemingly set in opposition against one another. Science is restlessly progressive, shrinking from the conception of any truth as unalterably absolute, there is a constant process of revision and reconstruction of beliefs to keep in touch with the changes of reality.

The truths of science and religion, however, though kindred in many respects cannot be regarded in exactly the same light. We may believe in a "tenet" of a science because it has been sufficiently proved, yet, as William James so aptly puts it, there is indeed a right to adopt a believing attitude in religious matters in spite of the fact that our merely logical intellect may not have been "coerced." Now the necessary postulate in every form of study is that reality is knowable and truth is attainable and real. Religious belief regards God as the ground of reality and claims that that reality can be known, whilst a reality that responds to the approach

of our reason may also respond to other human values: if it does not there is no guarantee that our reason is not a mere will-o'-the-wisp forever doomed to excavate errors and deem them to be truths.

The study of religion claims that God *is* knowable. Yet religious belief should not be based solely on facts to the exclusion of all unproved beliefs. James fails to agree with Clifford when he over-cautiously proclaims belief to be desecrated when given to unproved and unquestioned statements "for the solace of the believer" who protects the purity of his belief "with a very fanaticism of jealous care."

Whether one adopts an empiricist or an absolutist view of taking the truth is a minor point. What is vitally essential is the actual attainment thereof, and a far lesser point is whether we infallibly recognize it when it is attained. One school of empiricist philosophy sets out the duty of a thinker as to know the truth and to avoid error. Yet errors are surely not such terrible things after all! James pleads for a lightheartedness that will not grow heavy if a slip occurs, a willing spirit towards belief. To those who would say it is better to go devoid of belief rather than to believe a single lie would reply that this merely shews "a preponderant private fear of being a dupe." Generals do not advise their soldiers that it is better to keep out of battle forever than to risk a single wound.

No, there is a call for action, for taking our life, our belief, into our own hands. Belief is measured by action and the whole defence of Christian faith revolves upon it; we must take a leap no matter whether it even be into the dark. "We stand on a mountain pass," Fitz James Stephen wrote, "in the midst of whirling snow and blinding mist, through which we get glimpses now and then of paths which may be deceptive. If we stand still we shall be frozen to death. If we take the wrong road we shall be dashed to pieces. We do not certainly know whether there is any right one. What must we do? 'Be strong and of a good courage.' Act for the best, hope for the best and take what comes. . . . . If death ends all, we cannot meet death better."

SELF-GOVERNMENT IN RELIGION

BY M. E. ROBINSON

SO many lives of unselfish devotion have derived their force and beauty from the traditional religions, especially, perhaps, the Jewish and the Christian, that one hesitates to plead for a fresh presentation of the old religious truths. These, however, can hardly be accepted, in their present form, by many of the learners in the self-governing schools, because they are often supported by arguments which would convince only those who rely on authority without observing and thinking for themselves.

For example, Dr. Gore defends divine "justice" which used "cruel and monstrous tyrannies" as instruments of chastisement and then destroyed them for this compliance; maintains that, in the Scriptures, "unconstrained naturalness of narrative is more convincing than scrupulous accuracy:" and states that God, "perfect in righteousness," made Himself known to man largely through the "true" Hebrew prophets—true according to their own showing and their contempt of their rivals—whose message consisted, the unlearned reader finds, in angry self-assertions and particularized threatenings of hideous devastations and massacres, with a general command, here and there, to do justly and love mercy. These writers were acutely conscious of God as a person, distinct from themselves, issuing their denunciations, of the divinity of which this conviction, for Dr. Gore, is evidence enough.

This great apologist confesses that his religious beliefs are native predispositions, and that he allows science to modify them only up to the point beyond which he feels that his innermost self would be "quenched or blinded." He thus reveals the reason why religious and political thinking promotes enmities and favouritisms—why, for instance, the ruling classes in England do not regard the Government as cruel and incompetent for letting the miners well-nigh perish; and why the late Mr. A. C. Benson, as a child, would

pass a Nonconformist chapel with a thrill of horror. By the mistaking of principles and convictions for facts lamentable consequences are, today, being wrought; e.g., the division of all the great churches into quarreling sects, and the fighting of Jews against Arabs in Palestine.

Such hatreds are due to deep impressions made in babyhood. A very indulgent mother may turn a child into a Roman Catholic, who needs protective influences, or, by reaction, into a blatant atheist or Protestant, or a quietly independent Quaker; just as a stern father whom he admires may bring him up to be a power-loving Lutheran, like the Germans who wanted to subject all the world to their discipline.

All the religions, in fact, particularly those which claim divine sanction for belief and conduct, have produced both weak and strong, ugly and beautiful characters; and most of them, now, embody ideas of authority and obedience, punishment and reward, which have long been abandoned in criminology and education. Dr. Relton, representing the Anglican Church, threatens unbelievers with the loss of personal immortality, and, as if to give a psychological appearance to this warning, suggests that their personalities may be disintegrated after death, and the fragments cast on "a spiritual dust-heap" and worked up into new souls.

Would not self-disciplined learners regard this doctrine as an insult? Having been placed in circumstances that suit their character and abilities, but offer difficulties enough to give them only a hero's chance of reaching the appointed goal, they have won not prizes, as the result of bribery or competition with others, but the triumph of having arrived at a standard to which their own self-respect has urged them. They do not what they are told by God, king, parent or teacher, but the right they have themselves discovered after making experiments and mistakes. Therefore the work is stimulating sport, and the master a friend and referee, not an angry, commanding, punishing tyrant.

The child of the age will, in time, create a world

> "Where the will rages not with fever to destroy
> Differing wills, or warp another's life to its use,
> But each lives in the light of its own joy."

Those who would assist him in this constructive work must base their religion not on creeds and ceremonies, but on kindnesses,

understandings and imaginations. Knowing that belief on demand is impossible, they must leave the child free to form his beliefs according to his own experience and poetic power. They must therefore put splendid examples before him in the shape of great works of art, and employ stories instead of sermons to drive morals home. The story constitutes a valuable discipline, because it is a challenge to the listener's own intelligence to side with the noble and against the ignoble characters; whereas the sermon carries with it a criticism of him which, deep in his mind, often creates resentment and rebellion. Moreover the preacher may, unwittingly, take an unfair advantage of the congregation because his personality hypnotizes them and paralyzes their judgment. On the other hand, the personality of the story-teller is lost in the story. For the time being he is the story.

The religious helper of the modern child, adult and adolescent must, further, bring out heroism and the power to take responsibility and reject enervating doctrines—that, for example, disease can be removed by pure thought or prayer; that pardon cancels ill deeds; that Christ will come again to tell His people exactly what to do, as their parents did when they were children, or as, in the war, the commander did on the field and the doctor and nurses at the hospital: or that sin is a debt which can be paid by the sacrifice of an innocent saviour. The victim pays, and so does the offender, in the long run, by the degradation of his character and the hatred of others; and nothing will remove the stain or right the wrong but rebuilding the character and confessing the sin to the sufferer and, as far as possible, making amends to him.

To make such reparation transgressors will sometimes need the aid of a pastor who will interpret their relation to the injured ones. He should be a specialist in the study of human nature and social organization, and, like the psychologists at the clinics for child guidance, ought to be so interested in and sympathetic for individuals, that he will make no trouble of studying their mental and physical make-up and all their history if he cannot, otherwise, help them to understand themselves, their companions and their circumstances.

The need for personal guidance and enlightenment may be gauged by the popularity of spiritualistic mediums, advice columns in the newspapers, bureaus for would-be suicides, and similar work-

ers and institutions. And indeed the duties of life are perplexing and numerous enough to overburden even the strongest man or woman acting alone. They consist in doing one's work well, fulfilling one's family obligations, and being just and generous to all the world.

We do not know who made the universe or gave us power to explore it. We only know that it is magnificent beyond our loftiest imaginations, a vast and beautiful inheritance that we can think of and use, at once deeply humble and exultantly proud, only with reverence, joy and gratitude. We are living in a world which is at least fifty million years old and has illimitable resources. That signs and wonders are necessary to declare the glory of the spirit or spirits who wrought so stupendous a creation is a pitiful misconception. Never have these left themselves without witness; and so great and beneficent is their power that no man need fear to trust himself to them, even in death, which, probably, is not a solution of personal continuity, but a fulfilment of our best selves.

It is true that we must bear the burdens and cure the diseases of humanity unaided; but it is only by meeting these responsibilities with courage and faith that we achieve what Professor Abercrombie calls "the first of all virtues, the virtue of personal existence which is wrought in the white heat of man's essential vigor, that vigor by which he is himself against the world." For this creational work secondhand experience will not serve. Probably it is the impulse to evade the difficulties of "this present" which has led so many people to borrow bizarre foreign religions, like the English Buddhism and Mazdaznanism of today, and the Judaism which has made British folk sing "Jerusalem my happy home" without a sense of strangeness, or think of heaven as a glittering city, not, according to their natural inclination, as a place of woods, fields and gardens.[1] On the authentic testimony of our own eyes and ears, honestly accepted and checked by the testimonies of contemporaries, we shall see visions more splendid than documents and excavations have revealed; and they will give rise to finer benevolences. Have we not "a cloud of witnesses" of "the things that are more excellent?" What scripture has equalled the majesty of M. Adrien Le Corbeau's *The Forest Giant,* the simple kindness of Mr. David Grayson's *Adventures in Friendship,* or the noble catholicity of Mr. Ralph Hodgson's *The Song of Honor?* There

[1]See, *Studies in Arcady,* by Norman Gale.

scores of painters, musicians and writers whose works, like these, are so human that mortals deem them to be divine. They and their work are imperfect, but such as they have they will give us if we will only take.

The people at large need a laymen's religion which would make systematic use of the gifts of present-day artists; promote the patience, charity and serenity which are waning with the decline of Christian culture; perpetuate the noble respect of Jesus for suffering and failure; maintain the joyful dependence on others that is so much more gracious than the hard self-sufficiency of the non-religious: and bring about the prayerful tranquillity in which, maybe, communion is established between human creatures and higher, discarnate beings of many orders.

As it would never be an end, but always a means, the new church —or school of personality, or social art and science association— ought to have a minimum of organization; and it should provide facilities for pursuits which, like those of the Boy Scouts, would in themselves be a discipline, willingly undergone, for an ideal, without external authority, and thus would help the members toward self-realization.

The following scheme is presented in the hope that it will draw criticism and attract workers who will co-operate in realizing it.

SUNDAY PROGRAMME

The services, held on a Sunday afternoon or evening, would consist in stories—mainly biographies, but also fairy and folk tales, narratives belonging to world history, nature stories, etc.—told by a gifted and well-trained story-teller. There would also be readings of poetry and essays, as often as possible by the authors themselves; music of both the past and the present; a familiar hymn or two: and a few minutes of silence.

WEEKDAY PROGRAMME

The pastor would be versed in applied psychology, in order that, as father—or mother—confessor, he—or she—could help enquirers to make the best of themselves, and to overcome faults which prevented them from being happy, successful and useful to others.

He ought, also, to give lessons on home life and hygiene to parents, adolescents and betrothed men and women, and help children to choose their vocation; and he might lecture on demography, the

mental causes of war, the origin of hatreds and similar themes.

There would be many activities which would enable the members to act up, without self-consciousness or self-righteousness, to the visions that were shown them on the Sundays. For instance, there might be a gardening club; a nursing sisterhood; an ideal-homes exhibition committee: a Bible-study group; a prayer circle, a series of seances: a drama troupe; a book-and-picture society; a choral association; a musical appreciation company; a literature class, and so on.

As much as possible the leaders of the church associations would use existing institutions rather than establish new ones. For example, it is to be hoped that they would persuade the whole congregation to join Peace and Health societies; and that they would take advantage of the evening institutes in the neighborhood for learning any sciences, arts and industries which they wished to master in order to help themselves and the others.

The church would, indeed, be like a large family the members of which were always promoting one another's prosperity—but not at the expense of outsiders—and cultivating each other's personality. Each would be expected to bring the characteristic gifts of the rest into use, and not to demand self-sacrifice of anyone.

The works of the church would, in fact, be neither "charities" nor, for the most part, mere amusements like dancing and whist drives; but well-conceived, educative enterprises of the nature, to some extent, of social experiments. On the Montessori and Dalton principle they would be initiated and maintained almost entirely by the members, not by the organizer or the pastor; and would show that good people need not be sentimental and merely harmless, and are not necessarily inferior to the makers of evil conspiracies in patience and endurance, energy and imagination, intelligence and *esprit de corps*.

LAO TSE AND LAOISM

BY H. G. CREEL

THE school of thought which is usually designated as "Philosophic Taoism" is referred to in this study as Laoism, for reasons stated in Chapter III. Of all the nuances of ancient Chinese thought, it is the one best calculated to catch the attention of the Occidental philosopher. A detailed study of this philosophy, by itself, is fascinating. The present purpose is, however, to orient it with regard to ancient Chinese thought as a whole.

From this point of view, Laoism is of the greatest interest. The central thesis of this system[257] is easily grasped. We have seen that the position of Confucius was that the universe is naturally good, but that for some reason it has been perverted from that state. His technique for restoring the original perfection is to find the rules by which men acted in the "Golden Age," and then to apply them as closely as "common sense" and "humanity" would allow. This certainly has a logical appeal; Lao Tse used the same premise to draw an equally logical, but very different, conclusion. If the world has within itself this natural tendency to perfection, then why tamper with it? asked Lao Tse. Instead of trying to find a set of rules to apply, should we not rather abstain from applying any rules at all, and merely let the natural perfection assert itself? Is not any attempt artificially to regulate the universe a movement away from the better to the worse?

As expounded by their defenders, these philosophies are equally logical. But men everywhere have seldom, if ever, espoused a philosophy *solely* because of its appeal to reason. This is always

[257] From this point on the word "system" is much more properly to be used, for the thinkers we now treat had to construct their ideas so as to withstand the most constant criticism from every hand.

a factor, but men's philosophies are primarily rational bases which justify them in doing that which they wish to do; they are formulas for solving practical situations (however impractical those situations may seem to us) and allowing action to proceed along a line which promises satisfactions. Islam, Christian Protestantism, "absolute idealism," "pragmatism," the belief in immortality, "neo-humanism," and in fact, every religious and philosophical belief has arisen because of a practical situation which demanded it or something like it. This is by no means to say that all or any one of them has been a mere "rationalization" in the derogatory sense of the term; it is only to apply to the history of thought the modern insight concerning the secondary and instrumental nature of intellect. We may not, then, believe that Laoism came into existence merely because it was "logical." We must look for the situation which brought this one, of many possible "logical" philosophies, into existence.

We shall consider briefly three theories of its origin, that of Wieger, that of Wilhelm, and one which has not, to my knowledge, been previously advanced.

Wieger declares that Laoism shows an "indentité complète" with the Indian philosophy of the *Upanishads*.[257a] In China, Laoism, he says, is an evident innovation. Further, he declares that Chinese critics, beginning with the bibliographic index of the former Han dynasty (202 B. C.—8 A. D.) are unanimous in declaring that Laoism did not grow out of China's past, but was elaborated by the custodians of national *and foreign* records. Wieger believes, then, that Lao Tse, who was a keeper of the archives, got his philosophy from a document which at least reflected Indian thought.

The position merits thorough study, and lacking this may not be utterly rejected nor dogmatically accepted. But certain weaknesses are evident. In the first place, Wieger himself dates the earliest *Upanishads* from the eighth and the seventh centuries B. C., [258] a scant one hundred fifty years before Lao Tse (570-490 B. C.) flourished in China. This must certainly have been a remarkably rapid case of diffusion. In the second place, scrutiny of Fr. Wieger's own account of the *Upanishads* fails to show that "complete identity" which he alleges. To be sure, there is something like that flying through the air which was one of the accom-

[257a] Wieger, *Taoisme* p. 9.

[258] Wieger, *Bouddhisme Chinois* (hereafter cited as *Bouddhisme*) p. 40.

plishments of the Taoist genii;[259] there is breath control; there is the concept of Brahman which shows some resemblances to one aspect of the *tao*. But all of these may well be what Goldenweiser calls "convergences," similarities traceable to like conditions of origin rather than to diffusion. Further, certain cardinal principles of Laoism, such as *yin-yang* duality, are utterly foreign to the *Upanishads*. But the chief reason for believing Laoism to be a Chinese rather than a Hindu product is that it can be traced as a natural development out of the Chinese past. Wieger's Chinese testimony on this point, while important, can not be admitted to be infallible.

Wilhelm agrees with the position that the fundamental postulate of cosmic harmony as the normal state is common to Confucius and to Lao Tse. He believes, however, that Lao Tse obtained the idea from the *Yi King*, or *Book of Changes*,[260] and that it was he who gave the idea to Confucius.[260a]

In the first place, Lao Tse must certainly have possessed unusually keen powers of penetration to obtain his ideas from this source. In the second place, if the reader is not by this time convinced that the idea of the cosmic *tao*, the universal harmony, was in existence long before Confucius, and had a prominent place in Chinese tradition and in the documents of which the *Shu* and the *Shi* were composed, then it is impossible to convince him here.

The explanation of Lao Tse to be put forward in this study lies along very different lines. He was only one example of a type of men who had appeared in China, from time to time, long before his day. Education in China, from ancient times until very recently, has meant, almost entirely, education for governmental office. The ambition, even of peasant families, has been to produce a member who would fill such a place. But offices were limited. The result has been a great over-supply of men trained only to govern, able to do little else, but "out of work." Chinese literature is filled with their laments. Their ranks were swelled with men discharged because they had offended their superiors and others who had resigned as a protest against the manner in which affairs were conducted. This was occurring at least two centuries before Lao

[259] *Ibid.*, p. 42.

[260] This, one of the classics, is usually interpreted as a book of divination, but has also been explained in a bewildering variety of other ways. It is an enigma. See Legge's preface, vol. XVI, *Sacred Books of the East*.

[260a] Wilhelm, *Lao-tse und der Taoismus*, p. 56.

Tse.[261] The only proper and dignified course for such a scholar was to retire from the world, and to live a life bordering on that of a recluse, if he did not, in fact (as many did), become a veritable hermit.

Here we have all of the conditions for the rise of a new philosophy. The old philosophy of Sinism depended on the exercise of the technique of government, but that door was closed to these men. Could they admit themselves of no value in the world? Certainly not, if they were men! They *had* to rationalize their position. Several such rationalizations occur in the *Classics.* It is related that after Confucius had resigned his position in Lu, while he was travelling in search of another place, one of his disciples accosted a man working in a field, asking directions. The old man countered by asking who he was. Then he said:

"Disorder, like a swelling flood, spreads over the whole empire, and who is he that will change it *for you?* Than follow one who merely withdraws from this one and that one, had you not better follow those who have withdrawn from the world altogether?" *With this* he fell to covering up the seed. . . [262]

Here is an embryonic philosophy performing a function similar to that of Lao Tse's system. But the example cited, and the others which occur in the *Classics,* are merely expressions of resignation, which leave the individual, after all, admitting failure and impotence. But it was the glory of Lao Tse to have the supreme intellectual daring to turn this debit into an asset. He had the genius to declare not only that inaction was the only proper course for the disappointed man, but that it was the only proper course for every person whatsoever—indeed, the recluse, apparently impotent, was actually the most effective man in the empire. Though seemingly obscure, the man living in retirement was really the greatest and most important man in the world. It must certainly be admitted that he accomplished a magnificent stroke when he succeeded, not merely in conceiving so novel an idea, but in actually causing it, eventually, to be accepted by a very considerable portion of the Chinese world.

Of course, the matter was not stated so plainly as it is here set forth. It was developed, in true philosophical style, through a long and most intricate train of hypotheses. But certain passages of the *Tao Tê King* reveal Lao Tse's purpose of self-justification to have been central in his thinking. It will be recalled that he was keeper

[261] *Cf. Shi* p. 324-25; p. 229. *An.* 18,5-6-7-8-9-10; 14,39.

[262] *An.* 18,6,3.

of the imperial archives. This was a position which gave him little, if any, opportunity to have a hand in the control of affairs. He was, however, a man of the keenest intellect, deeply concerned, as we know, with the evils of his day, and especially abhorrent of the wars of extermination which were going on between the Chinese themselves at the time. His impotence to alter the situation must have hurt him keenly. Finally, according to tradition, he decided that the only thing for him to do was to leave the world altogether. As he was on his way to retirement, he was asked to write down his wisdom as a heritage to the world. He wrote the *Tao Tê King.*

In this book he tells us that the Sages of old (of whom he considers himself a modern representative) were subtle, abstruse, and profound to a degree which language is powerless to describe.[263] Those who follow the way which Lao Tse prescribes are always successful, even if they seem otherwise.[264] To know oneself able to accomplish anything, but to hold oneself down to an inferior place, voluntarily to seem, indeed, the least important being in the empire—this proves that one really preserves within himself the primary virtue of the totality of the universe.[265]

Very few, Lao Tse declares, recognize his worth, and few understand him. Therein lies his glory. He is mistreated because he is a sage, and misunderstood by the rabble who can not see through his unpolished manner to the precious stones which fill his bosom.[266] Other passages could be cited, but these will be sufficient evidence for anyone familiar with the psychological concepts of the "defense mechanism" and "compensation." Yet, while we may be convinced that Lao Tse received the first impulse to his system from such a source, that is no reason for undervaluing his philosophy. This psychological motive does not negate the intellectual brilliance with which he worked out his ideas, nor does it lessen their importance in Chinese history. Lao Tse is supremely significant for the reason that his thinking, in many ways antagonistic to traditional thought, broke up the rigid hold of the *old* Sinism on the intellectuals, and made possible a rethinking of problems which had been considered settled for all time. This led directly to many of the most important developments in Chinese thought.

[263] *Tao Tê King* (hereafter *T.T.K.*) 15. My treatment of this work is based chiefly on Wieger's translation in his *Taoisme.*

[264] *Ibid.* 23.

[265] *Ibid.* 28.

[266] *Ibid.* 70.

Lao Tse's chief concept was that of the *tao,* a familiar word which now has its meaning expanded somewhat. According to ancient Chinese ideas, all things were composed of *yin* and *yang.* When one pondered on the origin of things, what was more natural than to postulate a single source from which these two came? This is what Lao Tse did.[267] He called this primeval existence "the *tao.*" From this single substance, all things emanated. Yet they are still in contact with it, and, indeed, projections of it, like the tributaries of a river.[268] Within this emanation there are centers of particular importance, such as certain powerful stars, mountains, etc. These are to be considered good if they are in proper relation to the whole, bad if out of harmony with it.[269] This, it will be noted, differs little in its fundamental thought patterns from that philosophy of Sinism which we constructed without reference to Lao Tse.

But the concept of "the *tao,*" as used by Lao Tse, has been adjudged an innovation in Chinese thought, something that must have come from the outside. We have seen that the idea of "the *tao*" or "the *tao* of Heaven," as a cosmically sanctioned plan of action, dates far back of Lao Tse. Further, there are places in the *Classics* where this concept seems already to be treated as if it were a substance.[270] But what was the Chinese idea of substance? Have we not seen that the very "material" "five elements" were more nearly localizations of action-patterns than anything which the West would call "substance."[270a]

Furthermore, the character *hsing,* "element," means "to walk, to move," and *tao* is literally a road or a path. In Watters' *Essays on the Chinese Language,* p. 155, he says, "In this sense (meaning "a highway") *tao* is sometimes replaced by *hsing.*" An archaic form of the character *tao* was composed of *hsing* and another character (*Cf. ibid,* p. 153). Do not these ideas fit well together? Was not Lao Tse following the main stream of Chinese thought when he considered the *tao* to be the source from which the *yang* and the *yin,* the five *hsing,* and all other things had sprung?

It is probable that Lao Tse's profession as keeper of the archives had a strong influence on his conception of the *tao.* He had charge of the books of divination, and it was part of his duty to record

267 Granet, *Religion,* p. 143.
268 *T.T.K., 32.*
269 Wieger, *Taoisme,* p. 10.
270 *Shu,* p. 261.
270a *Cf. Men.* 4(2),25-26; *Shu* pp. 70-71.

natural and celestial phenomena of any unusual character. It has been suggested by Prof. A. E. Haydon that this would inevitably have caused the processes of the cosmos to assume, in his thinking, an importance even greater than that which they possessed for every Chinese thinker. For Confucius, the statesman, the *tao* was, of course, primarily a political entity. For Lao Tse, the student of natural phenomena and divination, it was in the very nature of the case a cosmic concept.

This *tao* is described by a series of paradoxes. Doing nothing it accomplishes everything; without consciousness, it is the seat of the highest intelligence; exercising no forethought whatsoever, it governs all things. Much ingenuity has been, in my judgment, misused by some Western scholars who try to read into Lao Tse's words bits of abstruse profundity which never occurred to the Sage himself. Much of the *Tao Tê King* is so involved as to be scarcely translatable. We need not judge a philosopher to be wise in direct proportion to the degree in which he is impossible to understand.[271] The fact is that Lao Tse, in many places, deals with matter of which he himself (as he admits) has no clear conception.[272] It is a weakness, rather than a strength, in a philosophy, that its ultimate statement is a paradox; but the fatal fascination of the paradox for many minds is well known.

The first object of Lao Tse, as has been said, was to win distinction for the man who had renounced the world. He was to conform himself entirely to the *tao,* imitating it in every way.[273] By this action, he appropriated to himself the prestige, the greatness, and the glory of the very source and being of the universe. Thus to imitate the *tao* would have meant, according to Lao Tse's own logic, to do nothing (*wu wei* 無爲). But every man who advocates a return to the natural demands for himself the right to define the "state of nature." Lao Tse's program for "doing nothing" is an exacting one. One must have few interests and few desires; he must shun luxury; he must be guided by charity, simplicity, humility; he must be equally benevolent to the good and to the bad, and must trust the insincere as implicitly as he trusts those who have proved faithful.[274] One must wish for nothing, for then

[271] *Cf.* Wilhelm, *op. cit.,* p. 53.
[272] *T.T.K.* 54.
[273] *T.T.K.* 54.
[274] *T.T.K.* 19; 53; 67; 8; 49.

he will not be disappointed; he must strive for nothing, for then all things will spontaneously come to him.[275] (I suggest in passing that this idea, that self-abasement is the road to fame and neglect of profit is the road to riches, may be traceable in part to what Granet has indicated as the "potlatch" idea in China,[276] and to that idea if "reciprocity" as a cosmic and ethical necessity, which pervades old Sinism).[277]

Lao Tse sets himself in absolute opposition to Confucius' recommendation that the person seeking understanding should study; study, he asserts, is worse than a waste of time, for it multiplies harmful notions. The proper way is to meditate on the *tao*.[278] This Laoist meditation may have been a genuine mystic trance, although this has not been proved, and is certainly not clear on the basis of the *Tao Tê King*.

It is evident that the techniques of Lao Tse and of Confucius were very different. The similarity of their basic metaphysic has been obscured as a result of the opposition of their practical teachings. The disciples of the two men were constantly at war, if only with words. Even in the *Tao Tê King* and in the *Analects* we find barbed shafts which, though they did not name each other, Confucius and Lao Tse certainly intended to exchange. Lao Tse declares that virtue and righteousness, filial piety and paternal affection (all dear to the heart of Confucius), were never heard of until after the world had fallen into disorder; the way to regain that natural harmony which is the only hope of the world is to dispense with all of these artificial, and therefore vain, attempts to win felicity.[279] The Confucian politician, Lao Tse says, deems himself the born master and the professional saviour of all things.[280] Confucius returns his fire no less shrewdly.[281]

On the other hand, the similarity of the two philosophies stands out in bold relief when we take up Lao Tse's technique for political control. To be sure, his dictum to "empty the minds and fill the stomachs, enfeeble the initiative and strengthen the backs" of men,

[275] *T.T.K.* 7; 9; 13; 15.
[276] Granet, *Danses*, p. 135, pp. 583-85.
[277] *An.* 15,23; *Li Ki* (in *S.B.E.*) p. 65.
[278] *T.T.K.* 48; 1.
[279] *Ibid.* 18; 19.
[280] *Ibid.* 27.
[281] *An.* 9,26; 14,46; 15,30; 17,1,2; 17,22; 17,8,3. *Cf.* also *The Doctrine of the Mean*, 11,1; 13,1.

and to keep the people in "ignorance and apathy"[282] conflicts with Confucius. In similar opposition stands his statement that the (Laoist) sage is not beneficent to the people whom he governs, but treats them as mere pawns, since the sage must imitate destiny, and destiny shows not the slightest regard for human concerns.[283] This last is a heroic bit of philosophizing which seems to have been thrown in "for good measure," since it stands in direct contradiction to other portions of the document.[284]

Lao Tse gives several formulas for government in various chapters. Let us start with those which seem least like that of Confucius. We are told that the empire is an extremely delicate mechanism, with which one has no business to meddle. The emperor and his ministers and assistants in the government were not put in their places to interfere; their duty is to meditate on the *tao*.[285] The Laoist sage must occupy no position in the government save that of chief of all the officers, exercising a general supervision over them all but not bothering about any details.[286] This supports my hypothesis that Lao Tse's aim was rather to exalt the members of a very small group, than to save men in general, since the number who could occupy such a position was strictly limited. In his position as chief of the officers, the sage is to allow all beings to function according to their nature, without restraint, *except* that he is to repress such harmful excesses as power, wealth, and ambition![287]

But the *reductio ad absurdum* comes when Lao Tse tells us, in Chapter 80, what he would do "if he were king." He would be very careful indeed to keep capable men out of office (since they would try to use their intelligence, and spoil things). He would prevent his subjects from travelling, and make them so afraid of accidents and death that they would not dare set foot on a boat, nor even mount a carriage. He would forbid all use of arms. He would force them to give up all learning, to forget how to write, and to return to the ancient system of knotting cords for what few records they wished to keep. He would sever all communications, so that while his people could hear the crowing of the

[282] *T.T.K.* 3; 65.
[283] *Ibid.* 5.
[284] *Ibid.* 8; 49; 60; 67.
[285] *Ibid.* 29; 2; 62.
[286] *Ibid.* 28.
[287] *Ibid.* 29.

cocks and the barking of the dogs of neighboring villages, they would die without knowing anything more about them. Thus he would make them healthy, agreeable, and peaceful. The chief difference between the avowed regulation of Confucius, and the policy of allowing utter freedom which Lao Tse preached, is that the latter eventuates in a much more rigid despotism. The practical meaning of Lao Tse's commandment to "do nothing" (contrary to nature) is identical with that of Confucius' maxim "Follow the *tao* of Heaven."

It is fruitless to attempt to account for Chapter 80 of the *Tao Tê King*, just outlined, as the outcome of any system of metaphysics. It is the result, rather, of the complete disgust with the civilization of his day, and the great abhorrence of war and bloodshed, which Lao Tse had come to acquire. Similarly, it was not his metaphysics primarily, but his fear of death and his desire to live, which account for the techniques for great prolongation of life which we find elaborated even in Lao Tse's own writing. This is the background of the Laoist *hsien* (geni or "immortal") concept, and the Laoist alchemy which were elaborated in great detail in later books, and soon came to occupy the center of the stage in connection with the Laoist doctrines. But these things are peripheral to Sinism, and we must come back to the main line.

As a final statement, let it be said that the difference between Confucius and Lao Tse was not chiefly one of world-view, nor even, if we look closely, of technique;[288] the difference was, rather, that Confucius was, first of all, a practical statesman seeking to save the world, while Lao Tse was a disheartened philosopher, despairing of the world and fleeing from it, yet driven by the imperative necessity of vindicating the worth of his own personality; in the process of rehabilitating the latter, he achieved a technique for overcoming his despair of the world.

Yang Chu was a personal disciple of Lao Tse. Wilhelm[289] opines that he did not understand the Sage very well. On the contrary, I think he understood the logical outcome of Lao Tse's position better than did Lao Tse himself. If the universe was a mechanism so ordered as best to run itself without interference, then why bother with it in any way? And if the thing to do was to be natural, then why not satisfy one's desires, and live as happily as possible,

[288] Compare *T.T.K.* 17; *An.* 13,6; *Men.* 7(1),5.

[289] *Op. cit.*, p. 103.

without regret? Yang Chu is usually described as a fatalist, an "Epicurean," and an egoist.[290] He has been represented more harshly than justly by some writers to whom these points of view are scandalous.

The life of Chuang Tse, the most famous of Lao Tse's successors as champion of Laoism, is little known, probably because of his deliberate and successful attempt to live in that obscurity which the Master had preached. An amusing story is related concerning the reply which he gave to emissaries sent to ask him to become a minister at the court of the king of Ch'ou. They found him fishing, and when they had delivered their message, he replied, without turning his head: "I have heard that there is, at your court, a tortoise, sacrificed three thousand years ago, and used for divination. Do you think that tortoise would prefer to be at the court, or to be here, wagging his tail in the mud?" The emissaries said that, of course, he would prefer to be waggling his tail in the mud. "So would I," replied Chuang Tse.[291]

Himself apparently a younger contemporary of Mencius, Chuang Tse devoted himself to the task of expanding and systematising the philosophy of the *Tao Tê King,* and to refuting the teachings of the members of the Confucian school. He did this with great keenness, and a wealth of clever anecdote. He expressed the greatest admiration for Confucius himself, whom he held to have been converted to Laoism in his sixtieth year. This story seems highly dubious, but it was a master stroke on Chuang Tse's part, whether or not he executed it with conscious guile. Chuang Tse is credited with having performed for Laoism the same service of wide dissemination which Mencius did for the teachings of Confucius.

Lieh Tse is the name given to a book of Laoist writings, of importance and size second only to that bearing the name of Chuang Tse. Lieh Tse has also been considered to be the name of an early Laoist, whom Wieger believes was born in the latter half of the fifth century B. C. The existence of such a figure is in very great doubt, however, and a prevalent opinion is that the name was used to cover a compilation of Laoist writings of various dates, some of them early. Wilhelm says that the redaction of the book can not be placed earlier than the fourth century A.D.[292] It will be

[290] The sources for Yang Chu are *Lieh Tse,* chaps. 6-7 (see Wieger's *Taoisme,* v. II), and *Men.* 3(2),9; 7(1),26; 7(2),26.

[291] *Chuang Tse,* Chap. 17 (see Wieger, *Taoisme,* v. II, p. 347).

[292] Wilhelm, *op. cit.,* pp. 102-3.

noted that Buddhism had been in China, at that time, for more than two centuries. Wilhelm says:

> Charakteristisch ist, dass in Form von Gleichnissen manche Geschichten erzählt werden, die z.T. ins Wunderbare spielen und die Kraft einer auf Vereinheitlichung gerichteten Yoga-praxis zeigen sollen.[293]

We are now in position to return to the consideration of Wieger's contention that Laoism must have resulted from a knowledge by Lao Tse of the philosophy of the Indian *Upanishads*. But in his reconstruction of early Laoism, Wieger has used both *Lieh Tse* and *Chuang Tse* along with, and on the same basis as the writings of Lao Tse. On this basis, he makes a picture which does, indeed, show great similarities to India. I am willing to admit that some Indian influences *might* have reached Chuang Tse, and, on Wilhelm's dating of *Lieh Tse,* it is certain that that book must have been influenced by Indian thought, and especially Buddhism. But the problem of Laoism is fundamentally a problem of origin, and must be solved on the basis of Lao Tse. He does not show any clear signs of Indian influence; his thought is a logical development of old Sinism. Laoism must, therefore, be considered a development, chiefly and probably entirely, of indigenous Chinese thought.

[293] *Ibid.* p. 103.

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    That skies are blue, and stars are bright
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    The fruitful earth at restful night.

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    Of woman's love and treasured pain,
That nature holds in lawful scorn
    Presumed infraction of her reign.

It is my faith, Infinity
    Its secret old must hold untaught,
That star dust's sacred mystery
    Lies fathomless to human thought.

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

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THE RELIGIOUS EVOLUTION OF TOLSTOY

BY J. V. NASH

WHILE the echoes of the Tolstoy centenary of 1928 still linger in the air, it is a timely moment to compare, or rather contrast, the religious evolution of the great Russian seer with that of his illustrious English contemporary, Charles Darwin; for these two thinkers stand out today as the ones who most profoundly, in their day, impressed world thought; the one from the standpoint of physical science, the other from that of social science and religion.

The study will be interesting for another reason. In my article, "The Religious Evolution of Darwin" (*Open Court,* August, 1928), I pointed out that Darwin is a striking example of the human type described by William James as the "once born," by which he meant those whose outlook upon the world is one of healthy optimism, who are never shaken by emotional crises, and who enjoy, in a spirit of quiet thankfulness, the good things of this life. Tolstoy is an equally typical representative of the "twice born," i.e., those who are torn by an inner conflict, who experience severe emotional disturbance, and who attain equilibrium and interior peace only through a process of "conversion," by which their disharmony is resolved into harmony through the establishment of satisfying relations with God, the universe, or some spiritual power which gives support and purpose to their lives.

In terms of modern advanced psychology, Darwin was an extravert, Tolstoy an introvert.

A preliminary glance at Tolstoy's ancestry will throw light upon the turbulent heredity which formed his background. His ancestor, the first Count Tolstoy, was Peter the Great's ambassador to the

Sublime Porte. He received his title, which he passed on to his descendants, for his service in enticing the Crown Prince, Tsarevich Alexis, back from Italy to Russia, that he might be killed. Leo Tolstoy was this Machiavellian diplomat's great-grandson.

The father of Tolstoy's mother was Prince Volkonsky, who rose to the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army under the notorious Empress Catherine; he was summarily deposed and disgraced for "refusing to marry the niece and mistress of Potemkin, the most powerful of Catherine the Great's favorites."

Leo's father, Count Nicholas Tolstoy, entered the army before he was seventeen, to help resist Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812. Falling into the hands of the enemy, he was taken as a prisoner of war, first to Germany, and later to Paris. Returning home after the peace, he found the family estates heavily encumbered, and his mother—a woman of luxurious tastes—dependent upon him for support. Well wishing friends helped the young man out of his difficulty by arranging a marriage for him with the extremely wealthy but plain featured Princess Mary Volkonsky, several years older than himself. The lady was highly educated, had many accomplishments, and seems to have made a good wife and mother.

The couple had five children: four sons in succession, of whom Leo was the youngest, and then a daughter, Mary, in giving birth to whom the mother died. Leo Tolstoy, born on August 28 (new style, September 9), 1828, was only a year and a half old when his mother died. Naturally, he had no recollection of her, but he idealized her to such an extent in his imagination that, as he tells us, he used to pray to her for guidance amid the temptations of life, and "such prayer always helped me much."

Nicholas, the oldest of the four sons, seems to have been of a highly imaginative nature. When Leo was five, Nicholas informed his three little brothers that he was in possession of a wonderful secret, "by means of which, when disclosed, all men would become happy: there would be no more disease, no trouble, no one would be angry with anybody, all would love one another, and all would become 'Ant-Brothers.'" The little boys organized an "Ant-Brotherhood," cuddling together under chairs and in large boxes. But the great secret was not revealed to them. Nicholas told the neophytes that he had written the secret on a green stick which was buried at the roadside on the edge of a certain ravine.

Leo, in after life, said that he suspected that Nicholas had heard something about the Freemasons, their ideals of human brotherhood and their secret initiatory rites, and also of the Moravian Brothers (the religious sect deriving from John Huss), the Russian word for *ant* being "muravey."

The impression made upon Leo Tolstoy by this playful fiction of Nicholas was so profound that he never outgrew it. His whole life ultimately became centered upon the quest for the secret of the miraculous "green stick," which would banish evil from the world and usher in the millennium. When an old man of over seventy, he wrote:

> "The ideal of Ant-Brothers lovingly clinging to one another, though not under two arm-chairs curtained by shawls, but of all mankind under the wide dome of heaven, has remained the same for me. As I then believed that there existed a little green stick whereon was written the message which could destroy all evil in men and give them universal welfare, so I now believe that such truth exists and will be revealed to men and will give them all it promises."

The family estate where Tolstoy was born was called Yasnaya Polyana, meaning "Bright Glade." It was located about 130 miles south of Moscow, in a pleasantly undulating country, well wooded and with many avenues of lime and birch trees. Tolstoy's extraordinary confidence in himself was no doubt partly due to his family having been for generations the only people of education and authority in a wide territory. The absence of free public discussion in Russia further encouraged a dogmatic attitude toward his own opinions.

Outwardly, Tolstoy's childhood seems to have been happy. As a member of a numerous household, in easy economic circumstances, he had no environmental encouragement to isolation and introspection. Even the game of the Ant-Brothers and the mystification of the green stick would have been treated as fun and quickly forgotten by a child of different temperament. As it was, there were dogs and horses, hunting, and all sorts of outdoor amusements to divert his attention. The result was that, notwithstanding his sensitive spirit, these years of childhood were filled with healthy pleasures that only the most fortunate children are privileged to enjoy.

If there was ever a man who, from a purely selfish point of

view had no reason to rebel against the economic and political *status quo,* which guaranteed him all these good things, it was Tolstoy. Yet such is the unaccountability of human nature, that he was destined to become the deadliest enemy of existing institutions, religious, economic, and political. But this was all hidden in the future, and meanwhile life flowed on happily in "Bright Glade." While still a young child, Tolstoy became a skilled horseman, and horseback riding remained for life a favorite form of exercise.

At the age of thirteen, Leo, with his brothers, went to Kazan, where they entered the university, making their home with an aunt. It is said that the atmosphere of Kazan was not such as would inspire an enthusiasm for learning. Leo Tolstoy registered with the faculty of Oriental Languages; although he made good progress in French and German, he failed in his final examinations at the end of the first year—possibly because of the social distractions in the town—and transferred to the faculty of Law.

Tolstoy at this time was noted for his fine clothes and the care he paid to his personal appearance. A fellow-student speaks of his snobbishness, being driven to his classes by a "fast trotter," while the poorer students went on foot. It appears, too, that he joined a narrow clique of "aristocrats" at the university.

In May, 1847, before he was nineteen, Tolstoy left the university without completing his course or receiving a degree. His failure seems to have caused him deep humiliation; at any rate, after returning to Yasnaya Polyana he compiled a formidable program of subjects for private study.

We get a touch of Benjamin Franklin in the statement of Tolstoy's English biographer, Aylmer Maude, who lived in Russia for many years and knew Tolstoy intimately, that he "was always forming good resolutions and writing them down, but they were never carried out fully, and often not at all." In the same spirit, while at the university, he began the keeping of a diary in which he carefully noted all his derelictions, particularly offenses against the Seventh Commandment, so that he might repent of them and correct them. The truth is that Tolsoy was burdened with a strongly sensual physical nature, which in these years only too often overmastered his powers of resistance.

While at the university, Tolstoy had met an idealistic fellow-student named Dyakov, with whom he formed a close friendship.

The effect of this friendship, he tells us, was "an ecstatic worship of the ideal of virtue, and the conviction that it is man's destiny continually to perfect himself. To put all mankind right and to destroy all human vices and misfortunes appeared a matter that could well be accomplished. It seemed quite easy and simple to put oneself right, to acquire all the virtues, and to be happy."

A pretty large order, as Tolstoy was soon to realize.

This moral enthusiasm was accompanied by a loss of his religious orthodoxy. Years later he wrote:

> "I was baptized and brought up in the Christian Orthodox faith. I was taught it in my childhood and all through my boyhood and youth. But before I left the University, in my second year, at the age of eighteen, I no longer believed anything I had been taught."

It was characteristic of him, however, that although he had become intellectually an Agnostic, his diary reveals that he continued to pray frequently and with earnestness, turning to God for help in time of trouble.

The deepest influence upon Tolstoy at this time seems to have been Rousseau.

> "I read the whole of Rousseau. I was more than enthusiastic about him, I worshipped him. At the age of fifteen I wore a medallion portrait of him next my body, instead of the Orthodox cross. Many of his pages are so akin to me that it seems to me that I must have written them myself."

Having gone to school to Rousseau so assiduously at such an early age, it was perhaps inevitable that Tolstoy should some day turn his world upside down.

Next we find Tolstoy at St. Petersburg—as it then was—arranging to matriculate at the university there in Law. Then he changed his mind and wanted to enter the army to see service in the campaign against the Hungarian rebels, whom Russia was helping Austria suppress. But the balmy breezes of spring altered his plans. "Spring came," he says, "and the charm of country life again drew me back to my estate."

So he settled down at Yasnaya Polyana and, under the tutor-

ship of a convivial companion, a German named Rudolph whom he had picked up in St. Petersburg, he became a skilled pianist. His life during the next three years was a strange alternation of piety and debauchery. Aylmer Maude considers these years "among the wildest and most wasted years of his life." But the point is that he never yielded without reserve to vice. His conscience gave him no peace. The entries in his diary speak on in terms of self-reproach and penitence. In an access of contrition and resolve he drew up schedules of labor and study; but the schedules were neglected. "Gusts of passion again and again swept away his good resolution." In one of his periods of reformation he established a school for the peasant children of the district; at the end of two years, however, he had to close it because of financial embarrassment arising from losses in gambling.

Years later he told a friend that neither drinking nor gambling, nor any other vice, had caused him such a terrific struggle to overcome as did that of lasciviousness. It must not be imagined, however, that in this matter young Tolstoy was any different from the average young Russian aristocrat of that day. Even his aunt, whom he considered "the purest of beings," had amazingly loose views concerning what was allowable to a young man in the matter of his relations with women.

Head over ears in debts contracted at the gambling table, Tolstoy swore off from cards and decided to accompany his brother Nicholas, now an officer of artillery, to the Caucasus.

An interesting illustration of the spiritual *Strum und Drang* through which he was passing is found in the following entry made in his diary on June 11, 1851, during this sojourn in the Caucasus:

> "Yesterday I hardly slept all night. Having posted up my Diary, I prayed to God. It is impossible to convey the sweetness of the feeling I experienced during my prayer. . . . I desired something supreme and good; but what, I cannot express, though I was clearly conscious of what I wanted. I wished to merge into the Universal Being. I asked Him to pardon my crimes; yet no, I did not ask for that, for I felt that if He had given me this blissful moment, He had pardoned me. I asked, and at the same time felt that I had nothing to ask, and that I cannot and do not

know how to ask; I thanked Him, but not with words or thoughts. I combined in one feling both petition and gratitude. Fear quite vanished. I could not have separated any one emotion—faith, hope, or love—from the general feeling. No, this was what I experienced: it was love of God, lofty love, uniting in itself all that is good, excluding all that is bad. How dreadful it was to me to see the trivial and vicious side of life! I could not understand its having any attraction for me. With a pure heart I asked God to receive me into His bosom! I did not feel the flesh. . . . . But no, the carnal, trivial side again asserted itself, and before an hour had passed I almost consciously heard the call of vice, vanity, and the empty side of life. I knew whence that voice came, knew it had ruined my bliss! I struggled against it and yielded to it. I fell asleep thinking of fame and of women; but it was not my fault, I could not help it."

So the conflict goes on, God on one side calling him, and Mephistopheles seductively beckoning on the other. A few days after the entry just quoted, he reflects at some length on suffering and death; then the lure of the flesh seizes him again. The entry concludes:

"How strong I seem to myself to be against all that can happen; how firm in the conviction that one must here expect nothing but death; yet a moment later I am thinking with pleasure of a saddle I have ordered on which I shall ride dressed in a Cossack cloak, and of how I shall carry on with the Cossack girls; and I fall into despair because my left moustache is thinner than my right, and for two hours I straighten it out before the looking-glass."

While he was not technically in the army, but only a sort of gentleman observer, his intrepidity in an expedition against the Tatars so favorable impressed the Commander-in-chief that he urged Leo to secure a military commission. While waiting in Tiflis to pass his examination, he composed his first story, "Childhood," which was sent to the editor of *The Contemporary* at St. Petersburg and promptly accepted.

As a lieutenant in the army Tolstoy saw much action and won

repeated recognition. In his leisure time he wrote more stories, and still further varied his program by falling in love with a charming native girl; but she discouraged his attentions because he did not sufficiently measure up to her "cave man" ideals.

In his diary at this time Tolstoy notes his chief weaknesses as gambling, sensuality, and vanity. Sensuality, as usual, he finds the most deadly of his temptations; "it increases with abstinence and therefore the struggle against it is very difficult. The best way is by labor and occupation."

Meanwhile, the Crimean War broke out. Tolstoy distinguished himself brilliantly in the defense of Sebastopol. Then he yielded again to the lure of gambling, and in the fit of penitence following the debauch he busied himself with the idea of establishing a new religion. He writes in his diary:

> "A conversation about Divinity and Faith has suggested to me a great and stupendous idea, to the realization of which I feel myself capable of devoting my life. This idea is the founding of a new religion corresponding to the present state of mankind: the religion of Christianity, but purged of dogma and mysticism: a practical religion, not promising future bliss but giving bliss on earth. I understand that to accomplish this the conscious labor of generations will be needed. One generation will bequeath the idea to the next, and some day fanaticism or reason will accomplish it. Deliberately to promote the union of mankind by religion—that is the basic thought which, I hope, will dominate me."

But the military campaign drew him back into more practical matters; in the following August he participated in the battle of Chernaya. The great fortress of Sebastopol was now about to fall, and Tolstoy was given the task of clearing two of the bastions before they were abandoned, as well as assembling the reports from the artillery commanders. His military service ended with his dispatch as courier to carry the reports to St. Petersburg.

In St. Petersburg Tolstoy fell in with a circle of literary men and led a Bohemian—indeed a somewhat disreputable—existence. One day the poet Fet, calling on Turgenev, saw a sword hanging in the hall, and a young officer, whose name he learned was Leo

Tolstoy, sprawled out asleep on the sofa in the sitting room. It was then ten o'clock in the morning. "He is like this all the time," Turgenev remarked. "He came back from his Sebastopol battery, put up here, and is going the pace. Sprees, gipsy-girls, and cards all night long—and then he sleeps like a corpse till two o'clock in the afternoon. At first I tried to put the brake on, but now I've given it up and let him do as he likes."

Yet Turgenev saw in Tolstoy even at this early period something more than a dissipated young officer. Some time later, writing from France to a friend in Russia, he said: "I hear that you have become very intimate with Tolstoy. . . . I am very glad. When that new wine has finished fermenting, it will yield a drink fit for the gods!"

Tolstoy, however, managed to keep sober long enough to turn out many stories; and, as usual, we find him bitterly reproaching himself for his many falls from grace. Some years later, in looking back on the hectic days of his youth, he wrote:

> "I cannot think of those years without horror, loathing, and heartache. I killed men in war and challenged men to duels in order to kill them; I lost at cards, consumed the labor of the peasants, sentenced them to punishments, lived loosely and deceived people. Lying, robbery, adultery of all kinds, drunkenness, violence, murder—there was no crime I did not commit, and people approved of my conduct, and my contemporaries considered and consider me to be a comparatively moral man."

All in all, this period seemed to him a "terrible twenty years of coarse dissipation, the service of ambition, vanity, and above all of lust." Probably he exaggerates the picture, in the impetuosity of his penitence, just as Paul in the New Testament excoriates himself as the "chief of sinners." And then Tolstoy characteristically adds, "With all my soul I wished to be good; but I was young, passionate, and alone, completely alone, when I sought goodness."

When nearly thirty, Tolstoy went abroad, staying for a time in Paris, where he was deeply moved by seeing a criminal guillotined. But he was soon back in Russia. After a visit to St. Petersburg, where he found that he had been quickly forgotten, he went on to Moscow, where he lived in a furnished apartment with his only

sister and his brother Nicholas. He became interested in athletics, or rather gymnastics, which were in fashion at the time, and we find him spending much time at the principal gymnasium, performing various feats. Unlike most introverts, Tolstoy was an expert in many forms of physical exercise, such as horseback riding, swimming, and skating.

In 1858 one of his aunts, the Countess Alexandra A. Tolstoy, who was influential at Court, came to Moscow to live; a close bond of sympathy sprang up between them, and this aunt in later years was able to secure for Tolstoy considerable protection from annoyance by the government. In this same year Tolstoy, when out with a hunting party, missed fire at an enormous bear, which knocked him down and bit him savagely in the face before being driven off and killed.

In 1859 Tolstoy, now thirty-one years old, was deeply depressed by his brother's ill health. He wrote in his diary: "The burden of the estate, the burden of bachelor life, and all sorts of doubts and pessimistic feelings agitate my mind."

Another trip abroad was decided upon; in July, 1860, accompanied by his sister, now married, and her children, he left for Berlin. After wandering through Germany, the party joined Nicholas, who had been ordered to the Mediterranean for his health. At Hyères, in September, Nicholas died. Leo, stunned with grief, found himself unable to work or to make plans for the future. He conceived the odd idea of writing a sort of agnostic *Life of Christ*. "At the very time of the funeral," he jotted down in his diary, "the thought occurred to me to write a Materialist Gospel, a Life of Christ as a Materialist."

Writing to a friend concerning the death of Nicholas, he said:

> "Nothing in my life has so impressed me. It is true, as he said, that nothing is worse than death. And when one realizes that *that* is the end of all—then there is nothing worse than life. Why strive or try, since of what was Nicholas Tolstoy nothing remains his?"

Having finally pulled himself together, Tolstoy went to England; he spent six weeks in London, studying English educational methods and visiting the House of Commons, where he heard Palmerston speak. "At that time," as he quaintly expressed it, "I knew

English with my eyes but not with my ears." He was suffering frightfully with the toothache; but he had a prejudice against dentists and never in his life allowed one to tamper with his teeth. A toothache, he declared, always subsided if given time enough; moreover, primitive man had no dentists and got along very well without them.

Stopping in Brussels on his way back to Russia, Tolstoy met Proudhon, the pioneer Socialist, and wrote "Polikushka," one of his best stories. April, 1861, just as the American Civil War was breaking, and a month after Alexander II's liberation of the Russian serfs, found Tolstoy back in the homeland, which he was destined never to leave again during the remaining half century of his life. In his later years it was intimated to him that if he left Russia the government would never allow him to return.

Settling down once more on his estate, he assumed the duties of a local Arbiter of the Peace. He began experimenting in the neighboring schools with the educational principles he had learned while abroad, and started a monthly magazine, *Yasnaya Polyana,* as an organ of his educational work. Tolstoy's own model school greatly astonished visitors. There was no discipline whatever, no memorizing of lessons, and no home work; the children sat wherever they liked, and a generally jolly atmosphere prevailed. "A child or a man," Tolstoy asserted, "is receptive only when he is roused; and therefore to regard a merry spirit in school as an enemy or a hindrance is the crudest of blunders."

On September 23, 1862, Tolstoy married Sophia Andreyevna Behrs, the daughter of Dr. Behrs, a Court physician of German origin. A loyal wife, and a devoted mother to his numerous children, her sound, practical business sense again and again saved Tolstoy's affairs from shipwreck. It was characteristic of Tolstoy that, before his marriage, he handed his private diary to his intended wife for perusal. The contents of it proved a terrible shock to her, but after a night of weeping she assured him of her forgiveness of all that was past. The bride was but eighteen years of age; Tolstoy was thirty-four. Countess Tolstoy never fully shared her distinguished husband's views as a reformer, but for many years she rendered efficient service as his secretary.

The responsibilities of marriage had a stabilizing effect on Tolstoy, and for the next fifteen years he lived happily and busily on

his estate. He suffered somewhat from indigestion, however, as a result of his former riotous living and the hardships of army life. During a period of twenty-six years, the Countess bore thirteen children, eight of whom grew up. Naturally loving children, Tolstoy was an indulgent father, entering joyfully into the children's games and interests. The development of his estate, the raising of live-stock, butter-making, tree-planting, fruit-culture, and even bee-keeping figured among his activities. He found time, too, for diversion as a sportsman. And this was not all.

Within two years after his marriage, Tolstoy began work on the greatest of his novels, *War and Peace,* inspired by the Napoleonic invasion of Russia. The writing of it occupied five years.

The desire for self-improvement seized him with renewed vigor. He became convinced that "without a knowledge of Greek, there is no culture." And so, during the winter of 1870-1, when nearing forty years of age, he began to learn Greek; with so much diligence, that he was soon reading the classical Greek authors without difficulty. An interlude of ill health, spent on an estate which he purchased in the province of Samara, was followed by the compilation of a *Reader* for the school-children, and the writing of his next great novel, *Anna Karenina.*

His affairs prospering, and his literary work received everywhere with acclaim, it might be supposed that Tolstoy should be happy and contented, looking forward to a serene old age in the midst of the delightful family group which was now growing up around him. But just at this time the religious problem began weighing upon his mind as never before; he fell into the depths of melancholy and began brooding over the deep mysteries of life and death. Writing to a literary friend, he said: "It is the first time you have spoken to me about the Deity—God. And I have long been thinking unceasingly about that chief problem. Do not say that one cannot think about it! One not only can, but must! In all ages the best, the real people, have thought about it. And if we cannot think of it as they did, we must find out how to." And he wants to know whether his friend has ever read Pascal's *Pensées.*

In truth, Tolstoy was rapidly approaching the great religious crisis of his life. The mental struggle lasted four years, culminating in 1878, when he was fifty years old. He began attending

church regularly, and closeted himself in his study morning and evening for private prayer. The high spirits for which he had been noted gave way to a deep humility. Considering it sinful to harbor an enmity, he wrote to Turgenev, from whom he had been estranged, begging for forgiveness and reconciliation. He was passing through the pangs of his spiritual rebirth.

On November 8, 1878, his wife wrote to her sister: "His eyes are fixed and strange, he hardly talks at all, has quite ceased to belong to this world, and is positively incapable of thinking about everyday matters."

The next year, when writing his *Confession,* Tolstoy himself described the process of his "conversion."

> "Five years ago something very strange began to happen to me. At first I experienced moments of perplexity and arrest of life, as though I did not know how to live or what to do; and I felt lost and became dejected. These moments of perplexity were always expressed by the questions: 'What is it for? What does it lead to?' . . . These questions began to repeat themselves frequently, and more and more insistently to demand replies. They seemed stupid, simple, childish questions; but as soon as I tried to solve them, I became convinced that they are not childish and stupid, but that they are the most important and deepest of life's questions. . . .
>
> "And I could find no reply at all. My life came to a standstill. . . . Had a fairy come and offered to fulfil my desires, I should not have known what to ask. . . . The truth seemed to be that life was meaningless. I had, as it were, lived, lived, and walked, walked, till I had come to a precipice and saw clearly that there was nothing ahead of me but destruction. It was impossible to stop; impossible to go back, and impossible to close my eyes or avoid seeing that there was nothing ahead but suffering and real death —complete annihilation.
>
> "It had come to this, that I, a healthy, fortunate man, felt I could no longer live: some irresistible power impelled me to rid myself of life one way or other. I cannot say I *wished* to kill myself. The power which drew me away

from life was stronger, fuller and more widespread than any mere wish. . . . And it was then that I, a man favored by fortune, hid a cord from myself lest I should hang myself from the crosspiece of the partition in my room where I undressed alone every evening. . . .

"And all this befell me at a time when all around me I had what is considered complete good fortune. I was not yet fifty; I had a good wife who loved me and whom I loved, good children, and a large estate, which without much effort on my part improved and increased. I was respected by my relations and acquaintances more than at any previous time. I was praised by others, and without much self-deception could consider that my name was famous. And not only was I not insane or mentally unwell, but on the contrary I enjoyed a strength of mind and body such as I have seldom met with among men of my kind: physically I could keep up with the peasants at mowing, and mentally I could work continuously for eight or ten hours without experiencing any ill results from such exertion. . . .

"The question which brought me to the verge of suicide was the simplest of questions present in the soul of every man, from the foolish child to the wisest elder: it was a question without answering which one cannot live, as I had found by experience. It was, What will come of what I am doing today or shall do tomorrow—What will come of my whole life? . . . .

"My position was terrible. I could find nothing along the path of reasonable knowledge, except a denial of life; and in faith I could find nothing but a denial of reason, still more impossible to me than a denial of life.

"Finally I saw that my mistake lay in ever expecting an examination of finite things to supply a meaning to life. The finite has no ultimate meaning apart from the infinite. The two must be linked together before an answer to life's problems can be reached.

"It had only seemed to me that knowledge gave a definite answer—Schopenhauer's answer: that life has no meaning and is an evil. On examining the matter further,

I understood that philosophic knowledge merely asserts that it cannot solve the question, and the solution remains, as far as *it* is concerned, indefinite. And I understood, further, that however unreasonable and monstrous might be the replies given by faith, they had this advantage, that they introduce a relation between the finite and the infinite, without which no reply is possible.

"Faith still remained to me as irrational as it was before, yet I could not but admit that it alone gives mankind a reply to the questions of life: and consequently makes life possible. . . . Faith is the strength of life. If a man lives, he believes in something. If he does not see and recognize the illusory nature of the finite, then he believes in the finite; if he understands the illusory nature of the finite, he must believe in the infinite. Without faith he cannot live. . . .

"What am I?—A part of the infinite. In those few words lies the whole problem.

"I began dimly to understand that in the replies given by faith is stored up the deepest human wisdom.

"I understood this; but it made matters no better for me. I was now ready to accept any faith if only it did not demand of me a direct denial of reason—which would be a falsehood. And I studied Buddhism and Mohammedanism from books and, most of all, I studied Christianity both from books and from living people. . . .

"During that whole year, when I was asking myself almost every moment whether I should not end matters with a noose or a bullet—all that time, beside the course of thought and observation about which I have spoken, my heart was oppressed with a painful feeling which I can only describe as a search for God."

Yet his intellect refused to allow him to believe in the God described in the Church's creeds; on the other hand, he could not live without God. "Not twice or three times, but tens and hundreds of times," he writes, "I reached a condition first of joy and animation, and then of despair and consciousness of the impossibility of living."

At last, the solution burst upon him in a blinding flash of light. The phenomena accompanying his illumination will be familiar to those who have read Bucke's *Cosmic Consciousness.* Tolstoy, in describing the great event, writes:

> "I remember that it was in early spring: I was alone in the wood listening to its sounds. I listened and thought ever of the same thing, as I had constantly done during those last three years. I was again seeking God.
>
> " 'Very well, there is no God,' said I to myself. 'There is no one who is not my imagination but a reality like my whole life. He does not exist, and no miracles can prove his existence, because the miracles would be my perceptions, besides being irrational.' . . .
>
> "But then I turned my gaze upon myself, on what went on within me, and I remembered that I only lived at those times when I believed in God. As it was before, so it was now; I need only be aware of God to live; I need only forget him, or disbelieve in him, and I die. . . 'What more do you seek?' exclaimed a voice within me. 'This is he. He is that without which one cannot live. To know God and to live is one and the same thing. God is life. Live seeking God, and then you will not live without God.' And more than ever before, all within me and around me lit up, and the light did not again abandon me."

Tolstoy had begun to feel a strong kinship with the peasants. They somehow had solved the deep problems of life and death; and, notwithstanding the hardships of their lives, they were happy. He, the cultured aristocrat, held long conversations with these simple souls. Count Keyserling, in his recent book, *Creative Understanding,* remarks that Tolstoy's being driven to communion with illiterate peasants is a striking commentary on the shallowness of "Being" among the Russian upper classes with whom he should have had most in common. And Edward Garnett adds: "By his analysis of the emotional poverty of the life of the privileged classes, who, divorced from the knowledge of actual struggle and real interest in the facts of life, fill up the void with pride, sensuality, and weariness of life, Tolstoy drives the herd of aesthetic impostors and dilettanti before him like sheep."

To be sure, Tolstoy realized the mixture of truth and superstition in the religion of the peasants, but he considered it a lesser evil than the hypocrisy and materialism of the Church rulers. Still, he clung to the Church itself as long as he could. "I attended the services, knelt morning and evening in prayer, fasted and prepared to receive the Eucharist." But most of the service was meaningless to him; he felt that he was acting falsely, and "thereby quite destroying my relation to God and losing all possibility of belief."

It seemed to him that he must choose between Orthodoxy and truth. "Questions of life arose," he said, "which had to be decided; and the decision of these questions by the Church, contrary to the very bases of the belief by which I lived, obliged me at last to own that communion with Orthodoxy was impossible." He thought of the rivalry of the different Christian communions, of the spirit of sectarian hatred denying Christ's rule of love, and of the support which the Russian Church gave to war and militarism. The Russo-Turkish war of 1877 and the execution of youths for political offences at home gave him special food for reflection. "I took note," he tells us, "of all that is done by men who profess Christianity, and I was horrified"; the Church's spokesmen were "all living a lie." He resolved upon a thorough study of theology and of the Bible at first hand. "I must find what is true and what is false, and must disentangle the one from the other."

Meanwhile, as a result of his new experience of God, the whole direction of his life was violently turned about; there was (to borrow the Nietzschean phrase) a complete "transvaluation of all values." Fame, honor, riches, were forgotten forever; in their place he substituted poverty, humility, self-sacrifice, and the service of others. And with the change there came an unspeakable happiness. In May, 1879, he is rejoicing in the beautiful spring and writes to a friend: "It is so long since I enjoyed God's world as I have done this year. One stands open-mouthed, delighting in it and fearing to move lest one should miss anything."

His religious experiences and his investigations in the field of theology and Biblical criticism were set forth in a series of books, which occupied his attention during the next few years: *Confession, A Criticism of Dogmatic Theology, Union and Translation of the Four Gospels,* and *What I Believe,* or *My Religion.*

As preparation for his examination of the Old Testament, Tol-

stoy took lessons in Hebrew from a Moscow rabbi, and mastered the language with such success that he was enabled to read the Hebrew Scriptures and understand the precise meaning of important words and passages. His previous study of Greek enabled him to perform the same operation upon the New Testament.

These laborious studies led him to the conclusion that the dogmas of the Church are based upon misinterpretations, that they are supported by evidence which will not stand the simplest tests of logic, and are defended by arguments that are an insult to human intelligence. Nothing but the authority of the Church, he declared, prevented the exposure of the fraudulence of its theology. The Church itself seemed to him nothing better than "power in the hands of certain men," an obstacle to moral progress and to a right understanding of life and religion.

Many statements in the Bible, he points out, upon the literal interpretation of which is built the superstructure of theology, must now be read in a purely figurative sense. For modern astronomy makes it impossible to believe in a literal heaven above the earth and a literal hell beneath it. So the idea of the Ascension cannot be taken literally, when it is realized that the earth is rapidly revolving on its axis, so that there is no absolute "up" or "down," and only empty space, in freezing cold, outside the earth. It is utter nonsense, Tolstoy insisted, to talk about such dogmas as statements of fact; faith in them, he added, is not a virtue but the vice of credulity. He was a pioneer Modernist.

But along with all this destructive criticism, Tolstoy emphasized more passionately than ever the moral grandeur of the teachings of Jesus. The dogmas of the Church, he believed, had merely the effect of distracting attention from the things which Jesus cared most about—love, pity, repentance, the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man. As H. G. Wells, in our own day, once observed, in a witty epigram: "Repentance is the beginning and essential of the religious life; and organizations, acting through their secretaries and officials, never repent."

Tolstoy went on to point out that Jesus never mentioned Adam or Eve, the Fall of Man, the Holy Trinity, and so on; nor did he assert that he was the Son of God in any other sense than that in which all men may become so, as when he taught the disciples to pray to "Our Father," and again when he said, "I am in my Father,

and ye in me, and I in you." He believed that if mankind would accept the simple teachings of Christ in the gospels, it would revolutionize society.

This naturally led to an exhaustive examination, by Tolstoy, of the teachings of Jesus, divorced from theology and dogmas. He found five great rules. (1) The commandment, "Thou shalt not kill," is not enough; one must not even be angry with one's brother. (2) The commandment, "Thou shalt not commit adultery," is not enough; one must not even be lustful mentally. (3) One must not take any oaths, because it destroys freedom of future action. (4) The old law of "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth" must be replaced by the rule: Resist not him that is evil. (5) "Ye have heard that it was said, Thou shalt love thy neighbor and hate thine enemy; but I say unto you, Love your enemies. . . . that ye may be sons of your Father which is in heaven. . . . Ye therefore shall be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect."

The observance of these rules, without reservation, constituted for Tolstoy the essence of religion. He did not consider it important to make any assertions about the personality of God or the creation of the world; such things might be inherently unknowable, and in any event discussion of them leads only to confusion and conflict. It is only by recognizing a moral order in the universe and adjusting ourselves to it that life can have a real meaning and purpose; this moral order, said Tolstoy, is summarized by the teachings of Jesus, which the churches have obscured with their clouds of metaphysical dogma.

On the one hand, Tolstoy repudiated orthodox religion, and on the other hand the scientific materialism which would explain away the human soul in terms of the flux of atoms.

The Old Testament he considered much like the sacred scriptures of other ancient peoples, in which spiritual and poetic elements of much beauty are mixed with crudeness and immorality. In the New Testament he was antagonistic to the teachings of Paul, whom he considered a politician and opportunist. The words of Jesus were all that really mattered, especially the Sermon on the Mount. Whatever was obscure or contrary to reason, he simply ignored. The miracles he would explain naturalistically where possible, and draw from them whatever moral lessons they might contain. But he held that a miracle such as the feat of walking on wa-

ter had no religious significance. In fact, he dropped the miracles altogether from his own translation of the gospels.

As to immortality, for a long time Tolstoy considered it improbable and took no interest in it; later, however, his sense of oneness with the infinite became so intense that it seemed inconceivable that his spirit should cease with death. Nevertheless, the subject was so baffling that he felt it wise not to dogmatize with reference to the nature of the future life, but rather to look forward to it, whatever it may turn out to be, with confidence. The great thing, meanwhile, was to do everything possible to make this a better world. In spiritism and psychic research he took no interest whatever; he considered such tamperings with so profound a mystery an impertinence.

Tolstoy's conception of religion was purely individualistic—a matter of getting into and keeping in right relations with one's conscience and with God. He believed that if every individual would strive to solve the problem for himself, then all would be well with society as a whole. Similarly, it will be recalled, the laissez-faire school of economists held that if each man were allowed to promote his own welfare in his own way, without hindrance by the government, then the welfare of society would follow automatically. The theory sounded logical, but unfortunately it did not work, and the worst horrors of the industrial system resulted from its application. Tolstoy's disregard of the claims of society was one of the most serious defects of his system.

After having exhausted the study of the Christian Scriptures, Tolstoy passed on to an examination of the sacred books of India and China. This led to a notable broadening of his outlook; he felt that the fundamental spiritual truths are common to all the great religions. And although he insisted to the end of his life on the necessity of a literal application of the teachings of Christ, as he interpreted them, we learn with some astonishment that as time went on he became indifferent to the historicity of Jesus. The principles were more important to him than the man. He seems to have regarded with entire complacency the possibility of its being proved that Jesus never lived. In a letter to a friend, discussing a recent book which took this position, he said:

> "In this book it is very well argued (the probability is as strong *against* as *for*) that Christ never existed. The

> acceptance of this supposition or probability is like the destruction of the last outwork exposed to the enemy's attack, in order that the fortress (the moral teaching of goodness, which flows not from any one source in time or space, but from the whole spiritual life of humanity in its entirety) may remain impregnable."

This letter was written in 1900, when Tolstoy was seventy-two years old. Apparently it marks the culmination of his religious evolution. The very next year he was formally excommunicated by the Russian Orthodox Church, as "a new false teacher." To the edict of excommunication he sent a spirited reply; and with reference to the edict he said to friends who visited him at this time, "I positively decline to accept congratulations!"

The three foundation stones of Tolstoy's religion in its final phase were universal love, the rejection of private property, and non-resistance. He insisted that there must be no compromise in the application of these principles to everyday life. His attempt to give away his own property, including the copyright of his books, involved him in insoluble difficulties, for there was the question of the support of his wife and children to be considered. His wife was successful to some extent in preventing him from completely dissipating his property. This was the root of the painful estrangement which finally parted Tolstoy and his wife and in the end brought unspeakable misery upon them both.

In the matter of non-resistance, even the most devoted of his friends were appalled by his uncompromising attitude. For instance, W. T. Stead once asked him whether he would not use force to prevent a drunken man kicking a child to death. After careful thought, Tolstoy said that even here he could make no exception. Elsewhere he wrote: "A true Christian will always prefer to be killed by a madman, rather than to deprive him of his liberty." He even intimated that the rule should be extended to animals. The most passive Hindu could hardly have gone farther than this.

But Tolstoy honestly was convinced that if he allowed the least compromise with his principles on this subject, it would create a loop-hole through which, eventually, all the horrors of tyrannical government, oppression, war, and militarism would somehow creep back.

Again, paradoxically enough, Tolstoy's exaggerated doctrine of non-resistance was the best weapon that he could have employed for his own self-defense against force. In the eyes of the Czar and his government, Tolstoy was undoubtedly the most dangerous man in Russia. But how could they justify forcible measures against a man whose philosophy of absolute non-resistance acquitted him of even the thought of committing or encouraging any overt act of violence against the government? To have sent Tolstoy to the gallows, to prison, or to Siberia on some trumped-up charge of conspiring against the government would have shocked public opinion throughout the world and would have brought down upon the Russian government a torrent of international protest which even the most callous autocracy did not dare to face. The Czar, when urged to imprison Tolstoy, replied, "I have no intention of making a martyr of him, and bringing universal indignation upon myself." But many of his most important writings were suppressed by the government and had to be smuggled out of Russia for publication.

There were, nevertheless, many inconsistencies in Tolstoy's theories and practices. For instance, he transcended the idea of a personal God, and disapproved of prayer in the sense of petition. Still, he prayed constantly, and admitted that he found himself using a more personal note in his prayers than he could defend philosophically. But he continued the prayers, because he found great help in them—thereby becoming unconsciously a Pragmatist. During one of his last conversations, he said, "I speak of a *personal* God, whom I do not acknowledge, for the sake of convenience of expression." Some time before, he had observed that there are really two Gods: a non-existent God who serves people, and a real God—the Creator of all that is—whom people forget but whom all have to serve.

But inconsistencies never disturbed Tolstoy. He probably would have agreed with Emerson's dictum about inconsistency being "the bugbear that frightens little minds."

Perhaps the most extraordinary of all the apparent paradoxes in Tolstoy's program for the improvement of mankind was his advocacy of celibacy. As already indicated, he was a man of strong animal passions and in his youth he had, according to his own admissions, indulged in much promiscuity. After his marriage, these irregularities ceased, but his virility may be inferred from the fact

that the last of his thirteen children was born when he was sixty years old. For many years he defended the ideal of monogamous marriage. Finally he dumbfounded his friends by coming out as an advocate of absolute celibacy. Some scoffers raised the cry of "sour grapes," suggesting that Tolstoy was now old and feeble and wanted to deny to others what he could no longer enjoy himself. But this was not true; for when on the verge of seventy years, Tolstoy naively admitted that he himself had not succeeded in realizing his ideal of celibacy; but, he remarked, "that is no reason for abandoning the struggle." And he still hoped that God would aid him to attain the goal.

When his friends expostulated with him, in the matter of his advocacy of celibacy as a universal rule, pointing out that such a policy if adopted would depopulate the earth in one generation, Tolstoy calmly replied that he could not help this; that perhaps the ideal could never be widely achieved, but that this was no reason why it should be abandoned as an ideal to be striven for.

Tolstoy's attempt to put his social and economic program into practice alienated many of his friends. And it appeared that, in practice, many of his extreme policies—such as the absolute prohibition of private property of any kind—were unworkable. Tolstoy colonies sprang up, not only in Russia but in England and other countries, which were anything but successful. Count Keyserling says that Tolstoy's own estate became the worst managed in the country.

But Tolstoy had the courage of his convictions and did his best to live according to his principles. He held that each man should "work as much as possible, and content himself with as little as possible." He himself adopted peasant dress and performed heavy manual labor daily on his farms. And he found that this program, instead of detracting from his literary work, made him more efficient in it. The development of his moral principles led to his abandonment of hunting and shooting, but he still found enjoyment in horseback riding and in walking. He became a vigorous champion of temperance; many of his most powerful short stories were written primarily as propaganda to rescue Russia from the curse of drink. In his later years, though it cost him a powerful effort, he gave up the use of tobacco, and even adopted vegetarianism.

During the great Russian famine he saved countless lives through practical relief work on a large scale.

At one time he thought of abandoning home and family and going out into the world as a penniless beggar, taking St. Francis of Assisi as his model. The domestic troubles arising from his anti-property views led him to think seriously, when nearing seventy, of retiring into a place of solitude to spend his last years in meditation upon the Infinite, after the fashion of the Hindu sages. But various hindrances caused him to postpone putting the plan into execution. Meanwhile, in 1899, when he had turned seventy, he published his great novel, *Resurrection.* This book, as Garnett says, "brings into one artistic nucleus and expresses with the most adroit and passionate sincerity all the humanitarian convictions of Tolstoy's gospel of the brotherhood of man."

At last, in the autumn of 1910, when Tolstoy was eighty-two, he became involved in intrigues between certain intimate friends and members of his family over the matter of his will. His health was failing, and the domestic situation grew intolerable. On October 28, 1910, at about five o'clock in the morning, while his wife was still sleeping, Tolstoy stole out of the house, with the assistance of his daughter, Alexandra, and drove away in a carriage, accompanied only by his personal physician, Dr. Makovitsky.

Tolstoy had no definite plan or object in view, except to get away from an impossible environment. He decided, *en route,* to visit his sister Mary, who had become a nun and lived at the Shamardino Convent. After a disagreeable train journey in a third-class coach, involving exposore to cold wind and rain, Tolstoy arrived at the convent in a badly disorganized condition. The next day his daughter joined him, found him a very sick man, and decided to hurry him off to the milder climate of the Caucasus. In the early morning hours the party boarded a train for Rostov-on-Don, where it was planned to secure passports to leave Russia. But at noon Tolstoy was seized with such a desperate illness that the journey had to be broken at the next station, which happened to be a little town called Astapovo, where the station-master placed his house at the disposal of the distinguished invalid.

Tolstoy's wife, finally learning of her husband's whereabouts, hurried to Astapovo; but she was refused admittance to the house until after Tolstoy had lost consciousness. In *Reminiscences of*

Tolstoy, by his son, Count Ilya Tolstoy, there is a pathetic photograph of the Countess Tolstoy peering in at the window of the house which she was not allowed to enter. Count Ilya remarks with some bitterness: "If those who were about my father during the last years of his life had known what they were doing, it may be that things would have turned out differently." And he quotes a relative as saying, with reference to Tolstoy and his wife: "What a terrible misunderstanding! Each was a martyr to love for the other; each suffered without ceasing for the other's sake; and then —this terrible ending! It was as if Fate itself had stepped in with some purpose of its own to fulfil."

Meanwhile, the Archbishop of St. Petersburg, Metropolitan Antonius, sent a telegram urging Tolstoy to repent of his heresies and be reconciled with the Church; but the telegram was not shown to the dying man, for it was remembered that when a similar telegram had been sent to him during a previous illness, he had remarked to his son: "Tell these gentlemen that they should leave me in peace. . . . How is it they do not understand that, even when one is face to face with death, two and two still make four?"

Toward the end he was heard to murmur: "Ah, well! . . . This also is good—All is simple and good—It is good. . . . yes, yes!" And again: "It's time to knock off. . . . All is over!—Here is the end, and it doesn't matter!" The end came at seven minutes past six o'clock on Sunday morning, November 7 (November 20, Western style), 1910.

Instead of dying in solitude, after the manner of the Hindu sages, as he had wished, Tolstoy's life went out in a blaze of publicity, for the dramatic circumstances of his flight had been telegraphed all over the world, and the little town of Astapovo was soon swarming with government officials, police, reporters, photographers, moving picture operators, and curiosity-seekers of all kinds.

Crowds lined the railway as the train bearing his coffin made its way slowly back to Yasnaya Polyana. From the station to the house the coffin was borne by Tolstoy's sons and some faithful peasants. A procession almost a mile long followed, with two choirs singing "Eternal Memory." Without religious service or orations, the body was laid to rest, as he had desired, at the spot where, as a child seventy-five years before, he fancied there lay buried the magic

green stick with the formula which was to make all mankind good and happy.

Tolstoy's productivity was immense, touching practically every phase of human interest. As an artist in the novel, the short story, and the drama, he is one of the greatest glories not only of Russian but of world literature. Even William Dean Howells, the chief literary pundit of America in his day, acknowledges his great debt, as a writer, to Tolstoy's models. Yet Tolstoy never regarded literature from the point of view of "art for art's sake." In *What is Art?* he defends the thesis that the importance of all art lies in the fact that "it lays in the souls of men the rails along which in real life their actions will naturally pass." Back of the artist stood the propagandist; and had Tolstoy not been a genius the propaganda would have ruined the art.

As a religious and social reformer, his influence was mainly that of a powerful dissolvent. No other one man has ever made such a clean sweep of the inherited *status quo;* even Voltaire left many traditional institutions untouched. Nor did Tolstoy himself foresee the lengths to which his work, once started, was to carry him. It was because in Russia the Church was so closely tied up with the State and with social and economic evils of all kinds that, having questioned the validity of the Church's pretensions, Tolstoy was led on step by step, into conflict with the entire socio-political-economic organization. Because of the hideous tyranny of the Russian autocracy, he took up his pen against patriotism and force-supported government of any kind. It was a slow process; had he not lived into extreme old age his evolution could never have reached its final stages.

Within four years after Tolstoy's death, Europe became engulfed in the Great War, in the course of which the Russian throne crashed to the ground, carrying with it the political structure, the church, and the economic system. There is no doubt that Tolstoy would have regarded with utter abhorrence the program of Lenin and his associates, though his own labors probably did more than any other single factor to prepare the stage for the coming of the Bolshevist dictatorship; just as in an earlier day, Jean Jacques Rousseau, the mildest of philosophers, with his democratic and equalitarian ideology unwittingly put in motion forces that led to the Reign of Terror and the coming of the "Man on Horseback."

Yet to-day, in the perspective of more than a century, we see that the French Revolution and the Napoleonic conquests were but brief and transitory episodes, resulting from a peculiar concatenation of circumstances, in the emancipation of Europe from the shackles of medievalism.

The heart of Tolstoy's philosophy was that no good could come from the exercise of force. And in the final statement of his personal creed, Tolstoy, the introvert and religious seer, might have clasped hands with Darwin, the extravert and scientist. For Darwin, popularly regarded as a materialist and the father of the theory that all life is a ruthless struggle for existence, issuing in the survival of the physically fittest, summed up his true personal philosophy by saying, "Fame, honor, pleasure, wealth—all are dirt compared with affection."

So, too, Tolstoy came back always to Love. Visitors remarked that to hear the shaggy-haired, ruggedly masculine patriarch speaking of Love was deeply impressive. When everything was said and done, he believed that Love was all that mattered. He referred to it as "the motive power of life." And he summed up the results of a lifetime of almost fabulous historical research, personal experience, and profound reflection, in the simple words, "God is Love."

PSYCHOLOGICAL CHAOS

BY DR. D. E. PHILLIPS

EVERY now and then some science produces chaos in human thinking. Astronomy upset the old theories of the universe. Bruno bravely died at the stake in Padua, but calmly said to his persecutors, "Light the flames. I foresee that you dread this more than I do." The theory of evolution produced an upheaval in human thinking the echoes of which are still heard in every quarter of the globe. Psychology is the latest science to produce chaos in human thinking. But it differs from other sciences because it effects its own material—its own phenomena. It is as if some chemical discovery should modify all other chemical activity.

It is not my purpose to discuss the present status of psychology as a science. Even a glance at the conflicting theories in psychology spells chaos. But I propose to picture the chaos psychology has produced in certain lines of thinking. It has touched life at its very depths and is forcing us to *unmask ourselves.*

I refer specifically to the psychological chaos produced concerning the *meaning of words.* Slowly but surely the eruption is taking place. Instead of the doctrine of innate ideas by which the human soul was supposed to be miraculously endowed with the meaning of certain fundamental words, psychology now proclaims that *no word ever did or ever will have any meaning that did not come out of human feelings and experiences.* All else is as "sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal." A few fundamental urges, feelings, impulses and instincts are all that are left of the old doctrine of innate ideas. But even these fundamental tendencies cannot be accepted as any indication of objective truth. In short, the meaning of words never dropped down out of heaven, nor was any individual or convention of men authorized to fix and limit the meaning

of words. Words have no absolutely fixed meanings. Especially is this true in the subjective sciences where quality predominates over quantity or where quality is the exclusive basis of judgment.

We are no longer satisfied with science in mathematics, chemistry, physics, astronomy, and biology; but its domain has been extended to literature, art, morals, and religion. Havelock Ellis would have us inject it into love making. Everything must be scientific, even our feelings and ideals. But how can a *quantitative science* be applied to those fields of human experience which depend entirely upon qualitative subjective standards. Certainly science must mean something entirely different when applied to life and conduct. Standards of good and bad, better and worse, justice and injustice, right and wrong, beauty and ugliness, happiness and misery, moral and immoral are found only in the subjective court of appeals—in the desires, needs, and cravings of the human heart, without which nothing, not even life itself, would have value.

Words are only signs of some mental state supposed at least, to be similar in the minds of those using them. But they do not give origin or birth to the mental states. They only limit and make them more specific. Everyone recognizes that these symbols of thoughts and feelings are of two kinds—subjective and objective. But even the objective signs vary in all degrees of indefiniteness. You may say: "Anyone knows what a tree is. I look out of my window and there is a tree, and yonder is another, and another." Yes, but what about the small sprout growing from the root,—only three feet high? Trees are of an indefinite variety of patterns, no two of which are exactly alike. And the meaning we put into the word *tree* always has and always will vary with our experience with trees. Only in the region of *purely quantitative* symbols can words approximate a fixed meaning. The words, *foot, yard, pound, unit of energy, kilowatt, etc.,* are relatively fixed.

In such fields as art, music, literature, morals, and religion we have no objective standards such as the physical sciences have. We can approximate sameness of meaning only in so far as human feelings and experiences are the same. It is in these lines of human activity that psychological chaos is rapidly developing. In the absense of any objective fixed standards, no one can assert his judgment as right and all others as wrong. Ibsen saw this fundamental

psychological fact when he said: "My book is poetry, and if it is not it will be. The conception of poetry in Norway shall be made to conform to the book. *In the world of ideals there is no stability.*"

I hear my readers, trained in the old way of thinking, say: "What nonsense. For what purpose are dictionaries? Do they not tell us the meaning of words?" In answer I say that no one ever did or ever will get the meaning of a word out of a dictionary. What you do is to fill an unknown term with the thoughts, feelings, and experiences of your own life. If not this, you have only two meaningless terms where before you had but one. To learn that X means Y gets you nowhere. But if you learn that X is a symbol for human suffering, you know X just in as far as you have experiences with human suffering.

Let us show further the application of this psychological chaos. Suppose you are asked to pass judgment upon the question: Is suicide ever justifiable? You examine Webster's Dictionary as to the meaning of suicide and learn that "Suicide is the act of taking one's own life voluntarily and intentionally." Still your meaning of suicide is entirely limited by your feelings and ideas concerning the words in which it is defined. Suppose you are quite willing to stand by that definition and we apply it to the experiences of life. Here is a mother and her three children in a boat. To stay in the boat is to lose all. To throw herself overboard is the only chance of saving her children. The deed is done. Did she not "voluntarily and intentionally" take her own life? Did not Mrs. Strass commit suicide when she refused to leave the sinking Titanic and went down with her husband? She might have been walking the streets of New York today and rendering service to many as was her custom. You will not concede that she, or the mother, committed suicide because there is a qualitative element here which prevents your accepting the definition. But when you have conceded this you have abandoned all hope of any fixed objective standard. Every class has its varying conditions. The standard of human values is all absolutely and completely subjective. Every act of human life which we call good or bad and on which we place value exists but a few moments and will never be performed again. Ever afterwards it exists only in the subjective thinking of men. What seems to be its duplication is another act under modified or entirely different conditions.

The physical quantitative sciences are not so limited. An experiment or a discovery in one laboratory may soon be repeated under the same conditions in a thousand others. But suppose you gave a beggar on the street a dollar this evening. Neither you nor anyone else can ever repeat *that act* under the same circumstances. Neither will the reaction ever be the same for you or the beggar. That act modifies all future acts and tomorrow finds you with modified feelings and ideas.

However, even this is not the limit of the psychological chaos which confronts us. Webster's definition of suicide contains the word *voluntarily*. The psychologist and physician proceed to show us that there are an almost unlimited number of factors that make any strictly voluntary act impossible. These are such as the strength of the original impulses and instincts, the circumstances of early life, habits of thought and action, age and physical health, the secretions of the endocrine glands, the presence or absence of conflicting emotions, the great unconscious forces both of mind and body.

Apparently the law, "Thou shalt not steal" is simple and plain enough for anyone and for all time. But when, where, and how was the meaning of the word "steal" determined? Evidently it grew out of the experiences, conditions and feelings of men, and has and will continue to vary with these experiences and conditions. Suppose I am a real estate dealer and offer you a house for $12,000, while you are in turn willing to pay only $10,000. Months later, real estate has greatly depreciated, but you are ignorant of this fact. It is now worth only $6,000. I appeal to you to buy the property. You hesitate and finally say that you will give the $10,000 you at first offered. When I close the bargain have I stolen $4,000 from you, and will I be considered a thief? Not legally, for thousands of such transactions take place daily. But may such a transaction some day be considered stealing? Certainly it may, and ten thousand others.

Public conscience has no objective quantitative basis. It is therefore flexible and may expand or contract—now here, now there. Psychologically, the meaning of the word steal is not and never can be fixed and complete. The chief occupation of Socrates was to bewilder his countrymen by showing them the purely subjective nature of art, morals, and religion.

The gap that now exists—almost a gulf—between the old generation and modern youth is due more to the fact that modern youth has become saturated with the introspective variability of all moral standards than to any other one thing. The new generation realizes as no other generation ever has the shifting sand on which they stand; while the old generation is still clinging to what they think to be solid rock—objective universal standards. No one can understand modern youth until he comprehends how far this psychological conception has spread among them.

"Thou shalt not lie" would seem to be a law about which there could be no difficulty in giving a universal application. Suppose we should ask, as Socrates did, "Is a lie ever justifiable?" To answer yes undermines the law at once. To say no involves the most serious difficulties. Such an answer would be incompatible with any justification of war, for the art of war is mainly one string of deceptions after another. A lie is a qualitative phase of human conduct with no objective standard, and only human feelings and human experiences can put a meaning into the word.

When Socrates received from Thrasymachus the positive answer that a lie is never justifiable, he presented cases such as these "At the battle of Thermopylae did not our officers lie to the soldiers and tell them that the Spartans would be there in three days? They held the pass and we were saved from slavery. Was that all right?" Again, he asked Thrasymachus if a poor widow has saved her money and buried it in the right hand corner of the cellar, and robbers should come and say: "Madam, have you any money in the house?" should she say, "Yes, in the right hand corner of the cellar?" Turning to another phase of the problem he said: "Do you think there is a physician in Athens who tells his patients the truth about themselves?"

What is true of these concepts is also true of the fundamental concepts of all subjective qualitative thinking. Some will ask and have asked if we are going to outgrow the Bible and the Commandments. Certainly, we are not only going to do so, we have long ago done so, in the sense that we have given new meanings to the old laws and formulas.

Herein lies the collapse of the so-called doctrine of the infallibility of the Pope. Suppose he is infallible. He must still com-

municate this wisdom to his hearers or readers through words which must either remain empty words or get their meaning out of experiences of the individual. The same thing is true for those who fall back on the Commandments as having been dropped down from Heaven. There is no way to escape this difficulty except on the absolutely false assumption that words not only have a fixed meaning, but that they mysteriously impose that meaning on the individual.

During the Middle Ages, Logic reigned supreme in human speculations, and the whole fabric which it created rested on the assumption of definite meanings in abstract words. In mathematics where logic deals with exact quantitative measurements all is well, but logic is only a delusion and a snare when the syllogism deals with subjective, qualitative concepts. This has been the chief blunder of theology for two thousand years. Geothe saw this difficulty and in his "Faust" he makes Mephistopheles say to a theological student:

> "To sum up all—to words hold fast—
> For there precisely where ideas fail,
> A word comes opportunely into play.
> Most admirable weapons words are found,
> On words a system we securely ground."

It is shocking to think that for a thousand years the learned world should have labored under the delusion that the meanings of words must be secured by the study of dead languages. No dead language or any foreign language possesses any hidden meanings that may be secured by learning these symbols. Dead languages do not contain the thoughts and feelings of dead people. They are only the signs and symbols they used in thinking and feeling. After long study and by a process of emptying new wine into old bottles we may come to express *our* thoughts and feelings by means of these symbols. In a few cases we may even improve our signs and symbols but the content is still *our thoughts and feelings.*

One of the most useless and even dangerous things psychology can conceive is the effort to discover truth, applicable to our needs, by chasing through dead languages. I once put this question to an advocate of the dead languages. "If I can find twenty-five words the meaning of which you do not know, will you be willing to look up the root meanings and, relying entirely upon such, write an

article for a standard magazine using these words. Yes or no?" He saw the dilemma and said, "No." Even if we could arrive at the thoughts and feelings of the Hebrews or Greeks without corrupting them with *ours,* on what grounds do we assume that they had the truth? Such an assumption carries with it the idea of human degeneration. It is a sorry trade that tends to drag us backward instead of forward. Human conduct and human values have no objective standards—at least none that can so far be discovered. Its maxims and so-called laws depend upon the subjective thoughts and feelings of a people at any one time. Consequently they are qualitative and vary not only with every age but with each thinking, feeling individual. All conduct is coming more and more to be judged as good or bad not only by these general tendencies, but by modified conditions of each individual act.

However, the difficulty is equally in evidence when we turn to the fields of art, music and literature. They all rest upon a subjective basis and belong to the *world of ideals where there is no stability.* The laws of literature and art are simply mental ways of conceiving things; they are subjective and changeable. So long as human intelligence, feelings, and sentiments vary in different individuals, in races, and at different periods of the world's progress, so long shall we be obliged to content ourselves with *approximation to any fixed universal principles.* The more knowledge increases, the more will this psychological chaos spread, and the less will we be hypnotized into formal assent to those who say they know what is best in these fields of art, music, and literature.

Suppose it be a question as to whether Shakespeare's *Hamlet* or Mark Twain's *Mysterious Stranger* is better. Suppose 10,000 people read the two and only 100 vote in favor of *Hamlet.* Suppose these are teachers and students of literature. Shall we not accept their judgment as final? But for whom have they spoken? Only for themselves. How can they speak for the 9900 unless they can bring them to see in *Hamlet* what they think they see in it? But even then must they not know what the *Mysterious Sranger* has meant to these 9900? Remember that "best" in any of these fields has no objective standard. Its value is individual and consists in building up an appreciative sentiment. In other words that piece of music, literature, or art which does not seem to be an extension of

yourself is not suited to you. *It is not best for you and no one can make it best for you by saying that it is best for him.*

The fact that certain pieces of literature have survived is often claimed to be sufficient grounds to pronounce them the *best.* But have we not evidence in other fields that teaching can perpetuate almost anything? Again, it is said that when a great number of the wisest renders a favorable judgment it is safe to accept this judgment as best for the average. Yes, certainly for the average of those who have *similar feelings and ideas.* But that judgment is subjective and cannot be made a universal law. The same is true of all principles of literature and standards of judgment in human conduct.

Certain general lines of development in all these fields of human achievement may be catalogued and formulated. This similarity and approximation arises from the fact that the human mind is so constituted that under similar conditions its manifestations are similar. But these manifestations are, and have only been similar because human feeling and thinking have varied and will continue to vary. Value is qualitative and is fixed by the human heart and its satisfaction. Even this does not establish the objective truth of these general and approximate laws. The so-called *best* may yet remain to be discovered in all these lines of human achievement. In the world of ideals there is no stability and a great genius may arise in any of these arts and overturn most of what we have thought to be eternal.

In spite of its great difficulty and the danger of being called unscientific by the behaviorists I cannot imagine how psychology can avoid dealing with this psychological chaos which it has produced. In the end it will not be a thing to be regretted any more than the temporary chaos produced by the physical sciences. But he who sees the rapid undermining of the old ideals through these psychological principles, readily anticipates the greatest change in human beliefs the world has ever seen. This movement marks the dividing line between the Fundamentalists and Modernists. The chief fortification of Fundamentalism always has been and always will be the tacit assumption of definite meanings in words. Undermine this foundation and the whole structure gradually slides into Modernism. But Modernism is involved in this psychological chaos

and must trust to the use of scientific methods for deliverance in the future.

Psychology must by its very nature deal with both the quantitative and qualitative phases of conduct—with the objective and the subjective. Its methods will vary accordingly. No mere objective description of behavior will ever satisfy the demands of human existence. In fact, the discoveries in the other sciences receive their value and are ranked on the basis of their ability to serve human needs and human desires—all of which are subjective and introspective. The discoveries of the radio and x-ray would never stamp them as *good* or *great*. No fact of the quantitative sciences is ever wonderful until it receives the stamp of the introspective, qualitative, subjective approval as meeting some of the needs and desires of the human heart.

BIRTH-MONTHS OF GENIUS

BY CHARLES KASSEL

I

THE influence of season upon the human embryo, in so far as concerns the mental and moral traits of the after-born individual, is something which appears to have received scant attention at the hands of science. It should readily suggest itself that of the numerous peculiarities of mind and body for which no explanation can be found in the family strain no few might trace back to climatic influence upon the germ. From this quarter also, in some measure at least, may flow the variations in temperament among children of the same parents born and reared under similar conditions, nor is it impossible that the tendencies in mature men and women which lapse so easily into insanity, and lesser psychological and even physical derangements, spring in some part from like causes.

In this department of speculation there is little which can serve as a guide to the student either in theory or experiment. Yet the subject is of manifest importance to humanity. Nor is it without a bearing in other directions. If climate and season leave an impress worthy of consideration it is scarcely to be supposed that this impress would be limited to mankind, so that in animal husbandry, where breeding for intelligence is an object, no less than in the field of human race-culture, where that end is always in view, the influences of climate and season may play no mean parts.

II

As a possible factor in the determination of sex the effect of heat and cold has been considered. Thus, in Geddes and Thomson upon *The Evolution of Sex* it is said: "In the human species Düsing and others have noted that more males are born during the

cold months; and Schlechter has reached the same results from observations upon horses. The temperature of the time not of birth but of sex determination is, however, more important; nor must it be forgotten that temperature may have many indirect and subtle influences."

In its larger aspects the subject has rested equally in conjecture. Weismann, in his work upon *The Germ Plasm* appears to concede an importance to the influence of season. In the discussion of climatic variations in butterflies he takes kindly to the suggestion that such variations may be due to modifications induced by climatic differences, and adds: "In many other animals and plants the influence of temperature and environment may very possibly produce permanent hereditary variations in a similar manner; but it is difficult—in fact almost impossible—to identify such cases with anything like certainty from the observations which have heretofore been made."

Even as late as 1922, when the splendid *Outline of Science,* edited by Professor J. Arthur Thomson, appeared, only the slenderest progress had been made toward a solution of this problem, although its scientific importance is clearly recognized: "If we probe a little deeper"—we quote from volume 2, page 378—"we see the possibility that stimuli of outside changes, e.g., of climate, may saturate through the organism and provoke the complex germ-cells to change. Thus, Professor W. L. Tower subjected potato beetles at a certain stage of their development to very unusual conditions of temperature and humidity. The beetles themselves were not changed, for these hard-shelled creatures do not lend themselves to external modifications. But in a number of cases the offspring of the beetles showed remarkable changes, e.g. in color and markings, and the offspring of these variants did not revert to the grand-parental type. In such a case it looks as if an environmental stimulus penetrating through the body serves as the liberator or stimulus of variability in the germ-cells."

III

The domain which science has thus neglected, the imagination of mankind in all ages has filled with illusions of its own. It is to the gifts of the fays in the birth-hour, coming from the innerland where dwell the lovely shades of things, that we owe the talents and tendencies that make us admired and loved—so we all believed

in our fairy-book days. On the other hand, as we grew older, the larger belief in an astral influence, raining down from the heavens, seized and stirred the imagination. This fancy of an earlier day was once a universally accepted belief, and not only poets such as Chaucer and Shakespeare and Milton, but astronomers such as Kepler and Brahe, and great commanders like Napoleon and Wallenstein, read in the stars the destiny of men and nations. Even yet the horoscope is a popular feature of many journals and magazines, attesting the hold upon our imagination of this inheritance from a vanished age.

Nor is it possible to deny that in the mystical literature of the subject coming down from the ages we are startled, now and then, by analyses of character according to birth-months which, as mere guesses, seem remarkably happy. That the constellations rule our lives can no longer be believed, but that a seasonal influence, wrongly attributed to the stars in the past, may tend to mold character and determine bent of mind, is not thoughtlessly to be flouted. Such a theory might explain much in the apparent predictions of astrology which challenged the respect and even the belief of great minds in the past.

In his *Man of Genius* Lombroso has not disdained to study the influence of season upon creative genius and has elaborately compiled from biography the most productive months for the various orders of talent. "It is evident," he concludes, "that the first warm months distinctly predominate in the creations of genius as well as in organic nature although the question can not be absolutely resolved on account of the scarcity of data as regards both quantity and quality." Lombroso, indeed, pushes his inquiry in directions which verge somewhat toward the subject we have in hand. Dealing with the sensitiveness of men of genius to barometrical conditions, he enumerates geniuses who loved heat and found the richest outflowering of their talents in the same stimulus to which nature so gloriously responds in field and garden, and he submits an interesting table of favorite months for the various orders of genius. The most favorable month for esthetic creations, he tells us, is May; then come September and April, the least favorable being represented by the months of February, October and December. The same may be observed, he adds, with astronomic discoveries, but here April and July predominate, while for physical discoveries,

as for esthetic creations, the months of May, April and September stand first. The advantage, he concludes, belongs to the months of early warmth rather than those of great heat, and in the same way the months of great barometric variation have an advantage over very hot and very cold months.

A study of the birth-months of eminent individuals is by no means the absurd thing it might seem on its face to be. So much has superstition through all history centered about birthdays that it is hard to adjust ourselves to the thought of a sober inquiry upon such a subject. Difficult as such an investigation is, however, and wearisome as may be the task of gathering adequate data, the effort is well worth while. We have only to shift the quest from the influences prevailing at birth to those prevailing at the beginning of life, and at critical periods of the panorama of unfoldment before birth, in order to take the subject out of the realm of fancy and into the realm of science.

"What lies beyond our reach at present, as Driesch has very ably urged," remarks Edmund B. Wilson in his work, *The Cell in Development and Inheritance,* page 432, "is to explain the orderly rhythm of development—the co-ordinating power that guides development to its pre-destined end. We are logically compelled to refer this power to the inherent organization of the germ, but we neither know nor can we even conceive what that organization is . . . . . We know no more how the organization of the germ-cell involves the properties of the adult body than we know how the properties of hydrogen and oxygen involve those of water." Our ignorance is not as abysmal, indeed, as when Wilson wrote, and the process of discovery has given us an inkling of the method nature pursues in accomplishing her great ends, but the ultimate mystery is the same as when the work of Wilson appeared.

IV

In our earlier studies *Fertility and Genius, Genius and Stature, Physiognomy and Genius* and *Hair Color and Genius,* as published in the *Popular Science Monthly* for November, 1907, December, 1910, February, 1911, and September, 1912, *Longevity and Genius* as published in the *Open Court* for December, 1920, and *Heredity and Genius,* as published in the *South Atlantic Quarterly* for April, 1924, we were clearly within the limits of legitimate scientific in-

quiry. The present study, we are persuaded, does not trespass on forbidden ground.

It is true that when the first results of our inquiry appeared in the *Scientific American* for August 2, 1913, the publication marked an entry into what seemed a grotesque field. Other workers had labored with statistical studies of genius but all before appeared to shun a domain resigned to fortune-tellers and mountebanks. Since that time, however, an occasional nod of recognition in eminently respectable quarters has given the subject a standing to which otherwise it could scarcely have aspired.

In *Nature* for July 8, 1922, (Vol. 110, page 40), F. J. Allen of Cambridge, England, has spoken a brief word upon "seasonal incidence in the births of eminent people," while page 218 of the same volume of that scientific journal, under date of February 16, 1922, carries a note upon "birth days in relation to intelligence" from a discussion of the annual incidence of intelligence by Mr. M'Callum Fairgrieve before the Royal Society of Edinburgh.

In order to find, if possible, the causes underlying the production of eminent intellects at certain periods Mr. Allen collected statistics of dates of birth of more than two hundred eminent persons, and an analysis of the dates showed that the greater number were born in the colder months, February being distinctly the most prolific with December next in importance and August and June as the most productive during the warm months, and the author of this communication explains that he could find no correspondence between the distribution of general birth-months and the distribution of births of eminent persons.

It is of course apparent, as Allen clearly recognized, that the statistics of infant mortality may have a decided bearing on the question. The distribution of birth-months for the ordinary population can have no connection with the distribution of birth-months for genius where infant mortality enters as an important factor into the problem. If children born at one season of the year are subject to a high mortality they are forever lost to the ranks of genius, however favorable their heredity or the auspices ruling when their being commenced, while those born in the more favorable seasons live to swell the pages of biographical dictionaries.

Grieve, it appears, in order to determine whether the season of birth bore any relation to intelligence, experimented with 368 boys,

using chiefly the American army tests, supplemented by some of the tests used by Dr. Cyril Burt, and found that the boys born in the late spring were less intelligent than those born about October, and Grieve suggested that a test in other districts would be valuable and that the entire problem is deserving of systematic investigation.

V

The only pretentious study that has yet appeared—so far at least as our search has disclosed—is the discussion by Alleyne Ireland in *Hearst's International* for May, 1925, under the popular title of *The Month of Your Son's Birth.* On the basis of names in the *Hall of Fame for Great Americans* he found the distribution of birth-months as follows: January 5, February 12, March 3, April 7, May 6, June 2, July 6, August 3, September 5, October 4, November 3, December 5. Ireland, it appears, then made use of a list of 10,181 names selected by himself from a dictionary of international biography and by eliminating the mediocre, whose presence among the eminent came merely from royal or official station, he arrived at 2,650 names, analysis of which yielded 382 names for February as against an average of 206 names for each of the other eleven months of the year, with a low point of 149 for June.

Ireland then inquired into the distribution of births for the general population and on the basis of figures dealing with 21,695,646 births in Europe and America determined that February had fewer births than January, March, April, May and September, about the same number as August and October, and more than June, July, October and December.

Setting against the data for the birth-months of genius the "breeding months," or months of the commencement of life, Ireland arrives at April breedings for the January births, May breedings for the February births, and so on, and from the curves plotted in a diagram and published with the article it appears that for most of the year the figures for genius-breedings follow quite closely the general breedings, but between April and May and May and June the general breedings go down 1.4 per cent while genius-breedings go up 55.5 per cent, and between May and June the general breedings go up 8.4 per cent while genius-breedings go down 36.1 per cent.

Ireland, as the immediate result of his compilation, reaches the conclusion that the figures signify nothing and that the large-place of February among the birth-months of genius means no more

than that "May, when all nature renews itself, is the natural breeding-month," so that his "puzzle was no puzzle at all," and that probably mother nature was smiling indulgently upon him as he plodded through his exhaustive figures.

Ireland does not give his authority for the birth-months of the 21,695,646 individuals in Europe and the United States The present writer has found extreme difficulty in getting together dependable data upon the subject. Nor does it appear that Ireland made any effort to classify the birth-months of the general population according to geographical location. His original list, moreover, of the world's distinguished names, aggregating 10,181, and reduced by elimination to 2,650 appears to have been gathered, not by scientific methods, but from his own knowledge merely of history and geography, carrying, as with us all, predilections born of individual taste and reading. Finally, the element of infant mortality, with the differing rates in different seasons and different regions, appears not to have been considered, so far at least as is disclosed by the paper itself.

VI

The first step in a statistical investigation of this character is a catalogue of names assembled by careful methods and sufficiently extensive for use. In our own inquiries we have employed, where practicable, as appears from earlier papers, Dr. J. McKeen Cattell's tables, as published in the *Popular Science Monthly* for February, 1903, comprising the world's thousand most eminent men and women. The painstaking process by which these names were gathered, as described in the same issue of that magazine, is a proof alike of the importance of such a list and of the difficulties that surround its formulation. That no single mind, from its own resources and by subjective methods alone, is adequate to the compilation of such a catalogue becomes more than plain in the light of the discussion by Cattell. It is true that even these tables are the subject of criticism by Havelock Ellis in his magnificent *Study of British Genius,* but in default of any other existing list, world-wide in its scope, we have used Professor Cattell's thousand names in our studies, and the results, as we conceive, sufficiently attest their value and dependability for our purposes.

As affording, therefore, some basis for a study of the influence of season in the pre-natal hour, not only upon the moral and intel-

lectual but upon the physical being of the individual as well, we have investigated the birth-months of the world's thousand most famous men and women, using Professor Cattell's catalogue of names, and the results we have tabulated according to months. Of the thousand individuals the information sought was obtainable as to 431 from the authorities at our command, and of these 45 were born in January, 40 in February, 34 in March, 36 in April, 38 in May, 26 in June, 29 in July, 34 in August, 36 in September, 36 in October, 41 in November and 36 in December.

A marked falling off in number of births is apparent during the months of June and July, with the earlier months showing a higher average than the closing months of the year. Much the same variation, however, would seem to obtain in case of births at large. According to *Mulhall's Dictionary of Statistics,* fourth edition, page 92, the birth-averages by months for Europe, on the basis of a total for the year of 1200, are as follows: January 107, February 107, March 107, April 103, May 99, June 94, July 93, August 95, September 101, October 99, November 97, December 98.

Alleyne Ireland, as we have seen in an earlier portion of this paper, found as the outcome of a laborious investigation that "genius-births" were peculiar to February and so were related to May, the "natural breeding month," thus resolving the seeming mystery of the second month in the year as the favorite month for the appearance of genius. The table we have given, however, based upon the figures of a great statistician, and the results of our own inquiry with Professor Cattell's carefully assembled catalogue of names, shows the justice of the criticism we have ventured to offer against Ireland's methods and his results. The month of May, Ireland's "natural breeding month," makes a poor showing both in Mulhall's figures and ours, occupying, with December, the lowest place in our figures and, except March and April, the lowest place in Mulhall's. It is evident that the larger lists of names which Ireland used were faultily gathered and that he stopped in his inquiry too soon. Our tables and Mulhall's are consistent with each other, though arrived at by different means, and are more nearly in accord with actual human experience. Thus, the low months for the beginning of life in our data and Mulhall's are, as is apparent, March, April and May—the spring season in southern latitudes and when nature begins to awaken even in the more northerly

climes,—while October, November and December are the highest "breeding months" in Mulhall's figures, and October the highest breeding month for genius in our figures, with November among the next highest, and only December falling to a low point in contrast with Mulhall's December.

In our figures and those of Mulhall alike we fail to sense the supposed popularity of Easter through the centuries as the marriage-time. Christmas also, a favorite time, according to tradition, for the nuptial ceremony, leaves its trace rather faintly in Mulhall's list and even less markedly in ours. May, which notwithstanding its place in Ireland's figures as the "natural breeding month," has never been a favorite time for marriages, shows pronouncedly its historic unpopularity for that rite both in our data and Mulhall's. October, however, the after-harvest month, when the agricultural laborer in Europe counts his earnings and thinks of wedded bliss, emerges as the chief breeding month for genius and the general population alike.

The leading birth-months for royalty in Cattell's thousand names are February and September, which may indicate that Whitsuntide and Christmas are often chosen by monarchical houses for the marriage of their sons and daughters, but a larger proportion of births appears in June and July for rulers than for other ranks, betokening, perhaps, a greater independence of the festive seasons for the wedding rite than is true of other classes.

Viewed broadly our studies thus far seem to demonstrate that for genius as a whole there are no favorite birth-months, since the genius of the world seeks much the same month for the beginning of life as the ordinary population. In so far, too, as concerns genius at large, as reflected in Cattell's tables, the factor of infant mortality seems not to count for much, since had the contrary been the case a larger variation would have appeared between the figures for genius in our data and the figures for the ordinary population in Mulhall's. For genius, therefore, distributed over the world and throughout all historic periods, and for the general population of all Europe in our own day, the birth-months would seem to be much the same.

VII

A classification of birth-months in our list, however, by nationality shows startling variations from the general average. The

favorite birth-month, it appears, for American genius is January, with more than twenty-four percent of the total, and with April and May following in order, and February as the fourth highest with something over twelve per cent, the remaining months for Americans being almost negligible. For English genius, on the other hand, according to our tables, October is the striking month, with twelve percent, followed by November and December with something over ten percent, and March, April and February, in the order named, as the next highest. For French genius, as for American genius, January heads the list with something over eleven per cent, followed by September, August, April, May and June. German genius seeks predominantly the month of December, with May, January, February and November next in order, while Italian genius exalts the month of March with more than seventeen per cent, followed by September with fifteen per cent and June and July with over eleven per cent.

In considering these statistics, it is to be recalled that we are dealing with 431 names only out of Cattell's thousand, and due allowance for this circumstance must be made. The accidental factors may make their presence felt in a restricted catalogue of names when the contrary would be the case with a larger number. Sundry aspects of these tables suggest, nonetheless, that though actually based upon something less than half the distinguished personages in Cattell's catalogue the results would not be different if the classification could be extended to the entire list. It is chiefly, in fact, as to the genius of the earliest periods that the birth-months are wanting. As to the genius of more recent times our data is full.

It is worthy of remark that in the case of each nationality dealt with in our figures the high birth-months tend to gather into definite periods, which is precisely what we might expect upon the basis of seasonal incidence and climatic influence. Thus, for American genius the emphasis falls upon the first five months of the year. English genius spans from November to April, French genius selects the period from April to September, except that in the case of French genius, as in the case of American genius, the peak is represented by January, which stands alone in the latter case and apart from the general period of the year favorable for birth-months of French genius. German genius bridges from November to May, Italian genius favors the general period from July to Sep-

tember, with the month of March in that case standing off by itself and supplying the highest figure. With the marked proclivity of birth-months for the varying nationalities to seek special periods of the year we seem to approach the domain of law rather than the region of accident and chance.

A comparison of Mulhall's tables for the birth-months of the ordinary population in Europe, arranged by nationality, with our tables for genius birth-months, shows wide divergencies between the two. Mulhall's averages for birth-months of the general population in Europe, referred to in earlier portions of this paper, do not vary greatly, as we have seen, from the averages for genius at large—excluding America always which is not embraced in Mulhall's figures—and when Mulhall's tables are consulted for birth-months of the general population covering the various nationalities from which his averages are deduced, we find that while the birth-months for the general population in the various countries tend toward a uniform figure throughout the year genius birth-months, by contrast, show pronounced divergencies.

If we may safely rely upon our tables of genius birth-months, as seems true, then by offsetting these tables against Mulhall's tabulations for the general population we see a distinct tendency for genius-births to gather into different periods from the ordinary population. If, for example, we adopt Mulhall's figures for Scotland as serving equally for England, the births for the general population are at low ebb from March to July, with a reduced rate from July to January, and with the lowest point in February, whereas English genius appears to seek its birth-months chiefly in October, November and December, with March following closely, August, September and April next and after February the birth-months for genius falling to their lowest point in January, May, June and July. In the case of France the general population, according to Mulhall, has its favorite birth-months in February and March with January and April next, followed by May, July, August and November, and with December, October and June making up the low points, whereas French genius in our tables haunts February and March for its highest birth-months followed by January and April, with May, July, August, September and November next, and June, October and December least in favor. Germany, according to Mulhall, prefers January, February, March and Septem-

ber as the birth-months for its ordinary population, with the remainder of the year showing lower figures, excluding September, and with June reaching the low point for the year, whereas German genius, in our tables, chooses January, February, March and September as the highest birth-months, with April, May, July, August, October, November and December next, and June showing the lowest point. The ordinary population in Italy is born chiefly in February, with March close after, followed by January and April, the last four months of the year next, succeeded by June and August and with July displaying the lowest number. Italian genius, on the other hand, while selecting March as its highest month, which is likewise one of the higher months for the ordinary population, chooses next the month of September, which is one of the lower months for the ordinary population, followed by June and July, which are among the lowest months for the general population, and succeeded by February, which is the highest month for the ordinary population, after which come the months of May, August and November, then January, and with the lowest months April, October and December, which are fairly good months for the ordinary population.

VIII

In so far as concerns America we have seen that more than 24% of American genius-births in our data gather into the month of January, with April and May following and February ranking as fourth highest with something over 12%, and the remaining months of the year scarcely represented. A comparison of these figures with the general birth-statistics for continental United States is highly interesting and suggestive. Out of a total of 1,878,880 in continental United States, according to *Birth, Still-birth and Infant Mortality Statistics for the Birth-Registration Area of the United States, 1925,* issued by the Census Bureau, 161,145 occurred in January, 151,173 in February, 168,416 in March, 157,320 in April, 160,415 in May, 156,565 in June, 163,638 in July, 162,957 in August, 154,602 in September, 153,870 in October, 143,676 in November, 145,103 in December.

It is plain that the birth-statistics of the general population for continental United States, according to the census report in question, and the birth statistics of the general population of Europe, according to Mulhall, follow divergent lines. The highest month for

continental United States is March, with July and August next in the order named, followed by January and May, and which in turn are succeeded by April, June, September, October and February, in slowly decreasing proportions, and with November and December displaying low figures as marked as the high figure for March. In Mulhall's table for Europe, as we have seen, the first three months of the year are the highest, with April next, followed by September, May, October, December and November, and with June, July and August showing the lowest figures.

Whether the variations in the statistics for the United States and Europe are attributable to accidental factors, springing, for example, from inadequate data employed by Mulhall for his averages, the present writer is unable to determine, the publications of the *International Institute of Statistics* upon the subject not being available for his use, but the close parallel between his own figures for genius-births and Mulhall's figures for the general births in Europe might suggest the accuracy of Mulhall's calculations.

Since the dependability of the data for continental United States as published by the Census Bureau cannot be questioned, and as genius birth-months in the same area according to our data show a wide divergence from those figures, with a remarkable emphasis upon January as the favorite birth-month for American genius, it would follow that American genius seeks the month of April in predominant degree for the beginning of life. This is not far from the month of May—the "natural breeding month" arrived at by Ireland—nor the month of June to which the statistics for continental United States would point as the chief breeding month for the population at large, and indeed the high figures in Mulhall's tables for January, February and March would throw the breeding-months for the general population of Europe into the same general period, leaving the breeding-months for the separate nationalities of Europe to be determined from exact data and set off against the widely varying figures in our tables for European genius.

While the "natural breeding-month" does plainly evidence itself in the computations for American genius and for genius at large and for the general populations likewise of America and Europe, as might have been expected, the significance of the figures for American genius as contrasted with the figures for the general population of continental United States—where alone exhaustive

data is available—is manifest. March, the highest birth-month for the general population, occupies a low place in the table for American genius, and June and July rise to imposing heights as against the unfavorable aspect of those months in the statistics for American genius, as indeed for genius at large.

Whether the large place of January in our tables may be due to the comparatively small number of names for America present in Cattell's lists—thirty-one only—is a question which immediately suggests itself. Conceivably, too, the present day distribution of general birth-months may be different from distributions prevailing during the historic American period, when the leading names in American biography rose to note, or there may be regional variations in distribution, so that the figures for New England, for example, from which so many names in American biography are derived, might be deceptive if these figures differed widely from the figures for the great western areas of the United States, which have only lately begun their contributions to the honor-roll of American names.

As to variations in distribution throughout the American historic period the present writer is without dependable data, but for regional variations in our own day, the census report heretofore mentioned discloses no basis. From table 1, to be found at page 62 of the report in question, it appears that the distribution for states as widely separated as California and Connecticut, with their markedly different climates, follows much the same trend as the figures for the general population in the continental area of the United States.

Assuming no material variation in the distribution of the general birth-months throughout the American historic period, and waiving aside as probably untenable the idea of a regional variation in this country, the discussion as to America narrows down to the inquiry whether the highplace of January for birth-months of genius in America, according to the limited number of names involved in Cattell's list, is an illusion or an actuality.

A list of names for America alone, sufficiently large for study and carefully selected by such methods as Cattell pursued in compiling his thousand names does not exist, so far as the present writer is aware, but inquiry according to chance lists of names, found here and yonder, seems to confirm the large place of that month in the production of American genius. Using, for example,

the names in the *American Statesmen Series,* edited by Jas. T. Morse, Jr., we find the birth-months in those instances to center in January to the extent of one-fourth of the twenty-eight names. Employing *Outline History of English and American Literature,* by Charles F. Johnson, published by *American Book Co.,* in 1900, which the writer happened to come upon in his own library, and tracing out the birth-months of the 32 American literary celebrities dealt with by the author, the names, where the birth-months were given by the *Century Dictionary and Encyclopedia,* fall again, to the extent of one-fourth the number, in the first month of the year.

Who's Who in America, currently used by some workers in this field, is unadapted to our purpose. A little reflection will serve to make clear that only the smallest sprinkling of true genius could possibly be found among the names contained in that dictionary of contemporary biography. If, in Cattell's scientifically selected catalogue of names, published as lately as 1903, and comprehending the genius of the entire world for all time, so small a number of names could be found representative of America, it would be idle to expect more than a very few for a single generation among the twenty-five thousand contained in *Who's Who.* The individuals in that work, for the purpose at any rate of our present inquiry, must be ranked with the ordinary population. That this is true appears from a test of our problem by the names under the first letter of the alphabet in the 1924-5 edition. The 727 names in connection with which the birth-months appeared, are distributed over the calendar as follows: January 55, February 58, March 60, April 71, May 50, June 47, July 70, August 70, September 60, October 70, November 58, December 58. It is apparent that this closely parallels the distribution of birth-months for the ordinary population as disclosed by the report of the Census Bureau to which we have several times referred, and the results are in striking contrast with the results for the shorter lists of specially distinguished personages in American history which we have used.

IX

More than once in this discussion we have had occasion to refer to infant mortality as having a distinct bearing upon our subject and in view of the wide diversity in the seasonal advent of genius among the different nations it becomes important to consider whether the predominance of the varying periods in the calendar of

genius for the several nationalities could be due to an unusual mortality for infants at other seasons.

It is apparent that if the last seven months of the year in America are particularly inimical to infant life, genius-births and general births alike will gather to the first five months, and so our figures would be meaningless. Thus, also, if the portion of the year in England from May to October is especially deadly to infant life we would necessarily have for genius-births the very period we find in our tables. In the case of French genius, upon the same theory, the period of greatest mortality for infants would embrace the portion of the year from October to March, with the exception of January, German births upon that basis would point to the period from June to October as carrying the greatest menace to babyhood, and the figures for Italy would cast a shadow over the period from October to June as the most baneful to the lives of children with the unexpected exception of the month of March.

Exact data as to infant mortality in the various countries with which we are concerned during the several seasons we have found it impossible to obtain. If such statistics are available they are not offered by the sources we have been able to consult. The nearest approach to a dependable table is afforded by Mulhall's *Dictionary of Statistics,* dealing with the influence of season upon the death rate of infants under two years for Holland, Belgium, Nice, Genoa, Naples and Palermo in one group, and deaths under thirty days for another group consisting of Austria, Belgium, France, Florence, and other countries and localities, the irregular character of these statistics attesting the difficulty which must have confronted the author of the work in gathering the information required for his purposes. Reduced to percentages as regards the first group the mortality under two years was .234 for spring, .268 for summer, .231 for autumn, and .265 for winter, making a total of .998, disregarding the smaller fractions, and for the second group the proportion was .251 for spring, .201 for summer, .226 for autumn, and .321 for winter.

If these figures for infant mortality are typical of variations for the different seasons throughout all European countries, that factor will not serve as an important element in the problem so far, at least, as European genius is concerned, and it cannot account, therefore, for the shifting emphasis of genius birth-months through

the year with the varying nationalities. That this is true in the case of birth-months for the general population of all Europe, we have already seen, since genius birth-months and general birth-months parallel each other in the tables we have used. A test of the question by general birth-months for the various nationalities might be profitable, but those figures, as we have seen, baffle our search, such treatises upon the statistics of population as are available to the present writer being silent upon the question.

So far as concerns their bearing on American genius the statistics of infant mortality, as prevailing at present, are available in full detail in the *Census Report* for 1925 we have used in this discussion. From table 21, at page 188, it appears that infant deaths from all causes for the birth registration area in continental United States were 134,652, of which the distribution according to months was as follows: January 12,430, February 11,950, March 13,293, April 11,468, May 10,797, June 9,840, July 9,968, August 11,640, September 12,224, October 11,256, November 9,445, December 10,341. Comparing these figures with the birth-months of the general population, as disclosed by the same report, we discern a manifest tendency for high mortalities to accompany high birth-months, with only slight disturbance of the results here and there by seasonal factors especially menacing to infant life. There is nothing, however, as reflected in those tables, which would explain the high place of January in our figures for American genius birth-months.

If, as the indications suggest, infant mortality does not account for the segregation of genius birth-months and the figures in our tables are, as would seem to be the case, fairly representative so as to exclude accidental factors, we have reasonably definite periods among the different nations for the uprise of genius, which, translated into periods for the beginning of life, should give the months or seasons with peculiarly favorable auspices for genius.

X

A tabulation of the genius birth-months in Cattell's list by vocations, seems, in some measure, to disclose favored birth-months for varying *types* of genius. Of eminent personages connected with the church, 27 were born in the latter half as against 8 in the earlier half of the year, and much the same is true of poets, with whom the ratio is 25 to 15, and scientists, with whom the proportion is 30 to 24. On the other hand, 25 philosophers saw the light in the

earlier half as against 15 in the latter half of the year, and in the case of statesmen the numbers are 25 to 20, in the case of soldiers 22 to 13, in the case of composers 8 to 4, painters and sculptors 8 to 6. In the case of writers, including historians but not including those classed in the biographical dictionaries as philosophers, the proportion is only 26 to 25.

Whether these figures betoken the existence of climatic or other influences during the varying seasons inclining the child before birth to one instead of another line of endeavor is a question that instantly occurs. A test of the problem by anything less than the most exhaustive methods would be inconclusive nor would the results be worthy of acceptance until checked and rechecked by the statistics of birth-months for the several orders of genius in the different regions of the globe. The outward conditions which prevail at one period of the calendar in one region must be looked for in another at a different period and in such an inquiry a test of genius births in the Northern hemisphere by the genius births for the same season in the Southern hemisphere of the globe is logically called for.

If, however, after due consideration of all these elements, and upon the basis of a catalogue of names sufficiently large, the results show a well-defined tendency of certain types of genius to select definite periods of the year for the beginning of life, we are at the threshold of a principle of obvious importance. "Telling fortunes" by birthdays might in that case cease to be the inane thing it now is, beguiling the tedium of an idle hour, and become the sober task of the scientific eugenist.

That, in reality, whether for genius at large or for special orders of genius, favored birth-months exist, either in America or elsewhere, we do not pretend to say. The figures in these pages, with their singular challenge, we submit as we find them in our calculations. They have been gathered, as were the figures for earlier papers in the same series and papers yet to be published, during hours snatched from a busy professional life. To others, more richly blest with leisure, and better fitted by faculty and training, must be left the task of pursuing further the intricacies of this bizarre subject.

The predominance of January, in particular, among the birth-months of American genius can scarcely exist in so large a measure

as our chance figures would imply. Those figures must rest, to a large extent, upon mere coincidence. To throw one-fourth of the names in the muster-roll of American genius into the month of May for the beginning of life—even with the proverbial beauty of that month and its suggestiveness in far-flung bloom through scented fields and gardens—would require vastly more evidence than our tables supply. The whole subject of seasonal influence in the production of talent and genius awaits, in reality, the hand of its master. The present brief study makes no pretense to finality or scientific authority. To Professor Visher, of Indiana University, who is doing such conspicuously notable work in the statistical study of genius, and others like him, we must look for the exhaustive investigation which shall resolve all doubt.

That such studies, however, possess a peculiar fascination, quite apart from their real or fancied importance, is eloquently attested by their increasing popularity. In 1907, when the first of the present series of papers appeared, few individuals, either in America or England, were interested in such researches. In the interval of twenty years between that day and this such inquiries have become, not only the sober task of scores of special workers, but the pastime of hundreds of amateurs. The recent articles in *Liberty* based upon *Who's Who in America,* with their striking appeal to the man in the street, are a sufficient token that the quest for the secret of genius is on in good earnest and that whoso cares to take up and pursue the thread of these studies may be sure of a wide and interested audience, in pleasant contrast with the painfully limited public which responded to such labors in the past.

MO TSE

BY H. G. CREEL

THE thinkers of every race and every age show a distinct tendency to emphasize their differences from each other, while ignoring the most complete identities in their fundamental premises. It is said that, during the Middle Ages, many Franciscan monks would sooner show charity to the blackest heretic than to one of their Dominican brothers in Christ. The bitterest enmities grew up between medieval theologians over such questions as how many angels could stand on the point of a needle. But today, we lump all of these men together as representatives of a single, and a narrowly dogmatic, system of thought.

This tendency has shown itself to an almost unbelievable extent in the history of Chinese thought. Here we have the spectacle of various men, expounding the same philosophy with no more of difference than that one emphasizes more strongly one phase, while another places most stress on another factor, each of whom declares the views of the others to be so dangerous that their spread endangers the very foundations of the universe. These petty quarrels (they were often no more than that) mean little in themselves, but when we consider that the accusations exchanged in them have, in many cases, been written into the accepted histories of Chinese thought, it becomes apparent that they have obscured our understanding of the history of Chinese philosophy to an alarming degree.

In the cases of the thinkers already dealt with, the error is difficult to apprehend. As between Lao Tse and Confucius, there are not only mutual recriminations, but apparent differences of the widest scope. It is only when we penetrate the surface, and look, beyond grandiose generalizations, at their fundamental assumptions

and their practical programs, that we observe the similarities. But when we come to take up Mo Tse the case is quite otherwise. To be sure, Mo Tse was considered the deadly enemy of the Confucian school, and Mencius excoriates him, while he returned attacks with good will and a ready wit. Thus there has grown up the legend that Moism is one of the doctrines antithetic to "Confucianism" or Sinism. But if any student of average intelligence were given the *Analects* and the writings of Mo Tse to study side by side, it is doubtful if he could fail to see the fundamental identity of the two systems, unless he had had the "advantage" of a previous acquaintance with the tradition which denies it.

The dates of Mo Tse[294] are in some doubt. Those given by Yi Pao Mei, 470-391 B.C.,[295] are probably accurate enough for the present purpose. Mo Tse was given the usual education of a young scholar of the "Confucian" school, destined for government. *Huai Nan Tse* (chap. 21) says of him:

> Mo Tse was trained in the orthodox school and disciplined in Confucian ideas. But he felt that the code of propriety was too troublesome and annoying and that elaborate funerals consumed too much money and impoverished the people; that they were unwholesome to life and obstacles to industry. Thereupon he rebelled against the norms of Chou and adopted the regime of Hsia.

Like Confucius, Mo Tse traveled about a great deal, looking for an opportunity to serve as minister to some state, and so put his ideas into practice. He seems, however, to have found only one post, and that for a short time, in Sung. He gathered a number of disciples about him, but did not succeed in founding a permanent school. This was due in great part, no doubt, to the opposition of the "regular" Confucianists to his teachings. "It is no exaggeration to say that the neglect of Motse the man, his system, and his works since the Christian era had been all but universal until the middle of the eighteenth century A.D."[296] The recent interest in Mo Tse has been largely due to certain real or fancied resemblances of his teachings to Christianity.

[294] Mo Tse means, of course "Master Mo" or "The Philosopher Mo." His full name was Mo Ti. The character *mo* is pronounced either *mo* or *mei*, so that the philosopher may be referred to as Mo Tse, Mei Tse, Mo Ti, Mei Ti, or by the latinization "Micius."

[295] Yi-pao Mei, *Ethical and Political Philosophy of Motse* (Ph.D. Thesis, Chicago), p. 31.

[296] Mei, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

Mo Tse, like Confucius, was tremendously in earnest. He was genuinely concerned over the poverty and suffering of his people, and no sacrifice of time or personal comfort was too great for him to make for the cause of their welfare, to which he had devoted his life. Like Confucius, Mencius, and Lao Tse, he looked with the greatest abhorrence on the wholesale slaughter which characterized the China of his day, and the eradication of war waged for mere greed was his chief passion. It was this practical interest, this desire above all other things to ameliorate the condition of humanity, which was responsible for the attacks made upon him by the Confucianists, much more than any difference in basic philosophy. Had Mo Tse not preached against the ruinous funerals which often wiped out the patrimony of the poor, and against the prescribed three years of complete inaction in mourning, Mencius and others would probably have been a little more willing to see that his doctrine of "universal love" was, after all, only another way of stating the plea of Confucius for human cooperation and social harmony.

Nevertheless, it was about this doctrine of "universal love" that the fight on Mo Tse centred. Let Mo Tse state it in his own words:

> Partiality is to be replaced by universality. . . Now when everyone regards the states of others as he regards his own, who would attack the other's state? Others are regarded like one's self. When everyone regards the houses of others as he regards his own, who would disturb the others' houses? . . . Now, when the states and cities do not attack and seize each other and when the clans and individuals do not disturb and harm one another—is this a calamity or a benefit to the world? Of course it is a benefit. When we come to think about the several benefits in regard to their cause, how have they arisen? Have they arisen out of hate of others and injuring others? Of course we should say no. We should say that they have arisen out of love of others and benefiting others. If we should classify one by one all those who love others and benefit others, should we find them to be partial or universal? Of course we should say they are universal. Now, since universal love is the cause of the major benefits of the world, therefore Motse proclaims universal love to be right.[297]

This doctrine has been conceived, in modern as well as in ancient times, to strike at the very roots of Sinism and the teachings of Confucius. In this connection, four questions are pertinent con-

[297] Mei, *op. cit.*, (pt. 2) p. 96.

cerning the doctrine of "universal love": (1) Does it remove the sanction of "the will of Heaven"? (2) Does it undermine filial piety? (3) Does it weaken the political system by doing away with any special loyalty to one's rulers? (4) Does it condemn the punishment of criminals and evil-doers generally? If it can be shown that the doctrine, as interpreted by Mo Tse, did none of these things, it can hardly be held that the teaching was a menace to Sinism.

(1) "The will of Heaven" was specifically invoked as *the* sanction above all others for the doctrine of universal love.[298]

(2) It did not undermine filial piety, Mo Tse held, since it prescribed, not less love for one's parents, but only more love toward other people, and was in the end designed directly to benefit one's parents, by bettering the condition of the world.

(3) The practice of universal love, as prescribed by Mo Tse, could not interfere with the government, because of the other central tenet of Moism, that of "identification with the superior."

> All you people of the district shall identify yourselves with the lord of the state, and shall not unite with the subordinates. What the lord thinks to be right, all shall think to be right; what he thinks to be wrong, all shall think to be wrong. . . For the lord of the state is naturally the (most) virtuous of the state. If all the people in the state follow the example of their lord, then how can the state be in disorder?[299]
>
> Righteousness is the standard. A standard is not to be given by the subordinates to the superior, but by the superior to the subordinates. Therefore, while the common people should spare no pains at work, they may not make the standard at will. . . The emperor may not make the standard at will (either). There is Heaven to give him the standard. . . . The emperor gives the standard to the High Duke, to the feudal lords, to the scholars, and (through these intermediaries) to the common people.[300]

As a safeguard against incompetent officials, the moral sense of the people is trusted to cause them to refuse to identify their will with that of such persons.

All of this is very regular, Confucian, and Sinistic.

(4) We are at the heart of the testing of the Moist doctrine of

[298] *Ibid.* (pt.2) p. 167.
[299] *Ibid.* (pt.2) p. 66.
[300] *Ibid.* (pt.2) pp. 148-49.

"universal love" when we ask if its author advocated that it be carried to the point of condoning crime, or at least allowing it to go unpunished, because one must love even the criminal. To state the question generally, did Mo Tse intend, by his principle, merely to emphasize the need for an attitude of mutual cooperation within society, or was he espousing a soft sentimentalism which he would carry to the point of sacrificing the good of humanity in order to keep from harming a single human being?

It will be recalled that Confucius defined benevolence, on one occasion, as "to love men." Confucius was an outstanding preacher of cooperation, kindliness, and altruism. Yet this did not prevent him from advocating punishment when justice, and the good of society, seemed to require it. The position of Mo Tse is difficult to distinguish, here, from that of Confucius, unless one concern himself with very nice shades of emphasis indeed.

Mo Tse was greatly concerned with the problem of war, as has been noted. The arguments he used against it were the good Confucian ones, that aggression did not accord with the laws of Heaven, and brought destruction in its wake for the aggressor. However, Mo Tse advocated defensive war, and is said to have trained his scholars in the art of defensive warfare. There is a strong tradition that he was himself an engineer of some accomplishment.[301]

Mo Tse was such an opponent of offensive war that he is said to have made long journeys to try to dissuade rulers, whom he had heard were contemplating war, from carrying out their attacks. Yet he, like Confucius and Mencius, differentiated between just and unjust wars. Campaigns which were made in accordance with right and with the will of Heaven were not, he declared, to be called "attacks," but "punishment," and these he approved.[301a]

This is certainly sufficient to show that Mo Tse was not a mere sentimentalist, but held the application of universal love and mutual help within the boundaries of definite standards of conduct.

It is evident, then, that Mo Tse's doctrine of "universal love" was not calculated to remove the sanction of the will of Heaven, to undermine filial piety, to weaken the political system of graded authority, nor to make the enforcement of standards of conduct impossible by prohibiting punishments. It is true enough that Mo Tse did utter a heresy, from the standpoint of Confucius' teachings,

[301] Wieger, *Histoire des Croyances,* p. 209.

[301a] Mei, *op. cit.,* (pt. 2) p. 121.

when he said that men should love the parents of others as well as they loved their own parents. But this, important as it may have been, can hardly be considered a difference of opinion on a point fundamental to philosophy. On the contrary, the motive lying back of it, which was the desire to promote social cooperation and to reduce friction and war within the Chinese world, was decidedly a Confucian motive.

It has been shown that Mo Tse may not properly be said to have differed radically from Confucius, in his philosophy, on the basis of the Moist doctrine of "universal love."

Again, the so-called "pragmatism" of Mo Tse, his emphasis on the "usefulness" of things, may be made to seem very different from Confucius' own standard of ethics. When Mo Tse was asked whether his principle of "universal love," although it might be a good thing, could be of any use, he replied, "If it were not useful, then even I would disapprove of it."[302] On another occasion, Mo asked a member of the Confucian school why the Confucians studied music. The Confucian replied, "Music is pursued for music's sake." Mo Tse proceeded to ridicule him.[303] It is worthwhile to dwell on the incident, since one writer has declared that it makes clear Mo Tse's "departure from the Confucian approach." Such a statement is typical of the carelessness with which some scholars have interpreted Confucius. The fact is that the "Confucianist" mentioned had learned his lessons very poorly. Confucius was very explicit in holding that the study of music had a positive, normative value, as well as a definite usefulness in ceremonial.

> It is by the *Odes* that the mind is aroused.
> It is by *li* that the character is established.
> It is from Music that the finish is received.[304]
> The Master said, "If a man be without the virtues proper to humanity, what has he to do with *li?* If a man be without the virtues proper to humanity, what has he to do with music?"[305]

Further citations, of similar purport, might be made from Confucius, and even from Mencius.[306] For Confucius, as for Mo Tse,

[302] *Ibid.* (pt.2) p. 97.
[303] *Ibid.* (pt.2) p. 258.
[304] *An.* 8,8.
[305] *An.* 3,3.
[306] *An* 17,4; 17,11. *Men.* 1(2),1; 4(1),27.

the ultimate value of any practice is that it contributes to the welfare of human beings.

It must be remembered that, for all of the genuinely Sinist philosophers, the cosmic order was naturally oriented to harmonize with a flourishing human society. We are not surprised, therefore, when Mo Tse asks, "But how can there be anything that is good but not useful?" For all of these men, the ultimate measure of value is the capacity to contribute to human welfare.

The formula for Mo Tse's pragmatism ran somewhat as follows: The doctrines and practices of the ancient sage-kings were a perfect expression of the will of Heaven. The will of Heaven is that the people shall be peaceful, prosperous, and happy. *Therefore,* if (as is often the case) the doctrines and practices of the ancient sage-kings are in some doubt, it is only necessary to find out what will make the people peaceful, prosperous, and happy, in order to recover the ways of the ancient sage-kings in their pristine purity.

But there is never any doubt that Mo Tse is a confirmed traditionalist. Doctrines "should be based on the deeds of the ancient sage-kings."[307] His faith in the absolute perfection of the ways of those kings who had been approved by Sinist history is well shown in the following passage:

> Mo Tse said: "Any word, any action, that is beneficial to Heaven, the spirits, and the people, is to be carried out. Any word, any action, that is harmful to Heaven, the spirits, and the people, is to be abandoned. Any word, any action, that is in harmony with the (ways of the) sage-kings of the three dynasties, Yao, Shun, Yü, T'ang, Wên, and Wu, is to be carried out. Any word, any action, that is in agreement with the wicked kings of the three dynasties . . . . is to be abandoned.[308]

Time after time, Mo Tse appeals to tradition for support of his contentions. The citations which he thus makes have provided no unimportant source for criticism of some of the older historical documents.

But it would be a mistake to give the impression that Mo appeals to precisely the same traditions to which Confucius and his followers had recourse. There were certain practices, such as the three years of mourning, in support of which the Confucianists could cite perfectly good tradition, but which Mo Tse could not approve, since

[307] Mei, *op. cit.* (pt.2) p. 200.
[308] *Ibid.* (pt.2) p. 244.

he believed that their strict application would result in great harm to society.[309] He used the well-known method of "appealing from antiquity, to antiquity more remote." As he told Kung Meng Tse, a Confucianist, "you are following only Chow and not Hsia. Your antiquity does not go back far enough."[310] The practical conclusions which Mo drew from his appeal to antiquity were in some cases very different from the practices approved by Confucius and the Confucians, and these differences are sufficient to account for the bitter enmity between the two factions. But the underlying philosophy (in which we are primarily interested) was the same. The mere fact that Mo Tse selected his traditions does not differentiate him, for Confucius and Mencius did the same thing, and admitted that they did.[311]

The fundamental philosophy of Mo Tse is Sinism, simple, pure, and unmixed. He believes, with an unquenchable faith, in the basic goodness of the cosmos, and in the existence of a natural tendency which is always working to reinstate, for man, that good life in a good world which was the ancient and the natural state. Government was established by Heaven, for the benefit of the people. To lead them, Heaven chose the most virtuous man in the empire to be emperor. The rulers are, therefore, the recipients of a sacred trust, which they can not forsake with impunity.[312] Likewise, the minor rulers and their fiefs were ordained by Heaven, and those who use force to steal the latter are destroying the harmony of the world and making prosperity impossible.[313] With Confucius, Mo Tse holds that the most effective way to restore order and felicity is to exalt the virtuous men of the empire, and to place them in office, so that they may direct the government.

This discussion of Mo Tse could not be closed more fittingly than by a statement of his own, in which he sums up his Sinistic faith, simply and unequivocally:

> He who obeys the will of Heaven, loving universally and benefitting others, will obtain rewards. He who opposes the will of Heaven, by being partial and unfriendly and harming others, will incur punishment.[314]

309 *Cf. ibid.* (pt.2) pp. 135-41. Mo Tse makes out a convincing case here against the mourning regulations approved by Confucius.

310 *Ibid.* (pt.2) p. 254.

311 *An.* 9,3; 15,10. *Men.* 7(2),3.

312 Mei, *op. cit.* (pt.2) p. 77. Wieger, *Histoire des Croyances,* p. 210.

313 Wieger, *Histoire des Croyances,* p. 211.

314 Mei, *op. cit.* (pt.2) p. 149.

THE GREAT MIRACLE

BY CHARLES S. REID

A twitch of sinew, with a puling wail,
  And vital force looks forth from new-born eyes,
Potential will enounced of form's travail,
  Wherein strange pow'r, a moment sleeping, lies.

A splitting nut within the sodden mould
  Of earth's wild wastes, whence nodding twigs invoke
The passing breeze, and from the minute fold
  Of sundered tissue leaps the mighty oak.

A tiny cone beside a vicious thorn,
  Its heart enwrapped a moment fleet in gloom—
A sudden movement, of weird essence born,
  And sweet, compelling fragrance bursts abloom.

From rended wall of spheroid strangely lain,
  The moment past a pulseless, inert thing,
Now springs with song a form, of beauty's train,
  To sweep the endless skies on tireless wing.

And thus the miracle befits the end,
  Creation's secret stays all human kind—
Hypnosis marks alone ascetic trend,
  Sage jugglery but tricks the troubled mind.

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DR. GILBERT REID

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Volume XLIII (No. 12) DECEMBER, 1929 No. 883

THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CHINA

BY JOHN GILBERT REID

THIRTY-FIVE years ago, in the autumn of 1894, there returned to China a thirty-six-year-old American Presbyterian missionary. He took along with him a sum of about fourteen hundred dollars. He had no "home board" backing to depend on, yet he was launching a new independent mission. He called it A Mission Among the Higher Classes in China. His name was Gilbert Reid.

Gilbert Reid himself had collected the money which he took to China; part of it was contributed by his mother, wife of John Reid, a Presbyterian minister in New York State, and part by himself. He had only vague promises of further contributions in future. He had resigned from the Presbyterian mission staff in China, after a service of nearly twelve years, because the home Board of Foreign Missions had declined to permit him to work among the higher classes in China. The mission staff in Shantung province, China, where Gilbert Reid had been stationed since 1882, however, had urged that he be appointed for such a new undertaking.

When Gilbert Reid returned to China, this country was engaged in a futile war with Japan. The war ended disastrously for China. Assistance from abroad, therefore, was welcome, and his offer to help proved acceptable. Gilbert Reid initiated in Peking a new era in friendly contacts between Chinese officials and other nationals. He wore Chinese clothes, including a queue of his own, lived in a small Chinese house, ate Chinese food, adapted himself to Chinese manners and customs, but followed his own Christian faith. He was welcomed in Chinese and Manchu homes where no "bar-

barian" had ever entered; and in return he received in his humble dwelling high officials of the Chinese Government.

Gilbert Reid did not attempt to proselytize; he did not convert the higher classes into blue Presbyterians; he sought merely to influence them in favor of reform, of progress, of international cooperation. In order to pay his small bills, he acted as correspondent for various papers, in China and in England; for his funds were not sufficient to cover personal expenses. Obstacles of varied kinds met him; some officials were suspicious, some fellow-missionaries were contemptuous; but he persisted and gradually won over those who protested.

On New Year's Day 1897 he received a cablegram from his mother reporting the death of his father, and at once he decided to prepare for a trip home. Before he left, however, he made plans to extend his work. Hitherto it had depended entirely on his personal efforts, aided by a few Chinese employes; but now he secured the cooperation gratis at Peking of a great sinologue, Dr. W. A. P. Martin, an American, who consented to supervise his work in China while the founder was absent at home. Furthermore, a host of Chinese and Manchu scrolls and banners, to the number of over two hundred, were received by Gilbert Reid in honor and in memory of his father, a Presbyterian minister in far away America, a man unknown to these non-Christian officials in conservative China.

The main event, however, lay in the fact that, for the first time, the Chinese Foreign Office issued an official sanction for the proposed "Institute of Learning" to be established by "the American Missionary, Gilbert Reid," and promising to grant further assistance should this proposal be carried out. Therefore, en route home, Gilbert Reid launched in earnest a campaign for building funds and raised money in the principal port cities of China, from both Chinese officials and foreign nationals. It was the formal beginning of the International Institute of China. En route home, also, Gilbert Reid became engaged to marry Miss Sallie Bell Reynolds, of Columbia, S. C., piano teacher in the Southern Methodist church's McTyeire School for girls, at Shanghai, China. The wedding occurred later on in the bride's home town.

The Spanish-American war in 1898 somewhat dampened the enthusiasm of friends whom Gilbert Reid requested to help finance

his new International Institute. He was able to form an American committee in New York to shoulder the burden of raising funds for the work in China, and not only did he make this beginning in his own country, but he and his wife went to England as well. Leaving his wife there, and making London his headquarters, Gilbert Reid commenced a campaign which extended from Edinburgh to Paris, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Stockholm, and Copenhagen. Although committees were formed in several European countries and a certain amount of money was raised or promised, the actual financial result of the trip was not great. Nevertheless, the founder of the new Chinese-foreign friendship movement felt hopeful, as he had found much sympathy and interest among British and European men of influence.

While in England, the Gilbert Reids added a third member; this was myself; so, when we returned to New York, en route to China, there were three Reids rather than one, compared with two years before when Gilbert Reid started alone on his trip from China.

We arrived back in China the autumn of 1899. Gilbert Reid's mother had passed away a year after his father, while he was at home; so his family ties no longer bound him in any way to New York. During his absence from China, a promising reform movement, initiated by the young Manchu Emperor Kuang Hsu, had been halted by his aunt, the famous Empress Dowager Tzu Hsi, and a period of reactionary government had set in. Friends of Chinese progress abandoned hope in China's higher classes as an instrument through which to promote harmony, truth, and other lofty principles.

Within the year of our arrival in Peking, the Boxer uprising took place, we were besieged in the British legation at Peking, my father was wounded, and my mother and I barely survived the hardships of a terrible summer's experience. At the close of the siege, with the Manchu court refugeeing in west China, all work among the higher classes naturally was at a standstill. Gilbert Reid earned a livelihood by doing newspaper work again and interpreting for the British army at Peking. My mother and I left for Shanghai to recuperate, as we had no home board to pay our expenses back to the United States. But we recovered and duly returned to Peking in 1901.

Gilbert Reid consulted his many Chinese official friends and

was persuaded to transfer his International Institute to a safer, saner part of China. In 1902 we moved to Shanghai. From this time dates the property era of the young Institute; which is another way of saying the successful era, judging by standards accepted everywhere. The building funds were increased; a fine site of land, in the French concession, was purchased by a group of Chinese; and the first building was erected. The present buildings of the International Institute of China were all completed before the world war commenced in 1914; most of the money was contributed by Americans, chiefly by Mr. Wm. G. Low, of New York, in memory of his father who had been engaged in China trade. The property today is worth $100,000.

While Gilbert Reid had carried on classes in English at Peking, prior to the siege, schools of a reputable character being few, the principal work in Shanghai was also educational. At that time many Chinese desired their sons to enter a school managed by foreigners provided foreign religion was not compulsory as part of the curriculum. Thus the Institute school developed and prospered. In addition, however, other forms of activity were pursued; lectures, social gatherings, and all sorts of "uplifting" work were undertaken. The dozen years before the world war, the Institute and its director were known throughout China, and tourists always asked suggestions from Gilbert Reid. Prominent visitors, both Chinese and foreign, were entertained, and the Institute was a haven of goodwill.

In the summer of 1909 we again visited Peking. Both the Empress Dowager Tzu Hsi and the Emperor Kuang Hsu had died the previous autumn, within a day of each other, and the late Emperor's baby nephew had succeeded him. A period of reform and change had been ushered in. Friendly feeling between Chinese officials and foreigners was increasing, social intercourse spreading. The Foreign Office formally renewed its sanction of the Institute, contributed a sum of money in token of approval, and paid special honor to Mr. Wm. G. Low for his repeated gifts to the Institute. Gilbert Reid felt his work was bearing fruit.

In the winter, however, it was decided to close the school at Shanghai, for various reasons. Gilbert Reid was planning a trip to the United States and Europe, again; jealousy had been aroused among missionary institutions by a prosperous school which did

not stress Christianity as an entrance requirement; and educational work by Chinese was growing under Government encouragement. During the absence of the director from Shanghai, his place was taken by two Chinese co-directors and by an international committee.

We Reids now were four, having added Jean some time before; and we sailed from Shanghai in April 1910 aboard the Dollar freighter *Bessie Dollar,* for San Pedro, California. Captain Robert Dollar, then just beginning his present extensive shipping undertakings, allowed us to travel free of charge, except for meals at a nominal price of five dollars a day. We reached San Pedro about thirty-five days after leaving Shanghai. Gilbert Reid left his family in South Carolina for the rest of the year while he went north to campaign on behalf of his work in China. In July, 1911, we went across to England and Europe; our return to Shanghai in October coincided almost with the outbreak of the revolution against the Manchu dynasty.

Gilbert Reid had raised sufficient funds while at home to afford three new staff members at Shanghai. Thus reinforced, he was at more liberty to concentrate his own efforts along lines he preferred. Already he had published a series of books in Chinese. During the winter he tried strenuously to harmonize the conflicting points of view between the republican Chinese group at Shanghai and the imperial Government at Peking. He was threatened by both sides, each of which accused him of being in the employ of the other. Yet he interviewed the military commander at Nanking in November to persuade him against further warfare, and in January he visited Peking to advise his Manchu and Chinese friends to urge abdication of the Manchu dynasty, in order to prevent prolonged bloodshed.

With the inauguration of a republic in China, Gilbert Reid bent his efforts to make it a success. A reception was given by the Institute to Dr. Sun Yat-sen, leader of the republican revolutionaries, who duly planted a palm tree symbolizing peace. Social gatherings and lectures were held at the Institute and articles published to promote peace in China. A regular series of Sunday lectures on the different religions of the world was begun at the Institute, the one rule being that no one should attack another's religion. Gilbert Reid himself gave a series of lectures under the Billings fel-

lowship in appreciation of the good points of other religious faiths, comparing them with the best in Christian faith. These lectures subsequently were published in book form by The Open Court Publishing Company, under the title of *A Christian's Appreciation of Other Faiths* (1921).

An international committee representing twenty nationalities was organized in 1914 to promote establishment at the Institute of an international exhibit, to help trade, commerce, and industry, as well as to link the cultures of the world. Gilbert Reid went to Peking in the summer as delegate of this committee to request the official support of the Chinese Government and of the foreign legations. The Chinese Government, through President Yuan Shih-kai and his ministers, agreed to help such a plan if foreign governments would and promised to grant a sum of money. The promise, however, was made just prior to the outbreak of war in Europe, and the plan never materialized, owing to the immediate war situation halting all forms of international cooperation in China.

During the war years the Institute continued as best it could the various types of work already begun. These included, aside from religious and social meetings, the development of a library and of an exhibit of Chinese art and culture. A monthly Chinese publication was issued and sent to Chinese officials, and personal contacts by the director and his staff were maintained with prominent Chinese and foreigners. In 1916, while in Peking, the director held a reception in honor of the republican parliament. But, with the spread of the European war to Chinese waters and to Tsingtao, early in the conflict, repercussions shortly were felt by the International Institute.

Members who belonged to opposite belligerent groups soon caused a split; for allied members were warned not to have intercourse with Germans and Austrians. Consequently allied members resigned or stayed away, since the director did not ask German members to resign. His defense of Chinese neutral rights, in 1914 and later, following the invasion of Shantung province by Britain's ally, Japan, also caused allied members to boycott the Institute. Funds ran short, because international work was not deemed practicable at such a time in Shanghai.

Gilbert Reid found himself once more in a position where he was obliged to earn a livelihood outside of his own particular work.

Again he resorted to newspaper work; in January 1917 he moved back to Peking where he had acquired control of the Peking *Evening Post* from its Chinese owner. Through editorship of this paper he not only supported himself, thus indirectly assisting the Institute, but also continued the task of supporting the principles of peace in China and international goodwill. The direct result, however, was closure of his paper after both the United States and China had entered the war against Germany. On the occasion of his sixtieth birthday, November 29, 1917, Gilbert Reid received the congratulations of a host of prominent Chinese officials, ranging from the President down, and of foreign friends; less than a month afterward he was suddenly arrested by the American authorities in China and deported to Manila. The sole explanation given him was that the Chinese Government had requested that he be removed from China, thus the United States Government was forced to deport him.

The next few months were spent in the Philippines, where Gilbert Reid was constantly the guest of a large Chinese colony. The Chinese consul-general at Manila, having engaged his services as tutor in his family, was compelled to relinquish these services, because a foreign spy had reported to Peking and the Chinese government had been compelled to interfere. Subsequently Gilbert Reid learned that his deportation had been arranged, not by the Chinese Government, which had merely been a tool, but by certain foreign legations at Peking, which objected to his efforts on behalf of peace.

In July, 1918, Gilbert Reid reached New York to rejoin his family who had preceded him there a year previously. During the next three years he remained in the United States, at no expense to the Institute which in the interval functioned quietly at Shanghai under Chinese supervision. Before returning to Shanghai in August 1921, Gilbert Reid participated in a presidential campaign by criticizing the Wilson administration for allowing Japan to keep certain ex-German rights and properties in Shantung, China; he also published two books, one already mentioned, the other entitled *China: Captive or Free?,* a political book. These books were favorably reviewed in the American press; the political book was printed in England and in Germany, where it was translated into German.

Soon after reaching Shanghai, Gilbert Reid once more visited

Peking and decided to locate there and to establish a branch of the Institute in the capital city. The Institute had recently been incorporated under American law and its machinery had been reorganized; but officers and trustees resided in China, representing nationalities which had supported the Institute in past years. An international aspect was again possible.

For five years Gilbert Reid maintained his headquarters at Peking. Frequently he visited the Institute at Shanghai, to attend meetings, but he wished to secure a site and a building in Peking as well. Owing to successive civil wars and governmental changes, no progress in this direction was made; yet meetings were held, particularly inter-religious meetings, and a weekly bilingual publication, *The International Journal,* was launched. Such prominent men as Rabindranath Tagore, the Indian poet-philosopher; the Panshen Lama, spiritual leader of Tibet; and Dr. Charles E. Jefferson, of the Broadway Tabernacle, New York, were among the guests of honor at these conferences. Inter-religious conferences also were held in Shanghai.

By 1926, however, the Institute decided to concentrate on its Shanghai work, and Gilbert Reid returned south from Peking. Less than two years later Peking no longer remained the capital of China. But, in the meantime, Gilbert Reid had entered hospital for a double operation, which he survived more than six months, in the end passing away September 30, 1927, after a valiant struggle to recover in order to continue his life work for China and international goodwill.

His death caused a problem of great perplexity to the Institute. The officers and trustees undertook to determine the best method of perpetuating the Institute in accordance with its charter. No successor could be found to fill the place left vacant by the Institute's founder, and eventually, in April 1928, a meeting of members agreed to the following reorganization:

The Institute aims, charter, and property should remain unchanged;

The title of Director-in-chief should not be used in future by anyone else, being reserved in memory of Gilbert Reid, the founder; but instead there should be a President, who would be an American citizen resident in the United States and member of the Institute, and an Honorary President, who would be a Chinese citizen

resident in China, supported by a board of trustees, who should remain in charge of the Institute property, with an American supervisor and a Chinese associate supervisor of work at Shanghai.

An elementary school for poor Chinese children should be supported by the Institute at Shanghai, while a greater portion of the Institute building should be used for a hospital for Chinese women and children, these being two new forms of work of a useful nature which might be managed by Chinese under auspices of the Institute, though the latter would continue to maintain its office, meeting room, and library;

And, until further notice, the only paid staff members should be Chinese, resident in Shanghai, while all officers, trustees, and others connected with the Institute should serve gratis.

At present the officers of the Institute consist of an American secretary, an American and a Chinese joint treasurer, and an American honorary vice-president, while the trustees, resident in Shanghai, consist of three Americans, two Chinese, and a German. So far the American President and Chinese Honorary President of the Institute have not been determined. The new school and hospital have been launched and are progressing in good shape, under Chinese management; in fact, today, the trend in China is for Chinese to manage all forms of enterprise in their own country. Nevertheless, the Institute remains an international organization because it is incorporated under American law, its officers and trustees, as well as members, represent various nationalities, and its property is situated in a French concession, across the border from an international settlement, in a Chinese city.

The new hospital, superintended by Chinese women doctors and nurses, is financed largely by Chinese. A certain amount of charity work, both in the clinic and in the wards, is done, while the school for poor Chinese children is open to charity pupils who cannot afford to enter other schools. Public schools in China are still absent, and hospitals for women and children are only too rare.

Through the kind offer of Mr. Louis Mayer, sculptor of Eugene V. Debs, Walt Whitman, and Senator Robert M. LaFollette, a bust of my father, Gilbert Reid, has been cast into bronze and is offered to the International Institute free, provided other friends raise the sum of five hundred dollars to be donated to the Institute. The New York committee of the Institute is planning an appeal for

subscriptions to secure this bust, and any interested persons may write either Mr. G. T. Pearsons, 70 Fifth Avenue, New York, as Hon. Treasurer of the New York committee, or myself, at 1526 Walnut Street, Berkeley, California, as secretary of the Institute.

If the Institute were fortunate enough today to have an annual financial support from this country, its work might be extended in many directions. As it is, owing to limited income, its work is likewise limited to what seems most practicable and essential in a time of so much change and confusion in China. I trust, in time, the International Institute work in China may receive added life and that an organization along similar lines may be feasible also in this country. The principal aims, after all, are to help China help herself and to better friendly relations between Chinese and other nationals. This platform is broad enough for anyone.

THE WHOLE DUTY OF MAN

BY DR. GEORGE YEISLEY RUSK

I

IN recent years belief in a revealed religion has become impossible for the great majority of people who have become informed with regard to the historical origins of Christianity. For them it is necessary that ethics assume and merit the position of authority formerly held by the practical teachings of Christianity,—if they are to be saved from an unperceived drifting toward the rapids of practical materialism which after not many days can issue only in the vortex of pessimism. Man is too logical a creature to live happily with *no* answer to the ultimate questions of his duty to his fellows, and he is too spiritual to do so with any answer which does not somehow do justice to his very spirituality.

Candor forces us to admit that up to the present time no system of ethics intellectually and spiritually satisfactory has ever been formulated. In so far as an ethics has been self-consistent it has necessarily been written from one rigidly defined point of view. Therefore, although it has dealt in some fashion with all the problems of conduct, it obviously has done so from only one point of view, and so has not been able to do full justice to all ethical truth. This is often inadvertently acknowledged even in the systems themselves. And therefore each system, if consistently carried out in practice, would lead to flagrant injustice.

Let us consider first, for example, the a priori ethics of Kant. If, as Kant teaches, an act is not moral which is in accord with inclination, none is moral which will make anyone happy. If so, then one ought constantly to do what will harm, or at most be indifferent to the good of, himself and others. But this conclusion contradicts the conception of ethics held in common by Kant and

all men, and it permits the commission of every injustice. Again, Bentham, in naming the greatest good of the greatest number as the end of ethical action, evidently repudiated the utilitarian basis of his ethics, for utilitarianism cannot deny itself long enough to look beyond immediate passion to the whole of the personality and to the entire company of mankind. But if utilitarianism does not supply a basis for disinterested action, it must, like the Kantian absolutism, countenance every form of injustice. And finally, the theories of self-realization provide no objective definition of the self, and so at least permit an identification of the self with immediate desire. But actually immediate desire never is regarded by these systems as the whole of the personality. Thus these theories also are self-contradictory and set no bar to indulgence in every injustice. Ethics has had a history quite as contradictory as has theology—each system being opposed to all others and not even at peace with itself. If the history of ethics has not been as turbulent as that of theology, it has not been so only because to ethics humanity has never entrusted its supreme interests. The ethics of the future, the true ethics, while forming a consistent system and recognizing all concrete values, must not be a one-sided, contradictory, organization of human relationships—a mere abstraction. But how can we conceive of such an ethics?

We can construct a valid and authoritative ethics, I believe, if we bear in mind that we get into our unfortunately abstract ethics by forgetting that ethics is ultimately *practical*. We forget that it deals with full-orbed acts and not with one-sided abstractions. Let us therefore cast about for some *acts* to be the basis of ethics—its organizing principle, if such a phrase is not already too abstract a designation for the basis of a *concrete* system of ethics—a designation which will lead us imperceptibly into an abstract system. I would suggest that we consider if we shall not have in the following acts that basis of a concrete system of ethics for which we are looking:—

(1) The provision for one's self and dependents of a comfortable way of living.
(2) The provision of a fund for taking part in various charities.
(3) The cultivation of the non-competitive values.

It will be noticed that these acts form a necessary, Hegelian, trilogy of thesis (personal and family interest), antithesis (the in-

terest of others) and synthesis (the common interest of self and others). The acts ascend from the practical to the spiritual. Let us consider each of these fundamental duties in some detail.

II

Everyone would admit, I believe, that it is the duty of every able-bodied and able-minded man to provide a comfortable way of living for his dependents. But they would differ as to just what constitutes comfortable living. I think that all would agree that it certainly includes the provision of the conditions of efficient living. That is, I think that everyone would agree that it is the duty of every normal man to strive to earn wages large enough to buy a healthful environment and labor-saving devices for his family, for thus his family is enabled to produce the most for itself and the world. Since some families are capable of making better use of formal leisure than are others, it is ethically right for some to spend much more on themselves than for others. A trip to Europe, for instance, may bring forth a hundredfold in the soil of one family, but leave sterile that of another. In the former case the taking of such a trip would be ethical; in the latter it would not be so.

But when we have gone this far in a definition of ethical expenditures we have not exactly prescribed the duty of man with regard to his standard of living, and I for one am glad that we have not done so. Exact definition of ethical duty prevents the rhythmic action of the human mind within limits which modern psychiatry teaches us is absolutely essential to psychic health. Man needs a goal but not a straight-jacket for normal, effective, happy living. Duties cannot be exactly defined because the values to which they refer cannot be rated absolutely. One value can frequently be substituted for another. No one value is essential for ethical living. We often come to appreciate a certain new value only because we have by chance played the harlequin to another now held in high reverence.

Perhaps we can best make clear how values can be substituted for each other, and show why it is impossible to enumerate those which should govern the lives of men—in particular with regard to their expenditures—by quoting a passage from Lamb's *Essays of Elia* (Everyman Edition, p. 288). In this passage the delights of an intense enjoyment of a few objects of art, such as is forced

upon the poor, are substituted for the superficial enjoyment of many such objects which is inevitable for the rich:—

"'I wish the good old times would come again', she (Lamb's fictitious cousin) said, 'when we were not quite so rich. I do not mean that I want to be poor; but there was a middle state'—so she was pleased to ramble on,—'in which I am sure we were a great deal happier. A purchase is but a purchase, now that you have money enough and to spare. Formerly it used to be a triumph. When we coveted a cheap luxury (and, O! how much ado I had to get you to consent in those times!)—we were used to having a debate two or three days before, and to weigh the *for* and *against*, and think what we might spare it out of, and what saving we could hit upon, that should be an equivalent. A thing was worth buying then, when we felt the money that we paid for it.'

"'Do you remember the brown suit, which you made to hang upon you, till all your friends cried shame upon you, it grew so threadbare—and all because of that folio Beaumont and Fletcher, which you dragged home late at night from Barker's in Covent Garden? Do you remember how we eyed it for weeks before we could make up our minds to the purchase, and had not come to a determination till it was near ten o'clock of the Saturday night, when you set off from Islington, fearing you should be too late—and when the old bookseller with some grumbling opened his shop, and by the twinkling taper (for he was setting bedwards) lighted out the relic from his dusty treasures—and when you lugged it home, wishing it were twice as cumbersome—and when you presented it to me—and when we were exploring the perfectness of it (*collating* you called it)—and while I was repairing some of the loose leaves with paste, which your impatience would not suffer to be left till daybreak—was there no pleasure in being a poor man? or can those neat black clothes which you wear now, and are so careful to keep brushed, since we have become rich and finical, give you half the honest vanity, with which you flaunted it about in that overworn suit—your old corbeau—for four or five weeks longer than you should have done, to pacify your conscience for the mighty sum of fifteen—or sixteen shillings was it?—a great affair we thought it then—which you had lavished on the old folio. Now you can afford to buy any book that pleases you, but I do not see that you ever bring me home any nice old purchases now.'"

A second question naturally arises with regard to man's duty in providing for his family: how far should he injure others in securing what he wants for himself? He should get out of his present business if, when conducted honestly in respect to both consumer and employee, it does not provide an adequate living—even at the cost of reducing his family to the bare necessities of living. If he can earn an adequate living at other employment, he should do so; if not, he should without shame depend upon charity, for society owes an honest man a living. In every concrete case, however, the question arises whether the reason a man cannot make a living is his honesty or is some lack in himself either of mental ability, of emotional stability due to psychological complexes or of imperfect training. Since society demands such a high standard of efficiency today and since it is always possible to read a man's failures in terms of the environment (luxurious or poverty-stricken) in which he was brought up, when a man finds himself *for any cause* unable to provide for his family he should turn to charity for support till an adequate position can be secured for him and he be fitted for it. If adequate charity, even, cannot be secured for him, a man is justified in being dishonest, for a society which does not provide even charity for its members cannot make any ethical claims upon the individual and should be destroyed as a result of a growing lack of mutual confidence. One can make evident the evils of society only by himself acting evilly in view of them. If an earthquake, war, or other "act of God" has made temporarily impossible the earning of a living for one's self or family, the duty to do so does not exist. The suffering which ensues has nothing at all to do with human morality,—whatever we may think about the way it ought to affect the divine conscience.

In support of the contention made above that in extreme and irremediable need a man may be dishonest, I shall adduce the opinion of the leading Christian theologians in the days before property became sacrosanct in the western world:—

"The Fathers, as we have seen, held that almsgiving was an act of justice, not of mercy, because the rights of private property cannot alter the fact that God meant the earth to furnish its fruits for the maintenance of all men. The Canonists, too, set out very clearly the principle that no man has really the right to hold for himself more than he needs. Gratian cites, as from St. Ambrose,

a passage denouncing as unjust and avaricious the man who consumes in luxury what might have supplied the needs of those who are in want, and maintaining that it is as great a crime to refuse the necessaries of life to those who are in want as it is to take from a man the things which are his . . . St. Thomas . . . maintains that . . . if there is evident and urgent need, a man may legitimately take either openly or by stealth what he needs . . . In the case of extreme necessity, St. Thomas says, all things are common." (*Property,* edited by Bishop Gore, p. 136).

A nice, critical question arises when one considers what a man ought to do if he faces this situation: that he cannot earn his living honestly if he has a child, but that he knows ways of earning dishonestly the money necessary for the wise rearing of a child. He should not be dishonest and bring a child into being, for a life based upon persistent dishonesty would not be worthwhile for either parent or child. But the man would be justified in bringing a child into the world and then in accepting all possible charity and in joining whatever reformatory movements exist in order that larger opportunities might be provided for all workers of average ability.

It may be claimed, however, that decisions as to whether or not to bring children into the world are not based on abstract ethical considerations—as the foregoing discussion would imply. I am not so sure. I believe that abstract considerations do lie behind the concrete problems which parents consider when discussing procreation. Certainly it is a general rule that outstanding idealism grows dim when marriage and family responsibility press upon a man, and often the necessities of the family, hovering like a bird of prey over a man's head, lead him to employ shady business methods. One need not be too careful, however, about foreseeing how one's family will be provided for before bringing it into being. For the struggle against odds and the necessity of taking advantage of every opportunity—however adventitious—which a family which is plainly not secure must experience will give the children in it just the training essential to great success—as an acrobat, the minister of an unorthodox church, a candidate for the presidency of the United States or a stock broker. I once heard a man say of another that he had the native ability to be a great success—and would have become so if only he had been born a bastard.

III

In addition to providing for one's family a man should earn and set aside funds to be expended in charity. The size of these funds should be proportioned to the smallness of the increment of additional cost which its amassing would necessitate in the sale price of the article which he manufactures, or upon the size of his income if he cannot dictate the sale price of his "line"—either because of the severely competitive conditions in his industry or because he has not an executive position; or if he is in a profession and works on salary. Thus a man who needs to add, say, ten cents on the hundred dollars to the retail price of his article or deduct ten cents on the hundred dollars from the pay of his employees in order to amass a million dollars for charity should do so. But one who would need in the former case to add one dollar on a hundred or in the latter to deduce one on a hundred ought not to create a fund of more than perhaps ten thousand dollars for charity. Of course a man who works on a fixed income or on a salary should give to charity in proportion to his income or salary and in inverse proportion to his necessary expenses.

It is not right for a man to amass a great charity fund at the expense of his ultimate consumers or of his employees. If this were generally done, too large a place would be given to charity in the general economic scheme of things and honest labor would be discouraged. Yet it is requisite that some money be earned in order that it may be given to others. In the first place, the very fact that a man can earn the money suggests that for it he can give more immediately valuable service to society than can anyone else. Therefore it is socially important that he earns it—earn it even if he cannot well spend it on himself and so will find it almost necessary to give it to charity. In the second place, many people who are capable of making excellent deferred payments to society for all they receive can give small service till aided by charity. Them it is morally necessary to aid. They may produce a hundredfold upon the investment made in them by their benefactors. The provisions for the needs of the able poor also have this subsidiary effect: it enables them to force the comfortably rich to remain at work in order to retain their relative place in society. Thus one may through wise giving to specific institutions or persons raise to some extent the general level of national attainment. In the

third place, there is an element of chance in human success and failure. As we have already pointed out, it is always possible to read a failure—if not due to congenital weakness, in which case society must assume permanent charge of the sufferer—as due to the warping effect of an environment in which society has allowed the mal-adapted person to grow up from earliest infancy. It is only right, therefore, that society should seek increasingly by wise charity to rectify the more glaring freaks of fortune and the effects of unfavorable environments upon the individuals who have been harmed by them. And finally, in establishing the poor in comfortable circumstances their benefactors increase the actual consumption of goods (physical and mental) by society—including those which the benefactors themselves produce. Thus by their charities they increase their own incomes. Also by increasing the number of efficient workers by their charity they decrease the cost of living in the country, and so the cost of their own living.

IV

The third duty of man is to cultivate the non-competitive values. By the non-competitive values we mean, in the first place, the artistic values, for these a person can enjoy without lessening their enjoyment by others, for instance,—listening to music, viewing art, taking part in conversation. Perhaps the chief question which naturally would arise with regard to their cultivation is: how much should one spend in doing so? That depends upon the extent of his genius and upon whether or not he hopes ever to entertain others by the use of his gifts. If there is no marked ability, there can be no absolute rule. We must revert to what we said above about the expenses which a man is justified in incurring for his family. Even if by certain concrete expenditures some values are neglected, others, however, will neverthless by the same expenditures be advanced; and so, if the cultivation of values is the consistent aim of one's life, his life will be as full as possible of some sort of value, and that is the only justified goal for anyone.

By the non-competitive values we mean, in the second place, the virtues. The cultivation of no virtue prevents its cultivation by others; and most virtues immediately, all ultimately, bring men into reconciliation. We mean *all* the virtues, but *no one* taken singly, for each virtue taken singly leads off upon a path diverse from the

others, a path at length ending in a quagmire of absurdity. Thus if with Paul of Tarsus one puts love upon the supreme throne, high and lifted up, he finds that the requisite devotion to it requires that he approve of unworthy forms of conduct. If he enlarges the boundaries of love to include hate of the unloveable, he has robbed love of any distinctive meaning. If to avoid this predicament, one name redemption of wrong-doers as the final purpose of his life, he will become oversensitive to the faults of others, self-righteous, hard. Ever reasoning acutely in defense of his own position, he will be incapable of seeing what lies beyond it. But something always does lie beyond every concrete judgment of creatures of time and space. No judgment is absolute, fit to be the standard to which all other truth must logically conform,—except only a devotion to *all* values such as we here advocate. If one attempt to be faithful to every virtue taken singly, he will be plunged into a "sad weighing and discussion of sin," from which the tortured soul can never be set free. For, as we have seen, each virtue leads in an opposite direction. No sooner would one heed the call of one than he would hear the cry of the rest. And in the service of no one of the others would he find greater peace. The only possibility for ethical living lies in a serene devotion to *all* the virtues conceived as an ultimate unity. But, it will be asked, how can such a general law determine concrete speech and conduct?

(1) A general law of morality can determine concrete speech and conduct, in the first place, because the mind in the last analysis is one. There is only one stream of consciousness. Therefore there is no such thing at the time of action—however we may botanize afterwards—as a general intention as separated from the determination to do some specific act.

(2) In the second place, the life of one who has sworn high fealty to all the virtues is so ennobled that he envies no one. Not all the wealth of Atlantis could enrich him. Therefore, for him it is not possible to encroach upon the rights of others. His acts and speech must be essentially just. Noblesse oblige in all his relations with his fellow men becomes the inevitable expression of the acknowledged imperial nature of his soul. Yet as his patent of nobility has come only from his service to the non-competitive values, it cannot inspire within his soul a prideful distinction between himself and other men. He must simply rejoice at every

evidence that he can find in the lives of others that the ancient virtues increasingly extend their sway.

(3) In the third place, one who governs his life by all the virtues acts virtuously in concrete situations because he will not allow any virtue taken singly to assume undue importance in his decision. He will act in view of the sum total of all his past experience and of his unprejudiced understanding of the situation before him. These will give the special form that his general ethical purpose will take. If his decision is not in accord with that of another man, he will listen to the argument of the other without prejudice. He will listen without the arbitrary protruding of any special part of past experience which prevents the judging of the argument on the basis of the totality of past experience. When one does this he is acting normally. Of course one who claims that he is acting in view of all past experience and the objective facts of the present situation may not actually be doing so; but in that case he is not sincerely trying to serve non-competitive values either—whatever his claims may be. If through some defect of past experience one act unjustly in any case, the injustice is not a moral fault on the actor's part, and knowledge of its consequences will soon repair the defect in his experience upon which it was based. By describing ethics so one makes it practical. He makes the good life possible for all men. For all men, except those under unrealized nervous strain, can control the obtruding special idea by the sum total of experience.

(4) In the fourth place, a general devotion to ethical values can determine concrete deeds because it is possible to embody in a concrete deed several conflicting values. This can be done by the use of different organs of the body,—while condemning with words one can reveal a brotherly feeling by putting a hand on the shoulder. It can be done by expressing a position as one's own which is a compromise between all the various truths implicit in a situation. It can be done by expressing successively (perhaps at different times) the various truths implicit in a situation.

Concrete ethical decisions, we say, depend upon the special nature of one's past experience and the special nature of each situation that presents itself. Therefore it is impossible more exactly than we have done to show how a general devotion to ethical ideals determines concrete deeds. It is never possible to recount fully the

sum total of a man's past experience (conscious and unconscious) and to describe fully any concrete situation. Even the United States Supreme Court with its libraries of precedents to guide its judgments will not attempt to say what the general law means concretely—except in application to the exhaustive descriptions of a concrete situation given by opposing counsel. And it is willing to give judgment on the basis of even such descriptions only because no completer knowledge can be had. And when the decision is rendered, ideal justice is never done. The judgment of the court at best is what the litigants should have known that it would be in view of all previous relevant judgments. But we are considering the problem of absolute right, for with it alone does ethics deal. We are concerned about facts that can never be even approximately determined and about the inner elusive motives of men's deeds—not merely, like the courts, in their proved deeds in certain largely standardized relationships. Therefore we cannot apply a general devotion to ethical values to concrete situations *with any exactness,* that is, we cannot relate them by any logical process. We can only affirm, as we have done, that devotion to all ethical values enables one to be just in concrete decisions because every mind is ultimately one, because such devotion ennobles men, because men are thus saved from being led astray by any separate virtue, and because they are able to express many conflicting values in a single deed. We can only add, as we did in the case of the artistic values, that in so far as one in any case fails to advance one value he will be advancing another—if he is sincerely devoted to all values. Thus if one tells a minister that his discourse was very interesting—with a particular intonation—the minister is not as hurt as if he had been told the full truth, and so charity has been promoted, but even so he probably gets as much of the truth as he can use.

V

If one accepts the doctrine of ethics which has been advocated in this paper, then, in the first place, all meticulous, distressing self-examination and inexorable self-condemnation for not equally forwarding every virtue in every deed will be done away. They will flee like shadows before the ascending sun. Then one will take a carefree, joyous, welcoming, and so vital, attitude to life. And this

attitude will enable one easily to correct, as opportunity presents itself, the inevitable onesideness of any particular action. But if one repudiates it, if he tries to be absolutely correct in every instance, the soul will become so sensitive to evil that it will cling to its accustomed virtues in increasingly specialized forms, carry them to extremes, ignoring the others, and in the resultant conflicts with the sum of virtue and with persons with different codes the personality will become permanently distraught, suspicious, unjust.

In the second place, those who take what I may call the vital attitude to ethics, will not, as the legalist must, by a priori standards automatically rule out from consideration large classes of action which, although innocent and relaxing are not the most worthy of pursuit at the time. Thus the vitalists get the experience and enjoyment of these kinds of action as they pass through the mind prior to rejection in favor of the actions to be preferred. Therefore their lives are incomparably richer than those of the legalists. And their lives are not as defenseless before temptation as are those of the legalists because, having often viewed all aspects of experience, none can take them by surprise; and because their moral natures are strong by reason of repeated exercise upon innumerable occasions.

In the third place, the ethical vitalist may find support for his ethical living in religion. For God is simply that unity of all values, which we have named the true standard of all living. The only absolute unity is personality; so if all values are unified, it must be in a personal God. John Calvin, as part of his doctrine of election, taught that no deed could be good unless done unto the greater glory of God. So we have taught that each act derives its virtue from devotion to the sum total of ethical values. Religion, then, differs from ethics only in emphasizing the *final unity* of non-competitive values in personality, that is in God, and in inviting the neophyte to make the non-competitive values regnant in his life by using the most powerful motive known to men,—that of personal attraction and devotion. So viewed, religion loses its special, contradictory, obsolete commands. It strips itself of every impediment and is prepared to stride thru the ages abreast of the race, ever calling mankind to transcend this or that partial truth in a synthetic truth, because at all times it reminds of the holiest, highest. And the deliverance from the questioning pursuit of this or

that one-sided abstraction of duty thus wrought will bring to the human spirit a unity, a peace, a freedom and a power which in the past it has fully known only when the saints have mounted upon the concrete commandents of their religions into the throne room of the Eternal, and there have received words which made them unwilling to serve aught less perfect than God forever more.

To labor for those whom we freely love and for those who need succor from our abundance and to cultivate those values which, like the widow's cruse of oil, ever replenish themselves for our need and the need of all men—this is the whole duty of man. Surely the way of life is broad and straight. Wherefore, having divested ourselves of every needless anxiety from the days of our ignorance, let us, O child of man, with fortitude and rejoicing, fare forth upon it!

THE SYNAGOGUE OF SATAN

BY MAXIMILIAN J. RUDWIN

THE Synagogue of Satan is of greater antiquity and potency than the Church of God. The fear of a malign being was earlier in operation and more powerful in its appeal among primitive peoples than the love of a benign being. Fear, it should be remembered, was the first incentive of religious worship. Propitiation of harmful powers was the first phase of all sacrificial rites. This is perhaps the meaning of the old Gnostic tradition that when Solomon was summoned from his tomb and asked, "Who first named the name of God?" he answered, "The Devil."

Furthermore, every religion that preceded Christianity was a form of devil-worship in the eyes of the new faith. The early Christians actually believed that all pagans were devil-worshippers inasmuch as all pagan gods were in Christian eyes disguised demons who caused themselves to be adored under different names in different countries. It was believed that the spirits of hell took the form of idols, working through them, as St. Thomas Aquinas said, certain marvels which excited the wonder and admiration of their worshippers (*Summa theologica* II.ii.94).

This viewpoint was not confined to the Christians. It has ever been a custom among men to send to the Devil all who do not belong to their own particular caste, class or cult. Each nation or religion has always claimed the Deity for itself and assigned the Devil to other nations and religions. Zoroaster described alien worshippers as children of the Divas, which, in biblical parlance, is equivalent to sons of Belial. The Greeks ascribed the origin of the Scythian race to the Devil, while to Jewish eyes all Gentile races were demonic. In considering other religions as "devilish," Christianity did nothing more than accept the belief of its parent faith. If this viewpoint were confirmed, it would be safe to say

that the believers in Beelzebub outnumber to this day the worshippers of the Blessed Lord. The Christians, as far as numerical strength is concerned, play even now a rather insignificant part as compared with the followers of other religions, since only a fourth of the population of this earth is Christian.

The belief in the eternal damnation of all non-Christians is not greatly stressed nowadays. But the medieval Church was emphatic in its assertion that all who did not seek salvation in its bosom served Satan. Romance and history combined in representing those outside the pale of the Church as the personal vassals of Satan, who worked his deceptions among them. Jews, Turks and heretics, in addition to the heathen, were believed in all Christian lands to be allies of the infernal powers. The Jews were supposed by the Christians to worship the Devil and to accumulate their wealth with his aid. The Jewish synagogues were regarded by Christians as temples of Satan. The belief that every Jew wears horns has persisted in certain Christian circles to the present day. In the opinion of Emmanuel Malynski, a contemporary Polish-French writer, the Talmud has been inspired by the Spirit of Evil.

The Saracens were also regarded in the Middle Ages as living under the yoke of the demons, with whom they are even identified in *le Charroi de Nîmes,* one of the French medieval epic poems called *chansons de geste.* The Devil and the Turk were commonly thought in the Middle Ages to be closely related and often joined together. Martin Luther also called all Turks devils.

Similarly, in the eyes of the Catholic Church, heretics were the spawn of Satan. Heresy was traced by the Church to the blowing of Beelzebub's bellows into the ears of humanity. The Albigenses were called by the Catholics "members of the Devil," and the Waldenses were considered confederates of the powers of hell.

When the Church, at the advent of the Reformation, was divided against itself, each part accused the other of serving Satan. Catholics and Protestants never wearied in accusing each other of being influenced by the spirits of hell. Priests taught that Protestants were devil-worshippers and magicians (Samuel Harsnett: *Declaration of Egregious Popish Impostures,* 1603). The French Huguenots, among other Protestant bodies, were believed by the Catholics to be on intimate terms with the Devil.

The Protestants, on their part, stoutly maintained that the

Catholics were in the service of Satan. The Reformers attributed the miracles of the Catholic saints to an infernal origin, just as the Jews had believed the miracles of Christ to have been performed with the aid of Beelzebub (Matt. xii.24). The Calvinist Calfhill, in his answer to Martiall's *Treatise of the Cross* (1564), maintained that the Catholics were in reality serving Satan, while they believed that they worshipped the Lord. Martin Luther similarly considered the Catholic Church as an emanation of the Evil Spirit. The Roman Catholic and Apostolic Church was, in his eyes, the whole host of wickedness spoken of in the Book of Revelations. "Alongside of God's sacred Church," the German reformer affirmed, "the Devil has built his chapel, and keeps up in it his ape-like play with holy water" and other Catholic ceremonies.[1] The Protestant leaders supposed Roman ecclesiaticism to be tainted by a connection with the powers of hell. They saw the Devil, in his traditional form of horns, hoof and tail, standing with an immense bellows behind the Pope, the cardinals and the other prelates of the Roman Church, and filling them with hostile plans against the reformed teachings. Luther meant no metaphor when he described the Catholic clergy as the Devil's priests, and the monk's hood as the proper garment of Satan himself; and Melanchthon was deeply in earnest when he called the Papists the slavish imitators of magicians and necromancers whom he termed the agents of hell. The Jesuits were considered as the most "devilish" of all Catholic monks. Phineas Fletcher, in his poem, *The Apollyonists* (1627), identified the Jesuits with the spirits of hell by naming them after the biblical demon, Apollyon. In Béranger's belief, the Jesuits even outdo the demons of darkness in wickedness. The Pontiff in the Vatican himself was accused of diabolical relations in the writings of the Protestants. He was believed to have been crowned by Satan and to represent hell rather than heaven on earth. Others went so far as to maintain that the Pontiff of Rome and the Prince of the Pit were identical. Still others saw in the head of the Roman Church Antichrist in person.[2]

[1] Victor Hugo, in his novel *les Travailleurs de la mer* (1866), deduced from the idea that Satan had taken a fancy to the Catholics and sought their company a great deal the belief that the Devil was more Catholic than Protestant.

[2] The pope is described as Antichrist in Leconte de Lisle's poem "la Mort du moine" (1895). An interesting story about the relation between the head of the hierarchy of hell and the head of the Catholic hierarchy is Richard Garnett's "The Demon Pope" (1888), reprinted in the present writer's anthology of *Devil Stories* (1921).

The Protestant sects, warring among themselves, accused each other of connections with the powers of darkness. The Lutherans gave the Calvinists the rather unflattering name of "white devils." The Methodists considered the Presbyterians as devil-worshippers. "I perceive that your God is my devil," said John Wesley, the founder of free-will Methodism, to George Whitefield, the leader of the Calvinistic Methodists, one day in the course of an argument about predestination. The poet Swinburne considered all Puritans agents of hell. Judge Rutherford, the present head of "Russellism," declared the whole organized Church, Protestant as well as Papist, to be "Satan's organization." Thus not only all non-Christians but even the Christians themselves, if we are to credit their invectives against each other, belong to the Devil rather than the Deity.

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Apart from this diabolization of other men's deities as a result of denominational differences and sectarian strife, there actually were within the Church, down to the thirteenth century, many heretical sects, who fully deserved the term of devil-worshippers.[3] Among the groups who continued within Christianity the traditions of Persian Magism, Gnosticism and Manichæism, we may mention the Priscillianists of Spain, the Paulicians, the Bogomiles, the Catharists, and the Albigenses. The German Luciferians, of the thirteenth century, expressed their adoration for Lucifer in the belief that he had been unjustly banished from heaven and pronounced anathema against St. Michael, his conqueror. The French woman novelist, George Sand, puts her belief in the unjust treatment dealt out to the Devil by his celestial comrades into the mouth of the followers of Johann Huss in Bohemia, whom she designates as Lollards, a term really applied to the followers of Wycliffe. In her novel, *Consuelo* (1842-43), she tells us that

"In the opinion of the Lollards, Satan was not the enemy of

[3] The Devil has always counted his admirers and adorers even among the orthodox Christians. Many devout church folk, wishing to be on good terms with both parties, offer their allegiance to both the Lord and Lucifer. An English preacher of American extraction, M. D. Conway, tells of a Christian lady residing in Hampshire, England, who made her children bow their heads whenever they mentioned the name of the Devil. When asked the reason for her queer conduct, she replied: "It is safer." He also relates the story of a French peasant woman who was found one day in a church kneeling before a marble group. When she was warned by the priest that she was worshipping the wrong figure, namely, Beelzebub, she replied: "Never mind, it is well to have friends on both sides." (*Cf.* M. D. Conway: *Demonology and Devil-Lore,* 2 vols., London, 1879, II, 13.)

the human race, but, on the contrary, its protector and patron. They held that he was a victim of injustice and jealousy. According to them, the archangel Michael and the other celestial powers who had precipitated him into the abyss, were the real demons, while Lucifer, Beelzebub, Ashtaroth, Astarte, and all the monsters of hell, were innocence and light themselves. They believed that the reign of Michael and his glorious host would soon come to an end, and that the Devil would be restored and reinstated in heaven with his accursed myrmidons. They paid him an impious worship and accosted each other by saying, *Celui à qui on a fait tort te salue* —that is to say, He who has been misunderstood and unjustly condemned, salute thee—that is, protect and assist thee."

Among contemporary devil-worshippers we will mention the Yezidis, a sect living in ancient Assyria, on the slopes of the mountain called Djebel Makub, who still worship the Devil as creator of the world and author of evil, the black Jews in Cochin, British India, and the Voodoos of the West Indies and Haiti. There are infernal cults also in the North of China, in Africa, near Lake Tschad, in the Solomon Islands, and in the New Hebrides.[3a]

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The members of the witch-cult were equally, though perhaps less justly, regarded as devil-worshippers by the Church. It is generally believed that the Witches' Sabbath, as the reunion of Satan and his worshippers was called, applied particularly to the members of the gentler sex, had no basis in reality. The general assumption among the enemies of the Catholic Church is that medieval witchcraft was an invention of the Inquisition. Modern historical research, however, has established the fact that witchcraft was not wholly an imaginary affair, but had its foundation in solid reality.[4] It should be added, though, that the mass of superstition built around it had its inception in the imagination of demented hags taken and tormented by the Inquisition.

The witch-cult was a lineal descendant of the old indigenous heathen religions that covered Europe before the advent of Christianity and that were not easily wiped out by the religion imported from the East. Even for many centuries after the conversion of the European peoples to Christianity, the new faith was only a

[3a] On the Yezidis, consult Isga Joseph's thesis, *Devil-Worship*. (Boston, 1919.) See also R. M. Macdonall's article "Solomon Islands and the New Hebrides" in *Cornhill's Magazine*, vol. LXIV (1928), pp. 178-92.

[4] The historicity of the Witches' Sabbath is maintained by Miss Alice Murray in her well documented thesis, *The Witch-Cult in Western Europe* (Oxford, 1921).

thin veneer. In many districts, the masses refused for a long time to abandon their pagan rites. Men and women, in particular living far from the advanced areas, tenaciously clung to their ancient beliefs and observances. Inasmuch as the Christians identified the old indigenous gods with the devils and evil spirits of the new religion, their ritual was decreed as devil-worship, and their priests and priestesses were branded as wizards and witches. The rites of ancient worship, which now came to be known as witch-cults, were chiefly devoted to the fertility of field, fold and family and by their "obscenity" scandalized the people whose very ancestors had practised the same ceremonies in pagan times.

The witch-cult may thus be considered as primarily a surival of the old fertility ritual. In fact, we can discover in the Witches' Sabbath many vestigial remains of the old fertility worship. The Devil of the Witches' Sabbath is successor to the ancient god, who may be recognized, in a degenerate form, by all the disguises which he assumed at these nocturnal ceremonies. It is well known that, on such occasions, the Devil appeared most frequently in the form of a goat, the animal sacred to Priapus, the Greek god of vegetal and animal fertility. The goat also served as the witch's steed when she repaired to the Sabbath. The broom or stick which was likewise employed by her as a mount and which was also ridden in the dances of the Witches' Sabbath, is similarly a fertility symbol.[5] Furthermore, the unholy ecstacy and unlicensed revelry with which the Witches' Sabbath terminated should be explained as a survival of the physical unions which formed part of the ancient fertility worship.

Next to the fertility rites, the ancient fire-worship may be recognized in the Witches' Sabbath. The witches worshipped their god as the universal father and protector, and such paternal attributes are generally applied to the ancient sun-divinity. Fire figured prominently at the Witches' Sabbath, as it did in all pre-Christian festivals. The torches, with which the gathering-places of the witches were lighted, had their origin in the Beltane and solar festivals. The worshippers held candles to the Devil when he performed certain rites, and thus the expression originated, "to hold a candle to the Devil." A candle was also carried in the witch-cult by the Devil himself, frequently on his head, in his quality as Lucifer.

[5] The broom, however, may also represent the sweeping storm, which was the habitation of the Devil. On the medieval stage, the Devil was often represented with a besom in his hand.

The witch-cult was also brought into connection with the weird superstition of the wild hunt, the rout of restless, wandering spirits, which was spread in all the European countries.[6] The witches repaired to their Sabbath on air-minded brooms or goats, just as the avenging maidens of Woden flew through the night air on magic steeds or in the form of swans. The Devil, who conveyed the women to their midnight convocations, was the successor to the Wild Huntsman. Popular belief mentions Diana, the goddess of the hunt in classical mythology, and Herodias, the wicked woman of biblical history, as leaders in this nocturnal air-flight. The "Canon Episcopi," of the ninth century, had already associated the Latin goddess and the Judean queen with the women who flew at midnight through the air. The *Malleus maleficarum* or *Witch Hammer* written by the two inquisitors, H. Institoris and J. Sprenger, in Germany toward the end of the fifteenth century, also mentioned Diana and Herodias as leading the wild women during their nocturnal trips in mid-air by the order of the Devil. No lesser persons than Albertus Magnus and Alexander of Hales put their faith in this superstition. Turrecremata, the Spanish commentator, who lived in the fifteenth century, expressed his doubts as to this belief, on the ground that Diana never existed and that Herodias was in all likelihood not permitted to leave hell in order to join the midnight air-processions.

The witch-queen Herodias, the Wandering Jewess, the counterpart of the Wandering Jew in Christian mythology, who leads the midnight revels of devils and witches in medieval superstition, is not, as is generally assumed, the wife of Herod Antipas and the mother of Salome. The idea that both mother and daughter were afflicted with the curse of eternal wandering because of their sinful love for the Baptist, which we find in Heinrich Heine's poem *Atta Troll* (ch.xix), has no foundation in popular belief. The Herodias who figures as leader of the medieval wild hunt is Mariamne, the wife of Herod the Great. She is believed to have brought down upon herself the wrath of the Lord for her contemptuous treatment of the Magi, when they passed Jerusalem on their way to the manger of Christ. It is said that she refused to go to the window

[6] Consult H. Plischke's thesis, *Die Sage vom wilden Heere* (Eilenburg, 1914). A beautiful description of the wild army will be found in Heine's poem *Atta Troll* (1842). In Bürger's ballad, "Der wilde Jäger" (1786), the poet gives expression to his indignation over the oppression exercised by some nobles upon their subjects.

to see them, pretending that she was busy sweeping the room. For this reason, she was doomed to wander through the air at night riding on a broom-stick. Legend thus links her with Epiphany Day, and on the Eve of this day, which, in the South of Germany, is not very much different from Shrove Tuesday or Carnival Day, Herodias-Berchta is led in procession through the streets riding on a broom-stick.[7] This fact points to an identification of the Judean queen with the Germanic goddess Berchta (Perchta, Bertha or Hertha), who, it will be remembered, is an appellation given in Southern Germany and in Switzerland to a spiritual being who probably corresponds to the Hulda (Holda or Holla) of Northern Germany. Frau Holda (Holde or Holle) is, in reality, an old goddess, indeed the chief goddess Frigg or Frija, the queen of heaven, the goddess of marriage, as Mother Earth is the goddess of agriculture, fertility, and growth. Friday is named after this goddess. In the country districts of Germany to this day, all marriages are celebrated on Friday. Holda signifies "the gracious, the benign one." This Frigaholda—even that name appears in an old manuscript—is the patroness of spinning maidens. She punishes idleness and slovenliness in spinning, and awards diligence and care. During the "Twelve Nights," the distaff and spindle were not to be touched on pain of inviting the wrath of Holda.[8]

In Thuringia, Frau Holda or Holla rides with the wild hunt on Walpurgis Night. In other parts of Germany, an image of this goddess, on her flying bed of snow, is still cursed, scourged, and burnt as Herodias. Thus the Judean queen, after having been identified with the ancient Germanic goddess, was assigned to be a companion to Diana, the savage goddess of hunting in Roman mythology, who, in medieval belief, assumed the character of a witch, and both were turned into wandering spirits eternally engaged in a wild hunt.[9]

[7] Consult MacCallum's article "The Great Blessing," in the periodical *Asia* for July, 1927, for Greek Orthodox customs on Epiphany Day, the festival of the baptism of Jesus. In Italy, the peasants, who do not understand the Greek term *epiphania*, have turned it into a fairy or witch Befana, just as an English sailor calls Bellerophon, Billy Ruffian. This Befana, who in Italian popular belief has been identified with Diana, wanders in the winter nights much in the manner of Odin in Scandinavian mythology.

[8] See B. Waschnitius: *Percht, Holda und verwante Gestalten.* Wien, 1913. (Sitzungsberichte der Wiener Akademie der Wissenschaften.)

[9] For further study of the legend of Herodias, consult Jacob Grimm: *Teutonic Mythology.* Transl. from the 6th edition of the German by J. S. Stallybrass. London, 1880-88; Karl Simrock: *Handbuch der deutschen Mythologie mit Einschluss der nordischen.* 5 Aufl. Bonn, 1878; E. K. Chambers: *The Mediæval Stage.* Oxford, 1903.

Medieval witchcraft is likewise a survival of pre-Christian magic. It may perhaps be traced, as Gustav Freytag suggests, to the cult of a group of dark demons, who figured in the paganism of the old Nords and who were represented as engaged in an eternal war against the bright deities.[10] The priests of these gloomy gods performed their sacred rites by night and sacrificed to their titular spirits dark-colored animals of all kinds. These priests also possessed the power, through the magic agency of their gods, to blast crops and to destroy flocks and herds. Similar beliefs seemed also to exist in ancient Rome. Pliny tells us that in his country laws were enacted against injury to crops by "fascination." The medieval witch or wizard was supposed to possess the power to harm both beast and man. In popular belief, the Devil and the sorcerer or sorceress united in a contract of witchcraft, as the term was understood in the Middle Ages,[11] joined their various powers of doing evil to inflict calamities upon the persons and property, the fortune and fame, of innocent human beings. The witch was especially dreaded in the Middle Ages. She was known as a compounder of philters and poisons, a caster of spells, a wicked woman, and a hideous hag.

The Devil also bestowed his power of physical tergiversation upon the witch and warlock, who thus could transform themselves into all sorts of animals. French witches generally changed themselves into wildcats, whereas the British witches preferred to be transformed into hares.[12] The wizards liked to crawl into the skins of wolves, but, at certain of their assemblies, they also changed themselves into stags, which explains the origin of the expression "stag parties."

The witch organization permeated the lower classes in France, Germany and England. The French historian, Jules Michelet, in

[10] *Cf.* Gustav Freytag: *The Devil in Germany During the Sixteenth Century.* Transl. from the German by Wm. A. Hervey (New York, 1893), pp. 7-8. This essay originally formed the second chapter of the second volume of *Bilder aus der deutschen Vergangenheit* (1859).

[11] The contract of witchcraft differed from the regular devil-compact in so far as it was not witnessed by an instrument written and sealed. The witches and their companions went over to the worship of the Devil and acknowledged him as their lord merely by giving him the oath of submission or by performing a certain act of homage, such as a kiss on a certain part of his body.

[12] Witches can also transform animals into human beings. A witch changes her cat into a cavalier in Théophile Gautier's poem *Albertus* (1830).

his book, *la Sorcière* (1862),[13] attributed the spread of witchcraft among the lower masses to the despair of the poor at finding that even the Church, long their friend and protector, had become feudal and tyrannical, even more tyrannical than their lay oppressors. He saw in the Witches' Sabbath the first glimpses of women's rights, of the equality of sexes, and, in fact, of all modern social reforms. The Black Mass was, in his opinion, "the protest of the oppressed masses, the symbol of the approaching freedom, the communion of rebellion." This author represents magic and sorcery as Nature's protest against the Church's proscriptions and the final victory of *terra mater* after centuries of struggles and atrocious persecutions.

The predominance of women over men in the witch-cult is easily explained by the fact that women are more conservative than men and hold more firmly to ancient beliefs and traditions. Jules Michelet, however, maintains that so many members of the weaker sex surrendered themselves to Satanism in medieval times for the reason that Satan lifted woman from the low position in which she had been held by the Church. His portrait of the medieval witch contains more poetry than history. In his opinion, she is the forerunner of the modern social reformer and natural scientist. She had neither father nor mother, nor son, nor husband, nor family. She was a marvel, an aerolith, alighted no one knew whence. Her place of abode was in spots impracticable, in a forest of brambles, on a wild moor where thorn and thistle forbade approach. She passed the night under an old cromlech. If any one found her there, she was isolated by the common dread; she was surrounded, as it were, by a ring of fire, and yet she was a woman. This very life of hers, dreadful though it appeared, tightened and braced her woman's energy. "You may see her endowed with two gifts. One is the inspiration of lucid frenzy, which, in its several degrees, becomes poesy, second sight, depth of insight, cunning simplicity of speech, the power especially of believing in yourself through all your delusions. . . . From this gift flows the other, the sublime power of unaided conception." But now the witch has nothing to say. "Her ashes have been scattered to the winds." She has perished, chiefly by the progress of those very sciences which began with her through the physician, the naturalist, for whom she had once toiled.

[13] Mr. A. R. Allinson has translated this book into English under the title, *The Sorceress, A Study in Middle Age Superstition.* The translation appeared in 1904 in Paris.

The witch groups were organized in worshipping congregations governed by boards known as "covens." The leader was believed to have divine inspiration by his followers, diabolic inspiration by outsiders. He was called the Devil, and in the ceremonial processions he brought up the rear, thus giving rise to the old saying, "the Devil take the hindermost." Mr. R. Lowe Thompson, in his recently published book, *The History of the Devil,* maintains that the leader in the witch-cult was first a magician—a magician disguised as an animal with horns and tail, who afterwards became a priest. When, in his later rôle as a god, he was dethroned by Christianity and driven underground, he turned into the lord of the underworld and king of the dead and finally into the Devil, as the medieval witch knew him. The Reverend Montague Summers in his recent book, *The History of Witchcraft and Demonology,* maintains that the Devil "was present in person for the hideous adoration of his besotted worshippers.[13a]

According to popular belief, the witch repaired to her secret tryst with Satan in the following manner: She removed every stitch of clothing, sat down on a broom stick, took three swallows from a liquid contained in a black bottle, immediately flew up the chimney and was gone. If she employed the goat as a mount, the witch anointed her body with a certain oil which endowed her with the power to fly through the air with the rapidity of a flash of lightning.

The meetings of the witches were held at fixed spots, chiefly in desolate heaths and hills (like the Broken or Blocksberg in Germany[14]), sometimes near the water and often at some old stand-

[13a] The book of this English clergyman represents wholly the medieval point of view. Mr. Summers shows himself in his work as an uncompromising inquisitor who would be only too glad to send heretics and "witches" to the stake if the secular authorities still executed the decrees of the Holy Office." See also his book *The Geography of Witchcraft.* (London, 1927.)

[14] Brocken is the Roman Mons Bructerus, the highest peak in the Harz mountains, in fact in Northern Germany. It is 3,745 feet above the sea-level. Old tradition has it that on this mountain witches, devils and all uncanny creatures meet for a great revelry on the night between April 30 and May 1. This tradition seems to go back to the old heathen spring festival, which the early Christians considered as "devilish." Goethe selected the Brocken for the place of one of the scenes in *Faust,* a fact which has greatly added to the popularity of this mountain. Its summit may now be reached during the summer months by a mountain railway, starting from Wernigerode. In winter the ascent, necessarily on foot, is sometimes difficult on account of the snow which often reaches a depth of several feet. Blocksberg is the popular name for the Brocken.

ing stone or megalithic monument. All around the meeting-place boiling cauldrons served as torches.

Spanish witches did not congregate, according to popular belief, in their own country, but across the seas in South America. Spain was too holy to permit a Witches' Sabbath to be held on its soil. The Spanish witches, unlike their sisters in other countries, did not mount on brooms or goats to fly to their revels with the devils, but repaired to their trans-Atlantic meeting-place in boats which sailed so fast that in three hours they travelled across the ocean and back again without ever being detected by their unsuspecting husbands. They must necessarily have had a strong wind at their command, for it was none other than the Devil himself who bellied out the sails of their boats (Prosper Mérimée: *les Sorcierès espagnoles,* 1829).

The main reunions of the witches occurred on May Eve (April 30), which was sometimes known as Toodmas in Great Britain and as Walpurgis Night in Germany,[14a] and on November Eve (October 31), called Hallowe'en. As a later addition, midway between these nights of power, we have witches' gatherings on Candlemas (February 2), and on Lammas, otherwise called the Gule of August (August 1). At each of the great assemblies, there were two gatherings. One was the "Sabbath,"[14b] a public meeting of all the witches in the district, who feasted, danced and celebrated their rites, worshipped their god, and indulged in all sorts of orgies. The other meeting, the "esbat," which was not open to the public, was a sort of business council at which the affairs of the cult were discussed by the officials, and the more esoteric rites were carried out by skilled hands. These secret ceremonies included blood sacrifices of creatures—such as a cat, a dog, a red cock, or an unbaptized child. In addition to the four great assemblies, smaller gatherings were held every week. It was believed that the devil-

[14a] Walpurga was an English saint, who accompanied her uncle St. Boniface to Germany in the eighth century to aid him in the foundation of religious houses. Her commemoration day fell on the 1st of May, the date of the great heathen spring festival, which was decried by the early Christians as devil-worship. In consequence, by a strange iron of coincidence, the name of the good saint became associated with that "unholy carnival" into which the Christian imagination transformed the May Day ceremonies. See the scene "Walpurgisnacht" in the First Part of Goethe's *Faust.*

[14b] The word "Sabbath," it should be remembered, has no relation to the Jewish day of rest, but is most probably derived from the French word *s'esbattre,* which means "to frolic." In contrast to the old Puritan Sabbath, the Witches' Sabbath contained elements of joy.

THE WITCHES' SABBATH. (After Picart)

worshippers met on Thursdays to forestall the Mohammedans, who gathered for the adoration of their god on Fridays; of the Jews, who observed their day of rest on Saturdays; and of the Christians, who worshipped the Lord on Sundays.[15]

The main part of the ritual of a Witches' Sabbath consisted of hymns and prayers addressed to the Devil.[16] When the religious rites were ended, the feast commenced, all partaking of the choicest wines and the most delicious meats. Salt is said never to have been used in the witch ceremonies. The Devil, as heir of the ancient death-demons, appears in all European folk-lore as a hater of salt, the agent of preservation. Salt was used in the Middle Ages in the rites of exorcism. In the Catholic Church, a child is still given salt at baptism in order to drive out the Devil. "When I am at table and feel no hunger," we are told by Richalmus, a Cistercian monk, abbot of Schoenthal in Württemberg, who lived in the first part of the thirteenth century, "as soon as I take a little salt, the appetite, of which the Devil robbed me, returns; when my appetite disappears again after a while, I take salt again, and I am again hungry."

The feast was followed by lively dances accompanied by the music of violins, flutes, citterns, hautboys, tambourines and bagpipes. The feasts and dances led up to ecstasies and orgies of a rather promiscuous kind. It was believed that each and every witch had ceremonial union with the Devil, as her lord and master. These "Satanic stunts" reached their climax when "a Jew was married to a toad" (Alexander Pushkin: "The Hussar," 1833).

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The fact is worth noting that the church did not start its campaign of extermination against the witch-cult until the end of the Middle Ages.[17] In the first centuries of the Christian era, the Church ignored this secret survival of ancient paganism and refused

[15] The matter summarized in this paragraph has been taken chiefly from the books by Miss Murray and by Mr. Thompson. *Cf.* also the present writer's review of Mr. Thompson's book, which appeared in the *Sewanee Review*, of October, 1929.

[16] The music of the Witches' Sabbath was probably not of the best. The choir could hardly be expected to be composed of trained and well modulated voices. In Victor Hugo's novel, *Han d'Islande* (1823), it is said that "Beelzebub's punishment is frightful indeed if he is condemned to hear the chorus of the women of Drontheim once a week."

[17] Jules Michelet unhesitatingly asserted that the witch first appeared in the "age of despair" engendered by the gentry of the Church.

to put any credence in the confused mass of superstition that gathered around witchcraft as a nucleus. An episcopal document of the ninth century reprimanded the belief, current among credulous folk, in the nocturnal mid-air trips undertaken by wild women at the order of the Devil. It was not until several centuries afterwards that the Church revealed its full faith in these superstitions and persecuted all whom she suspected of participating in revels which she had previously declared to be sheer phantasms. "After the Church itself stiffened into a hierarchy," writes Gustav Freytag, "after the unlimited pretensions of the popes drove many a stout heart to heresy, after more than one nation became stultified under the domination of the mendicant friars, then this superstition gradually developed in the Church into a well-grounded and deep-rooted belief. Whatever passed as devilish was wiped out in bloody persecution."[18]

After the famous and fatal bull "Summis desiderantes" issued by Innocent VIII in 1484, a burning of witches began in all European countries that continued, with interruptions, until far into the eighteenth century. The witch-hunt abated somewhat during the Reformation period, Catholics and Protestants being then deeply engrossed in persecuting each other. It was, however, soon revived and raged with greater fury than ever. Catholics and Calvinists vied with each other in burning the greater number of witches for the greater glory of God. The Puritans carried the witch-hunt into the New World. The witch-hangings at Salem and in other American towns form a dark chapter in the history of the New Continent.

Thanks to the heroic efforts of a Cornelius Agrippa, a Johannes Wierus and a Friedrich Spe, the belief in witchcraft gradually disappeared in the various European countries. Holland abolished witch persecution in 1610; Geneva in 1632, Sweden in 1649, and England in 1682. The last judicial execution for witchcraft in Europe took place in Poland in 1793, when two old women were burned at the stake. In one European country, witchcraft still has a legal status. Ireland even now recognizes witchcraft as an offence against the law. In the Commission of Peace, the newly appointed magistrate is empowered to take cognizance, among other

[18] Gustav Freytag, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

crimes, of "Witchcraft, Inchantment, Sorcery, Magic Arts."[19]

The belief in witchcraft, however, has not wholly disappeared even in the twentieth century. An unbelievably wide-spread condition of superstition and sorcery still exists in many European countries. It is generally known that faith in witchcraft and fear of the evil eye are prevalent among certain uneducated classes in small European towns. An incident that recently occurred at Bordeaux, in France, shows that the belief in witchcraft has made headway even in the advanced modern cities. In our own country, "Voodooism" is manifestly a lineal descendant of medieval witchcraft. The "hex murders" in a small Pennsylvania town not so long ago furnish sufficient proof that the witch, in the United States, has not passed out of the realm of belief with the Salem persecutions. Witchcraft, however, is not limited to remote towns in the United States. It has repeatedly come to light even in our centers of civilization. In New York, in Chicago and in most of the big cities of this country, there are thousands of persons, mostly of foreign extraction, who still believe in and practice the arts of witchcraft. The fear of the evil-eye, which prevails among many classes in our big cities, has been brought over primarily from Italy, where this superstition still counts thousands upon thousands of believers. In Naples, the *jettatore,* as the owner of the evil eye is called, is so feared that, at his approach, a street is rapidly emptied of men, women and children. In India, China, Turkey, and Greece, there exists a belief that the evil eye affects also horses and cattle. The persistence of the belief in the evil eye shows with what tenacity old beliefs and ancient superstitions will continue to exist through the ages.[20]

[19] *Cf.* St. John D. Seymour: *Irish Demonology and Witchcraft* (New York, 1913), p. 248.

[20] The matter of medieval witchcraft is avowedly treated summarily in this paper. The reader, who is interested in this subject, is referred to the works by Miss Murray and Mr. Thompson already mentioned, and especially to Professor G. L. Kittredge's thorough work *Witchcraft in Old and New England,* which has just been published. Among German studies on the subject we will mention the following: W. G. Soldan: *Geschichte der Hexenprozesse* (1843, 3. Aufl. 2 Bde. 1912); Johann Diefenbach: *Der Hexenwahn* (1886). A curious little book on the Witches' Sabbath is *le Sabbat des Sorciers* by Bourneville and E. Teinturier, which appeared in the *Bibliothèque diabolique* (2nd ed., 1890). Of particular interest is the book *Là-Bas* by the French novelist Joris-Karl Huysmans (1891), which was originally intended by its author as a serious study rather than a novel. In the journal *Echo de Paris,* where it first ran in serial form, it had as subtitle "Etude sur le satanisme." *Là-Bas* is a store-house of occult sciences. We learn in it all about ecclesiology, liturgy, astrology, theurgy, therapy, alchemy, sorcery, necromancy, sadism,

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Nor is devil-worship wholly extinct in modern times. Contemporary Satanism, however, is not historic, but ecclectic. It is not directly connected with medieval witchcraft, although it borrowed many elements from the cult. In contrast to the medieval witch-cult, modern Satanism is practiced by the cultured classes in the European capitals. Huysmans in his novel *Là-Bas* affirms that "the cult of Satan still survives in France as in the other principal European countries and that it has not been unknown even in England during the past hundred years."[21] The English critic, Mr. Arthur Symons, who certainly cannot be accused of credulity, maintains that "all but the most horrible practices of the sacrilegious magic of the Middle Ages are yet performed from time to time in a secrecy which is all but absolute."[22] The Reverend Mr. Montague Summers likewise asserts that "Satanists yet celebrate the Black Mass in London, Brighton, Paris, Lyons, Bruges, Berlin, Milan, and alas! in Rome itself. . . . Often they seem to concentrate their vile energies in quiet cathedral cities of England, France and Italy."[23]

Although Huysmans' presentation of modern Satanism is offered in the form of fiction, the impression must not be gained that it was evolved out of the author's imagination. As a naturalist, Huysmans relied for his material wholly on observation and documentation. He must have read hundreds of folios and collected mountains of notes in the preparation of his book, which Léon Bloy calls a cataclysm of documents. Huysmans supplemented his reading by personal observation. For several years previous to the publication of his novel, he zealously frequented the circles of the

vampirism, incubism, succubism, and all other varieties of black magic, in addition to somewhat more conventional subjects, ranging from painting to cooking. In this book, we are also told the history of Gilles de Rais, who was a leader in the medieval witch-cult, we are instructed in regard to the meaning of the sacrifice of Melchisedek, and we are informed concerning the person of Antichrist and the teaching of Paracelsus. This frightful book, as it has aptly been called, also appeared a few years ago in this country in an abbreviated English translation but was driven under cover immediately upon its publication.

[21] Huysmans reiterated his firm belief in the existence of the Satanic cult in the prefatory essay he contributed to Jules Bois's book, *le Satanisme et la magie* (1895).

[22] *Cf.* Arthur Symons: *Figures of Several Centuries* (London, 1916), p. 296, and *The Symbolist Movement in Literature* (London, 1919), p. 257.

[23] Montague Summers: *The History of Witchcraft and Demonology.* London, 1926.

Rosicrucians, Illuminists,[24] spiritualists and other occultists of the type of the Marquis de Guaita, who, in 1888, founded the neo-Rosicrucian Society of Paris, and Joséphin Péladan, who assumed the title of Sar and who dabbled in all sorts of diabolism. The bulk of his information with regard to modern Satanism was furnished Huysmans by the ex-abbé Boullan, of Lyons, to whom he addressed himself in a letter during the preparation of his novel, stating that he wished proofs of Satanism "in order to be able to affirm that the Devil existed, that he reigned, that the power he had in the Middle Ages had not diminished and that he still was the absolute Master, the Omniarch." The ex-abbé, who figures in *Là-Bas* under the most flattering aspects as Dr. Johannès, an exorcist, was well competent to furnish the desired information, inasmuch as he himself committed the acts which he attributed to others. He hoodwinked Huysmans with regard to his own work, presenting himself as an exorcist and a victim of the machinations of certain unfrocked priests, to whom he ascribed the very deeds committed by himself. The principal proofs of the existence of a cult of Satan furnished by Boullan to Huysmans were the frequent thefts of consecrated wafers throughout France, which, as he maintained, were employed in the celebration of the Black Mass.

The description of the Black Mass, which forms the central episode of *Là-Bas* and which is so marvelously painted in all of its revolting details, has been derived from the manuals of the Inquisition and the reports of the parliamentarians, and supplemented by a study of the life of Vintras, a wonder-worker, who was charged by two former members of his sect with the celebration of the Black Mass.[25] Remy de Gourmont also helped the author in his documentation on the tradition of the Black Mass. But Gourmont soon lost interest in these investigations, having finally arrived at the conclusion that no such diabolical ceremony had ever been celebrated in the Middle Ages, and left Huysmans to construct

[24] The original "Illuminati" were a secret mystical sect which sprang up in Bavaria under the leadership of Adam Weishaupt in the latter part of the eighteenth century, and which found adherents also in France. Secret societies were extremely numerous in that country and "Illuminism" of various kinds took particular hold of men's minds during the period just prior to the Revolution. *Cf.* J. P. L. de la Roche du Moine, Marquis de Luchet: *Essai sur la secte des Illuminés.* Paris, 1789.

[25] On the machinations of Boullan and Vintras and other men of their stamp, see Jules Bois: *les Petites religions de Paris* (1894).

unaided the unsavory episodes of his novel.[26] Johanny Bricaud, who knew Huysmans personally, maintains, however, that the novelist actually assisted at a Black Mass in the rue de Sèvres, the street in which he lived,[27] although he may have drawn largely on his documentation for many of the most diabolical diversions connected with this ceremony. The reader cannot bring himself to believe that practices of this kind still exist in modern times—from the horrible profanation of the Eucharist, with which the Black Mass begins, to the atrocious and promiscuous orgies, with which it ends. It is also doubtful whether a woman of the type of Mme Chantelouve exists even in the Bohemian quarters of Paris. The contemporary cult of Satan is primarily a diabolism of debauchery. The principal part of the modern Black Mass consists of sexual perversions of all kinds. The materialist Des Hermies in *Là-Bas* reveals a deep insight into human nature when, with regard to Durtal's description of the Black Mass supposedly celebrated in Paris, he remarks: "Je suis sûr qu'en invoquant Belzébuth, ils pensent aux prélibations charnelles" (I am certain that in invoking Beelzebub, they only think of carnal prelibations.[28]

Huysmans, following the lead of other ultra-Catholic writers, includes the Masons among the devil-worshippers in his novel

[26] Remy de Gourmont's essay on Huysmans' *Là-Bas* entitled "le Paganism éternel" in his book of essays *la Culture des idées* (1900) is very interesting in the light of our discussion.

[27] *Cf.* Johanny Bricaud: *J. K. Huysmans et le Satanisme* (1913), p. 16.

[28] Mr. Harry Kemp, in an article contributed to the Sunday edition of the New York *World*, of August 2, 1914, described the activities of a Satanic cult in London, which he claimed had even spread to this country.

It is not the object of this article to go at length into the matter of modern devil-worship in France, but the reader, who is interested in this question, will find ample material in the following books and magazine articles: Alexandre Erdan: *la France mystique* (1853); Charles Sauvestre: *les Congrégations religieuses dévoilées* (1867); Stanislas de Guaita: *Essais de sciences maudites* (1886). M. Jules Bois, who is at present residing in the United States, has constituted himself the historian of modern Satanism by his book *les Petites religions de Paris* (1893) and especially by his study *le Satanisme et la magie* (1895). M. Bois's views on modern Satanism are detailed by Miss Marie A. Belloc in her interview with this French writer, which appeared under the title "Satanism: Ancient and Modern" in the London monthly magazine *The Humanitarian*, vol. XI (1897), pp. 81-7, and by Thomas Walsh in his article "The Amateurs of Satan" published in the New York *Bookman*, vol. IX (1899), pp. 220-23. M. Bois has in recent years found a competitor in R. Schwæblé, who has written the novel *Chez Satan: Roman de mœurs de satanistes contemporains* (1906) and the two studies *le Satanisme flagellé; Satanistes contemporains, incubat, succubat, sadisme et satanisme* (1912), and *Chez Satan, Pages à l'Index. Possession* (1913). Johanny Bricaud, author of *J. K. Huysmans et le satanisme* (1913), already mentioned, announced for publication a study, *le Satanisme contemporain*, which apparently has not yet appeared.

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Là-Bas. But especially in his preface to Jules Bois's study on Satanism, he expresses his belief that the Masons worship the Devil, although he calls them Luciferians in contrast to the Satanists and thus renders them slightly less odious than other devil-worshippers. The distinction between these two classes of diabolists consists in the fact that, while the Satanists worship the Devil as the spirit of evil, the Luciferians see in him the spirit of good. Huysmans has many surprises for the American reader. One may learn from him that devil-worship existed in our own country as well as in Europe, and that Americans were at the head of the two international associations for the Propagation of the Faith in the Prince of Darkness. Huysmans asserts that the "Ré-Theurgists-Optimates,"[29] founded in 1855, with headquarters in America, had for their Grand Master no less a person than the poet Longfellow, whose official title was "Grand-Prêtre du Nouveau Magisme Evocateur" (High Priest of the New Evocatory Sorcery.[30] At the head of the second diabolical organization in America stood the Southern poet General Albert Pike, who was called "le vicaire du Très-Bas, le pontife installé dans la Rome infernale" (The vicar of the Very-Low, the Pontiff installed in the Infernal Rome), by which infernal Rome was meant our good Southern town of Charleston, S. C. Albert Pike, together with the Mormon bishop John Taylor, is alleged to have introduced into France, in 1881, the so-called "Maçonnerie Palladique" (Palladic, *i. e.* Luciferian Masonry).[31]

The Catholics have always considered the Freemasons allies of the Devil. They are believed to have surrendered their souls to Satan, whom they worship in their rites and ceremonials. But, toward the end of the last century, Europe was literally flooded with accusations of devil-worship and immorality against the Masons. This occurred on the occasion of the papal encyclic "Humanum genus," in which the faithful were urged to "snatch from Free-

[29] This extraordinary phrase is, according to Mr. F. Legge, "apparently composed of three languages: Optimates is used by Cicero for the aristocratic, as opposed to the popular, party; Theurgos is a man who works wonders by means of the gods, . . . Ré is apparently the Egyptian sun-god Ra" ("Devil-worship and Freemasonry" in *The Contemporary Review,* vol. LXX [1896], p. 472, note).

[30] Huysmans innocently followed his authorities, who, curiously enough, confused the poet Longfellow with a Scotchman by the same name, who was said to have helped in the organization of the "New Reformed Palladium." *Cf.* Arthur Edward Waite: *Devil-Worship in France* (London, 1896), p. 35.

[31] *Ibid.,* pp. 32 ff.

masonry the mask with which it is covered, and to let it be seen what it really is." The ball was set rolling by Léo Taxil (pseud. of Gabriel-Jogand Pagès), who, in the very year of his conversion, gave to the world the first of his "complete revelations concerning Freemasonry," in two volumes called *The Brethren of the Three Points* (1884). This writer started his literary career as editor of *l'Anti-Clérical,* an anti-clerical paper of the lowest type, but later was converted, or reverted, to the faith of his childhood. He published his books under various pseudonyms in order to gain greater credence among his readers. He kept up this deception as long as he could, and, in the year 1897, on the eve of being exposed, publicly confessed that all his revelations about Masonic devil-worship were a hoax. Other books by this anti-Masonic writer are: *The Cult of the Grand Architect* (1886); *Sister Masons,* or *Ladies' Freemasonry* (1888); and *Are There Women in Freemasonry?* (1891). His novel, *The Devil in the Nineteenth Century,* appeared in serial form, in 1892-1895, under the pseudonym of Dr. Bataille. His *Memoirs of an ex-Palladist* were passed off as the work of an English lady, Miss Diana Vaughan, who claimed that she had seen Lucifer appearing at one of the meetings of a Masonic ladies' auxiliary as a very handsome young man, clad in a golden *maillot* and seated on a throne of diamonds.

This great accuser of the Masonic Brethren was followed by others, chief among whom were Mgr. Léon Meurin, S. J., archbishop of Port-Louis in Mauritius, author of the book entitled *The Freemasonry; The Synagogue of Satan* (1893), and Signor Domenico Margiotta, commander of a pontifical order, whose chief book of accusation against the Masons is named *The Palladism as Cult of Satan-Lucifer* 1895). Obviously Signor Margiotta does not uphold the distinction between Satanists and Luciferians marked by other writers. He received from the Pope the apostolic benediction for his denunciation of the Masons, his former associates. Other anti-Masonic writers were Paul Rosen, author of *Satan and Company* (1888), and Jean Koska (pseud. of Jules Doinel), who wrote a book with the significant title of *Lucifer Unmasked* (1895).[32]

[32] The reader who is interested in this Catholic-Masonic controversy, in addition to the writings of Legge and Waite already mentioned, is referred to the following books and magazine articles: Arthur Lillie: *The Worship of Satan in Modern France* (1896); Bräunlich: *Der neueste Teufelsschwindel* (1897); and Charles Henry: "Der entlarvte Lucifer" in the Stuttgart Socialist monthly *Die neue Zeit,* vol. XV (1897), II, pp. 490-98.

THE LATER AWARDS OF THE CORNPLANTER MEDAL

BY FREDERICK STARR

THE history of *The Cornplanter Medal for Iroquois Research,* from the time of its establishment to its fifth award has been made known through a series of articles, which, not only reached the readers of the magazines in which they were printed, but as separately printed were further distributed.[1] Since the fifth award, in 1912, no detailed publicity has been given to it. In the present article its further history, from that time to the present is sketched.

In establishing the medal in 1904 I indicated four classes of recipients—Ethnologists, Historians, Artists and Philanthropists. First awarded in 1904 to General John D. Clark of Auburn, New York, the medal is administered by the Cayuga County Historical Society and is given once in two years. There has been a slight irregularity in the award of late but the intention is that it is to be given in February of the even-numbered years. The awards to date are as follows:

1904. John D. Clark, Auburn, N. Y.
1906. William M. Beauchamp, Syracuse, N. Y.
1908. David Boyle, Toronto, Ont.
1910. William P. Letchworth, Buffalo, N. Y.
1912. Reuben Gold Thwaites, Madison, Wis.
1914. J. N. B. Hewitt, Washington, D. C.
1916. Arthur C. Parker, Rochester, N. Y.
1919. Alvin H. Dewey, Rochester, N. Y.
1920. Mrs. Mary Clark Thompson, Canandaigua, N. Y.

[1] *The Cornplanter Medal.* The American Journal of Numismatics. 1905; *The Cornplanter Medal.* The Open Court, March, 1905; *William M. Beauchamp and the Cornplanter Medal.* The Open Court, February, 1906; *The Cornplanter Medal for Iroquois Research.* The Open Court, May, 1908; *The Cornplanter Medal and William P. Letchworth.* The Open Court, 1910; *The Cornplanter Medal for Iroquois Research and Reuben Gold Thwaites.* The American Antiquarian, March, 1912.

1923. Frederick Houghton, Buffalo, N. Y.
1926. Edward H. Gohl, Auburn, N. Y.

It is expected that an award will be made in 1930. The Medal has come to be highly prized and there is no lack of names submitted for its award.

In 1914 the medal was given to a man eminent in the field of American ethnology. He is himself of Indian descent—Iroquois, a Tuscarora. John Napoleon Brinton Hewitt was born at Lewiston, N. Y., on December 16, 1859. So far as gained through schools, his education das received from the local public schools. He was ever a diligent student and an indefatigable worker. When but twenty years of age he became the amanuensis to Mrs. Erminnie A. Smith

ARTHUR C. PARKER

J. N. B. HEWITT

BY G. V. BUCK, WASHINGTON, D. C.

of Jersey City, who was a worker in the Bureau of American Ethnology, especially interested in Iroquois legends and ceremonials. She became acquainted with young Hewitt in her field work and owed much of her achievement to his assistance. Mr. Hewitt remained in association with Mrs. Smith until 1885, a period of six years. He was then for a year in business life, employed by the Adams Express Co., but then became definitely connected with the Bureau of American Ethnology, a connection which has continued to the present time. J. N. B. Hewitt is a member of the Washington Anthropological Society and of the American Anthropological

Association. His work has been especially in the direction of the mythology, sociology and sophiology of the American Indians, particularly of the Iroquois. Mr. Hewitt is an authority on the languages of the Iroquois and a large part of his printed work consists of interlinear (Iroquois and English) texts in the subjects mentioned. No one in the field commands greater respect for genuine scholarship than Mr. Hewitt and the founder of the medal and the society which administers it, felt especial satisfaction in this first award of it to a member of an Iroquois tribe.

It happens that the award of 1916 was also made to an Iroquois. Arthur Caswell Parker is a member of the Seneca tribe and was born on the Cattaraugus Reservation on April 5, 1881. He was the grandnephew of General Ely S. Parker, who was military-secretary of U. S. Grant and a co-worker with Lewis H. Morgan in the preparation of that famous book—*The League of the Iroquois*—a classic in American ethnology. Handsome Lake, "the Seneca Prophet" and founder of "the New Religion," was Arthur C. Parker's grandfather's grandfather. Arthur received his education first in the reservation schools and then outside in high school and seminary. Later, he made studies in American archaeology under Professor Frederic Ward Putnam of the Peabody Museum, Cambridge. Mr. Parker did a valuable and useful work in connection with the Society of American Indians. One of its founders in 1911, he long served as its secretary-treasurer and the editor of its magazine. His writings upon the status, condition and problems of the Indian have been many and valuable. His scientific work has been chiefly in the direction of Iroquoian archaeology and ethnology. His professional work began with field exploration in 1901 for Professor Putnam and the American Museum of Natural History. In 1905 he did archeological work for the New York State Educational Department and in the next year he was appointed archeologist for the State Museum at Albany. He here built up a most interesting and popular department and published a series of works dealing with Iroquois subjects. *The Code of Handsome Lake,* published by the Museum has a double interest in itself and in the fact that Mr. Parker is a descendant of the prophet. Limitations of space prevent a full discussion of Arthur Parker's printed works. His *Archeological History of New York* and his *Seneca Folk-Tales* are perhaps the best known. Since 1925 Mr. Parker has been the director of the Rochester Municipal Museum, which under his con-

trol has grown from obscurity and insignificance into an institution which is creditable to that beautiful city and promises a great future development.

In 1919 the Cornplanter Medal was given to Mr. Alvin H. Dewey of Rochester, in which city he was long a real power, his influence being felt alike in business, civic and social life. He was born in Watertown, New York, August 5, 1859. He was educated in that city and for a time published a daily paper there. He removed to Rochester in 1885 and from that time up to his death, in 1928, he was in active business in that city. His interest in archaeology began early. He came into personal contact with the Indians, who gave him the name *Gawa Sowanch,* meaning perhaps "the Talking Leaves." He was active in the founding of the Lewis H.

MRS. MARY CLARK THOMPSON

ALVIN H. DEWEY

Morgan Chapter of the New York State Archeological Society and for twelve years was its president. At the time of his death he was president of the State Society. Mr. Dewey was greatly interested in the founding and development of the Municipal Museum, serving as president of its committee and his sympathy and helpful advice have counted for much in its growth.

The one woman to receive the medal up to the present was Mrs. Mary Clark Thompson, to whom it was given in 1920. Daughter of Myron H. Clark, once governor of the State of New York, she was born in the village of Naples, December 27, 1835. Her parents

moved afterward to Canandaigua. She received her education in the village schools and in the once famous Ontario Female Seminary. She was married in 1857 to Frederick Ferris Thompson, well known New York City banker. A woman of large means and social position, Mrs. Thompson was constantly a contributor to varied and helpful community services. While she spent much time in the great city and at beautiful country homes she was always particularly interested in the advancement and improvement of Canandaigua. Without ostentation or display, she liberally contributed to many worthy causes. She aided not only New York and Canandaigua enterprises, she gave substantial assistance to Vassar College and Williams College. Her chief claim to the Cornplanter Medal was the fact that she provided the means for the construction of the series of Iroquois Indian "habitat groups" at the State Museum in Albany. At the time when they were made Doctor John M. Clark, her kinsman, was the director of the Museum and Mr. Parker was State Archeologist. It was under his direction and in accordance with his plans that they were assembled. There are six of them, representing hunting, warfare, council, ceremony, industry and agriculture. The figures in the groups are of life size and were made from living models. Mrs. Thompson is said to have supplied $60,000 for the project. When the Cornplanter Medal was awarded to her, Mrs. Thompson was unable to be present and Doctor John M. Clark went to Auburn to represent her and receive it. Mrs. Clark died in Canandaigua in July, 1923, at the age of 87 years. She will be long remembered for her good works.

One of the best museums in the United States, one in which the idea of popular education is particularly emphasized, is the Buffalo Museum, outgrowth and development of the old Buffalo Society of Natural History. Mr. Frederick Houghton, principal of Public School Number 69, is one of the men to whom it is due. He has been a deep student of the early history and archeology of his region. From 1908 to 1918 he was in charge of the archeological and ethnological department of the museum of the Buffalo Society of Natural Science (originally the Buffalo Society of Natural History). He carried on field work, organized the displays, and studied all printed sources of information. By careful comparative studies, based upon the excavation of town sites and archaeological specimens, he separated the difficult cultures represented in the region

and was able to trace the movement of the Senecas into the area. He clearly characterized three cultures,—that of the Neutral Nation, that of the Senecas, and that of an unknown Iroquois tribe who were in possession before the Senecas came crowding in. The results of his investigations were presented in a series of scholarly papers. Professor Houghton not only traced the movement of the Senecas into the Western New York area, he followed their history from the time of their arrival up to the present. He has shown a practical interest int the recent dispute between the Seneca Indians and the State of New York and has aided the Indians in the effort to re-establish their legal rights. He has also been active in securing the free passage of the Seneca back and forth between the United States and Canada, passage which had been barred by the customs authorities. Mr. Houghton, is of course, a member of the Board of Directors of the new Museum of Natural History. His school service deserves mention. He has been on the public school force for thirty-five years, and has three schools, with nineteen hundred pupils, mostly Polish, in his charge. He is also director of immigrant education for Buffalo and has about one hundred classes of adult foreigners in citizenship instruction under his jurisdiction. His list of activities is, however, too long to be further followed.

The last award of the Cornplanter Medal was made under exceptional circumstances. Edward Heinrich Gohl was born in Harrisville, Pennsylvania, November 3, 1862, the tenth in a family of sixteen children. From early childhood he was an indefatiguable reader and a serious student. As a little boy he used a pencil and delighted to copy and recopy the illustrations of a book about Indians that was on the family bookshelf. From a neighboring boy friend he learned of Indian relics and became so keen a collector that at fourteen years he had accumulated a large collection. At that time he determined to devote himself to art and, disposing of his collection, discontinued his archaeological activities. Through his early life he was delicate and weakly. His out-door rambles, archaeological and artistic, no doubt did much to improve his physique but he was always frail and slight—his height but five feet three inches and his weight never more than ninety-eight pounds. Once committed to art Mr. Gohl threw himself into it with enthusiasm. His success in landscape was greater than in portraiture. In

1884 he visited the Finger Lake Region of New York and was so much pleased with it that he settled in Auburn, which was his home from that time. Here he plied his art and here he resumed his interest in Indians and in archaeology. In 1906 Mr. Gohl made a series of mural paintings for the grill-room of the Osborn House. They represent the coming of the first white settlers and the life of the Cayuga Indians. Mr. Gohl used Iroquois (Onendaga) models and made warm friendship with them. He became deeply interested not only in them, but in their people. He was adopted by them and given the name *Tai-Goh-wens*. Mr. Gohl was long interested in Socialism and was for a time an outspoken champion and supporter of its principles. He was an ardent admirer of Lewis H. Morgan's *Ancient Society*. He was interested in designing and materializing the bronze memorial tablet to Morgan which is at Wells College, Aurora. It was perhaps his political views which gave him a particularly keen sense of the wrongs done the Iroquois. He was a staunch supporter of their rights and actively opposed measures, both at Albany and Washington, which he considered against their interest. At Auburn he resumed his studies in archeology and early local history. He not only located unknown village sites and explored them, he aroused an interest in other Auburnians in the subject and called the attention of the state archeologists to his finds. He was a devoted friend of the Cauyuga County Historical Society and in the candidates for the Cornplanter Medal. He had long been in line for the award, but actively interested himself in directing its bestowal on others—Parker, Dewey, Mrs. Thompson. When, in May, 1926, Mr. Gohl was seriously ill and it was recognized that death was approaching, it was decided that the medal should be given him without delay. A special meeting was arranged at the home of the president of the Society. A program was carried out in which Mr. Parker—coming from Rochester for the purpose—made the chief address and received the medal on Mr. Gohl's behalf. A small committe, including President Searing and Mr. Parker, then went to Mr. Gohl's apartment, where the medal was transferred to him. He was keenly appreciative and deeply touched. A few days later he died.

Surely the recipients of the Cornplanter Medal for Iroquois Research form an interesting, a worthy, list.

THE VITAL ELEMENT IN BELIEF

BY RUSSELL F. SPEIRS

I HAVE lately been reading De Unamuno, Bertrand Russell, Santayana, and Whitman. I have been interested in the manner in which each has expressed himself upon that great problem which brooks no solution—the problem of immortality. Having listened to what each has said, I find that I am neither for nor against the belief in immortality. As mere beliefs, immortality and mortality may avail nothing and indeed be unimportant to man. We do not live by what are commonly called beliefs but by hungers and passions, for of these is begotten insight. And we live by insight, which is vital belief. Before a belief can become vital it must be integral with the spirit of man, one with his entire being; and by that time it has attained an intensity and purity which have made of it something more than a mere belief. Instead of it, whatever *it* may be, being a part of man, man sees to become a part of It. (I have capitalized this last *It* advisedly.)

How many people, people who think men good or bad according to what beliefs they maintain, in seeking to know a person, ask the question: "Do you believe in God?" or "Do you believe in immortality?" and are satisfied with a simple *Yes* or *No,* whichever corresponds with their own prejudice. "Good," they say, "I know you. You are right; you will be admitted into the fold." But in truth they only reveal the fact that they do not even know themselves. Beliefs *per se* are of no great value. Believing persons whose whole spirits have been kindled by what they believe, are of value. They belong to Earth's best. They have some vital connection with eixstence. They are God's handful and justify His experiment with this mystery that we call Life.

When is a belief important? When does it become more than a mere belief? When it has the kindling power of wine, or fire.

But it must do more than kindle. We have all known "possessed" persons, the lesser breed of fanatics, who have plenty of fire in them but who are enveloped in their own smoke, a smoke that also envelopes others and causes confusion and discord. A belief is important when it astonishes the believer with the light it sheds upon the whole of eixstence. In a vital belief the importance of illumination transcends that of comfort. The belief of a person in immortality because he is horrified at the thought of his own annihilation is only significant in that it reveals something of selfishness and cowardice. But one such belief does not convince us that all belief in immortality is selfish, cowardly, worthless. It does let us see that beliefs are not necessarily coeval with values.

It must be admitted that a great deal of what has been said and written about immortality is offensive stuff. In those who scoff at the idea there is often a meanness of spirit, a petty arrogance, or a sniveling grief. In many who prate about the idea in churches there is a certain lack of manliness and courage. They use a terminology that is old and lifeless. It is at once apparent that they have no living experience to impart; all they have is an absurd, aenemic vocabulary. They speak to us of eternal life, but the death-rattle is in their words. One listens and hears the hollow tones of Death speaking of immortality. Horrible mockery! Of what value is a belief if it quicken not the spirit of the believer but is at most a pleasant opiate?

How much finer is the attitude of De Unamuno, who, feeling that reason cannot invalidate the claims of the spirit nor the claims of the spirit entirely invalidate reason, welcomes the divine uncertainty that produces "the eternal disquietudes of the spirit," the life-giving conflict of spiritual hunger with human reason. One cannot solve the problem of immortality and turn to worldly things; one can but engage in a spiritual warfare destined never to end but destined to strengthen the strongholds of the soul. Who would have the question of immortality answered once and for all and recorded as the solution of an equasion that has been solved, when it is the very uncertainty of the problem that gives life and virility to Whitman's beautiful faith, expressed in the lyric cry of his hungering heart? Who would crave the certainty that would kill such hunger, leaving unborn the most ecstatic utterances of one of the world's brave, beholding spirits?

And who, on the other hand, would disallow the value to the

human spirit of those who passionately disbelieve? Who would be so poor in spirit and such a cowardly half-believer as to deny the spiritual lift, the soul-strengthening courage in the beautiful faith of Santayana, a faith that is built upon disillusion? Or who that has read Bertrand Russell's *A Free Man's Worship,* in which the hope of immortality and of other long cherished human desires is denied, can find nothing of heroic proportion in the strong faith that yet persists amid so much honest denial?

Shall we praise Whitman for his belief in immortality and censure these others for their unbelief or doubt? Or shall we censure the first mentioned and praise the others? We shall do neither. To do one or the other would be an admission that, for the life of the mind and spirit we have substituted beliefs that are without vitality because they are still in that low stage of development that makes of them mere formulas. To do either would be to attach values to beliefs that beliefs *per se* do not possess. Life is not so simple as that. We cannot live by creeds and equasions. We cannot live by the beliefs of others or make them wholly our own. Our belief must, if it be our *very* own, have in it an element that is unique. In order that we may live significantly, our faith in beliefs that are formulas merely must fall away before the life-giving heroic spirit of man, in whatever form it may be expressed. Above all, in the development of a clear, resilient life of the spirit, we must never become "light half-believers in a casual creed." That way stagnation lies. Ever vigilant, we must remain forever receptive of the waters of Life, the fount of which is the exclusive possession of no single individual or school. These waters flow in many directions and from many sources; and from such diverse streams as Whitman, Santayana, Russell, and De Unamuno we may extract the nourishment that the soul needs.

POPULAR RELIGION

BY H. G. CREEL

THE major portion of the study of Sinism has been devoted to the Chinese "intellectuals" of our period, while comparatively little space has been given to things popular. This accords with the accepted traditions of scholarship, which has, until recently, given but little attention to popular ideas, popular religion, and cultural history, as opposed to high philosophy, sacred scriptures, and political history. Against the charge of remissness, in this connection, the scholar may defend himself, however, by pointing out that the materials bequeathed to him, with which he must work, tell him very little of the ways of the common people, but deal almost exclusively with the more "elevated" strata of society. If this be true everywhere, it is doubly true of China.[315]

The reason for our lack of knowledge of the people, as distinguished from the intellectuals, is self-evident. Without archeology, we are chiefly dependent for our information upon written records. In any but a modern civilization, the very fact that a man is able to write usually signifies that he belongs in a class apart from the common people, for whom he often has the greatest disdain. He would seldom think of soiling his papyrus, or parchment, or bamboo, or silk, by recording the ordinary comings and goings of mere peasants. The "nobler" themes of philosophy, and the courtly and religious life of the aristocracy are his subjects, and concerning

[315] This is especially the case because of the absence, verging on relative totality, of archeological excavation in China. It surely cannot long remain true that the oldest of the great cultures living today is also the one about which we know least. Archeological work has already begun on a small scale, and it may confidently be expected that means will be provided, before many years have gone by, to fill this appalling and colossal blank in the history of mankind. The beginning of the great awakening may already be seen, in Bulletin No. 10 (April, 1929), of the "American Council of Learned Societies," entitled "Promotion of Chinese Studies."

these he never tires of telling us the same things over and over again.

Happy it is then when we can run across so unusual a work as the *Lun Hêng* or *Scale of Discourse,* written by the eccentric Wang Chung about 83 A. D. Wang received the usual education for a political career, but not without the necessity of struggling for himself. He acquired the usual self-confidence of the self-made man, with the result that when he received a small office he not only thought that he knew more about how to run things than did his superiors, but made the mistake of telling them so. This resulted in an early termination of his career. Embittered, he retired and wrote books, of which only the *Lun Hêng* survives. Its most frequently recurrent theme is that a man's career, and his winning of honors or failure to do so, do not at all depend upon his deserts, but only upon an utterly blind fate. Second only to this is his delight in dwelling upon the utter incapacity and imbecility of almost all of those in power, and their complete inability to recognize a man of parts when they see him. But it is not for these cleverly disguised "defense mechanisms" that Wang's book is cited here.

Wang conceives himself as a crusader against the "silly superstitions" of his day, and in preaching against them he sketches them in detail. Because of these descriptions, his lengthy volume (which has been handed down to us almost intact) is of priceless value. Certain cautions are necessary in using it, however. It must be remembered that Wang himself is after all a member (albeit not in very good standing) of the literati. His material is not all based on personal observation. Much of it is based on older literary sources, and he often quotes verbatim from the *Shan Hai King* and other works, as Forke has shown in the careful notes to his translation.[316] Furthermore, we must remember that, notwithstanding the very modern ring of occasional passages, Wang was a true child of his age, and held some ideas which we find quite as "absurd" as those which he so characterised. Lastly, Wang likes to argue, and in order to make a point will not hesitate completely to reverse a position which he has defended no more than ten pages previously. For all of these reasons, his testimony must always be taken with some reservation.

Western writers have called Wang a "heretic," and he has never been very popular in China. His heresy would seem to lie chiefly

[316] Alfred Forke, *Lun Hêng,* 2 vols. Quotations from Wang, used herein, are taken from Forke, though sometimes slightly altered on the basis of the text.

in his willingness to subject almost everything, no matter how sacred, to the scrutiny of his very keen critical faculty. It has been said that Chinese thinkers did not bother much about systematising their philosophies. Wang, although conspicuously inconsistent himself, was merciless in pointing out the most embarassing discrepancies in the thinking of others, and even in the *Classics*. Little wonder that he has not been popular!

A careful study of the *Lun Hêng* provides a standard by which it is possible to judge, in some degree, what was the relation of that changing and evolving philosophy which has been called Sinism, to popular thought in China in the first century A. D. and thereabouts.

The first fact brought out by such a comparative study is that Sinism is a philosophy of the state, of society as a whole, while popular thought has to do with the individual, or at most with the family. Sinism is concerned with government, with people *en masse;* the individual as such counts for little with it, whereas in popular thought the individual is everything. Sinism has nothing to do with the illness of an individual, unless he be the emperor or some other very important person, but formulas for curing even the most obscure peasant have an important place in the popular lore. This body of popular knowledge includes techniques for meeting all of the life-needs of individuals, such as protection from death, provision for welfare after death, protection from ghosts, protection on journeys, the interpretation of dreams and other omens, and general guarantees of livelihood, long life, and offspring.

It is plain that these techniques would not have been confined, in their exercise, to the plebeians alone. The philosopher, the ruler and the statesman, were also men, experiencing the desires and meeting the crises of men. And while it is true that they might have trusted in the certainty of that felicity which Sinism promised for the faithful discharge of their duties, not all of them did. Confucius is a conspicuous exception,[317] but Wang repeatedly accuses the scholars of his day of having the fullest credence in every sort of charms and auguries (I,525-526; II,250,393,402). Further, it is well-nigh impossible to draw any certain line between the various techniques for divination, protection, etc., which are mentioned as appearing promiscuously among the people, and those which are mentioned and sanctioned in the *Classics* themselves. Popular Laoism, developing along lines foreshadowed in the *Tao Tê King,* be-

[317] *An.* 7,34.

came almost entirely a complex of techniques for securing longevity and other values for the individual.

Even to catalogue the various popular ideas and techniques which were extant would require an entire work. Such a task is quite beyond the possibilities of this chapter. The most that can be done here is to indicate their nature. Certain of them are evidently based on the agricultural life of the people, probably survivals from earlier times. Such ceremonies are the rain sacrifice (II, 335), the practice of offering the first-fruits before eating of the new crop,[318] the offerings to the five household *shên* (I, 517), the spring ploughing ceremonies in which clay figures of men and women labouring in the fields were set up (II, 355), etc. The Han emperors went to some pains to restore the ancient agricultural rituals, which had fallen into desuetude in the disorders preceding their reign.[319] While many of these practices had impressed themselves upon Sinism, and were definitely a part of it, the reverse process of modification of the ceremonies by Sinism itself does not appear to have operated conspicuously.

Another factor in the formation of the popular ideology, which we cannot, as yet, begin accurately to gauge, is foreign influence. That it did operate we may be sure. Precisely how it operated must be determined by future research. One very important ingredient, the cycle of the twelve animals (corresponding to the signs of the zodiac) has been held by Chavannes to be Turkish in origin, and of late introduction into China.[320]

Still another origin of these popular ideas is the pun. When we consider that the Chinese vocalize some thousands of characters with a few hundreds of sounds, and that they make up all of their characters out of a small number of basic elements, it is readily seen that puns, both auditory and visual, must occur constantly. These were, and are, believed to be fraught with the deepest significance. The characters which mean, respectively, "peach-tree" and "be gone!" are both pronounced *t'ao*. This is perhaps why peach-wood is considered a sure protection against spectres. Wang tells us:

> One avoids grinding a knife over a well—lest it fall into the well, or, as some say, because the character *hsing* 刑 (capital punishment) is composed of *ching* 井 (a well) and *tao* 刀 (knife). Grinding a knife over a well, the knife and the well

[318] *Li Ki* (in *S.B.E.*) p. 75.
[319] Granet, *Religion,* pp. 63, 126. [320] *T'oung Pao,* 1906, pp. 52, 84.

face each other, and one apprehends suffering capital punishment (II, 385).

A whole system of divination was based on the dissection of written characters.[321] Still another sort of pun is represented by the case in which a man, suffering from a skin disease known as "rat," cures it by eating a cat, since cats eat rats. The number of such practices, based on puns, is endless.

The general metaphysical principles of Sinism are found in the popular beliefs.

> People universally believe that he who is good meets with happiness, and that evil-doers are visited with misfortune. They believe that Heaven sends down happiness or misfortune in response to man's doings, and that the rewards graciously given by the sovereigns to the virtuous are visible, whereas the requital of Heaven and Earth is not always apparent. There is nobody, high or low, clever or imbecile, who would disagree with this view (I, 156).

Harmony is the ideal still, and people look back longingly to the times of "universal peace," and hope that they may be reproduced in the future as they existed under the ancient sage-kings. Omens such as vermilion grass, springs of wine, the flying phoenix, sweet dew, "the brilliant star," auspicious grain (a special variety which never grew in ordinary times), the marvelous "meat fan," the monthly plant (a kind of automatic botanical calendar), the "indicator" (a plant which grew in the palace and pointed out wicked persons), mountains giving birth to chariots and lakes producing boats, all were considered the concomitants of such a harmonious epoch. In such a time people were believed to agree perfectly together. There were no robberies, there was wind only once in five days (but it did not howl in the boughs), and it rained once every ten days but did not wash away the earth from the roots of the crops (II, 315). Here is the Sinistic "Utopia" made specific and popular. In such a time, people were taller and more long-lived than usual (I, 315), the sun and the moon were specially brilliant (II, 324), and gold and gems were plentiful (II, 215).

The *yang* and *yin* and the five *hsing* figure very prominently in the popular ideas, but they are probably older than Sinism. In order to obtain some idea of the way in which Sinism is reflected in popular thought, let us arbitrarily select certain test factors of Sinism and then inquire if these have had any influence on popular ideas.

[321] Doré, *Researches into Chinese Superstitions,* vol. IV, pp. 356-62.

For this purpose, the following will serve: the ruler, Heaven, the sage, the governmental officers, the four geographical quarters.

With regard to rulers, both the emperor and the feudatories, the usual formulas of Sinism seem to have been taken over by people in general. The ruler is at the center of things; if he does well, all things in his territory prosper, if he does not, all goes badly. If the ruler becomes angry, he causes droughts; his dissipation brings floods (II, 343). When the sovereign punishes, it becomes cold; he must be careful, then, to punish only in the fall, not in midsummer, lest he blight the crops. The reverse is the case with the giving of rewards (II, 119). The government has the general responsibility of keeping the *yin* and the *yang* in harmony; the growth of insects in unusual numbers is traceable to the failure of the government in this duty (II, 367).

In conformity with the ancient Chinese theory, the emperor rules as the viceroy of Heaven. So long as he is virtuous, he certainly prospers, but if he departs from the right way, Heaven warns him by causing extraordinary occurrences, such as comets, etc. If he still continues in his evil ways, calamities are first visited on his people, and finally on himself (I, 109, 119, 126). Thousands of omens, of every conceivable sort, are listed by Wang as having appeared as warnings or felicitations for bad or good emperors.[322]

An emperor is believed to be personally very different from ordinary men. The marks of his future greatness are on his body at the time of birth (I. 131). This belief is found in the Occident, also, of course. Certain of the more ancient kings were believed to be no more than half human in form, having the faces of dragons, etc. Huang Ti was able, it is said, to talk at birth (II, 124).

T'ien, Heaven, appears in the *Lun Hêng* as a very tangible entity. *T'ien shên,* the "spirit," "intelligence," or "essence" of Heaven is an appellation which Wang Ch'ung employs frequently. Heaven has a body (II, 155). The *shên* of Heaven lives in certain constellations, just as a king lives in his various palaces. In the popular imagination, Heaven did not merely punish kings, nor visit calamities only on society as a whole; it might even visit its wrath on individuals, striking them dead with bolts of thunder. Such a death was a sure sign of guilt (I, 294). It might also order the

[322] I,137,235,245. II,161,206,207,215,216,306,309. *Cf.* also H. G. Creel, *Chinese Divination as Indicated by the Lun Hêng* (D.B. Thesis, Chicago), pp. 10-23.

myriad spirits, of whom it was master, to punish recalcitrant individuals. This was the more usual practice, but personal manifestations of Heaven were not uncommon. The genealogies of certain royal houses were traced back to *liaisons* between *T'ien,* manifested as a dragon or a giant, and a female ancestor. It was believed that the widely used divination by the tortoise-shell was a direct interrogation of Heaven (I, 182). The noise made by wind was believed by some persons to be the voice of Heaven and Earth (II, 173). Wang goes so far as to declare that "even Heaven may be induced to respond, by tricks." Certainly, this is a far cry from the lofty conception of Heaven entertained by most of the Sinistic philosophers. Yet the place of Heaven, as supreme governor of the world, remains the same.

Popular fancy invested the sage with marvelous powers much like those which it gave the emperor. Although Mencius specifically said that sages were not different in species from common men,[323] such an idea could not have been expected to win currency. According to Wang Ch'ung, even the *ju,* (literati) spiritual posterity of Mencius, declared that a special essence of Heaven replaced human sperm in the birth of sages (I, 318). Since the sage was distinguished by his powers of knowledge, these were raised to the *n*th power by those who would exalt him. Sages were declared to know the events of the past, for thousands of years, and to tell of the future for ten thousand generations. Their knowledge of all things came spontaneously, without any labor of learning. Upon seeing a thing for the first time, they knew all about it. Therefore, the sage was considered to be *shên,* "super-usual," "spiritual," by many persons (II, 114). Wang Ch'ung, the sceptic, does not believe that sages are *shên;* according to him they are ordinary men, but their powers of observation and inference are so phenomenally keen as to make it possible for them to accomplish the marvels of mind-reading, etc., for which they were known among the people. Wang conceived the sage as a sort of "super-Sherlock Holmes" (II, 117, 288, 289). Wang tells the following story, which he got from the *Tso Chuan*:

> Hearing a cow lowing (Ko Lu) said, "This cow has already had three calves, but they have all been taken away from her." Somebody asking how he knew this, he replied that her voice disclosed it. The man applied to the owner of the cow, and it was really as Ko Lu had said (II, 122-123).

[323] *Men.* 2(1),2,28.

On another occasion, Chan Ho heard a cow lowing outside the gate, and was able to tell that it was a black cow with whitened hoofs. But this, Wang thinks, was not such a great feat; why did not Chan Ho also tell who was its owner, and why its hoofs had been whitened? (II, 122). The *Lun Hêng* recounts such stories by the dozen.

Apocryphal legends concerning Confucius equal those surrounding Jesus, Mohammed, and Gautama. Although his lineage had been concealed from him, Confucius had only to blow the flute in order to discover all of the details of his ancestry (II, 115).[324] He was reputed to have been able to see a thousand *li* (more than three hundred miles) with the naked eye (II, 242). When he died, he left a book of prophecies, which came true (II, 114). His tomb was on the shore of the river Sse; when he was buried there, the waters of the river flowed backwards (II, 223, 251).

It was, of course, the aspiration of every educated man to be appointed to governmental office, and every family hoped that one or more of its members might attain this dignity. Such a happy event was supposed always to be foretold by omens (II, 25), and a regular system of these auguries was developed. A man predestined to office was believed to show his happy fate, in his countenance, from birth; he was a marked man (I, 131).

Any disaster befalling the people of a district was likely to be laid to the account of misconduct on the part of its officers. If tigers carried off a number of men, that was because the high commissioners were fleecing their subordinates, since, just as the tigers were fiercest of beasts, the high commissioners were the chiefs of the officers (II,357). Plagues of insects were considered to be caused by the misdeeds of officers; if the insects had black bodies and red heads, the military officers were to blame, but if the bodies were red and the heads black, then it was the civil officers who were the culprits. Wang says that when such visitations of insects occurred, the officers to blame were "flogged and maltreated, for the purpose of removing the calamity" (II,341,363). It is related that during the reign of P'ing Ti, 1-5 A.D., all of the districts of Honan province were ravaged by locusts, save only that one ruled by the

[324] It is interesting to remark that Wang uses a valid principle of literary criticism to discredit these tales. They are all built, he declares, after a few regular patterns taken from old legends (II,115).

magistrate Cho, which was spared because of the wisdom and virtue of its ruler (II,190).

The division of China into four quarters, by lines passing NE-SW and NW-SE, and the correspondence of the five *hsing* to these quarters and to the directions, provided the basis for many popular techniques of control. A citation will illustrate the way in which they were used:

> When people dig up the earth for the foundation of a building, the year-star and the moon will swallow something,[325] and on the land which they consume a case of death occurs. If *e.g.* the planet Jupiter is in the sign *tse* (the north), the year-star swallows up some land in the sign *yu* (the west), and if the moon in the first month stands in *yin* (east-north-east), it consumes some land in the sign *sse* (south-south-east). Some building being erected on land situated in *tse* and *yin,* people living in *yu* and *sse* are swallowed up, and being about to be thus injured, they have recourse to charms to counteract these influences, using objects made of the five *hsing,* and hanging up metal, wood, water, and fire. Should, for example, Jupiter and the moon infest a family living in the west, they would suspend metal,[326] and should those luminaries be going to devour a family in the east, this family would suspend charcoal.[327] Moreover, they institute sacrifices with a view to averting the evil, or they feign to change their residence, in order thus to eschew the calamity. There is unanimity about this, everyone doing like the others (II,387).

An objection which might be made to the foregoing study is that, whereas it pretends to be a description of popular ideas, it actually deals in large part with notions which were shared even by the emperors, the high officials, and the literati. The reply is that, while many of these theories and techniques were undoubtedly originated by men who had at least some smattering of book learning, there is little doubt that they were shared, at least in their fundamental premises, by the people, the peasants and the artisans. They do, then, present an accurate cross-section of a portion of the popular lore of the land.

Further, it must be remembered that in the China of the first century A.D. a man could be a member of the literati, an officer,

325 *I.e.*, will cause a disaster. This idea probably springs from the belief in the sacredness of Earth (Cf.II,394,400).

326 The *hsing* of the west.

327 The element of the east is wood, and that of the south where the inimical luminaries are placed, while menacing the family, is fire. Charcoal is a combination of wood and fire (Forke's note).

or an emperor, without necessarily being a member of what we might call the "intelligentsia." Confucius, Mencius, and Mo Tse would have laughed at much of what has been recounted, but not every man who could write was "enlightened," in these latter days. In these times, it was more necessary that an emperor be a good military strategist and a good schemer, than that he be intellectually sophisticated. It will be recalled that the founder of the former Han dynasty rose to power as the leader of a bandit gang; this is not to say that he was not an able man, but it is well known that he was not a learned one. The Chinese court of these days was likely to be the headquarters for the diviners, soothsayers, and sorcerers of the nation.

Certain fundamental attitudes and conceptions lay behind these various techniques by means of which the common people were striving, not merely to live, but to live more securely, more happily, more abundantly. This inarticulate and incoherent folk-philosophy is not by any means identical with Sinism, that flower which was the product of the labors of centuries of intellectuals. But it will be noted that it does not conflict with Sinism, either, and that where the two impinge on each other they agree in the essentials. It is as if an illiterate man were trying, with the best of will but only the vaguest understanding, to comprehend the intricacies of a metaphysical system. Of course he exaggerates the marvelous powers of the sage, of course he makes Heaven very like a big man living in the sky—not from any intention to contradict or to offend, but because of too much zeal to agree.

It is not supposed, however, that Sinism first grew up, as a high philosophy, and then was taken over and vulgarized by the masses. It is rather the case that the attitudes grew up, by the process briefly sketched in the first part of this study, as a result of racial experience. Side by side, the popular and the more esoteric expressions of this national philosophy developed.

It is this fundamental agreement between the ideas of the common people, on the one hand, and those of the high philosophers, on the other, which provides the most certain evidence that Sinism was not the chance creation of a handful of Chinese intellectuals led by Confucius, but that it was rather the expression, in philosophical form, of the historically-evolved world-view of the Chinese people.

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